THE STATE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE: HOW WE BECOME WHAT WE STUDY

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American political science is a product of the American state. There are political reasons why particular subdisciplines became hegemonic with the emergence of the “Second Republic” after World War II. The three hegemonic subdisciplines of our time are public opinion, public policy, and public choice. Each is a case study of consonance with the thought-ways and methods of a modern bureaucratized government committed to scientific decision making. Following Leviathan too closely results in three principal consequences: (1) failure to catch and evaluate the replacement of law by economics as the language of the state, (2) the loss of passion in political science discourse, and (3) the failure of political science to appreciate the significance of ideological sea changes accompanying regime changes.

This presidential pilgrimage is over, and I can report that the American Political Science Association is alive and well. But a pilgrimage is not a journey into happiness. A pilgrimage is a search, and no pilgrimage is fulfilled until the the pilgrim returns and shares the pains of discovery.

From out of their early pilgrimage, the Quakers cried, “Speak truth to power.” From out of my pilgrimage I responded, “Who’s listening?” and “What truths do we have to impart?” On my pilgrimage I listened in on the conversation between political science and power, and it is my duty to report that the terms of discourse have been set by power. We are not the teachers we thought ourselves to be.

The insights of my pilgrimage began with my awakening to three facts: (1) U.S. political science is itself a political phenomenon and, as such, is a product of the state; (2) there is not one science of politics but several, each the outcome of a particular adaptation to what it studies; and (3) even assuming that we are all sincerely searching for the truth (and it is more interesting to assume that), there are reasons other than the search for truth why we do the kinds of political science we do and why particular subdisciplines become hegemonic. In sum, every regime tends to produce a politics consonant with itself; therefore every regime tends to produce a political science consonant with itself. Consonance between the state and political science is a problem worthy of the attention of every political scientist.

To explore the relation between the state and political science, I have chosen case studies of the three hegemonic subdisciplines of our time—public opinion, public policy, and public choice—preceded by an overview of the transformation from the old to the new state and the old to the new political science. I will conclude with a brief evaluation of the consequences for political science of being a “dependent variable.”

There is no need to document for political scientists the contention that the American state until the 1930s was virtually an oxymoron. The level of national government activity was almost as low in 1932 as it had been in 1832. However, although a number of large social movements had failed to expand the national government after the Civil War, they had succeeded in nationalizing the focus of U.S. politics. The Civil War and industrialization made us one nation in fact. Wabash, St. Louis, and Pacific Railway v. Illinois of 1886 (118 U.S. 357) contributed with the doctrine that the state governments were constitutionally incompetent to confront the nationalizing economy. The media transferred their dependence from the highly localized political parties to the corporations seeking mass sales through advertising.

Political science as a profession was a product of this nationalization of political focus. Intellectual historians such as Somit and Tannenhaus (1967) and Seidelman (1985) report that the APSA was part of the progressive reform movement. Somit/Tannenhaus report that only 20% of the first decade’s membership were “professors and teachers” (p. 55). From out of the beginnings in the 1890s, where the writing was “legalistic, formalistic, conceptually barren and largely devoid of what would today be called empirical data” (p. 69), the founders of the association were committed to political realism, which meant facts, the here and now, and the exposure of the gap between the formal institutions and the realities. James Bryce in his address as the fourth association president in 1909, urged political scientists to “Keep close to the facts. Never lose yourself in abstractions. . . . The Fact is the first thing. Make sure of it. Get it perfectly clear. Polish it till it shines and sparkles like a gem” (quoted in Somit and Tannenhaus 1967, 70). The title of Woodrow Wilson’s presidential address to the seventh annual meeting of the APSA was “The Law and the Facts.” Early in his speech he said, “I take the science of politics to be the accurate and detailed observation of [the] processes by which the lessons of experience are brought into the field of consciousness, transmutated into active purposes, put under the scrutiny of discussion, sifted, and at last given determinate form in law” (1911, 2). But these were not
facts for themselves alone. Some early political scientists were active reformers, others were radical muck-rakers, and a few may have been completely aloof. But facts were to be put in the service of assessment: Did a given political institution meet its purpose? According to Wilson, political scientists should serve as a kind of “self-constituted commission . . . to discover, amidst our present economic chaos, a common interest, so that we might legislate for the whole country instead of this, that, or the other interest, one by one” (pp. 6–7).

