POLITICAL THEORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE*

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Like Rachel, Jacob’s beloved but still childless bride, who asked herself and the Lord each morning, “Am I?,” or “Can I?,” so presidents of this Association on these annual occasions intermittently ask, “Are we a science?,” or “Can we become one?” My predecessor, David Truman, raised this question last September applying some of the notions of Thomas Kuhn in his recent book on scientific revolutions.¹ I shall be following in Truman’s footsteps, repeating much that he said but viewing the development of the profession from a somewhat different perspective and intellectual history. My comments will be organized around three assertions.

First, there was a coherent theoretical formulation in the American political theory of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Second, the development of professional political science in the United States from the turn of the century until well into the 1950’s was carried on largely in terms of this paradigm, to use Kuhn’s term. The most significant and characteristic theoretical speculation and research during these decades produced anomalous findings which cumulatively shook its validity.

Third, in the last decade or two the elements of a new, more surely scientific paradigm seem to be manifesting themselves rapidly. The core concept of this new approach is that of the political system.

Let me first develop my theme by the back door, so to speak, through some comments on the sociology of political science, arguing that we are becoming a science by inference from changes in the magnitude, structure, age distribution, and intellectual environment of the political science profession. Up to the time of the founding of the American Political Science Association, and going all the way back more than two millennia to Plato, the total number of political philosophers and theorists who had contributed to systematic speculation about and study of politics did not exceed a few hundred. In 1903 the fledgling American Political Science Association numbered a little over 200 members. In 1934 there were 1,800 members of the Association; in 1944, 3,200; in 1954, 6,000; and in 1966, 15,000. The expectation is that the membership will exceed 20,000 in the 1970’s. Our Washington office assures us that we are the most rapidly growing discipline in the social sciences.

This extraordinary rate of growth is associated with the rate of growth of American higher education; the expansion of faculties, and the increasing division of labor which is resulting in separate departments of political science in existing universities and colleges or in new departments in newly founded institutions. This growth of the political science profession is primarily an American phenomenon. England has a few hundred members in its Political Studies Association. Japan has a few hundred political scientists. There are a few hundred more on the European continent and in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. But nine out of every ten political scientists in the world today are American, and probably two out of every three political scientists who have ever lived are alive and practicing today. Though American preponderance is very great indeed,
growth is occurring outside the United States as well. In Europe and elsewhere there is a noticeable shift from the single chair in the theory of the state, or political philosophy, to the American plan with a departmental division of labor similar to ours.

These figures on the rate of growth of the profession make it clear that the professional accent is on youth. Thus the eight or nine thousand new members who joined the Association between 1954 and 1966 must have created quite a bulge of young men in their thirties; and the anticipated growth in the profession in the next decade will probably increase this proportion of young men. I have been given to understand that a similar bulge in the proportion of young men in the population as a whole has some connection with the increased crime rate. It should not surprise us that this increased proportion of younger men should be associated with departure from norm and tradition in political science.

Furthermore, the growth of departments of political science at a rate exceeding the capacity of our graduate schools to produce Ph.D.’s means that these young men are scarce, are in a seller’s market, and are being promoted rapidly, and becoming department chairmen and otherwise influential in the affairs of the profession. There are two aspects of this changing age distribution which call for comment.

First, young men are intellectually and professionally more innovative than older men. And second, younger men are more likely to have been trained in the newer approaches to political science and more effectively exposed to the intellectual currents of the times.

This brings me to my third point regarding the growth of the field. It is taking place in the age of the scientific revolution—indeed, it is an integral part of this revolution. There is hardly a major center of graduate training in the United States where scientific methods have not been accepted, or are in process of being accepted, and where the components of the scientific approach are not acknowledged to be important parts of graduate training. The use of quantitative methods, the use of the new research technology, sample surveys, rigorous logical methods, sociological, psychological, and anthropological theory, large-scale research undertakings, research grants, team research, surely are here to stay. An increasing proportion of the newer generation of political scientists has this kind of training, and this proportion will continue to grow. Indeed, we might argue the case that while political philosophy and political analysis are ancient fields of inquiry—primarily Mediterranean and European in their origins—political science as a profession, with specialization of interests, substantial research support, emphasis on systematic field research, and rigorous logical methods, is relatively new, and at the present time is almost entirely American.

