POLITICAL SCIENCE AND WORLD STABILIZATION*

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Few persons who look at the world thoughtfully are complacent. It is difficult to believe that the balance of power will become more stable. Quite the contrary! A degree of bi-polarity in world politics has been reached which compels each of the opposing groups to bend its efforts to bring the remaining neutrals into its orbit and to augment its power. If the war which each regards as a possibility should come, each wants to be sure that it will not be the loser. The race in atomic weapons and armaments of all kinds is on and experience suggests, as in the rivalries between sections before the American Civil War and the rivalries between alliances before the first World War, that such a race will eventuate in war.

There is no balancer in a bi-polar world, nor are there uncommitted powers which may cast their lot on one side or the other in a crisis. The process of nucleation about the two poles makes prediction of the power potential of each more and more feasible. It becomes increasingly clear to one side that time is with it and to the other that time is against it. Under such circumstances each expects war and it can be anticipated that the side which becomes convinced that time is against it will start the war. Fortunately there are still many unknown variables in the present situation. No precise calculation is yet possible, though it may be in the course of a few years. However, if war comes, there are few who doubt that atomic weapons would be used and that the human race would face disaster.

But if few people expect a stable balance of power, the number who anticipate effective world government is even less. There is not, nor can there be, an external enemy against which the world as a whole can organize itself in defense. The differences of culture are so great that a

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sense of solidarity throughout the world’s population is slow in developing. Traditional insistence upon national sovereignty and traditional loyalty to national governments resist modification even though reason suggests that common defense against the disaster of war is expedient. While inventions in the fields of communication and transport, and interdependence in commerce and security make for one world, the actual sentiments of peoples have been moving toward more exclusive loyalty to their nations, more insistence that their governments exercise totalitarian control over law, defense, economy, and even opinion. Materially the world community steadily becomes more integrated, but morally each nation gains in solidarity and the split in the world community becomes wider. Under these conditions, people await with a blind fatalism the approach of atomic war. Disaster seems as inevitable as in a Greek tragedy. Has the science of politics anything to offer in this situation?

Initially we stumble on the insistence by many that a science of politics is impossible. That position can hardly be taken by this Association. We have thousands of members, a half century of activity, a vigorous journal, numerous committees, and an established tradition. These give evidence of a widespread belief that politics can be treated scientifically, that there is a science of politics. The evidence is less convincing outside the United States. In September, 1949, a group of one hundred German professors met at the castle of Waldeleiningen and passed resolutions to introduce political science as a discipline in German universities. They all recognized that there had been no such discipline for fifteen years and that even earlier, political science had been less a science than a philosophy in Germany. At a meeting held the same month in Paris to organize an International Political Science Association, it appeared that there were only three national associations in the world, in America, Canada, and India. An association was being formed in England but the majority wished to call it an Association for Political Studies, implying that politics could not be a science. In France formation of a national association was also in process, but its center seemed to be public law and administration, rather than politics.

Politics may be defined as the art and practice of achieving group ends against the opposition of other groups. It implies that a practitioner of the art has identified himself with one state, one nation, one party, one government, or one group of some kind and is seeking to achieve the ends of that group against the opposition of other groups. Conflict is its essence. People engaged in politics are engaged in a battle, if not of bullets then of ballots, if not of armies then of rhetoric, if not of strategy then of persuasion. There have always been people who dislike conflict
in any form. Their vision of the perfect human society is a City of God in which there is perfect harmony, or a communist society in which there are no classes or groups and where all differences are coordinated. There are others who do not regard politics as an evil, but who look upon conflict and competition as conditions of progress and as means for realizing the better life. To liberals, a continuous competition of ideas in a free market place of discussion is a better society than one in which the dead hand of unanimity has eliminated freedom and personality.

Political scientists assume, not only that politics is always to be with us, but also that it is a positive value. It is usually recognized, however, that there should be limits to the methods used. Discussion, most would say, is better than assassination. Parties are better than concentration camps. Vituperation in the General Assembly of the United Nations is better than war. Politics, therefore, should not only seek to gain the ends of one party; it should seek to keep the methods which it uses from degenerating. War, insurrection, assassination, terrorism, though frequent methods of politics, are also evidence of the failure of politics. Politics implies that men struggle to achieve their values, but they also struggle to prevent methods from sinking beneath the dignity of man. In the latter struggle, men engage in politics as members of the universal society of humanity faced by the opposition of any lesser group which attempts to justify barbarous means by ends which it considers noble.