There is no evidence to suggest that the founding generation were trying to form an intelligentsia, defined as an organization of intellectuals in opposition to the state. There was, in fact, no state to organize against. If anything, there was a memory trace of the two states that conducted the most devastating total war in history up to 1865. But both states were dismantled quickly after the Civil War and were folded back into the “stateless polity” of the restored Union (Bensel 1990). One could say, however, that the early APSA was a kind of counterintelligentsia formed in defense of a state that did not yet exist. The political science of the entire first generation of the APSA was formed around politics—the observable, the immediate, and the short-run purpose to be served. But politics was not only a phenomenon, it was a problem. For example, to Goodnow, the purpose of the political science was to show “particularly from a consideration of political conditions as they now exist in the U.S., that the formal governmental system as set forth in the law is not always the same as the actual system” (quoted in Ross 1991, 274). And for most of them, there was a handy solution to the problem of politics—government, properly characterized as the “building of a new American state” (Skowronek 1982). This goal of a new American state can, in turn, be characterized as a stateless government, or an enlightened administration. Woodrow Wilson, while still an obscure professor of political science at Johns Hopkins, sounded the call for the study of administration in 1887. This should be understood, however, within the context of his still larger declaration that the era of constitution making was closed “so far as the establishment of essential principles is concerned” (quoted in Ross 1991, 275). Administration could be a solution to politics because, in Wilson’s words, we could have the Prussian state breathe free American air (Wilson 1887). As Seidelman puts it, “the study of politics for Wilson thus had to evolve into a study of America’s cultural uniqueness and European administration” (1985, 44). Wilson was confirming the unarticulated major premise of political science, namely, that the American system was permanent and that the science of politics involved the study and assessment of political things within a permanent and unique context. We were one republic, then and forever. Political scientists could remain a counterintelligentsia not because all members shared the Lockean liberal consensus but because they were scientists in the state-building business even while, as with Bentley, they were attacking the very concept of the state as “soul stuff” (ibid., 70–71). For the same reason, political science was atheoretical. Works produced by the founding generation stand up well even by today’s standards of science and are superior to most of ours in the quality of the knowledge they brought to bear and in their use of the English language. But the work remained essentially empirical and became almost technocratic in its participation in the reform movement, primarily because it had no concept of an alternative regime in the United States.

It should have been unmistakably clear to any political scientist of 1887 or later that the American system after the Civil War was a new regime, deserving a new name. Why not the Second Republic? The answer is that that would have suggested an impermanence to the American regime. If a Second Republic, why not a Third and Fourth? My wife sometimes introduces me to her friends as her first husband. That is a sobering sobriquet. Political science was atheoretical because it had no concept of a Second Republic or of any other alternative regime. Eventually, political scientists would virtually rewrite democratic theory to accommodate political parties and would rewrite republican theory to accommodate the devolution of constitutional powers from Congress to the presidency. But this was not a self-conscious act of political theory; it was part of “the study of political conditions as they exist.” In the stateless polity of the founding epoch, the science of politics was the study of politics and of political institutions within a timeless, as well as a uniquely American, framework.

In my opinion, the golden age of U.S. political science came toward the end of this founding epoch, which corresponds, of course, with the end of the stateless polity. Works of political science of the 1930s and 1940s were magnificent in their ability to describe a complex political whole; thorough, honest, and imaginative in their use of statistics to describe a dynamic reality; and powerful and cogent in pointing out flaws and departures from U.S. ideals. But this was the sentimental part of my journey. To yearn for those particular studies of elections, case studies of interest groups and policymaking, histories of party systems, and representation in Congress is to yearn also for the luxury of the First Republic, now that we are irreversibly in the Second and possess at least the bare beginnings of an awareness of the possibility of regime change in the United States.

Surely by now there has been, in fact, a change of regime, which I call the Second Republic, for lack of an established enumeration. It is not the French state or the Prussian state; but at least, we can say that the American state is no longer an oxymoron. Here, all too briefly, are its relevant high spots: (1) it is a positive, not a reactive, state, from the start centered on the executive branch; (2) constitutional limits on the powers of the national government over the economy and on the distribution of power among the branches within the national government were very quickly laid to rest; (3) many aspects of politics that had traditionally been private (e.g., registration, bal-
lots, election administration, nomination, job patronage, polling, and campaign finance) have been governmentalized—that is, modern government has assumed responsibility for its own politics; (4) political parties, like nuclear families, have declined for lack of enough to do; (5) bureaucracy, independent of party and Congress, has expanded in size and scale approaching autonomy as a social force; and, (6) intimately connected with (5), government has become intensely committed to science. This was no accident, and it is no mere policy. Science is an inherent part of the new, bureaucratized state, in at least two dimensions: First, it involves a commitment to building science as an institution, that is, a commitment to government for science; and second, it involves a commitment to government by science—that is to say, it involves scientific decision making. This has been properly characterized as technocratization, which I take to mean “to predict in order to control” (compare Mills 1959, 113). But another tone-more-interesting but less appreciated part of this aspect of the expansion of science is that economics has replaced law as the language of the state.