If it is at the present time a predominantly American discipline, then we must particularly concern ourselves with political theory in America on the eve of the development of political science as a specialized discipline. The paradigm of American political theory in the nineteenth century consisted of the doctrines of separation of power, checks and balances, and the mixed constitution—theories of diverse origins, which had been combined in American political and constitutional thought into a coherent and relatively explicit empirical and normative theory of politics.

Let me briefly recount the historical background of this theory. Or better, let me present a swift sketch of these developments in the hope that my mistakes and oversimplifications may challenge more competent political theorists to do this essential job of relating contemporary notions to earlier concepts and formulations. From Plato and Aristotle, through Polybius and Cicero, Aquinas and others, there had been developed a partly differentiated theory or categorization of political activities or functions. Thus in his discussions of the Laws and in his references to historic political systems, Plato refers to different ways in which political activities such as choosing magistrates and legislators, proposing and ratifying laws, administering laws and justice may be assigned to particular institutions such as a popular assembly, a council, and a magistracy. Aristotle deals with the consequences of differing patterns of distribution of activities among agencies for the form of the polity, and for its normative qualities. But neither Plato nor Aristotle systematically separates structure from function. Aristotle proposed a threefold categorization of powers of government—the deliberative, magistrative, and judicial. But it is obvious that in Aristotle these functions are not analytically separated from structures. It is true that he defines the deliberative power by its activities, assigning to it sovereignty on the issues of war, peace, and alliances, sovereignty in the enactment of laws, the control of the death penalty, and the appointment of magistrates. But he speaks of the magistrative power

as consisting of the elected officials of the state and of the judicial power as being expressed in the system of law courts.¹

Actually, classical political theory is more a political sociology and psychology and a normative political theory than it is a theory of the political process. What goes on inside the black box of the political system and its consequences are inferred from the ways in which the social structure is represented in it. The Platonic, Aristotelian and later Roman classifications of types of political systems are far more explicit on the consequences of varieties of social stratification and their representation in political systems for their forms and their performance, than they are regarding the varieties of political decision-making processes. The bases of political classification are sociological rather than political, depending on whether a monarchy, an aristocracy, or the people predominate, or some combination of these three elements, or two of them. (This tendency is most marked in Aristotle who distinguishes four types of oligarchy and five types of democracy associated with different socio-economic stratification patterns.)² These three socio-political types are again divided normatively according to whether they govern in the interests of the ruling group or of the whole. The Greek and Roman theory of political development is a social-psychological theory, treating the pure forms of rule as inherently unstable because of their susceptibility to corruption stemming from sociological and psychological processes. Hence, the Greek and Roman theorists are advocates of the “mixed constitution” which, while lacking the structural simplicity of “lawful” monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, has the virtue of optimizing the values of stability, virtue, and liberty.

Greek and Roman political theory stressed the interrelations of social stratification with the political system as the basis of political classification and political change, leaving the internal operations of the political process in a relatively unelaborated form. The British political theorists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries focussed more sharply on the political system itself, emphasizing the internal division of functions and powers. The classical concepts of mixed constitution (i.e., mixing of social status groups in the political system) and checks and balances (i.e., the checking and balancing of the powers of social classes in the political system) were assimilated into a specifically political theory of separation of powers and checks and balances.

This development of political theory was brought about by British constitutional experience as interpreted by such theorists as Harrington, Lilburne, and Locke⁶ and later by Montesquieu, who introduced the familiar threefold separation-of-powers conception. Struggle for an independent judiciary and over the legislative power of Parliament in the period from the fifteenth century to the eighteenth suggested such a functional, analytical, treatment of the political process. It was justified on grounds of efficiency, government in the common interest, the rule of law, and stability. In Montesquieu⁶ separation of powers rather than the representation of status groups in the political system becomes the basis of political classification. Though he does not reject the Platonic and Aristotelian monarchic, aristocratic, and democratic categories, he introduces a new classification based on different ways of organizing the executive, legislative, and judicial functions. Monarchies are differentiated from despots through the separation of judicial power from the legislative and the executive. And republics are separated from monarchies and despots by the separation of legislative from executive power.

