THE RÔLE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE*

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Custom has decreed that the president of this Association, as almost his final act before leaving his briefly-held office, shall deliver an address to those of his colleagues who are hardy enough to assemble to hear him. In this address he endeavors to give something of his best thought concerning some political question. Thereby he generally contrives, also, to convey to his fellow-members something of a feeling of corporate unity and a sense of professional direction.

As my thoughts have turned recently toward the consideration of political science as a whole, as a unified discipline, and as a factor in the government of man, I thought I would discuss with you the question of the rôle of political science in the conduct and preservation of what we now call democratic government.

Standing before you a year ago, President Frederic Austin Ogg spoke thoughtfully and with eloquence of American democracy after the war. He directed his remarks in part to the gloomy predictions of various speculative writers who prophesy the end in our age of democracy and constitutional government. With masterly competence, he showed that the modern trend toward strong executive leadership is not at all the same as a drift into dictatorship. In the United States this trend primarily means that the executive office is being developed to fulfil its true function in a democracy that intends to become stronger, more active, and more efficient. The democracy of the United States is persistently, and

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at times rapidly, leaving behind it the swaddling clothes and leading strings of its early laissez-faire policy. Today it deals vigorously with important social and economic issues. It endeavors to round out the concept of democracy so as to include the social and economic as well as the political phases, and to extend the bill of rights by underwriting the claims of common men to remunerative employment, a share in the management of industry, social security, and new protections for health and home. This democracy of ours may even be learning, if it has not already learned, that no nation can live unto itself. If there is to be a free world of free nations, American democracy must have a positive program of international action, and be prepared to shoulder its part of the responsibility for world-wide order and decency. For all these new purposes, the people of the United States need, and are now developing, a type of popular leadership that is forthright, vigorous, and still, by deliberate preference, democratic.

In short, President Ogg’s address was both robust and optimistic. It was the answer of a careful scholar to the fearsome imaginings of a limited number of publicists who are more vocal than learned, and who on every occasion predict the downfall of American democracy. In preparing and delivering it, President Ogg was performing one of the most important functions of the political scientist, the cool, objective analysis of political trends and ideas. Let us have more such addresses in the future!

As I read his address some weeks afterwards, it occurred to me that this was not only President Ogg speaking to us. His own contribution was truly substantial, yet behind him must be the works and the thoughts of many, many others. Speaking through him were not only his contemporaries here and abroad, not alone his immediate ancestors and teachers, but a whole line of students of politics back at least to Aristotle and Plato. The literature of American politics alone is already rich and extensive, yet behind it and around it lies an even vaster store of political writing and analysis, the fruit of many centuries and many lands.

Thinking of the awe-inspiring lapse of ages since Plato, one of the first political scientists, wrote down his pregnant thoughts, and of the great literature concerned with human government that has been produced since he taught Aristotle and other young men in his Academy, I felt again a great thankfulness for the inventions of
writing and of printing, which preserve and help to disseminate the ideas of great men. For today in any good library we can refresh ourselves with the living thoughts of the outstanding political thinkers of all recorded time. Alongside the literature of religion and philosophy, of drama, story, and poetry, stands the literature of human aspirations in government and politics, one of the most priceless possessions in the hands of men. There is about it a certain timeless quality, since all its writers, in their different lands and times, have really been discussing the same questions. There is about it, too, an uplifting quality, since they have taken us up to high places to survey the whole scene of human efforts to achieve justice, equity, efficient government, and humane public policies.

Scanning again some parts of this great literature, embodying its ageless debate on the best government for man, I could imagine myself at one end of the long corridor of time, listening in on the discussion of wise men. At the far end of the hall Plato was saying that justice is the purpose of state action, but that justice can be achieved only if every man is assigned to do the work for which he is best fitted. Voices nearer to me said that this sounded very much like the efficiency doctrines of modern students of public administration. But when Plato went on to say that men are by nature divided into several distinct classes and that fables and propaganda should be used to keep them in their places so that only philosophers would rule, I heard protests from many rooms along the hall. Many voices insisted that men are by nature equal, or so nearly equal that the differences are less important than the points of equality, and that all should have some part in rulership.