Science is the process of systematizing observation and thought, and of formulating propositions the truth of which is tested by their capacity to predict and to control. Science is primarily contemplative, while politics is manipulative. Science is motivated by curiosity rather than by utility. It progresses when it ignores values, as Bacon suggested when he said that final causes are barren. This is true of pure science. Applied science, however, assumes certain values and seeks formulae to control events toward their achievement, thus contributing to the arts.

Political science as a pure science, therefore, should seek to devise formulae to predict how political conflicts are likely to turn out. What new political conflicts are likely to develop? What groups are likely to become important? What methods are likely to be used? What goals are likely to be striven for? In short, political science should seek to devise formulae to predict those aspects of group behavior centering about tension, struggle, and conflict.

As an applied science, political science may assume the values of a particular group and seek formulae useful in achieving those values. Most of political science has been of this type. It has asked for example: What are the ends of the United States internally and externally? What
type of organization, what methods of administration, what principles
of law, what legislation, what foreign policy will contribute to achieve
those ends? As an applied science, however, political science may also
assume values above the parties in the political struggle. Values of the
most general type, such as human personality, general welfare, civiliza-
tion, human progress may be assumed and formulae sought for keeping
the political struggle from utilizing methods which would frustrate these
higher values. There are always men who, whether their group be state,
church, or business, become so wedded in the heat of politics to their
ends that they conceive them as justifying any means. There are always
others who, however committed they are to particular group ends,
believe that there are limits and bounds to the means which can pro-
perly be employed. Such an appreciation is certainly one of the signs of
civilization. Machiavelli thought of applied political science in the first
sense. He advised the Prince how to build the power of his group and
through the use of that power to achieve his ends. Erasmus, writing at
the same time, thought of applied political science in the second sense:
How can the struggles of politics be kept from getting too violent, too
oppressive, too monopolistic, too anarchic? What arrangement will
assure that politics operates with reasonable respect for human person-
ality, for civilization, for justice, for welfare—all values which most
men, upon reflection, will recognize?

Neither in its pure nor in its applied aspect has political science be-
come so exact a science as physics or even biology. We cannot ignore the
circumstances which hamper such development. The methods of science
imply, first, exhaustive analysis of a situation or problem so that all its
elements may be described as constants or measured as variables, or
perhaps treated as parameters which, though actually varying, can be
taken as constants over periods of time and over areas of space. Secondly,
scientific method implies the search for relations among those constants
and variables which are persistent and as independent as possible of
particular times and places. Insofar as relations are independent of time,
they can be anticipated in the future and thus make prediction possible.
Finally, science implies continuous testing and self correction. No scien-
tific formulation is absolute. Science does not envisage the world as a
body of immutable laws, but as congeries of regularities and irregulari-
ties which may appear increasingly regular as the process of scientific for-
mulation continues. The scientist seeks to make his formula as general
as possible, but he anticipates that every formula will in time yield to
new observations.

As James B. Conant has remarked, the test of a good scientific theory
is the stimulus it gives for new investigation which will in time produce
a better theory. While science seeks generalizations, independent of
time and space, it recognizes that all generalizations are in fact dated
and located. The Newtonian law of gravitation was the best that could
be said in 17th century England. Much better can be said on the subject
today, and if science continues, we can expect still better in the future.
The mind that demands absolute and eternal truth is not adapted to
science. Science has no place for doctrinaires. While 18th century
rationalism was associated with contemporary developments of science,
there can be no doubt that science has considered concrete observations
as more real than any generalizations. Its philosophy is nominalism and
relativism.

In this aspect science resembles politics. Both are pragmatic and rela-
tivistic. Absolutists like Hitler and Stalin seek to eliminate politics by
subordinating all parties to one, and to eliminate science by subordinat-
ing all investigators to the party line. Both science and politics assume
the virtue of free competition of ideas and policies in the market place
of discussion. They accept the concept of free speech enunciated by
Mr. Justice Holmes.

