AMERICAN DEMOCRACY—AFTER WAR*

FREDERIC A. OGG

University of Wisconsin

I

More than once in its history, the American Political Science Association has met in a period of national emergency. Our Philadelphia gathering of 1917 (the thirteenth in the series) found the country occupied with a major conflict overseas for which it still was arduously preparing more than eight months after the declaration of a state of war by the Congress. Our Detroit meeting of 1932 (the twenty-eighth, and one of the most thinly attended in a decade) took place at a time when two and a quarter years of industrial depression and social disintegration had cast a pall of pessimism and despair over a national scene so recently—and so deceptively—effulgent, and when there was much shaking of heads over the outlook for our entire political and economic system.

Twenty-three years ago this week, indeed, the continuity of our annual conventions was broken by the omission altogether of a meeting which was to have been held in Cleveland, a request having been made by our own sixth president—then in the White House—that railroads groaning under the task of transporting fifty thousand tons of supplies every twenty-four hours for the use of two million soldiers in France (even though no longer actually fighting when our meeting-time came round) should not be burdened with carrying people to gatherings that could be dispensed with or postponed.

This New York meeting of 1941 finds the nation once more in an emergency—and not merely the "unlimited emergency" proclaimed by the President last May, but, since that fateful Sunday

* Presidential address delivered before the American Political Science Association at its thirty-seventh annual meeting, New York City, December 29, 1941.
of three weeks ago, emergency in the form of immediate and total war. We have not been asked to change our plans for the present gathering; and we may hope that the contributions capable of being made by learned and professional societies to the prosecution of war-time activities, to the maintenance of civilian and military morale, and to the constructive thinking that must go into the framing and organizing of a just and durable peace will seem sufficient to justify bringing our members together in future with the customary frequency as a useful part of the national effort. But all of us know that this may prove our last meeting for some time to come.

We meet amid war-time emergency because the high hopes entertained (shortsightedly, as we now can see) when our 1918 meeting was sacrificed to national exigency—when Woodrow Wilson, in London, during the very week we were to have assembled, was telling the Lord Mayor that no such “sudden and potent union of purpose” to build a new and better world order had ever been witnessed—we meet amid emergency, I say, because the high hopes then entertained failed dismally to be realized. It is not my purpose to enter into the reasons why they failed. Mountains of books and articles and documents on that subject have accumulated; and there will be more mountains. The ugly fact simply is that, despite efforts well-meant, and because of others not so well meant, the years in which this Association has been growing to maturity have been a sorry period in human history, and that as we assemble here tonight the world is getting well into a second successive decade of stark tragedy. In the decade beginning in 1929, we saw, no longer the dazzling “prosperity,” the streamlined progress, of the “roaring twenties,” but instead financial panic, industrial stagnation, strangulation of international trade, the flaunting of strange and brazen ideologies, the deterioration and collapse of democratic governments, the rape of China, Ethiopia, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, the withering of the League of Nations, the approach of Armageddon. A year ago, with the devastating thirties giving way to the terrifying forties, war had spread to five of the six continents; more than half of the world’s two billion inhabitants were living in a state of undeclared but actual belligerency; totalitarianism was riding high; half a dozen more democracies had gone down (including one that free men had thought an impregnable bulwark); the
then president of this Association, my lamented predecessor, was discussing for us the "world revolution of 1940," hopefully speculating as to whether—on the theory that a revolution is not a revolution until it succeeds—the term might not in the end prove a misnomer. However that might be, there was no denying that we were living perilously in a world that, for the time being at least, had widely abandoned reason for force, freedom for compulsion, civilization for barbarism.

But our situation tonight is still more hazardous. A war that for more than two years has marched from crescendo to crescendo, from climax to climax—that has pulled down dynasties, destroyed nations, uprooted millions of unoffending people, changed the political, economic, and social face of Europe, and ended forever the world in which we lived—no longer merely is (as I wrote a few short weeks ago) so close upon us that its hot breath can be felt upon our tightening muscles and straining sinews, but has actually overtaken us. Our situation indeed appears worse; and yet it perhaps is really better, in that the attack so treacherously launched against us has sharpened our conviction, intensified our determination, whetted our courage, heightened our unity of spirit and purpose, and hastened the day when our national safety can be re-established and the values of our Western civilization again made secure.