Aristotle then took up the argument, saying he largely agreed with the critics of Plato. But we must approach the question scientifically and systematically. There are, he said, three forms of government, and each has its good and its bad sub-varieties. First comes the government of one man, next the government of the few, and finally the government of the many. Not so, said James Bryce, far toward my end of the corridor. There is but one form of government, the government of the few.

So the debate continued, moving now in this direction, now in that, but always adding something to our knowledge, opening new vistas to thought, developing ever farther the interrelations of men and institutions, and approaching a fuller understanding of prob-
lems of human government. Some of the voices were bland, urbane, and philosophical, like those of Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Montesquieu, and Madison. Others were tense and fiery, like those of Rousseau, Paine, and Marx. Machiavelli and Hamilton seemed hard and cynical, yet coldly logical. De Toqueville was sadly pessimistic. Some, like Thomas Aquinas and Calvin, were motivated by high religious and moral purpose, while others took the scientific approach and said: "First let us look at the facts and see how they fit together." The discussion was at a high level throughout, for no grander secular theme is possible than that of human government, and no greater thinkers than these have ever lived.

Naturally I could hear and understand better the voices that spoke near the end of the hall where I stood. Not far away were Jefferson, Lieber, and Burgess, spanning a whole century, and still nearer Frank Goodnow, William Dunning, James Bryce, and Woodrow Wilson—not to mention any of the masters who still dwell among us. Their speech was practical, searching, and timely, yet it had about it a quality that no ravages of time could wholly obliterate. They digressed now and then into other paths, but mainly they dealt with the question of understanding and strengthening the American system of democratic government. In so doing, they showed how their own studies in political parties, public opinion, pressure groups, local government, public administration, legislation, and foreign policy could open new and fruitful avenues of study to those who would follow them.

As I listened and heard developed one phase after another of the whole problem of human government, I began to feel a new pride in American political science. In the whole sweep of time since Plato, our Association, which is not yet forty years old, has occupied but one-sixtieth of the time. If the centuries that have passed since Plato wrote can be compared to an hour, then fifty-nine minutes of it had already elapsed before our Association came upon the scene. And if we take the whole of the estimated period of human life upon the earth, some two million years or more, then we in this Association have had for our work but a single minute in a period of at least five or six weeks.

Despite the brevity of their effort as measured by time, the American people have made most outstanding contributions to the
practice of good government, and American students of government have made unrivaled additions to the knowledge of political science. To read over the names of the leading members of this Association during the past thirty-eight years is to read the names of many internationally recognized masters in their fields. To list their major works is to present a bibliography of some of the best contributions of all times.

What have been the factors that have made possible this rich flowering of political studies in the United States? First we may mention the existence of conditions in which neither church nor state has been dominant over all aspects of social life. We of the present generation have been the fortunate inheritors of an unusual measure of social and economic liberty. The constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion, speech, and press have all been ours. Closely associated with these have been the benefits of a developing system of popular government that has held forth unrivaled opportunities for the political participation, training, and experience of every citizen, and for the observations of the scholar. In counting up our blessings, neither should we forget the wealth of natural resources that made possible an ever-rising standard of living, and the widespread support of education up through the universities. To all these conditions let us add the generally hopeful outlook on life of the American people, their tolerance, their belief in progress, and their willingness to make and to permit numerous political and social innovations and inventions. Some of these would hardly have been possible in countries that were older, poorer, and more bound by tradition and the rigidities of a fixed class structure. No country in the world has been more favorable to the rise of the social sciences, and of political science in particular. In no country is there such a large number of teachers in colleges and universities devoting their time to these disciplines. Even so, and granting all these relative advantages, the very substantial achievements of American political science did not come without a great deal of imagination, courage, and hard work.

