Wellsprings of Political Leadership*

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Tradition stretching back into the mystic origins of the American Political Science Association commands that the retiring president of the Association offer an address, which is later presented in the pages of the American Political Science Review. A few months ago I tried to challenge this tradition, as I have a few others in the Association, but in this case with less success. I proposed to the authorities a course of action—or inaction—that I thought might be most acceptable, in our over-verbalizing society; I proposed that I not give a speech and hence not do a paper. My manifest reason was to help solve the APSR backlog. A glow of noble self-sacrifice spread over me as I thought of some struggling young scholar who might appear in the Review because I did not. Another reason was less self-sacrificial. I have been working on general problems of political leadership for most of my scholarly life, and intensively during the last few years. I have not quite solved all the mysteries and complexities of the subject but expect to by May 1977, which happens to be the deadline for a manuscript on the subject. Perhaps a speech on the subject now would be a bit premature?

I went to the keepers of tradition in the Association with these irrefutable arguments, only to be told that not only custom but the remorseless and inexorable publishing schedule of The American Political Science Review would brook no alteration in timing or tradition. Besides, I was told, my colleagues would wonder why I did not speak. Vainly I argued that it was better that they ask why I did not speak than why I did. Then some choice bait was dangled in front of me. If I gave the address, I was reminded, some eminent political scientist could be invited to introduce me, and he might say unduly kind things about me. Someone of the eminence of Harold Lasswell, perhaps. To this seductive thought I instantly succumbed.

My modesty as an analyst of political leadership is by no means a false one, but I have my excuses. The state of the art is primitive, in my view. Political leadership is one of the most widely noted and reported and least understood phenomena in modern politics. If you doubt this, glance at the indexes of any of several hundred works that deal with political leaders but have little concept of, or reference to, the role of political leadership. Moreover, any theory of political leadership must, in my view, be part of a more general theory of social or historical causation. Hence the student of political leadership must deal with the most refractory questions of political power and social change. Brilliant work has been done on countless aspects of political leadership. But we lack a general theory.

Because we lack a general theory of political leadership, we may be tempted to resort to the opposite strategy—the hypothesizing of a limitless assortment of psychological, social, and political variables in the shaping of political leadership and the making of history. This strategy would be the safest and the least rewarding. It would move analysis back from the endless manifestations of overt behavior—voting, for example, or rioting—to the multitudinous forces lying behind those behaviors and hence would pose the same questions of causation all over again, though in different guises. And it would raise the question of just where in the long causal sequence we should concentrate our analytical resources—for example, in the study of the formation of attitudes directly affecting behavior, or in the study of the far less visible but more profound interplay between leader and led that occurs in the earlier stages of the sequence, in the study of obscure but powerful biological, social, and psychological forces.

A related problem is also serious. Though we use the concept of sequence, and though we will see the causal forces operating largely in a certain direction over time (that is, toward time-identified elections, assassinations, revolutions), in fact the sequence consists of interacting dispositions, anticipations, and behaviors over time, and there is a good deal of causal feedback and circularity. Much of this circularity is neglected if we emphasize one or two stages in the sequence to the neglect of others.

*This paper, presented as the Presidential Address at the American Political Science Association Meeting in Chicago, in September, 1976, is an exploration of sources of leadership that lie in areas that are to some degree outside the traditional boundaries of political science. It is excerpted and summarized from a larger work in progress. I solicit comments and criticism, addressed to me at Williams College, Williamstown, Massachusetts 01267.
We must be more audacious, if we are to locate the process of political leadership in a general theory of social causation. Audacious because, if we wish to understand the genesis of political behavior, we must probe psychological and social forces operant at several stages prior to the interlinked stages of derivative political behavior, governmental policy, and real social change. Audacious also because, amid the plethora of historical, psychological, environmental, and situational forces, for a general theory of leadership we must identify original and decisive sources of leadership—sources that I am calling here wellsprings of political leadership. To find these sources we must enter a darkling plain dotted by phenomena called habit, motive, trait, instinct, need, drive, emotion, feeling, wish, purpose, desire, expectation, aspiration, claim, demand. We find to our dismay that the rulers of this terrain—mainly psychologists—have been unable to establish clear boundaries among these entities or even to reach agreement on their definition. In searching for our original and central variable, we are depressed by the flatness of the conceptual terrain, the lack of a commanding continental feature, the absence of that same central variable that might help transform a welter of social influences into a hierarchy of causal forces, in which the process of political leadership would have a significant and identifiable function.