Montesquieu does not reject the political sociology of the Greek and Roman theorists. The notions of mixed constitution and checks and balances are used in his partly erroneous treatment of the British constitution, where a social status system consisting of a royal family, an aristocracy, and a commons have special access to governmental powers and means of protecting this access from invasion by other social groupings. Nevertheless, the seventeenth and eighteenth century theorists

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² Aristotle, op. cit., Book IV: Chapter IV on democracy; Chapter V on oligarchy.

moved toward a more analytically sophisticated theory in two respects. They came closer
to making an analytical separation between
social structure and political process, and in
their theory of the political process they came
closer to separating structure from function.

The writers of The Federalist Papers go far
ther in analytical sophistication. The British
theorists and Montesquieu, reflecting British
constitutional experience with the separation
of a judicial function and a legislative function
from the powers of the crown and the feudal
magnates, tend to treat the executive function
residually. Hamilton and Madison, on the other
hand, viewing these concepts from the perspec-
tive of American political and constitutional
experience, and particularly from the point of
view of the experiments in the state constitu-
tions under the Articles of Confederation with
powerful legislative bodies and weak execu-
tives, were forced to think more explicitly
about the relations between the legislative and
the executive functions. Thus, the theory of
separation of powers as formulated in the Fed-
eralist is more of a systemic-equilibrium con-
cept than that elaborated in Locke and Mon-
tesquieu. If we think of some of our contem-
porary, behaviorally oriented systems theorists
as arrogant, it is instructive to read once again
the remarks of the thirty-year-old Hamilton in
Federalist No. 1.

It has frequently been remarked, that, it seems
to have been reserved to the people of this coun-
try, to decide by their conduct and example, the
important question, whether Societies of men are
really capable or not, of establishing good govern-
ment from reflection and choice, or whether they
are forever destined to depend, for their political
constitutions on accident and force. . . .

And in Federalist No. 9 he observes,

The science of politics, however, like most other
sciences, has received great improvement. . . .
The regular distribution of power into distinct
departments, the introduction of legislative bal-
ances and checks; the institution of courts com-
posed of judges holding their offices during good
behavior; the representation of the people in the
legislature by deputies of their own election;
these are either wholly new discoveries, or have
made their principal progress towards perfection
in modern times.7

This confidence was in part the product of
general ‘Enlightenment optimism’ and in part
the special consequence of the fact that the
writers of the Federalist Papers could benefit
from a period of experimentation in constitu-
tion-making and from the informed and often
analytically elegant debates of the Constitu-
tional Convention. The explanatory power of
their theories was an intoxicating experience.
Perhaps I go too far when I suggest that the
contemporary renascence of creative political
theory is again associated with a period of
experimentation in constitution-making and
nation building, this time on a world scale in
the explosions into nationhood of the last de-
cades. And again, we have a generation of po-
itical theorists searching for an explanatory,
predictive, and manipulative political theory.
But I shall return to this theme at a later point.

It is in the formulation of the Federalist Pa-
pers, then, and in the early commentaries on
the American Constitution, that we first get a
clear-cut and explicit functional theory of
separation of powers. Each power is positively
defined, as generic aspects of political systems.
Varieties of political systems are classified ac-
cording to the ways in which these functions are
allocated among political institutions.
Tyrannies combine the legislative, executive,
and judicial functions in a single institution or
structure. The early political systems of the
states are treated as unstable republican sys-
tems because they fail to separate the three
functions effectively. The legislative function
is inherently dominant; and true balance and
separation can only be maintained by checks
and balances, by some mixture of functions
among the structures, by according some leg-
isative power to the executive and courts,
some executive power to the legislative, and so
forth. A political system with separation of
power, duly checked and balanced to main-
tain the separation, is in a state of internal
equilibrium, and is in a state of equilibrium
with the other components of the general
society, the individual, the family, the com-

7 The Federalist, Beloff edition (Oxford: Black-
well, 1948), No. 1, and No. 9.

community, religious groups, and the economy.
Separation of powers with checks and balances
maintains a stable social order, combining jus-
tice with liberty and equality.8