In short, we are the beneficiaries not only of a great political science tradition and literature from Plato to the present, not only of a set of conditions that have made possible the flowering of our subject here as in no other land, but also of the devoted and capable labors of hundreds of American statesmen and scholars who for at
least two hundred years have been adding significant works to the increasing and improving literature of political science. Let us think of ourselves, therefore, as united with all the ages. We are the stewards of a noble estate, the trustees of a great tradition.

Thirty-eight years ago our American predecessors in the study of political science accepted the trusteeship for advancing the study of political science in the United States. Though few in number, they struck out boldly and formed their own scientific and professional Association. How wise was their decision is recorded not only in the increased roll of members, but also in the great achievements of the Association and of many of its individual members. The stewardship that they accepted now rests squarely upon us. What was, then, the nature of the rôle that they visualized for political science in the United States? And what is that rôle today?

In what follows I have tried to make explicit what I believe is implicit in the actions and decisions of our founders and in the discussions and changes that have taken place in American political science since their time. If I have in any way misinterpreted the rôle of political science in American democracy, I trust that more learned and wiser men will find ways of correcting what I say.

The first and most comprehensive obligation of political scientists as scientists is to do what they can to understand, describe, and explain those forms and principles of government that provide the maximum freedom for the human spirit, and as citizens to do all that they are capable of to ensure and preserve those principles. In our day, this means defending to the utmost the essentials of responsible popular government and the constitutional provisions that guarantee freedom of religion, speech, and press. The United States and the other democracies among the Allied Nations are today the sole hope of human freedom, religion, and science. Darkness has already descended upon central Europe. The light of true learning has flickered out there except in a few weak and threatened neutral nations, where it burns with candle-light dimness. Such a thing as untrammeled, objective search for truth in any branch of knowledge has been destroyed in all the Axis nations and in the lands that they have conquered. The preservation of human freedom is the greatest immediate goal for the united democracies, and the continuing obligation of all men of good will. Political scien-
tists find today that their obligations as scientists and as citizens are so nearly in accord as to be practically indistinguishable. As best they can, they must show how popular governments should be organized and operated to ensure victory in the present battle for freedom, and to guarantee that the fruits of victory shall not be lost in the years to come.

In a sense, this merely states a broad goal for all political science activities. At the same time, it is not the only goal of our activities. Very few will be satisfied merely to preserve existing human rights and forms of government. They wish to see improvements made, to see rights extended and freedom enlarged, not only here but throughout the world. Democratic government has not yet reached the peak of its efficiency, or gone as far as it can in promoting human well-being.

These necessary changes and improvements in government may well be conceded, but is it not still true that the real goal is human welfare? Is not man himself the measure of the success of any government? If improvement is made, is it not measurable only in the morality, health, education, freedom, initiative, and general sturdiness and viability of the people? As I read the record, political science is not primarily interested in making the state powerful or efficient, or in extending the scope of government activity. These things may be necessary or desirable instrumentally, as means for perfecting men, but not as ends in themselves. It is the good life for men that is the true goal, and that implies the building up in man himself of character, intelligence, and a sense of public responsibility.

Toward the attainment of this broad goal, what are the specific responsibilities of political scientists? It is the burden of my argument that we have certain special obligations, an integrated cluster of duties, that we cannot shift to others. Economists, historians, and sociologists—lawyers, judges, legislators, public administrators, journalists, and politicians—all have their own important work to do in relation to government; but it is not the same as ours, although it impinges upon us. Our own specific functions may be grouped under four heads:

In the first place, most of us are directly, and all of us are indirectly, teachers. Like Plato and Aristotle and many others of our distinguished forerunners, down through Woodrow Wilson and
into our own time, we are responsible for teaching our fellow citizens the principles and the methods of free and popular government. As no other group, we have the golden opportunity to teach and train men and women for the service of the state. In helping as largely as we do to teach citizens the principles and processes of government, we are helping to mold the government itself as it is to be ten or twenty years hence. As we face our classes, we should never fail to remind ourselves that any one of these students may be a future governor of the state, another a senator or representative in Congress, that one or more may become judges, and that others will participate directly in public administration.