Could we in our audacity supply that central variable? Such a variable conceptually would have to cut across a wide range of cultures and classes and polities, for it is a general theory of leadership in social causation that we are pursuing. It would have to embrace biological and social energies so powerful as to give a general shape and direction and tempo to the social and political forces subsequent to it in the causal flow. Where do we start? Where can we find original springs of human thought and action, the analysis of which will allow us to hypothesize and to generalize through space and time?

Wants, Needs and Expectations

The primal sources of political leadership lie in the vast pools of human energy known as wants, needs, aspirations and expectations. Of these overlapping terms, "want" and "need" in particular are usually treated as equivalents. We begin with the term want rather than need because "want" over the centuries has meant the condition of persons directly experiencing the lack of certain things, such as food or drink, that stem from immediate tissue demands. The feeling of want is highly conscious, subjective, internal, autonomous, as with a month-old infant wanting nourishment; the want stems from a drive, a tissue demand, born into the child. Need in long-time English usage implies a more socialized, collective, objective phenomenon, in the sense of someone being "needy," in the views of others as well as herself requiring certain things. Needs are more widely sanctioned wants.

It is in the transformation of wants into needs that leadership first occurs. The wanting child is responding to a generalized drive born in him. He will want drink but will consume nutrition-lacking liquid as well as milk, will want food but eat poisoned candy as well as rice, will want to explore but touch a scorching andiron as readily as a rubber ball. Parents who insist on milk and rice and balls are substituting their own conception of the infants' needs for those of the infants, and they do so in the pursuit of aims and values that the parents rather than the children establish. This is the initial act of leadership, and a vital one.

Wants and needs and the elements into which they may be transformed may all be considered examples of motivation, a blanket term that has come to mean all variables from innate biological drives to the most refined and developed attitudes. It is these motivations, whether in their more primitive or refined form, whether in their more individual or collective manifestations, that the leaders tap on the basis of their own motivations as well. Wants serve as energizers of action rather than as guides to action. Motives are "pushed" by generalized drives and other body-bound forces and "pulled" by more specific wants, needs, aspirations, goals, and values. As they come to be activated less at the biological and more at the cultural stages, less in body-bound situations and more in socially influenced environments, motives are more likely to be dominated by "higher" needs, aspirations, and values, as noted below. Thus motives may come to be shaped increasingly, but never wholly, by the consequence—the satisfaction of need, the

1 Rather than finding a psychological science on which to draw for insight," the political scientist "finds a congeries of more or less competing models and frames of reference, with imperfect agreement on the nature of man's inner dispositions, the appropriate terms for characterizing them, and the methodologies for observation..." in the view of Fred L. Greenstein, "Personality and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference, and Conceptualization," American Behavioral Scientist, 11 (Nov.–Dec. 1967), 38–53, at p. 40.

realization of purpose—to which behavior affected by the motive leads.

We must discriminate among processes covered by the umbrella concept of motivation to glimpse the role of leadership at every stage in the sequence of transitions from the "pushes" of "lower" wants and needs to the "pulls" of higher aims and values. At the earliest and most primordial stage the phenomenon of want has typically been seen as a stimulus to the system by a tissue requirement external to it, leading to activity terminated by satisfaction of the requirement. The want is direct, internal, physiological, and to a degree undiscriminating; the tissue requirements of liquid is satisfied by drink in almost any form. Even at the stage of want a person will begin differentiating—the infant will doubtless prefer milk to whisky—but the differentiation stems almost wholly from inherited dispositions rather than from cultural influences on wants and needs. The physical structure of the person comes into play—motor abilities, for example, and sensory perceptual tendencies, and these capabilities increasingly make contact with environmental cues, responses, and resistances. This transition is marked by a shift from "I want" to "I want to..." The source of action, though, is still the subject, responding to internal requirements.3