Mixed-constitution doctrine still appears in
an attenuated form in the Federalist Papers.
But it must be remembered that for most of
the earlier theorists the mixed constitution
doctrine implied a balancing of estates—mon-
archy, aristocracy and clerical hierarchy, and
commons. The early American republic had no
estates. It had holders of different amounts and

8 Ibid. See Nos. 9–10 on factions, No. 47 on
separation of powers, No. 51 on checks and bal-
ances.
forms of property and the propertyless. Separation of powers and checks and balances provided for access for these economic interest groups to the various functions in the political process. An indirectly elected executive and senate, a popular legislative assembly, an appointive judiciary, different electorates for different agencies, connected the specifically political theory of separation of powers with the less differentiated political-sociological theory of the classical writers.9

These propositions became the dominant American political theory of the first half of the nineteenth century. There was of course a political-constitutional polemic. But the early American Jacobins, Jeffersonians, and Jacksonians challenged the specifics; they did not themselves propose alternative general theories of politics. The validity of the threefold scheme is taken for granted, and the virtues of some version of separation and checks are acknowledged.

But in the latter part of the nineteenth century, as professional university-based political science began to develop, almost with its first breath so to speak, questions were raised as to the validity of the theory in its whole and in its parts. Woodrow Wilson,10 A. Lawrence Lowell,11 Frank Goodnow,12 among others, pressed for a sharper analytic distinction between structure and function, striving to free empirical political science from the earlier assumptions of necessary relations between them. Wilson and Goodnow explicitly rejected the threefold distinction in favor of a twofold one between politics and administration.13 A. Lawrence Lowell tried to find a legitimate place for the bargaining function of the party politician in the theory of the political process,14 while Arthur Bentley rejected structural-functional theory in favor of an interest-group theory of the political process.15 All of them rejected formalism, whether legal or ideological, in favor of a study of the facts—real operations, performance, behavior.

Thus, on the eve of the emergence of American political science as a large-scale, empirically oriented discipline there was considerable theoretical ferment. But while the separation-of-powers theory was under attack, the two more elaborate efforts at proposing alternative general theories of the political process—those of Goodnow and Bentley—had surprisingly little resonance at the level of general theory. There was no general theoretical polemic at this time, but rather a strong anti-theoretical, empirical movement which gathered momentum after World War I, questioning in an ad hoc way the whole separation-of-powers scheme—the threefold division of functions, the association of particular functions with particular structures, and the assumptions of the normative consequences of separation of powers.

Several scholarly generations of empiricists and "middle range" theorists followed in the wake of these "turn of the century" theorists, pointing to a division of functions among governmental agencies quite different from the classic conception of separation of powers. The judiciary was shown to be a significant lawmaker; executives were demonstrated to be the primary legislative agencies; administrative agencies were represented as being legislators and adjudicators; and legislative bodies were pictured as modifiers, legitimators, aggregators, and not as legislators at all. And yet while they rejected separation-of-powers concepts, they were still prisoners of the theory, reflected by efforts to reconcile these anomalies at least with the nomenclature of separation of powers. Thus the legislative and adjudicative powers of administrative agencies were referred to as quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial.

Similarly other scholars in the period roughly from World War I on into the present challenged separation-of-powers theory as an inadequate categorization of the political process. Thus the students of political parties, following Lowell's insight, developed a theory of the party and the politician as a system of brokerage, bargaining, aggregation. But there is no place in separation of powers theory for a brokerage or bargaining function. It was reconciled as a function which could impart coherence to a separation-of-powers, checks-


10 Woodrow Wilson, The State (Boston: D. C. Heath, 1898), Chapter III.


12 Frank J. Goodnow, Politics and Administration (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1900), Chapter I.

13 Woodrow Wilson, "The Study of Administration," Political Science Quarterly, 2 (June, 1887), 197–222; Frank J. Goodnow, op. cit., Chapter I.


and-balances, and federal system. Students of pressure groups and the lobby in their search for theoretical legitimation spoke of the lobby and pressure groups as a "third chamber of the legislature." And finally students of the media of communication, in similar efforts to fit these institutions into the political process resorted to such strained analogies as "America's House of Lords," or "the fourth branch of government."