Of our responsibility as teachers there are at least two distinct phases. By many persons we are looked upon as teachers of citizenship and community responsibility in a very general way. Somehow it is thought that the instruction of college undergraduates, and even of high school students, in government or political science is identical with instruction in citizenship. What we teach should be, indeed, the heart of the subject if we perform our task properly, but the distinction between the two things should be most clearly indicated, and our rôle be correctly understood. Every citizen needs considerable knowledge of the government of his own country and of government in general. That knowledge we political scientists endeavor to impart. This is, indeed, one of our special functions.

But instruction in the responsibilities of citizenship generally is a much broader thing. It involves many, if not all, aspects of life. It is taught incidentally in courses in philosophy, ethics, history, economics, sociology, literature, and many others. It is a joint responsibility of the home, the school, the church, the community, and of many disciplines in higher education. It cannot be borne by political scientists alone, nor simply at the college level.

The problem of citizenship-training in our time is quite unlike that which Plato and Aristotle confronted. In their small city states, where only a small part of the people had citizenship, the numbers who needed to be taught the obligations of citizenship were relatively few, and the education given was at the same time training for the public service. Aristotle defined the citizen as one who takes part in the deliberative and judicial administration of his state. Moreover, he and Plato taught only small groups of men, kept them a long time in their schools, and tried to cover with them the entire curriculum. They were trying to educate men in all
arts and sciences in order to produce philosophers who could be kings. We in our departments of political science are responsible for only a small part of the curriculum, and we have most of our students for but a short time. We must not fail to remind our colleagues in other departments, therefore, that, while they have no duty to teach the principles of government as such, they share with us the responsibility of teaching the ethics of citizenship, objectivity in judgment, and social responsibility in general.

The other aspect of our teaching problem is that of further educating and training the relatively small number of more advanced students in methods of research and teaching, in the several branches of politics and public administration, and in the foreign service, to any one of which they may be admitted. At this point our teaching needs to be far more technical and detailed. There are many ways in which the work of government can be made more effective and economical, and many ways in which public administration in practice falls short of the ideal. It is difficult for the teacher who knows these things not to grow impatient and to impart some of his impatience to his students. The clumsy ways and low standards that so often prevail in democratic administration are always an easy target for cynical comment. It is not surprising, therefore, that some few graduates of training programs in public administration would like to brush away all democratic controls and get on to the streamlining of government. Here is a potential danger against which the teacher of public administration needs to be ever alert. Speed, efficiency, streamlining are not the only tests of good administration in a democracy. Transcending them all in importance is the preservation of popular government itself. That is the first principle for the student of public administration to learn.

A second major obligation of the political scientist is that of direct service to the government. Specific studies into problems of everyday government, including politics, administration, and intergovernmental relations, and a habit of taking broad and responsible views in public affairs, make the political scientist peculiarly valuable in certain advisory and technical consultant capacities in government. Several writers have expressed great pessimism and disappointment because politicians, legislators, and administrators make so little use of political scientists as advisers, while utilizing economists and other specialists extensively. It has been my own
observation that the fault, if any, lies as much on our side as on the
other, but that on the whole the situation is rapidly improving.
Political scientists are, in fact, being consulted more and more.
City, state, and national governments are all tapping this source
of advice and information, and are constantly coming back for
more. Indeed the science of politics is already suffering because so
many of our able colleagues are so much engaged in doing public
work. We have unquestionably an obligation to give whatever we
can of our knowledge and counsel when called upon by responsible
public officials, and the direct contacts thus made with practical
public questions are very important for every political scientist.
But it is unfortunate that the talents of first-rate scholars in politics
often come to be taken up with routine and unimportant work.
With all our rising numbers, there are not too many of us engaged
in the essential research and thinking that are needed to push for-
ward the boundaries of knowledge in political science. It is often
questionable, too, whether any particular scholar in our discipline
would not be serving his nation and his science far better by holding
a more detached position, one close to, but outside of, the govern-
ment. This is a question that every individual needs to ponder and
to answer for himself.