It is the deliberate process of selective encouragement and discouragement by others of a person's felt wants that brings into play the leadership process. The leader—parent, doctor, schoolmate—chooses to satisfy or encourage the expression of certain wants and discourage or deny others. Drives and wants remain the basic energizers, but the targets against which the wants are directed become more focused as wants give way to needs. The child's want for food becomes, under his mother's guidance, a need for nutrition; his want for freedom from pain becomes, under his doctor's prescription, a need for medicine. The leaders are those who direct the transformation and satisfaction of the wants arising from the original energizers.

If wants are subjectively felt drives, needs are socially influenced wants. Needs are shaped to a significant degree by impersonal environmental forces and by persons who themselves are caught in the grip of circumstance. Arendt refers to those "who desired liberation from their masters or from necessity, the great master of their masters..."4 Franklin D. Roosevelt reiterated that "necessitous men are not free men."5 Within the workings of iron necessity, however, there is some play at the joints, and this provides the margin for leadership. Various leaders—parents, teachers, etc.—encourage and suppress feelings of need based on their perception of what the "needy" truly need and their ability and desire to affect the needy's behavior. Such actions serve to exacerbate or diminish needs; once the leader has curbed or reinforced or otherwise altered the followers' definition of their needs, behavior will tend to change accordingly, but this behavior is closely affected by further leadership.

Both the frustration of needs and their gratification may have a direct influence on the political environment. During the French Revolution, at a time when workers spent the bulk of their income on food alone and sometimes on bread alone, the housewives of Paris exerted an intense pressure in face-to-face confrontation with the Jacobin leadership in the capital; they would not long be put off by excuses and promises. Throughout history food-deprivation has led to fierce competition for limited resources, to massive migrations, wars of conquest, revolutions, civil strife—as well as to egalitarian ideas and movements.

Another powerful "lower" need is that for safety or security—for order and predictability, for protection against invasion, war, catastrophe, disease, against threats to one's territory or home, against crime in the streets. Karen Horney conceived the phenomenon largely in individual terms—as feelings of insecurity, especially on the part of infants and children, in the face of a hostile and dangerous environment, resulting in turn in neurotic needs of adults for affection, approval, and prestige.6 This kind of individual need for security may strongly influence the personality and attitudes of specific political leaders, but the safety needs rising from a sense of collective insecurity can influence whole populations. "People generally do not turn to politics," Davies says, "to satisfy hunger and to gain love, self-esteem and self-actualization; they go to the food market, pursue members of the opposite sex, show friends what they have done, and lose themselves in handicrafts, fishing, or contemplation—with rarely a thought about politics. If achievement of these goals is threatened by other individuals or groups too powerful to be dealt with privately, people then turn to poli-


6Karen Horney, The Neurotic Personality of our Time (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1937.)
tics to secure these ends." Moreover, the need for safety may be combined with other basic needs, such as that for food, and produce a multiplier effect on political leadership. That kind of combination helps explain such episodes as the massacres and other horrors of the French Revolution and the ferocity of combat in the Russian and other civil wars.

If the deprivation of food, drink, and perhaps of sex and security is politically consequential, paradoxically the gratification of such needs may be even more significant for the political process. According to need-hierarchy theory, the satisfactions of basic needs releases persons from basic physical and psychic restraints and frees them to respond to higher needs.