What Tocqueville said of the First Republic we may say of the Second: “A new science of politics is needed for a new world” (quoted in Wood 1969, 191). But life is not quite so simple. If modern states are differentiated, there are almost certain to be several sciences of politics, rather than just one. We tend to call these subdisciplines; but despite continuities and overlaps, they are quite distinct. Each can be understood as a product of the phenomena it studies; but I am concerned here not to explain or place them all but only to understand the “hegemonics” of disciplines—why public opinion, public policy, and public choice became hot topics and when.

Some call public opinion behavioral science. I think I am more accurate calling it public opinion. Observers from an alien intellectual planet would find it most peculiar that the study of individual opinions and attitudes could be called behavioral—until they deconstructed the discourse between the new bureaucratized state and the new political science. Here is my deconstruction:

1. If science is to be public, it must be neutral.
2. It must also be rational and therefore concern itself with rational phenomena, that is, orderly, repeatable, predictable phenomena. This is precisely what makes science and bureaucracy so compatible. Karl Mannheim, in 1929, over 20 years before the behavioral revolution, wrote, “Bureaucratic thought is permeated by measurement, formalization, and systematization on the basis of fixed axioms . . . [such that] only those forms of knowledge were legitimate which touched and appealed to what is common to all human beings” (1936, 167).
3. Science also has to be microscopic, down to the irreducibly smallest unit. It is no paradox that as our state grew larger, the units of analysis in our social science became smaller. This is a profoundly important aspect of rationality: out of small units, large numbers grow; and large numbers behave according to the regularities of mathematical probability. (In this context it is easy to understand why Arthur Bentley’s appeal “to fashion a tool” with the group as the smallest unit of analysis was first uttered in 1907 and not really heard, or responded to, until over 40 years later [see Seidelman 1985, 72–74].

4. Science, like administration, has to follow a prescribed method. As Robert Wiebe put it, “Bureaucratic thought . . . made ‘science’ practically synonymous with ‘scientific method’ . . . science had become a procedure . . . rather than a body of results” (1967, 147).

5. The language itself has to be microscopic; that is, science has to be translated into the language of variables.

The phenomena and methodology of public opinion obviously meet all the requirements of a science that would be consonant with bureaucratic thinking. And now consider the units of analysis within the sample surveys that give public opinion its link to political behavior: voting and participation. These display an even stronger consonance with the state, in that these are approved political behavior (i.e., political behavior sponsored by the state and needed by regimes and elites to maintain their legitimacy).

Some see behavioral science as a large step toward hard science and, through that, an advancement toward greater enlightenment about society and politics. I do not disagree. But my political analysis tells me also that the hegemony of the subdiscipline of behavioral science or public opinion was to a large extent a product of its compatibility with bureaucratic thought-ways, rather than the result of successful discourse within political science.

It is important to emphasize, however, that the hegemony of the subdiscipline of public opinion is a case of natural selection, not one of political maneuvering or intellectual opportunism. Anyone personally acquainted with the people who made the behavioral revolution in political science would agree that if political skill were required to succeed, there would be no survey research centers—probably no behavioral science at all. It is their very lack of attention to playing the political game that makes the success of their field so interesting. The explanation is to be found not in politics in the vulgar sense but politics in the higher sense—the politics of state building.

The Second Republic, having put a new emphasis on science, also determined what that science would be. The capacity to engage in public opinion research in political science had been in existence since at least the late nineteenth century. Statistics, which takes its name from state and statist, reached maturity still earlier in the nineteenth century and grew in importance as states democratized and individuals began to “count” for something. Sampling was also well advanced and widely practiced, especially in the agricultural sciences (Porter 1986, 23–25). Even opinion polling in political campaigns was actually tried at least as early as 1892, albeit over the objections of many defenders of the sanctity of elections (Jensen 1969, 228–229)—and was picked up by advertising
companies and newspapers soon after. Yet public opinion did not become the hegemonic subdiscipline of political science until the Second Republic.