The ethical justification of separation-of-powers theory also came in for attack. The assumption that separation of powers was not only a natural and efficient organization of the political process, but a sure guarantor of the preservation of order and liberty, was challenged by those who questioned the identification of liberty with a governmental system with limited powers to legislate for mass welfare, a governmental system that provided institutionally for oligarchic interests. A groping began here to make a sharper analytic separation between empirical and normative propositions and to subject assertions about the ethical consequences of structural-functional arrangements to empirical examination. But even in this area there was no principled effort to replace separation of powers with another general theory. While there were populist political theorists who favored direct legislation and simple majority rule, and other political theorists who were influenced by Marx, Michels, and Pareto, they founded no schools of political theory in America. There was a certain uneasiness, even guilt feeling, among these empirical iconoclasts. Students of Merriam will recall that he brooded now and then about the unwritten Allgemeine Staatslehre which he had in his bones. And an earlier generation of students of public administration will recall the search for "principles."

There was indeed a certain uneasiness about this atheoretic orientation. It was in part the consequence of a cumulative sense of the inadequacy of the theory of separation of powers as a scheme for dealing with political reality and in part a nostalgia for the great tradition of political theory which dealt with first principles. What general theory we had was attenuating, and to all intents and purposes creative political theorizing as a discipline had ceased to exist on any significant scale. And this condition could continue as long as one component of the original theory survived. This was the Enlightenment faith in the irreversibility of the relation between the spread of knowledge and education and the diffusion of the rule of law, popular participation in the political process, and government by intelligent deliberation—in other words, some version of the separation-of-powers system. This was the final anomaly, the final disconfirmation, the disproof of prediction at the hands of history which turned us back to theory again.

Half a century or more ago the universe of political systems as seen by Anglo-American political philosophers and theorists had a hierarchic structure. At the peak were the Anglo-American systems representing man's highest attainment of the Enlightenment ideals of reason, liberty, justice, and equality. Other systems were viewed according to their distance from or proximity to these morally and historically leading systems. These systems were the primary objects of study, since the historical process was moving in these directions. The relationship between the Enlightenment faith and the empirical iconoclastic approach is beautifully illustrated in the work of Charles Merriam, who perhaps more than any other American political scientist of his generation shook the validity of various elements of separation-of-powers theory. With an Enlightenment faith as strong as his one could break idol after idol of the separation-of-powers


19 L. D. White, Introduction to Public Administration (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926); see particularly the third edition (1948) for a discussion of principles of public administration.
scheme and still get along without an alternative general theory of politics. This became increasingly difficult for his students who not only saw a new world of political reality coming, but had to inhabit it, make some intellectual order and meaning out of it. It became difficult to believe simply in the idea of progress in a world in which fascism could capture strongholds in Western culture. It became painfully difficult to think of communism as a historical digression, as it seized power in Russia, moved into Eastern Europe and China, and threatened Western Europe. It became intellectually impossible to accept either a separation-of-powers approach or a predominantly empirical approach in the analysis of the unstable phenomena of the new nations of the post-World War II period.

Thus far we have described a sequence much like that presented by Thomas Kuhn in his theory of scientific revolutions.20 If it does not quite fit his model, then we must remember that the social sciences may have a dialectic somewhat different from the physical and biological sciences. At any rate, we begin with a dominant paradigm, a formulation of the subject matter of political analysis, specifying variables, parameters, their relations and consequences. Political science as normal science, as a professional discipline in America, begins with problems suggested by this theory, turning up anomalous finding after anomalous finding which are reconciled with strained formulations such as quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions, third chambers, fourth estates, or fourth branches of government. The final anomaly—the disproof of Enlightenment-historical predictions—breaks the back of the traditional conceptual scheme and an era of theoretical speculation, of new candidates for paradigms begins.