The first of these processes is the more apparent. No one is more enslaved—at the level of bodily need—than the person wild with thirst, deep in pain, desperate with hunger, driven by fear. No matter that it is his own body that imprisons him; necessity controls. Those economic, social or political leaders who can supply these needs become the masters of necessity. It is not a far step from this concept to Marx and the economic iron laws that are supposed to determine rewards and deprivations for whole classes and nations. When lower needs have been gratified, the second and more complex step in the liberation of humans from "lower" needs is the consequent capacity to satisfy the "higher" needs. These are the needs for belonging, for love, for esteem from oneself and from others, for self-actualization; the need to know; aesthetic needs beyond self-actualization. While psychologists are broadly agreed on the major distinctions between lower and higher needs, they differ on the question of whether these higher needs are themselves hierarchically organized, from the lowest higher need, that of belonging, to the highest, self-actualization. This dispute need not divert us. The essential question is the extent to which the higher needs are common to all humankind and hence constitute a variable in theories of social causation and political leadership in all cultures. Do all humans share the need for love, for the esteem of themselves and of others, for self-actualization? The evidence for this is far less persuasive than that for the commonality of basic or lower needs. As a person satisfies his lower needs and becomes freer to respond to higher ones, he is liberated from biological urgencies and exposed to the needs developed in his socialization and learning processes. These manifestations of biologically determined needs will be also environmentally shaped.

Another crucial process in the alteration of needs is the change in the extent of leadership influence, which varies widely according to the qualities and purposes of the leader and follower, and the responses and restraints of the environment. To a degree the follower's needs become less egoistic and short-run and more consciously and deliberately defined as he moves out of the gross restraints rising from hunger, perceived threats to survival, and the like and as he both cultivates and becomes engaged with a broader, more diverse, more culture- and leader-influenced set of needs. This is not to say that leaders may not shape the manifestations of more basic needs, as well. In the endless interplay between leaders and followers each will be motivated by sets of needs. Followers may seek to enlist leaders' concern for their own needs, or turn to other leaders who promise to show more concern. At the political level, they may follow a Winston Churchill with enthusiasm during a time of need for security, and later reject him when social and economic needs seem likely to be paramount. But the process of selecting and rejecting begins much earlier, on the part of both leaders and followers. People usually will turn to leaders for specific remedies for specific problems, but people may also feel a need for a certain style of leadership, as Davies has emphasized. People select "characteristics within a broader framework which determines both the limits of leadership characteristics and of the awareness of the fact that certain characteristics are appreciated or depreciated," Davies says.

And then another great transition. As the expression of needs becomes more purposeful—that is, as that expression becomes less subjective, egoistic, body-bound, direct and immediate, as it becomes more related to socially sanctioned aims and collective goals and values—needs are transformed into positive hopes and aspirations. Hopes emerge from needs but are closely influenced by leaders who arouse or dampen them. Hope—looking forward with desire and with belief in possibility—can readily be escalated into aspiration—the eager and ambitious desire of a higher goal—by leadership and other socializing influences. Studies of aspiration levels, such as subjective factors involved in the game of throwing darts, suggest that such levels are affected by leaders—for example, by the way in which experimenters influence aspiration levels by the phrasing of questions—as well as by more subjective

7Davies, Human Nature in Politics, p. 10.
9Davies, op. cit., p. 291.
factors such as anticipation of success. Leaders also, of course, can play on fears of failure.

Leaders can, in turn, help convert hopes and aspiration into expectation. Expectations carry more psychological and political force than hopes and aspirations. They are more purposeful, focused, and affect-laden; the expectation is directed toward more specific and explicit goals, ones that are valued by the builder of expectations. They carry a greater air of legitimacy; people expect what is rightfully theirs and are provoked or outraged when they do not receive it. And they widen the margin of the perceived probable. All these factors, and especially the last, have two further effects. They cultivate a situation in which heightened expectations, confronted with lowered or zero realization, combine to produce an extreme sense of deprivation in people. And dashed hopes, blighted aspirations, and thwarted expectations are the materials for political exploitation. Thus theories of revolution have been based in large part on the broadening gap between what people expect and what they get. Violence becomes increasingly probable, Davies argues, when any basic need that has come to be routinely satisfied suddenly becomes deprived.\(^{10}\) Revolution occurs, Gurr contends, when major segments of society perceive a discrepancy between their "value expectations" and the "value capabilities" of the environment.\(^{11}\) Expectations are closely influenced by what leaders hold out as necessary, desirable, deserved, and possible.