The dominant theme of the meeting in which we are engaged is the defense (now become the war) effort of the United States in this dangerous hour; and in pursuance of it, round-tables and section conferences are busily discussing defense administration, war financing, problems of defense economy, civil-military relations in a democracy, the grand strategy of national defense, and (hope-fully) the organization of peace. Without presuming to synthesize papers that I have not read and discussions that I have not heard, I may perhaps allude for a moment to a disturbing theory abroad among us that our American civilization is foredoomed by the world crisis to basic deterioration, and afterwards call attention (if it be not watering a garden in the midst of rain) to two or three problems that will in any case confront our country later on—I will not say after the crisis has passed, for, unhappily, the crisis will not be over when the shooting ceases—but at any rate after our national energies can again be turned to something other than the demands of war.
II

The notion that our American civilization is destined to devastating change stems from a concept of the world crisis best presented in a book that to my mind is one of the most significant of the year—*The Crisis of Our Age,* by the Russian-born but American-adopted sociologist, Pitirim Sorokin of Harvard.¹ Time fails in which even to epitomize Sorokin’s argument. But it comes closer to putting the scrambled pieces of our contemporary civilization into an understandable pattern (whether ultimately the true one or not) than any other that I know. It is a little less dismal than Oswald Spengler’s organismic interpretation of a few years ago, to the effect that every culture is mortal; that, having reached maturity, a culture declines and dies; that the crisis of these latter years constitutes the death agony of Western culture and society; and that there is no palliative or cure.² What Sorokin tells us is that, just as the *ideal* cultural characteristic of the Middle Ages, based on the principle of a supersensory and superrational God as the only true reality and value, gave way between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries to a *sensate* culture, based on the notion that all true reality and value are sensory, empirical, and “this-worldly,” so the sensate culture of these last four hundred years, which has produced many fine things (including the entire contractual, as opposed to the compulsory, basis of government), but which has always contained the seeds of its own destruction, is breaking up—is, indeed, already gone in most of Continental Europe—while the world waits, in blood and tears, to find what is going to take its place. And it is Sorokin’s idea that, while a new and perhaps better culture will gradually emerge, and a culture in which will survive at least some portions of that which is best in the now dying form, the world is destined in the meantime—and perhaps for a rather long time—to be convulsed by war and revolution which no new League of Nations, Federation of Europe, or Union Now, nor indeed any other hopefully devised contrivance of man, can avert.

From this cosmic transition, we are told—and this is what makes the theory pertinent here—not even the surviving democracies will be exempt; on the contrary, they (including the United States)

¹ Pitirim A. Sorokin, *The Crisis of Our Age* (New York, 1941). Happily, this work is relatively free from the jargon of pseudo-scientific terms which handicapped the author’s earlier *Social and Cultural Dynamics,* 4 vols. (New York, 1937 ff.)
already show, in slower tempo, the same general tendencies that at the last developed so rapidly (starting also at a more advanced point) in post-World War Italy and Germany. The capitalist system (principal embodiment of contractualism in the economic realm) is said to be passing; political contractualism, as evidenced in constitutions, elections, and guaranteed freedoms, is giving way to growing coercion and regimentation. In the United States, the tempo has accelerated sharply since 1929, the depression preparing the way and the New Deal following up the advantage. The defense effort, say those who accept the theory, has been stepping up the transition; the war now started will throw it into still higher speed; troubles to follow military and economic demobilization will keep the tendency going. In spite of themselves, both Britain and the United States are heading, for a prolonged transitional period, if not permanently, into an order of things so appallingly similar to totalitarianism that any one of us may well shudder to contemplate it. A variation on the theme, envisaging the same eclipse of representative institutions, but through different processes, is supplied by Mr. James Burnham in his view that, with capitalism doomed, and with the instrumentalities of production and distribution owned and held by the state, there will arise, even among us, an order under which control will lie, not with the supreme and absolutistic political executive anticipated in the foregoing interpretation, but with production executives, administrative engineers, supervisory technicians, plant coordinators, government bureau heads and commissioners and administrators—in brief, with economic and political “managers,” fusing into a professional oligarchy and riding into full power as the heralded “managerial revolution” reaches its culminating stages.³

Who can say which, if any, of these transition-of-culture interpretations, as applied even to Europe, is correct? For the Spengler view, it can be adduced that, after all, great cultures have emerged, flourished, decayed, and perished. For the Sorokin theory, it can be cited that we are at this moment witnessing a mortal combat between a contractual, democratic, capitalist culture-pattern, or order, on the one hand, and, on the other, a Nazi-Fascist culture-pattern, rejecting freedom, denying equality, spurning free enterprise—an order seeking to deflect and stop the normal evolution of

the democratic, capitalist system by throwing the switch and sending all the best that we have gained in the last two or three hundred years to its doom. For the Burnham interpretation, it can be said that, with the rise and extraordinary growth of corporation and trust economy, under which the millions of small stockholders and bondholders neither manage nor use nor dispose of the huge property interests involved, the capitalist system, as our fathers knew it, is at least being transformed before our eyes into something different, and that to some extent political, as well as economic, controls are passing into the hands of people termed in the Burnham cosmology the "managers."