Those who do leave their teaching for public positions can still
render invaluable aid to our science. They can be of great assistance
to students and teachers by opening doors and clearing the ways
for the latter when they wish to make their first-hand studies of
government. Then, too, they can often, with a little effort, see to it
that their own agencies establish intelligent practices of record-
keeping and publication for the benefit of scholars now and in the
future. And finally it is to be hoped that some of them will take
the time and expend the energy needed to write down for later
publication their own inside observations on government in action.
There are in the United States all too few first-rate political and
administrative autobiographies.

In our direct services to the government and the community, as
well as in our capacity as scientists, we have, in the third place,
opportunities for political invention, and for the installation and ob-
servation of such inventions. To put it in another way, there are
many times when we can conduct genuine experiments in politics
and administration. I refer in this connection to such recent inno-
vations as municipal home rule, city manager government, modern
budgeting, central purchasing, improved methods of training and recruitment for the public service, public planning, administrative reorganization, legislative and judicial councils, the League of Nations, the Permanent Court of International Justice, and new forms of international administration. How much political scientists have had to do with inventing, developing, propagating, observing, and reporting upon such new devices it would be hard to say, but certainly it has been a great deal. More than any other learned profession, we have been participants in the making of many of these experiments. Political science is not simply a propaganda for any of these promising innovations. When political scientists help to introduce any one of them into their own nation or locality, it is not only because they think the change will do some good and advance the cause of better government. That is certainly an important motivation, but in addition every true scientist among us looks upon the innovation as an experiment that must be watched and reported upon to the ends that still further improvements may be made, knowledge may be extended, and the cause of better government may be advanced.

This reference to political invention and experimentation brings us directly to our fourth group of functions, our inescapable obligations as scientists. It is as scientists that we approach our full stature. It is as an organization of scientists that our Association will stand or fall. Our specific functions in this regard cannot be too often repeated.

First I would name the observation, analysis, and criticism of the organizations and institutions that carry on, or that affect in some important way, the government of the people. What are these institutions? How do they work? Do they promote or retard man's struggle toward such goals as justice and freedom? This work of observation and analysis must center itself in, but cannot limit itself to, those institutions that are strictly governmental. Great private aggregations like pressure groups, political parties, trade unions, the public press, and churches, have immeasurable influence on the functioning of government. The study must be a continuous one, because we can never be sure but that, at the very time when things seem to be going most smoothly, disturbing but undetected changes are not taking place. Few though we be, we must serve as sentinels to give warning and true description of the political and governmental changes that are taking place. Mon-
tesquieu might have done much better by all people if he had accurately described the British government in his time.

Closely related to these things are the analysis and criticism of the broad policies of governments, parties, and men in public life. We are engaged in studying something that is alive and in action. It is a government of parties and men as well as of laws and institutions. The general policies of public men and political parties may well be dangerous to the institutions and the final goals of the community. They must not go unexamined. This does not imply that the political scientist as such should step down into the political arena to make attacks upon public men, or that he is to concern himself with all the smaller acts of governments. His true rôle is to be impersonal and objective, to consider the broader phases of public policy, to discuss issues as issues, and to be the teacher of leaders and public officials as well as of citizens.

Then, too, there are the political ideas that are put forth from time to time—good ideas, bad ideas, nostrums, panaceas. Some are the products of the careful thought and study of intelligent men of good will. Others are the well-camouflaged designs of sinister, self-seeking interests. Many are just the dizzy speculations of irresponsible and inexperienced dreamers. All must be examined, tested, ventilated, and exposed for what they are. If we did nothing more than this, our work would not be in vain.

But while we are examining the political ideas and policies of others we must not fail to examine closely our own. We have a number of basic assumptions that affect our thinking and our scientific methods. We assume the dignity and the infinite value of each individual human being. We act on the belief that man is essentially a rational animal, with capacity for education and perfectibility. We assume that popular or democratic government will in the long run bring the race of men closest to the desired goal of justice and freedom. I have made these assumptions myself and would defend them, because I believe they have been thoroughly tested.