I cannot escape a certain uneasiness about Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions. I have the impression that in the interest of making his point about the discontinuous aspect of scientific growth, he understates the element of continuity, of cumulativeness. Normal science is treated as somewhat more orthodox than may often be the case. And the discontinuities may be treated as more innovative. At any rate in the development of political science in America, the generation of empirical researchers who turned up the anomalies, had been preceded by more speculative theorists who argued that the anomalies would be there if we looked. And the empirical students of legislative, administrative, and judicial processes, of parties, pressure groups, and communication, were operating with process and functional concepts which were the direct ancestors of contemporary system and functional concepts. The relationship is quite clear. The concept of process, as Easton points out, preceded that of system. The one may be said to have led to the other.21

The introduction of the system concept represents a genuinely important step in the direction of science. It is a step comparable in significance to the ones taken in Enlightenment political theory over the earlier classic formulations, comparable in significance to the analytical-empirical achievements of the political process movement in American political science in the first half of the twentieth century. Taking place in the era of the scientific revolution it represents a surer thrust into the culture of modern science. This may be a premature account of its intellectual origins, but surely Merriam’s prophetic New Aspects of Politics,22 Lasswell’s brilliant early analysis of “the state as a manifold of events,”23 and the generalization of the concept of process and of interaction in the work of Herring, Schattschneider, Odegard, and Key in their studies of the interrelations of interest groups, political parties, bureaucracy, and executives illuminated a new horizon in political science. If these scholars spied out the land, then we might say that men such as Truman, Easton, Dahl, Deutsch,24 and others have been moving across the Jordan to possess it.

A new paradigm is surely developing in political science. Its first formulations are crude, partial, and often pretentious. But theory formulation will undoubtedly go forward with

20 Thomas Kuhn, op. cit., Chapters III–VII.

23 Harold D. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), Chapter XIII.
the rapid growth of the profession and with the high capabilities and research opportunities of an increasing proportion of its members. What are some of the principal features of this emerging approach?

1) The first is a statistical approach to the universe of political systems. We no longer focus simply on the "great powers," but are concerned with sampling the total universe of man's experiments with politics, contemporary and historical, national, sub-national, and international. Increasingly, we select our cases for study in order to test hypotheses about the relations between variables—environmental influences on politics, political influences on the environment, and the interaction of political variables with each other. The comparative method is used more rigorously, in a self-conscious search for control, not only in cross-national comparisons, but in sub-national comparisons and international system comparisons as well.25

2) A second significant characteristic of this emerging paradigm of political science is the differentiation and specification of variables and the assumptions of probability and reflexivity in their relations. Thus, in our efforts to establish the properties of political systems, compare them with each other, and classify them into types, we explicitly separate structure from function, structure from culture, social systems from political systems, empirical properties from their normative implications. We tend to view the individual political system as a universe of interactions and make case studies of its operations according to some sampling strategy. The result is a movement away from black-and-white typcasting, toward classification based on statements of probability of process and performance patterns which enable us to compare, explain, and evaluate more precisely.26

3) The emerging analytical framework in contemporary political theory is the concept of system whether it is employed at the level of sub-national, regional, or structural units such as communities, legislative bodies or committees, at the level of national political units, or at the level of the international political system. The principal advantage of the system concept is that it analytically differentiates the object of study from its environment, directs attention to the interaction of the system with other systems in its environment, to its own conversion characteristics, and to its maintenance and adaptive properties. In the development of the political system concept, Lasswell's seven functional categories of the decision process and Easton's demand-support-output model represent post-separation-of-powers efforts at postulating sets of categories which are logically distinct and universally applicable. The scientific approach to categorization is the modest approach of the coder, rather than that of the philosopher. There is constant revision of the code as it is used to organize data. The ease with which we can get and analyze data these days gives us a secular attitude toward our categories. They have a short and instrumental life, and we avoid becoming their prisoners as we once were of separation-of-powers concepts.

In this search for an adequate system of functional categories, one thing seems to be clear. Our analytical framework has to enable us to relate three aspects of the functioning of political systems. We need functional categories in order to describe and compare political systems at the level of their performance—as systems interacting with other systems in their domestic and international environments. We need functional categories which will enable us to describe and compare political systems according to their internal conversion processes. And finally we need functional categories in order to describe and compare political systems according to their maintenance and adaptive characteristics. Modern political theory will consist in good part of a logic which will enable us to relate changes in the performance of political systems to changes in internal process and conversion patterns and to changes in


26 In this connection see Robert Dahl, op. cit.; Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR (New York: Viking Press, 1965); and Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, op cit., Chapter I.
recruitment and socialization patterns. Another part of it will consist of a logic which will enable us to move from empirical relationships to normative judgments.