Of one thing we may be sure, namely, that, despite Atlantic and Pacific oceans, the relative youth of our nation, and strong traditions of separatism, whatever is really taking place elsewhere permanently and fatefuly involves the United States. Allowing for secondary differences, there is, at bottom, but one Euro-American or Western culture; and whatever happens to it in Britain or France or Germany is more than likely, in the long run, to happen to it here. Politically, the United States would not long endure as a mere "island of democracy" in a totalitarian world; economically, we could not long maintain free enterprise if the rest of the earth were to give it up. There are no more tight compartments in the world—no significant European metabolisms that may not become American metabolisms as well. And we are pouring out our billions not merely for protection of our territory, our freedom on the seas, our right to trade, our liberty of action generally, but, more basically, for defense of our share in a form of culture which, if it permanently perishes abroad, will carry down with it, in time, all our own richer heritages, achievements, and values.

Of this, too, we may be certain, that, whether or not the crisis is carrying us along the dimly lighted corridors of time to a culture-pattern of a wholly different sort, it indubitably is precipitating us into a future about which the one thing positively known is that it will be different from the past. Even if history ever repeated itself, it would falter now. Government, industry, trade, finance, technology—none will be back where it was, after the "wave of the future" shall, as we confidently expect, have become a "wave of the past." All of us will be like Thomas Wolfe's hero—"we can't go home again." In any event, it is the future that is going to matter—who is to build it, of what stuff it is to be made, what
shall be its quality, and what the upshot; and even though its shape be now concealed from us, students and teachers of political science today must more than ever project their thinking and teaching into its unfolding reaches. No less truly today than when Professor Beard reminded us of the fact in his presidential address of fifteen years ago, it is in the substance of the approaching years that those whom we teach and for whom we write must work, rather than in the ashes of yesterday. 4

III

I emphasize this reorientation toward the future because, whether or not we accept for America any one of the somber interpretations to which I have earlier alluded, we still must concede that at few, if any, periods in its history has our nation been confronted with such a galaxy of flaming question marks as will overarch the road ahead when our war effort shall have ended. Out of the blinding array of interrogations, I select three for a word of comment. And the first one is: Toward what kind of a government are we being borne by the hurrying tide of affairs? I am assuming that our government will still be our own, and not one imposed upon us. But even so, what will be its nature? The question is, of course, as old as Hamilton and his Bank and Jefferson and his Kentucky Resolutions. But it is also as new as SEC and OPM; and the position in which the nation will find itself when defense and war shall have been demobilized gives it the poignancy of a cosmic challenge.

It would be futile to undertake to portray a coming national situation which admittedly, since the outbreak of war, is more than ever speculative. But we at least can depend upon this: that we shall have "big government" functioning in a big way—more power wielded by public authority than ever before (except perhaps momentarily in 1933), a more colossal mechanism of controls, a more numerous bureaucracy, an economy more completely underpinned by government initiative, participation, and support. Despite all effort to cushion the shock of military and economic demobilization—indeed, as part of that effort—heavy deficit spending by the

4 Charles A. Beard, "Time, Technology, and the Creative Spirit in Political Science," in this Review, Vol. 21, p. 4 (Feb., 1927). Other recent wide-ranging interpretations of the world of today in relation to the future include Gustav Stolper, This Age of Fable (New York, 1941); W. H. Chamberlin, The World's Iron Age (New York, 1941); and, especially for Great Britain, Harold J. Laski, Where Do We Go from Here? (New York, 1940).
national government, inviting a continuing expansion, concentration, and intensification of public controls, will be unavoidable. And these controls may be expected to go on expressing themselves through executive decision and ordinance, and through administrative management, lately so characteristic of them. Does this mean that government is henceforth going to press down its authority more heavily on the people, while more and more escaping restraint and responsibility through the traditional democratic processes? Does it mean that for us the days of free contractualism are indeed numbered? There are those (including serious scholars as well as partisan calamity-howlers) who tell us so—who allege, in fact, that precisely such a development was coming fast, even before defense and war; and the picture of executive usurpation, devitalized democratic processes, regimented economic life, which they draw is truly depressing.