Heightened expectations, crushed expectations—these are materials for political action and leadership. Expectations of government are easily converted into demands on government. And in these processes again leaders have a central part in shaping, articulating, and targeting popular demands. But typically their ability to shape and redirect is limited, for they are dealing—in these instances—not with transient popular attitudes but with demands emerging directly from hopes and needs and wants. They can redefine purpose, but their power of manipulating mutual goals is subject to the circumstance that followers' wants, as they are transformed into needs and aspirations, are more and more closely linked with followers' purposes and their own purposes or both.

**The Structure of Values**

To probe into the day-to-day thoughts,


\(^{11}\)Ted Robert Gurr, cited in Knutson, op. cit., p. 248.
measures questions of public policy by egalitarian standards, monitors his own and his adversaries’ efforts by the canons of civility and honor, and favors a value like fraternity because it also leads to the end-state of equality, he can summon wide support from followers with many different values.  

Are values mere motives, or do they have a different and stronger arousing and directing power? Students of the subject disagree; sometimes values are treated as merely another, perhaps “higher”, motive. If so, the difference in degree amounts to a difference in kind. “Values have a strong motivational component as well as cognitive, affective, and behavioral components,” Rokeach says. As compared to beliefs, which may be opportunistic reflections of ephemeral attitudes, values are internalized so deeply that they define personality as well as the structure of attitudes. They become an expression of both conscience and consciousness. Hence holders of values will follow the dictates of those values in the absence of incentives, sanctions, or even witnesses—like the girl who returns a lost wallet when she knows no one saw her pick it up, or the politician who defends free speech when it is guaranteed to lose him votes. A test of adherence to values is persons’ willingness to apply principles or standards to themselves as well as others. Inevitably values are seated deep in cognitive, affective, and behavioral processes.

Phenomena so powerful hardly develop in a fit of absentmindedness, nor do they spring full-clothed from the brow of Jove. Yet the source of these potent and palpable forces has long been in dispute. As a “practical” matter, parents, teachers, ministers and other keepers of parochial and general liturgies, codes, and moralities have, over the millennia, sought to instill the right values, including especially moral values, in the young and seemingly pliable. These deliberate efforts have had mixed results; some recent evidence suggests that the more deliberate, obvious, and formal the efforts at teaching values, the more meager the results. Perhaps the official norm-definers and standard-setters influence the “lower-level” value retailers—parents, teachers, etc.—who have some influence on followers, in the familiar two-step process. But the practical, grass-roots teachers of morals are often the first to admit the limits on their influence, as they see daily evidence of this.

How, then, account for the strong grip of certain values on large numbers of persons? In part because value setters are established throughout society, and they are all the more influential because they are informal and do not seem bent on reforming their fellow humans. Both Piaget and Kohlberg have thrown some light on this process in certain societies. Why do children move on from “lower” to “higher” stages in moral outlook? Why, if they are born into a lower stage, do they not remain locked into it, captive to cultural forces, prisoners of their “lower” wants and needs? Some of course so remain, but many do not. For the latter, the moving force is composed mainly of peers who set norms for their fellows, or of persons who are one step ahead of the others, whether in school, church, social status, or peer group. Studies have indicated that children tend to prefer levels of moral thinking just above their own stage of development, but not necessarily higher stages of morality. Doubtless there is considerable slippage in the communication of values. It is unlikely that leaders who serve as “value communicators” convey the precise values adumbrated from on high, except perhaps in wars or other crises. Usually they exact a price in serving as transmitters, modifying values as they express or impart them. But this role may make the assimilation of the values more expeditious and effective, and even insidious. Different types of leaders exercise influence at different stages—parents during the earlier years, teachers later, peers and politicians at others. Fathers may instill values as authority figures more than as mealtime or bedtime preachers, mothers as suppliers and withholding of affection rather than as in-house purveyors of official doctrine. Kohlberg hypothesizes that “there are natural tendencies for the child to perceive the father as the dominant authority in almost all societies...”.