But while acknowledging this resemblance between science and poli-
tics one must be aware of the difficulties of making scientific generaliza-
tions about political behavior. Political situations and problems are so
complex that they cannot be exhaustively analyzed. They depend upon
information rather than upon energy. New information from distant or
remote places, from ancient history or from the other side of the world,
may at any moment inject itself into a political situation in a way
which could not be anticipated. As the means of communication, as the
recording of history, and as the advance of science itself proceed, the
complexity of political situations becomes greater and the possibility of
exhaustive analysis less. Any formulation of constants and variables in
a political situation is therefore necessarily incomplete. Unknown or
hitherto non-existent factors are likely to be influential and to frustrate
the best documented expectations. Even the known conditions in any
society are so complicated that it is usually wisest to confine particular
formulations of political science to limited areas and periods within
which it is reasonable to assume that the general conditions of opinion,
of attitude, and of culture will not change. These conditions are the
parameters of most generalizations in political science, making such
generalizations imperfectly transferable from one country to another or
from one civilization to another.

A particular difficulty arises from the advance of science itself. Planets
and atoms are not influenced in their behavior by the generalizations
of Newton or Einstein, but human beings are influenced in their be-
havior by the predictions of political science. The continuous stream of new political knowledge affects the behavior of the society which is the subject matter of that knowledge. Consequently generalizations made in political science may make or break themselves in accordance with the influence they exert upon the groups and persons whose behavior they seek to predict or control. As impartial analysts, political scientists must, therefore, include as a variable in their equations this "feed back" of the developing science itself upon the behavior which the science generalizes.

As citizens, political scientists must take cognizance of the influence which their generalizations will have upon the values to which they are committed. This is true even of physical scientists. The atomic scientists have appreciated that as citizens they should hesitate to place dangerous weapons in the hands of immature politicians. The problem is however exaggerated in political science. Valid instruction on how man may be manipulated to achieve political ends may aid tyrants to destroy human dignity and freedom.

Closely related to this consideration is the fact that controlled experiments, and even certain types of investigation, are inhibited by the moral and democratic principle that man is an end, and should not be made a means to any end, even the end of scientific advance. The West was properly shocked at the disclosures at Nuremberg of the extent to which Nazi medical scientists had used human beings as guinea pigs. Communist social scientists are utilizing human guinea pigs on an even larger scale. The entire communist state may be regarded as a huge human experiment to test methods by which men can be induced to conform to a plan imposed upon them.

These considerations suggest that political science and political practice must, as maintained by Mannheim, go hand in hand. Provisional conclusions of political science have to be tested by political practice, but in free and democratic societies, the only practices which are permissible are those which all the available evidence indicates will make toward the good society. In such a society practices can only be accepted which are supported mainly by consent and which require coercion only in rare cases. Consequently commitment to values and application of scientific generalizations must proceed together. The objectivity of the natural sciences which means that the scientist, as such, dissociates himself from human values, is impossible in political science. The political scientist cannot experiment to see whether the methods which, according to scientific prediction, will destroy a society with his values or produce a society with different values, will really do so. He can only experiment in maintaining the values in which he believes, and
he cannot experiment at all until he has persuaded the people who will be involved that these values are sound and that his prescriptions for maintaining them are reliable.

I have perhaps expanded too much on the nature of politics and science. I justify myself by the observation that both terms are controversial. One finds persons who assume that politics can be neither wise nor efficient unless the politician is guided by absolute values. There are likewise persons who associate science with a view of the universe as an absolute system of unchanging laws. To such persons, what I have to say may sound like nonsense. But if political science means what I think it does, I believe it can contribute to improving the present unsatisfactory state of the world.

Doubtless there are many American citizens and many officials in the Department of State and the Department of Defense who look to political science for advice on how to make sure that our side will win. I have no doubt that political science can give such advice on matters of organization, administration, and strategy. But as citizens of this country and of the world, I think political scientists should consider whether and to what extent they should give that advice.