Public policy as a subdiscipline of political science has an even longer genealogy than public opinion, although it was more than a decade later in emerging as a hegemonic subdiscipline. The study of public policy begins, of course, with the study of legislation, whose history is usually traced out from divine law through common law to something called positive law, to indicate the demystification of law and the deliberateness of modern laws. There is, then, one later stage called public policy, indicating the intervention of administration between legislature and citizen. Public policy is a term of art reflecting the interpenetration of liberal government and society, suggesting greater flexibility and reciprocity than such unilateralist synonyms as law, statute, ordinance, edict, and so on. Public policy began to gain some currency in public administration in the 1930s; and public administration had been one of the hegemonic subdisciplines in the political science of the stateless polity I refer to as the First Republic. The decline and transfiguration of public administration gives us the key to public policy. Traditional public administration was almost driven out of the APSA by the work of a single, diabolical mind, that of Herbert Simon. Simon transformed the field by lowering the discourse. He reduced the bureaucratic phenomenon to the smallest possible unit, the decision, and introduced rationality to tie decisions to a system—not to any system but to an economic system. His doctorate was in political science; his Nobel award was in economics.

Now, Simon did not accomplish this all by himself. His intellectual tour de force was made possible by actual changes in the administrative institutions of the Second Republic. Administrative authority in the First Republic partook of a fairly well established tradition of separating public from private life by a variety of legal rules and procedures that comprise what Joseph Vining calls the "masterful myth of the 'rule of law'": in the Second Republic, these rules and myths broke down—not spontaneously, but in face of the rise of economic thinking in the corporate world, as well as in government (1978, 27).

It is in this context that modern public policy became a hegemonic subdiscipline in political science, overshadowing behavioralism itself. The study of public policy in the political science of the First Republic drew upon public law and institutional economics. Some of that old-fashioned public policy study exists today. But the modern approach is more appropriately called public policy analysis, which draws upon macroeconomic methods and economic systems thinking. The best way to demonstrate the size and character of this new subdiscipline of political science is to point to the presence of the policy analysis courses within political science departments and the explosive growth of the separate policy analysis programs and the economics requirements in the schools of public affairs and public policy and in the law schools. All the students in those places are learning the new language of the state.

It does no disservice to the subdiscipline of public choice to tie it to another of Karl Mannheim's observations dating from 1929, namely, that in the political science of a bureaucratic state "an economic man, a political man, etc., irrespective of time and race, could be constructed on the basis of a few axiomatic characteristics" (1936, 167-68). Mannheim continues: "Only what could be known by the application of these axioms was considered as knowable. Everything else was due to the perverse 'manifoldness of the real', concerning which 'pure' theory need not worry itself" (p. 168). Compare this to Kenneth Arrow's assertion made in a boisterous spirit nearly 40 years later that any assumption other than the rational actor leads to mysticism and irrationality (Goldfield and Gilbert 1990, 14-15). This gives us a start toward a political explanation for why public choice has become probably the hottest thing going in political science today.

Quite aside from whatever merits it may have as a method and however true its truths may be, public choice is hegemonic today for political reasons or (to be more dignified about it) for reasons of state. Let me dramatize this in quite tangible rational actor terms: most of the luminaries in this subfield of political science came from, serve in, or are substantially associated with the same freshwater universities that kept burning the flame of laissez-faire ideology: Chicago, Rochester, Washington University of Saint Louis (or should we overlook the Saint Louis Federal Reserve staff) (Johnson 1991). Here, again, we are confronting not political opportunism but institutional consonance—a symbiotic relationship between state and political science.

The affinity between modern bureaucratic government and economics—already strong—was further strengthened by the revival of the political populality of laissez-faire ideology within the Republican party. For most of this century, laissez-faire liberalism (erroneously called conservative) had been the Republican party's center of gravity; but after the Depression, it had had little effect on voters and even less on intellectuals in the social sciences. Few intellectuals figured in national Republican party circles. Conservative intellectual was just another oxymoron. Today, of course, Republican administrations are overflowing with intellectuals, as are affiliated think tanks and the op-ed pages of the major newspapers. I see no signs yet of a Republican takeover of the APSA; but I do see one beneficiary of the Republican era in political science, namely, public choice. People of merit inhabit this subfield, but its hegemony has little to do with their merit. Their success as a group was entirely fortuitous.