Precisely which peers or cultural heroes—playmates, schoolmates, older siblings, parents, surrogates, teachers, scoutmasters, village editors, folk heroes—exercise how much influence over value-formation cannot be ascertained with much precision; in any event, those forms of influence would vary from culture to cul-


tecture. For our purposes, several factors must be kept in mind. The total, cumulative influence of these leaders on value formation is considerable but not total. The movement of children through stages of moral development and their receptivity to influence at any stage, still turns significantly on their lived, personal experience and on their skills. Widening activities and cognitions are in themselves forces for change. But cognitive development is in turn dependent on the direct, the two-step, and the multi-step flow of influence from peers and others. Through participatory experience the evolving persons "hook in" cognitively and morally with influential around them, but on their terms as well as the leaders'.

The psychological processes are multiple and complex. The child must develop some sense of guilt, or at least of empathy, as he makes value judgments about "fairness" and "honesty" at higher and higher levels above primitive levels of morality. He learns how to imitate parents and others, but his imitation is selective. A sense of reciprocity grows, taking different forms at different stages. In Kohlberg’s first stage of moral development, the "most primitive form of reciprocity is that based on power and punishment; i.e., the reciprocity of obedience and freedom from punishment." In the next higher stages come literal exchange and then a recognition that positive social relationships are systems of reciprocity based on gratitude, empathy, and mutual expectations. At the highest stage the child is appealing not to the palpable rules of the social order but to the abstract conception of justice that lies beyond those rules.

As children participate more widely in home, school, and play groups, confront diverse personalities, exchange confidences, take part in group decisions, they are drawn more and more into differentiated roles. Ultimately young people move into wider educational, occupational, legal, and political milieus. But not all do, or they do so on differing terms. "One index of differential opportunities for participation in the social structures of government and of work or economy," according to Kohlberg, "is that of socioeconomic status. It is abundantly clear that the lower class cannot and does not feel as much sense of power in, and responsibility for, the institutions of government and economy as does the middle class. This, in turn, tends to foster less of a disposition to view these institutions from a generalized, flexible and organized perspective based on various roles as vantage points..."17

Qualities of leadership emerge out of these imitative, selective, and role-taking processes. As persons gain in experience, cognition, imitation, intentionality, and capacity for higher moral judgment, and as they grow more skillful in accommodation and role-taking, they gain in the capacity for leadership that both turns on an understanding of others’ needs, roles, and values and expresses fundamental principles and purposes. Distinctions emerge between leader and follower, for the leader must comprehend many roles and the follower fewer, must accommodate followers’ wants and needs without sacrificing basic principle (otherwise she would not be a leader), must mediate group conflict without becoming a mere referee or conciliator without purpose of her own, must be "with" her followers but also "above" them. But the leader’s main strength is that she can operate close enough to the follower to draw him into the leader’s level of moral development, but far enough from him not to be pulled back down into the preconventional or conventional levels of moral development.18

Leaders do not neatly array themselves in stages, any more than followers do. In a study of high school teachers in California, Simpson, in a preliminary exploration, found a group of men and women who tended to be moderate-to-left in political beliefs, above average in interest and political participation, generally optimistic about the resolvability of social problems, and favorable to the values of freedom, responsibility, law-and-order, and fairness. But they were prone to conventional as well as postconventional thinking, in Kohlberg’s definition. They viewed the functions of law as more the prohibition of undesirable acts than "the prescription of facilitating behavior as standards and guidance, or a beneficial and rational approach to the assistance of human beings based on a principled belief in what is right or just."19 Most felt that the law could be broken under certain conditions, to be sure, but when asked the functions of law in the abstract, they responded on the basis of prohibition and control to a much larger degree than might have


18In order to clarify references to “leader” and “follower”—and also to counter slightly the sexual partiality of traditional usage—I refer occasionally herein to the “leader” as “she” or “her” and to the follower as “he” or “him.” Those experiencing difficulty with this formulation might find it helpful to conjure up images of Joan of Arc, Elizabeth I, Catherine the Great, Eleanor Roosevelt, Golda Meier, Indira Gandhi, or Bella Abzug.

been expected from their ages and social class. There were other inconsistencies in their politico-legal ideology. On balance, though, these teachers, in their collective shaping of the curriculum, their control of readings and discussions, their role as authority figures—but not, we can presume, in their formal preachings and moralizings—were helping to draw some students up through the levels of moral development.