They are faced by the same problem which faced the atomic scientists in contributing the atom bomb to our war effort. There is only too much reason to anticipate that concerted and effective efforts to assure that the United States would be in a position to win if a war should break out will encourage equally concerted efforts on the part of the advisers of the Soviet Union to make sure that the Soviet Union will win. The consequence is likely to be a war in which both will lose. I do not mean by this to dissuade political scientists from a reasonable interest in national defense. I certainly do not want the United States to lose if a war should occur. The question is, however, whether as political scientists we should not place prime emphasis upon means whereby the political struggle can be moderated and developed in such a way that neither side will lose. Victory by the United States after an atomic war would certainly not be of any particular advantage either to us or to the world. If, therefore, we are considering whether political science can do something to improve the present unsatisfactory situation of the world, we must raise our sights somewhat higher than national victory. What can political science do to increase the probability that the political struggles going on in the world will utilize only methods consistent with human dignity and human progress?

I believe that more general education in political science would be one such contribution. It is my experience that such an education tends to develop a spirit of moderation and to qualify the natural human
disposition toward doctrinalism and intolerance. It is hard to see how a political scientist can be either a Nazi or a Communist. The spirit of compromise and relativism inherent in political science, the appreciation of the relativity of means to ends and of ends to means can, I think, be a protection against absolutistic beliefs whether of the right or of the left, of the church or of the state.

Political science can also, I believe, contribute to an understanding of the nature of the world community. Political scientists understand the role of the external enemy—the "out-group"—in creating the solidarity of the state and they consequently appreciate that the world community, necessarily lacking such an "out-group," must differ from lesser political communities.

Political scientists also understand the role of common culture, common religion, common history, common language, and common nationality in contributing to the solidarity of the state. They realize that the world community, with its tremendous variety on all of these points, must be different from the national state. Recalling the history of crusades and aggressions seeking to establish a universal religion, a universal culture, or a universal ideology, they anticipate that this variety will continue for a long time. They therefore tend to conceive the problem of a world society as adjustment of the diverse rather than conversion of all to uniformity.

Conversant with the history of political constitutions, political scientists appreciate that political machinery which works is always a compromise between effectiveness and acceptability. Rationally perfect utopias that would alter the traditional practices of people and step upon innumerable vested interests are not likely to win sufficient acceptance to be given effect except through methods of mass coercion. The problem is not only to win consent of the leaders, but also to win consent of the masses who are to be governed. That consent is affected by numerous factors other than the logical perfection of a proposed constitution.

The political scientist therefore who remembers his Burke, as well as his Rousseau, is likely to envisage the improvement of the world's constitution, not as action to realize a plan, but as a process of development. Action to realize a plan assumes in proportion as the plan is detailed and comprehensive that politics has been eliminated within the community. A plan is a prescription for realizing a goal. Those engaged in implementing it assume that both the ends and means which it prescribes have ceased to be controversial. Their problem is, therefore, administration, not politics. Politics exists only when ends or means are controversial. Consequently, politics implies that all plans are tempo-
rary, limited and flexible, that new plans continually emerge, have their
day, and succumb to other plans as new parties come into power. Action
to realize a plan implies the persistence of one party at least for the
period of time for which the plan is made. Such action involves com-
pulsion and denial of freedom in proportion as the community is large
and heterogeneous, and as the plan is comprehensive in the aspects of life
it covers and precise in respect to goals, methods and timing. Political
scientists, therefore, are likely to be skeptical of planning in proportion
as the plan is long in duration, wide in area, comprehensive in coverage
and precise in means, ends, and timing. Consequently they think of
the world order not as a plan but as a developing process, and they
are willing to take one step at a time anticipating that if one step in
the right direction is taken it will be easier to win sufficient consent
for the next step. The cold war has arisen because inconsistent plans
for the world as a whole have emerged from different capitals. The effort
to plan for a group as lacking in solidarity and integration as the world
community results in the elaboration by many parties of many universal
but inconsistent plans. Efforts to realize them all means global war.