We political scientists enjoy the primitive wisdom of Mr. Dooley; and probably Mr. Dooley's best-known scientific proposition was, "No matter whether th' constitution follows th' flag or not, th' supreme court follows th' iliction returns." A more dignified Dooley would say, "The APSA follows
Leviathan.” I conclude with what are to me the three principal consequences of following Leviathan too closely. First, we have as a consequence failed to catch and evaluate the significance of the coming of economics as the language of the state. Second, we have failed to appreciate how this language made us a dismal science like economics. Third, having been so close to Leviathan, we failed to catch, characterize, and evaluate the great ideological sea changes accompanying the changes of regime.

First, then, why economics? Of what use is economic analysis to politics? Since economics was always a deeply flawed predictive science, why was it so attractive to policymakers and bureaucrats in the new state? Why was it so attractive to political science? My evaluation was inspired in part by an observation made 30 years ago by the distinguished economic philosopher Joan Robinson: “Economics . . . has always been partly a vehicle for the ruling ideology of each period as well as partly a method of scientific investigation” (1962, 1). My answer is that economic analysis is politically useful because it closes off debate, especially in a highly public representative assembly like Congress. The rise of economics as the language of the state parallels the decline of Congress as a creative legislature. (I argue this point more extensively in Lowi 1991.) Policymaking powers are delegated less to the agency and more to the decisionmaking formulas residing in the agency. The use of economic analysis to close off debate was strengthened as Republicans discovered that economic analysis could be used as effectively for them as for the Democrats—by manipulating the cost, rather than the benefit, side of cost–benefit analysis. I recommend John Schwarz’s evaluation of Murray Weidenbaum’s outrageous manipulation of the “costs of regulation” that supported the Reagan administration’s commitment to deregulation (1988, 90–99). But I must confess that both the Democratic and the Republican politicians were smarter than the political scientists, because they took the stuff as weaponry, while we took it as science. We swallowed economics before subjecting it to a political analysis.

We should have seen that economics rarely even pretends to speak truth to power. If substantive truths were claimed, there would be room for argument. But economics, particularly as a policy science, stresses method above all. And the key to the method is the vocabulary of economics, which is the index. An index is not a truth but an agreement or convention among its users about what will be the next best thing to truth. M_, the Dow, the CPI, unemployment, GNP: This is the new representative government—an index representing a truth. Indices have analytic power because they fit into defined systems; and of course, systems are also not truths but only useful fictions. (This, by the way, is not an attack on indices or systems. It is just a political evaluation of indices and systems.)

Now to the second of my consequences, that is, that the modern bureaucratic state has made political science just another dismal science. By dismal I do not mean merely the making of gloomy forecasts, in the Malthusian tradition: I mean the absence of passion.

During my pilgrimage, the most frequent complaints I heard were against the American Political Science Review. I join in at least one of these, which I do not limit to the APSR. Too few of the articles seek to transcend their analysis to join a more inclusive level of discourse. There is consequently little substantive controversy. The response is that a scientific journal must be dedicated to replication and disproof. But actually, very few pieces independently replicate anything; and even if they did, replication alone is dismal stuff. Political science is a harder science than the so-called hard sciences because we confront an unnatural universe that requires judgment and evaluation. Without this, there can be no love of subject, only vocational commitment to method and process. The modern state has made us a dismal science, and we have made it worse by the scientific practice of removing ourselves two or three levels away from sensory experience. Political scientists have always quantified whatever and whenever they could, and most tried to be rigorous; but they stayed close to sensory experience. Even with our original mechanical helper, the counter–sorter device, it was possible to maintain a sensory relation to the data. What a pleasure it was to watch the cards seek their slots! And what a pity today that the empiricists have only their printout!

Finally, I turn to our failure to catch or evaluate adequately the ideological sea changes accompanying the changes of regime. Time permits only the barest inventory of missed opportunities, but I think they will speak for themselves.