The Empowering of Leadership

Power over human beings is exercised when potential power wielders, motivated to achieve certain goals of their own, marshal capabilities in their power base, such as economic, institutional and skill resources, that enable them to influence the behavior of respondents by activating their motives—wants and needs, expectations and values—relevant to those capabilities. This is done in order to realize the goals of the power wielders, whether or not these are also the goals of the respondents. Power wielders also exercise influence over respondents by mobilizing their own power base in such a way as to establish direct physical control over the respondents’ behavior, as in a war of conquest, or through direct psychological control, as in hypnosis, but these are relatively restricted exercises of power, dependent on certain times, cultures, and personalities. Conflict between, and among, power wielders and power respondents helps to bring to fuller consciousness underlying motives, and hence conflict both molds and enhances the existing power relationships.

Leadership over human beings is exercised when persons with certain motives and purposes mobilize, in competition or conflict with others, their own institutional, political, psychological and other resources in such a manner as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers. This is done in order to satisfy similar needs and values held by both leaders and followers. In brief, leaders with motive and power bases tap followers’ motive bases in order to realize the purposes of both leaders and followers. Leadership is exercised especially in a condition of conflict or competition in which other leaders compete in appealing to the motive-bases of potential followers.

Thus, leaders constitute a particular kind of power wielder. Like power, leadership is relational, purposeful, and collective. Leadership shares with power the central function of achieving purpose. But the reach and domain of leadership is, in the short range at least, more limited than that of power. Leaders do not obliterate followers’ motives even if they wish to do so. They lead only other creatures, not things (and lead animals only to the degree that they recognize animal motives—i.e., leading cattle to shelter rather than to slaughter). To control things—tools, mineral resources, money, energy—is an act of power, not leadership, for things have no motives; power wielders, but not leaders, may treat people as things. And unlike the power holder, who may operate in a closed system, leaders act in a context of conflict and competition. All leaders are actual or potential power wielders, but not all power wielders are leaders. Conceptually, leadership is a subset of power.

These definitions of power and of leadership differ from a number of others. Lasswell and Kaplan hold that power must be relevant to people’s valued things; I hold that it must be relevant to the power wielder’s valued things and may or may not be relevant to the respondent’s needs or values. Janda defines power as “the ability to cause other persons to adjust their behavior in conformance with communicated behavior patterns”; I agree, assuming those behavior patterns effectuate the purpose of the power wielder. According to McFarland, “If the leader causes changes that he intended, he has exercised power; if the leader causes changes that he did not intend or want, he has exercised influence, but not power...” I dispense with the concept of influence as unnecessary and unparsimonious. For me, the leader is a very special, a very circumscribed but potentially the most effective type of power-holder, judged by the degree of intended “real change” finally achieved. Bell et al. contend that power is a relationship rather than an entity—an entity being something that “could be smelled and touched, or stored in a keg” while I agree that power is a relationship but contend that the relationship is one in which an entity—part of the “power base”—plays an indispensable part, whether that keg is a keg of beer, of dynamite, or of ink. The crucial variable is purpose. Some define leadership as leaders making followers do what otherwise followers would not do, or as leaders making followers do what the leaders want.

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them to do; I define leadership as leaders inducing followers to act for certain goals that represent the values and the motivations—the wants and needs, the aspirations and expectations—of both leaders and followers. And the genius of leadership lies in the manner in which leaders see and act on their own, and their followers', values and motivations.

Thus leadership is inseparable from followership. The essence of the leader-follower relation is the interaction of persons with different levels of motivations and of power potential, including skill. Various types of relationships between leader and follower are conceivable. Two persons having similar basic wants—hunger, or some other physiological want—could meet without either of them emerging as leader unless one had the motive and the capability of enlisting the other in a common purpose, exploiting the power bases of each, and sharing in the goals reached and the benefits received, presumably food. Or two persons with different motive bases might interact; one of them might have moved up through a hierarchy of wants and needs and other motives to the point where her main need is self-esteem (Maslow) or achievement (McClelland) or the value of justice (Kohlberg), while the other is operating at a “lower” need level, such as safety. The measure of leadership would be the extent to which, in the interaction between the two, both persons met their needs, the former by winning office or merely by feeling efficacious, and the latter by gaining a sense of national security or of personal safety. Or two persons with high achievement needs might encounter each other in pursuit of the common goal of esteem by others; they would variously share leadership and followership roles.