Nevertheless, even these assumptions need to be questioned, and still more so do certain others. What right have we, for example, to assume that a highly active, powerful national government will in the long run be amenable to popular control? Where is the experience and what are the reasons upon which this assumption is based? Further, can we safely postulate that a government that
provides the greatest personal security will also be one that guarantees maximum liberty? Again, how do we know that a governmental policy of raising the standard of living ever higher and higher is really in the long-run interest of man? How do we know that it will not undermine the vigor and fertility of the race and even produce race suicide? What price high standards of living if the very nations that enjoy them do not even desire to perpetuate their own kind, while those in poorer circumstances grow apace?

Out of all our questionings, studies, and analyses, the public and the scientific world in general not unreasonably expect that we will steadily develop and perfect a body of knowledge and generalizations that may be called the principles of political science, and that will actually serve the statesman and the citizen. Intelligent men will not expect from us a body of precepts having the accuracy of those in physics or chemistry; for, as Aristotle has said, "it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subjects admits." Nevertheless we shall have no acceptable excuse or defense if we fail to make the most of our materials and opportunities.

As I survey the works of recent American writers in our field, it has surprised me that so few have written books that attempt to state systematically the principles of political science. Although many other disciplines have evidenced the same tendency, this charge cannot be made as forcefully against economists, sociologists, or natural scientists within their respective fields. But if there is an excess of books on the principles of economics or of chemistry, there is a great dearth of them in political science. Are we suffering from undue modesty, is our subject too vast to be summarized in one treatise, or are we permitting our preoccupation with particular subjects to prevent us from at least attempting to recapitulate the main principles of politics? The question is an important one because our fellow-citizens have a right to expect us to perform this essential task. And if we do not do this work scientifically, there are many others who are willing to, and who do, undertake it unscientifically.

With respect to the scope of the subject to be surveyed in such a book of principles, James Bryce and Henry Jones Ford, discussing this question in the early years of this Association, both concluded that a very wide view of the subject is essential. Bryce urged that men deal with questions in government broadly, in their relations
to other things. He in effect argued that the total situation should
be appraised, and that the answers to questions should be pursued
in any and every direction where pertinent and significant data
could be found. If asked what limit to set to an investigation, he
would reply, "No limit."

Some of us American political scientists need, I might suggest,
a more comprehensive view of our subject. A purely American
political science is just as impossible as a distinctly American
science of chemistry. Political authority exists everywhere that
men are found throughout the world. It has existed at least since
the beginnings of recorded time. Anthropologists have found forms
of law and government among the most primitive peoples, and
biologists have described systems of social organization among
animals and insects. The latter may not add much to our knowledge
of human government, but they suggest interesting possibilities
concerning origins.

But that is not all. There is evidence, too, that we have con-
strued too narrowly the term "political." One of my colleagues
has shown in a very thoughtful article how few American political
scientists have dealt in significant ways with the economic factors
and forces in politics. Despite the development of ever-closer rela-
tions between the state and the economic order, and the steady
rise of a new political economy, we in general continue to neglect
this area except, for example, in descriptive books on government
regulation of business and in a few books on pressure groups. This
subject, along with such crucial questions as fiscal policy, public
budgeting, monetary and banking policy in relation to the state,
and the rôle of labor and agriculture in politics, are conspicuous
only by their almost complete absence from such books as we have
on the elements of political science. Other subjects of transcendent
importance that have been largely neglected in recent treatises on
politics are the rôle of war and conquest and the place of the mili-
tary establishment in modern government. To venture into the
study of these fields requires both imagination and courage, yet
what are these but the very hallmarks of the fertile scientific mind?

Here, too, it is not amiss to reëmphasize another aspect of our
responsibility. It is that of trying to see things whole, or to see the
thing we are studying in its significant relations to all other things.
Other sciences may appropriately be more analytical and abstract,
each dealing with a phase or a part of nature. It is the function of
political science to integrate, to synthesize, and to show things in proper balance. It considers the good of man as a whole. Advertising again to Aristotle, this seems to be what he had in mind when he spoke of politics as "the most authoritative art and that which is truly the master art." It is politics, he pointed out, "that ordains which of the sciences should be studied in a state, and which each class of citizens should learn, and up to what point they should learn them." Thus the goal of political science includes the specific ends of the other sciences. That is to say, since we are peculiarly responsible for studying government and politics, and since government affects the whole of human life, we cannot neglect any important relationship in human society.