Political science may contribute not only to the development of at-
titudes of moderation but also to the encouragement of ingenuity in
proposing practical compromises. Perhaps the most important of such
compromises is that between the policies which are suggested for the
realization of our national values and those which are appropriate to
realize the values of a stable and peaceful world order. More concretely
the problem can be posed: Shall we utilize the United Nations for the
purpose of forwarding American policies? Or shall we make the de-
velopment and effectiveness of the United Nations the first considera-
tion of American policy? I do not quarrel with the effort to realize
democratic values and human rights through the United Nations. Such
values are the essence, not only of American democracy, but also of the
United Nations. But if the United Nations is utilized as a means for
augmenting our prestige and power above that of the Soviet Union, we
may be weakening the United Nations itself.

Debates in the United Nations provide many opportunities for dis-
covering common values which are shared by all its members. There are
values which are shared by the people of the United States and the
people of the Soviet Union and, wherever the political process discloses
them, political invention may devise cooperative efforts for achieving
them. The barriers to communication across the iron curtain, the failure
of direct contact among peoples at each side of it, the doubt on each
side of the reliability of information from the other side, the refusal of
the Soviet Union to join Unesco and other of the Specialized Agencies,
present obstacles to understanding and cooperation. These obstacles make it all the more important to utilize the United Nations to the utmost. Political conflict is always less dangerous when the parties engaged in it are also engaged in political cooperation. The political scientist can contribute by continually recalling that the national policies of the United States are relative to the world policies of the United Nations, that these policies may at times appear to be conflicting, and that compromises must be made, if a world is to develop that is at the same time sufficiently varied to be progressive and sufficiently stable to be peaceful.

Political scientists should be particularly adept at drawing attention to the different levels at which political problems may be examined. As between the United States and the Soviet Union, the bi-polar rivalry seems implacable. If one fixes his gaze at this level, the impression of fateful tragedy is difficult to avoid. But both of these great groups are composed of many sub-groups, themselves composed of men and women. If no solution can be found at the international level, perhaps it would be well to focus attention at the sociological or the psychological level. May not the developing hardness, integration, solidarity, and implacability of these great structures be reduced? May not the United States and the Soviet Union simultaneously soften and pacify through changes in the relations of the sub-groups or in the minds of the men and women which compose them? May not both Americans and Russians become more world citizens and less nationalists? The difficulty of the problem lies in the necessity that it be solved simultaneously in both countries. A softening United States would be smashed by a hardening Soviet Union, but if both softened simultaneously, communication between the populations would be easier, understanding would be facilitated, cooperation would increase, tensions would diminish, and war would be less likely.

The hardness of these huge structures rests on the exclusiveness and intensity of the loyalties of the masses of their populations, and these loyalties are exaggerated by widespread expectations of inevitable victory or of inevitable war. In exclusive and intense loyalties there is danger for, as the psychoanalysts tell us, such loyalties can develop only if ambivalent feelings are resolved by displacement of hate upon an "out-group." An individual with many divergent loyalties may often live in quandary and sometimes in unhappiness. If some of the divergent loyalties are intense he may even become frustrated and either aggressive or neurotic. We must conclude that in a good society loyalties are neither exclusive nor excessively intense. A group composed of men
and women each with many loyalties, which are so moderate that conflicts among them can be compromised in each individual mind, is less dangerous and more stable than a group, each member of which maintains an exclusive loyalty to his group, building its power, hardening its policy, converting it from a rational association into an irrational mob eager for the blood of the "out-group" selected as a scapegoat.

It was this insight, as well as appreciation of the civilizing influence of the contact of different ideas and cultures, that induced Lord Acton, in the heyday of nationalism and long before the time of Freud, to regard "The theory of nationality as a retrograde step in history." "States," he said, "in which no mixture of races has occurred are imperfect; and those in which its effects have disappeared are decrepit. A state which is incompetent to satisfy different races condemns itself; a state which labors to neutralize, to absorb, or to expel them, destroys its own vitality; a state which does not include them is destitute of the chief basis of self government."

In our complicated world each human mind must continually synthesize the claims of family, nation, church, business, cultural associations, local community, and world society. That is the meaning and price of liberty and peace in a diverse but shrinking world. A world with millions of small conflicts in the minds of individuals and in the discussions of small groups is likely to be more peaceful and prosperous than a world divided into two opposing groups each of which commands the exclusive, intense, and blind obedience of its population.