The perspective of nearly 50 years makes it easy to see what we did not catch about the New Deal as a regime change. Although political scientists caught the new liberalism in the air, they failed to evaluate whether all the elements of this ideology were consistent with liberalism or with constitutionalism. They failed, for example, to capture and evaluate the significance of “administrative law.” They noticed, but merely celebrated, the delegation of power from Congress to the executive branch. At the time it meant only the fulfillment of the New Deal program. Even as time passed, our tendency was to render each change consistent with our existing model of the political system. There was virtually no serious political science inquiry into whether the changes in constitutional doctrine, governmental structure, and policy commitments constituted a regime change. Some Republicans suggested that the United States had become a socialist regime, but political science did not respond to this challenging formulation. It should be a matter of ultimate interest, as well as enjoyment, to fight intensely over the identification of criteria for determining when a political change is sufficient to constitute a regime change. The New Deal helped give us a new political science but did not provide sufficient inclination to evaluate what was new.

We are at this moment in the presence of another
failure, namely, a failure to catch the nature and significance of the ideological shift accompanying the current Republican era. The inability of the Reagan administration to terminate any important New Deal programs should at least have led to a reflection on the nature of the New Deal as a regime change. Even a post hoc evaluation would be useful. Meanwhile, the Republican era has brought with it some profound ideological changes that political science is failing to capture even though our own public opinion polls are sensing them. Political science has failed to catch and evaluate the two separate components of the Republican coalition: the old, laissez-faire liberalism and the genuine, native conservatism. Political science has stood by and permitted Republican candidates and staff intellectuals to treat the traditional laissez-faire core of the Republican party as conservative and then to compound the felony by stigmatizing liberalism as an alien belief system akin to socialism. This profound misuse of rich terminology is literally poisoning political discourse in the United States, and political science has to take a lot of the blame for this. We also did not catch the rise of the genuine conservatism; although our polls were picking up significant reactionary movements, we continued to treat the Falwell phenomenon and such predecessors as the Christian Anti-communist Crusade as aberrant. And we have passively witnessed the joining of laissez-faire liberalism with genuine right-wing conservatism as though they are consistent in their opposition to big government. Laissez-faire liberal Republicans, supported by their economists, embrace an ideal of radical individualism and view all government as a threat to freedom. In contrast, genuine conservatives are not individualists but statisticians. The state they want consists of tight and restrictive police control by state and local governments, but they are statisticians nevertheless. Genuine conservatives were never really at home with purely market relations; they have never espoused the ideal (much less the methodology) of rational individualism. (Many conservative Catholic lay intellectuals have tried in vain to establish a comfortable concordance with free market liberalism.) Conservative intellectuals are now writing the poetry of executive power and are the authors of most of the writing that bashes Congress and the politics of representative government. Just as political scientists did not catch the ideological significance of the presidencies of the New Deal supporters in the 1950s and early 1960s, we are now not catching the significance of the fact that most of the current presidencies are by the Far Right. The far right-wing intellectuals are also writing a significant proportion of the new work on the found-

ing intended not only to contribute to historical scholarship but to reconstitute the constitution in such a way as to place the presidency above the law and affirmative action beneath it.

No effort has been made to camouflage my antag-onism to Republican era ideology. But my own personal position is irrelevant. Political scientists of the Left, Right, and center are a unity in their failure to maintain a clear and critical consciousness of political consciousness. Causal and formal analyses of the relations among clusters of variables just will not suffice. Nor will meticulous analysis of original intent. It is time we became intellectuals.

At the end of my pilgrimage, I have come to the conclusion that among the sins of omission of modern political science, the greatest of all has been the omission of passion. There are no qualifications for membership in the APSA; but if I had the power to establish such standards, they would be that a member should love politics, love a good constitution, take joy in exploring the relation between the two, and be prepared to lose some domestic and even some foreign policy battles to keep alive a positive relation between the two. I do not speak for the passion of ideology, though I do not count it out. I speak for the pleasure of finding a pattern, the inspiration of a well-rounded argument, the satisfaction in having made a good guess about what makes democracy work and a good stab at improving the prospect of rationality in human behavior.

Regime changes throughout the world since 1989 ought to give us a clearer perspective on some new sciences of politics. Although only a few of the world’s regime changes will be liberal democracies, they are stimulating tremendous demand for transferrable insights about the workings of liberal democratic institutions, especially U.S. institutions. May this demand draw U.S. political scientists out of the shadow of Leviathan upward and outward toward a level of discourse worthy of the problem. This is not an opportunity to play philosopher-king. It is an opportunity to meet our own intellectual needs while serving the public interest. And we need not worry how to speak truth to power. It is enough to speak truth to ourselves.

**Note**

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References


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