If leaders and followers are joined so closely in these processes, what are the differences in their functions? These may be inseparable, but they are by no means indistinguishable. First, the leader takes the initiative in making the connection between the leader and the led; it is the leader who creates the linkage that allows communication and exchange to take place. An office-seeker does this in accosting a voter on the street, but if the voter espies the politician and accosts him, the voter is assuming a leadership function, at least for that brief moment. Second, the leader is more skillful in evaluating follower's motives, anticipating his response to an initiative, and estimating her power base, than the reverse. Third, the leader continues to take the dominant part in maintaining and effectuating the relationship with followers and will have the major role in ultimately carrying out the combined purpose of leader and follower. Finally, and most importantly by far, the leader addresses herself to the followers' wants and needs and other motivations, as well as to her own, and thus serves as an independent force in changing the make-up of the followers' motive-base through gratifying their motives.

The last function warrants special attention. The potential leader and follower might come together on the basis of a common motive, such as personal safety, in which case it would be simply the former's initiative, persistence, and skill that would mark her as the leader. In some cases, the potential leader may operate at a lower motivational base, perhaps in warning a follower that his prestige needs must give way to security needs. But more typically, the leader may operate at a motivational level higher than the follower's, in part because persons acting as leader usually have satisfied their own lower need levels and are seeking to satisfy "higher" ones, such as the need for self-realization or efficacy. But whatever the relative motive levels, the test of leadership is the capacity to help gratify follower's need and, by thus extinguishing it, help the follower move to a higher need level, following the principle of unidirectionality and irreversibility. This process changes the environment in which both leader and led operate and hence produces a new configuration in the relations of leaders and followers.

The question remains: just what are the leaders doing when they seek to satisfy and extinguish the followers' "lower" needs? Are they dealing with the followers' needs as leaders define them or as followers define them? Different leaders will have different notions of the follower's true needs, values, and goals. They will seek to influence followers toward different motive levels. They will define true consciousness in sharply different ways. What, then, is the follower's true need? Only the self-conscious follower can answer this question, and he can answer it effectively only when he has been exposed to the competing claims, approaches, values, and goals of the would-be leaders. Thus conflict and competition are essential to the legitimacy of leadership, as well as its empowering. True consciousness does not result from the mobilization of motives by one group or party with overwhelming, if not exclusive, access to the minds of the followers. That can only lead to false consciousness. True consciousness on the part of both leader and follower arises only out of the free play of competing doctrines and philosophies and appeals, out of full opportunity for followers to perceive, comprehend, test, and perhaps try out the principles and promises that are offered to
them. A power wielder can exert power in a situation without conflict. A leader can exert leadership only in conditions offering a significant degree of effective competition.

The common perception of leadership that it should inspire and elevate the public is quite correct. Revolutionary leaders may seek to appeal to the egalitarian ideals of followers at the same time that they satisfy their needs. Ministers urge their parishioners to rise above Mammon and materialism and to pursue more principled missions. Moralizing politicians seek to bring out "the best in us" in following some cause. What is the "best in us"? That remains the secret of the followers, until they wish to answer in the choices they make. Ultimately the legitimacy of political leadership does not turn mainly on elections and constitutions and representative processes, though these may be significant in measuring public attitudes and legitimating decisions. It stems from the capacity of the leader to establish an authentic relationship with the genuine needs of followers, as the leader can influence them in a free society. The empowering of leadership collapses unless it is, at least in the long run, validated by this kind of ethical certification. Hence, despite all the abuses and perversions and hypocrisy, the call for moral leadership, as it was issued by a founding father of this Association, Woodrow Wilson, and as renewed at this annual meeting by George McGovern, is still the noblest cry that can be sounded on this planet.