The political scientist can contribute to attitudes of moderation and formulae of conciliation. Can he also contribute a picture, however vague, of the complex of values and relationships which might ameliorate the tensions of diverse and conflicting nations and alliances in the world? If men must be world citizens as well as national citizens, what picture of the world can command some of their loyalties, however diverse their cultures, economies, and governments?

A picture will not command interest unless some relationship among, and some organization of, its parts is evident to the observer. So the picture of a peaceful and progressive world must include much world communication linking its parts and some world organization realizing its purposes. There can not be one world unless every people can and does talk to every other, and unless there is some system, however decentralized, by which decisions, authoritative for all, can be made on matters vital to all. All political scientists recognize the roles of communication and organization in the design of a good society. Do they also recognize that some uniformity of tone and some unity of idea are
as necessary in a good society as they are in a good picture? In a peaceful and progressive world some behavior patterns must be standardized and some objectives must attract the cooperation of all.

Doubtless there is a universal human nature, deriving not only from biological drives which man shares with lower animals, and from common experiences which all have encountered in infancy, but also from certain necessary relations of the individual to society which all adults and all cultures must take into account. To assure a maximum satisfaction of these demands of human nature is the object of constitutional bills of rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recently promulgated by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The abstract terms of the latter instrument must be applied to concrete situations and its meaning must be widely understood if it is to assist men everywhere spontaneously to understand one another.

If, however, emphasis is laid only upon what men have in common the variety of the world will be lost. There must also be an understanding, a tolerance, and even an appreciation by each people of the distinctive aspects of the cultures of others. Each must recognize, not only that all cultures, however much they differ, spring from a common human nature, but also that all, by their very diversity, have something to contribute to the world. Such an appreciation is difficult to achieve because people tend to be parochial minded. Each culture tends to judge others by its own values. But variety must enter into the picture of the world which every man carries in his mind, if the actual world is to be peaceful and desirable.

There must be more than understanding, tolerance, and appreciation for other cultures. There must be some loyalty to the whole. Men must synthesize national loyalty with world loyalty and this is hardly possible unless the world, in addition to symbolizing the common elements in mankind, is symbolized by something as concrete as the United Nations. But such a symbol can not long inspire loyalty unless it represents active and effective cooperation for specific ends which all people regard as valuable. It cannot be anticipated that the diverse people of the world will agree upon ultimate ends. Such ends are the final synthesis of an individual’s experience. In proportion as groups become large and peoples diverse, differences among individuals in regard to ultimate ends are to be anticipated. Cooperation for limited and temporary objectives which all deem of value is, however, possible and such cooperation can ameliorate the political struggles which develop around differences in regard to values of higher level.

Men must picture the world as a varied population with symbolic unity, the parts of which are related by systems of communication and
organization, and the members of which are standardized in some patterns of behavior and are cooperating to realize some common objectives. But above all they must see that the picture is moving. New inventions, technologies and ideas are continually changing it. The processes of communication, organization, standardization and cooperation are changing at differing rates. Tension and perhaps war occurs when development of one part, one system, or one process gets too far ahead or too far behind the others. Continuous measurement of rates of change and intelligent interventions to accelerate here, or retard there, are required, if the dynamic equilibrium is to be stable, and if the human drama is to be satisfying to the participant-observers.

A community varied, interesting, and deserving of affection; a society active and effective in achieving particular policies, vague in ultimate ideals and values; a dynamic equilibrium resulting from complex relationships of cooperation and opposition; a process by which the inertia of history, and the aspirations and inventions of genius continually interact to create the future—this may be the best meaning to attribute to "one-world."

In the task of understanding, developing and regulating such a dynamic, complex, stable, and peaceful world, political science needs the cooperation of the other social disciplines, psychology, sociology, economics, geography, anthropology, law. All of these have been coming together in a new discipline of international relations, but the science of politics is at the heart of this discipline. That science rests upon the assumption that conflict and cooperation are both of the essence of human society and are necessary for stability and progress. Its investigations contribute to the practice of the art of politics at all levels, local, national, and world. Its students tend to manifest the virtues of compromise, tolerance, balance, and sanity, which our world, distracted by the peddlers of nostrums and utopias, sorely needs.