4) The Enlightenment theory of progress toward democracy and the rule of law is giving way to a multi-linear theory of political development leading us to break through the historical and cultural parochialism of the field. Enlightenment theory began with the leviathan state and postulated as the legitimate problem of political theory that of bringing the leviathan under control through institutional and legal checks and balances, and through popular processes. Modern political theory has to ask how the leviathan itself comes into existence, in order to cope with the intellectual problems of understanding the political prospects and processes of the new nations. We are beginning to break through the historical barrier of the French Revolution and the ethnic barrier of Western Europe, reaching into historical and anthropological data for knowledge of the variety of political development patterns. And we are on the eve of a search for rational choice theories of political growth—an approach which may make political theory more relevant to public policy. Like the authors of the Federalist Papers, contemporary political theorists are inescapably confronted with the problem of how resources may be economically allocated to affect political change in preferred directions. The justification for this quest for an allocation-of-resources theory of political development is not only its relevance to central concerns of public policy, but its uses as a test of the validity and power of our theories. It forces us to place our bets, set the odds, and confront straightforwardly the issue of the kind of prediction which is possible in political science.

These developments are not matters of the remote future; they are already to be observed in the thrust of the various sub-fields of political science. Thus, American political studies are moving out of their parochial orientation in the search for the illumination and increased rigor which can be gained through cross-national and sub-national comparison. We are discovering that the American political system, no matter how much we love it, is still a political system comparable to other systems and that we can perhaps love it better as we acquire the perspective and illumination which systematic and rigorous comparison make possible. Some of the sub-disciplines of political science—political parties, interest groups, public opinion and communication, bureaucracy—previously based almost entirely on American experience, are increasingly treated in system terms and in a cross-national, comparative context. As the mood of the cold war changes from obsession to concern, Soviet and Communist studies are becoming more systemic and comparative. The newest developments in international relations theory reflect the impact of system concepts and comparative methods. Political theory begins to show signs of claiming its role as the systematizer, codifier, hypothesis formulator, and ethical evaluator of the field as a whole.

It has been the great privilege of the sub-discipline of comparative politics to have acted as a catalyst in this process of professional development. Because of the existing division of labor, comparative politics dealt with European, Asian, African, and Latin American political systems. Leaving out as it did the American and Communist political systems in an empirical, though not in a theoretical sense, it could avoid the pressures of ethnocentrism and the distortions of the Cold War. And, confronted by the exotic and unstable phenomena of the new and modernizing nations, it was uniquely challenged by the problems of comparison, classification, and change, and led in the search for analytical frameworks and categories suitable for coping with these intellectual problems. It is not accidental that it fell to comparative politics to be particularly active in reestablishing the relationship between the analysis of individual political systems and their classes and varieties with general political theory, and that it dramatized the necessity of forging the links between historical political theory, empirical political theory, and normative political theory.

A future historian of political science may find it suggestive to compare the fate of comparative politics with that of the Liberal Party of Britain which, having accustomed the Tories to competition and accommodation and having socialized the elites of the working classes into a common bargaining culture, found that it had put itself out of political business, so to speak. So the field of comparative politics pressing into strange lands and experimenting with exotic concepts may really have been leading political science back to the thread of continuity in the field and putting itself out of

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business as a distinctive subdiscipline. For comparison, whether it be in the experiment, in the analysis of the results of quantitative surveys, or in the observation of process and behavior in different contexts in the real world, is the very essence of the scientific method. It makes no sense to speak of a comparative politics in political science, since if it is a science, it goes without saying that it is comparative in its approach. And in time the significant message of comparative politics will be assimilated on the one hand into political theory and on the other into the analytical frameworks and methodologies of the empirical studies we make whether they be in American urban areas or legislative bodies, in Sub-Saharan Africa or in the international arena. This is no small mortal span, and it is not yet complete.