Bryce had much the same thing in his thoughts when he said he would set no limit to any political study. Various psychologists have stressed the necessity of seeing total situations, and Mary Parker Follett has pleaded for "undepartmentalized thinking," and for "emphasis on the whole as a unit of study."

The importance of the particular thing one studies is not, then, what determines the importance of the study itself. One may study the work of a single wardheeler, of a small field office in administration, or of a single committee of a legislative body, and yet so study the thing as to see all its relations or, if you will, its universal aspects, and make a significant contribution. It is not the point at which one starts but the circumference of the circle at which one ends, and what one has done over the whole area within the circle, that determine the value of any study.

The need to see government and society as a whole, and to take an integrating and synthesizing view of things presents many difficulties. We often appear to the world about us as vague generalists rather than useful specialists. This is the more strikingly true because our subject is one that truly belongs to all men. There is about it nothing of mystery, such as the technical knowledge of the research chemist, or the elaborate special terminology of several of our sister social sciences. We are under the necessity of dealing with common things and in a language that all men can understand. We must meet and understand men on the basis of their common needs and ordinary characteristics, and still be scientific.

This apparent weakness has also its elements of strength. By staying close to the common man in our study and thinking, by retaining something of the common touch, by trying to see life
whole from a human point of view, we in fact acquire a kinship with men, and an ability to see more deeply into human character and motivation. The insight and understanding thus gained into the common needs and nature of mankind should give us indispensable aid toward the understanding of democratic government and the elements of the general welfare. This, in turn, should make us better scholars and teachers in our field, better advisers for political leaders and administrators.

But I can hear the voices of a few doubters earnestly objecting. We are so few, they say, when compared with the tens of thousands in such professions as law and medicine. How can we exert substantial influence? Besides, they say, we are hardly known. Even our colleagues in the universities fail to understand our function and our field of work. To these I would say: Be of good cheer! Remember the Biblical references to the tiny but potent mustard seed, and to the small amount of leaven that leavens the whole lump. Or if a more modern and scientific analogy be more acceptable, note how small and obscure are some of the glands that determine the life and growth and functioning of the whole human body. It is neither size nor visibility nor the public's full understanding of us that determines our importance. It is rather the function that we are performing and its significance to the body politic that we serve.

That function is truly possible only in free and democratic societies, and at the same time it is indispensable to them. To do the things that we must do, we need freedom of thought and speech, public support, and security of position. Dictators dare not permit the untrammeled and objective study of the institutions and policies of government, but democracies cannot live without it. In every land it is the holders of irresponsible power, the possessors of vested interests, and those who fear a genuine government of the people, who are the first to attempt to suppress the free discussion of political questions. Liberal constitutional democracies that know their true interests protect and promote the unrestricted study of political institutions and methods, because their own welfare and progress depend upon it.

And so I say: Be of good cheer, but be also of great courage. The prospects of higher learning in general and of the social sciences in particular in the post-war world are none too bright. There will be periods and phases of reaction when we shall not escape some
measure of adverse criticism. This will be evidence of the fact that there are great maladjustments to be corrected, and that the work that lies before us will be more arduous, more searching of all our abilities than anything we have done in the past. Men in all nations will need the research, the inventions, and the integrated thinking of political scientists as never before in our history. And one thing is certain, that if we perform our functions to the utmost of our capacities, the nations that have defeated a titanic combination of enemies in order to preserve free and responsible popular government will in due time give even greater recognition to the indispensable functions that we perform.

Let us, then, in the hard years that lie ahead, outmaster the masters of our science who have gone before. Let us make our science both more searchingly scientific and more practical than ever. Let us prove to the American people and to the world that the scientific study of politics and administration is indispensable to the good government of democracy.