These trends toward rigor and scope, systematic exploration of the consequences for politics of social and psychological variables, and the formulation of general analytical frameworks represent a significant step into the modern world of science. And the rate of growth and professionalization of political science give promise that the intellectual rate of growth will be correspondingly rapid. It may very well be that there is no word of counsel, of caution, which the older Turks can give to the young ones, no unexplored area or neglected problem in the field which this numerous, talented, and highly skilled generation has not already anticipated or soon will encounter and solve more effectively than those who preceded them.

It may, however, be appropriate to point out that the persistent bipolar conflict in the field between humanists and behavioralists conceals a lively polemic within both camps and perhaps particularly among the so-called behavioralists. Among the modernists neologisms burst like roman candles in the sky, and wars of epistemological legitimacy are fought. The devotees of rigor and theories of the middle range reject more speculative general theory as non-knowledge; and the devotees of general theory attack those with more limited scope as technicians, as answerers in search of questions.

In my comments this evening I have tried to relate contemporary general theory to the great tradition. Or better, I have presented a plea to our political theorists to do this job of forging the links between past, present, and future more effectively than I possibly can. I attach special importance to this task since confusion, even loss, of identity is inevitably associated with professional growth. And when quantitative and qualitative growth occur at such extraordinary rates, the confusion and conflict may be multiplied. If Dahl was correct when he wrote the epitaph for a monument to a successful protest, then it may be that the battle of science has been won, and this may be an appropriate moment for the victors to take a look back at their intellectual origins.

If we consider the tradition of political science and the place of political science in the university curriculum, it becomes quite clear that, while drawing heavily upon other disciplines, political science is not science in general and not social science. However we define it, we have a limited and special responsibility for the political aspects of the social process. Our past imposes this structural restraint upon us; and the existence of anthropology, sociology, law, history, philosophy, statistics, economics, and mathematics within the community of the university confronts us with an inescapable problem of intellectual and institutional boundaries. We are not the best judges of psychological, sociological, mathematical, and statistical competence, though we are or should be the best judges of the appropriateness and usefulness of the application of these disciplines to the special field in which we have or should have the highest competence.

Whatever political science may become, one of its peculiarly important ingredients will be what it has been. And here let me argue that we have no cause for shame in this past. Surely the dominant element in this tradition is our special relation to the problem of violence and coercion in human affairs. This mission becomes peculiarly central in the political theory of the Enlightenment when the secular optimism of the Age of Reason led men to the conviction that this ethically dangerous—even normally wicked—instrumentality might be tamed and put to humane and constructive work. This is no small tradition, and it is peculiarly ours. The Enlightenment theorists were not only convinced that this was their mission, but that it was in sure progress of being accomplished. We are less sure of the outcome of this confrontation of knowledge and violence.

My friends will recall that I have never been able to resist the temptation of quoting Scripture, even when another book would do. I ask them to indulge me once again as I return to the childless Rachel seeking to remind the Lord of the role he had assigned her in his plan for man's redemption. She resorts to a desperate stratagem. She gives Jacob her handmaiden Bilhah as a concubine, and then acts as midwife receiving the two boys, Dan and Naphtali on her knees. It would take the compassionate and ironic fantasy of Thomas Mann to interpret this stratagem of Rachel. The
good book in its powerful and compact way simply tells the tale, and then moves on to the eventual birth of Rachel's Joseph, Jacob's favorite son and the instrument of Israel's salvation. My own theory is that there was no magic here, but simply a primitive form of suggestion therapy as Rachel sought to overcome her own sterility by sharing her simple handmaiden's fertility. But the point of the tale for my purposes this evening is that never, not even in the extremity of her childless grief, did Rachel confuse Bilhah's progeny with her own unborn Joseph. Her mission was still before her; her labor still undone.

Yet I sometimes have the impression that for many of us in the camp of the behavioralists, the intoxication of new research technologies, and the explanatory power of insights from other disciplines has obscured this mission—our own unborn Joseph—which is passed on to us inescapably by our past and imposed on us by our present division of labor. If this is true, or rather let me put it this way, to the extent that this is true, we are in danger of becoming alienated from our special professional culture and from the powerful motivation which comes from having a significant part in the solution of the ultimate problem of man's enlightenment.