I doubt whether we are in genuine danger at this point. Truly enough, our political system is in transition. But, in the first place, it would hardly be healthy if it were not so. And in the second place, on close analysis, this transition appears to be on lines not incompatible with democracy properly understood, but rather in fulfillment of it. What we are beholding, to the alarm of some, is a progression of necessary and inevitable readaptations of our governmental system, in the light of both peace-time and war-time experience, in directions made possible and essential by technology, and under the imperatives of newer economic and social conditions. It has become necessary to reopen many old questions, and often to accept new answers. Does strong government necessarily mean undemocratic government? We know now that it does not. Does democratic government mean inefficient government? We know now that it need not. Should the levels of government be kept strictly apart? We know now that they should not. Is it wise, or possible, to adhere rigidly to functional separation of powers? We know now that it is not. Is it the business of government to concern itself broadly with social security and social justice? We now believe that it is. As for our governmental machinery, it, as Professor Merriam has lately remarked, is in process of being streamlined to the newer conditions and ideas of our age. It is going to require a good deal more streamlining. And one of the most whole-

---

some things that has been happening has been (despite the false inferences drawn in some quarters) the progressive clarification and integration of the hitherto suspect and nebulous position of the executive in a well-ordered polity, when tasks of government and demands for government services have grown to their present proportions. In my own judgment, what we have chiefly to fear, after the present national exaltation shall have spent itself, is, not so much concentration and abuse of executive powers, or of government controls in general, as rather a let-down like that of twenty years ago, when a country grown weary of Aristides the Just surrendered to crass reaction against the Wilsonian régime.

IV

Another major question, as we look toward the future, is that of whether democracy—which, with all its imperfections, has been generally successful in America as a purely political device—can be made at least equally pervasive and effective in the domain of socio-economic relations. In the fertile eighteenth century of its birth, and well down into the succeeding century, democracy was almost exclusively a political concept; it denoted popular sovereignty, the right of revolution, the right of at least some substantial portion of the people to share in the control of government. Paralleling it in the economic realm was the individualism and laissez-faire of the Classical Economists, the very essence of which, however, was the absence of governmental participation and direction. The two concepts did not ripen concurrently by sheer accident; on the contrary, they were interrelated: exponents of free enterprise based on private property were also bearers of the democratic idea, as evidenced by the circumstances attending extension of the suffrage in England and parallel developments in the American states between 1815 and 1850. Nevertheless, the two ideals were separate, in the sense that political democracy commonly left economic life to operate and unfold under its own power and in obedience to its own forces and principles.

With, however, industrialism and concentrated economic power attaining their later levels, economic individualism and laissez-faire—despite efforts of the economists to invest them with the quality of timelessness and the halo of perfection—broke down; and

---

* This problem is discussed most recently and fully in Lewis L. Lorwin, *Economic Consequences of the Second World War* (New York, 1941).
today they stand discredited, never (so far as we can see) to be rehabilitated. Their collapse was signalized and accelerated by a broadening of the concept of democracy to embrace regulation by government of economic processes and relationships in the interest of democracy's prime objective, the public well-being. The English Factory Acts of the thirties and forties, limiting the freedom of employers and protecting workers against the harsher effects of machine industrialism, heralded the new order; and by a long progression afterwards, democracy—impelled by the surge of new social ideals and imperatives, and hurried along by the impacts of technology—has widened into a multilateral principle of politico-socio-economic relations—in fact, a whole synthesized philosophy of such relations—receiving fullest expression, perhaps, in the ill-fated constitutions of post-World War Europe and in the partially realized program of the New Deal in our own country.

Democratic government now has prime responsibility in connection, not merely with police and taxation and diplomacy, but with agriculture, industrial production, transportation, communications, trade, banking, insurance, education, conservation, sanitation and health; while to the traditional charter of civil liberties which it is expected to implement has been added a new and multifold bill of rights—utterly transcending the limits of the political, and embracing such startling items as the right to profitable and useful employment, the right to a minimum standard of living, the right of the worker through collective bargaining to share in the management of industry, the right to social security, the right to leisure and to opportunity for its satisfying use—a burden of responsibility and a program of action with which no democracy of even a generation ago offers anything to compare. Nor is the end in sight. Men hereafter will rightly expect of democratic government that it lose no opportunity to advance social justice—that it somehow contrive to see to it that the material and spiritual gains of civilization, which will go on and on, are distributed to all. Those who consider that government in this country is today trying to do too much may as well reconcile themselves to the certainty that tomorrow it will do more.

Measured by the clock of human existence, democracy is still youthful and experimental. Simply as a political device, it will require more time—a good deal more—for achieving its possibilities. More and more, however, its success is contingent—here in the
United States no less than elsewhere—on its capacity for providing and guaranteeing a workable socio-economic basis for the satisfactory life—a service which, if it had been performed in Continental Europe, would, I think, have meant no totalitarianism and no war. Here, up to now, is where democracy has encountered many of its most baffling obstacles. And while, in our own country, gains in the past ten years (especially in the matter of social security) have been peculiarly significant, the concentration of economic power on lines which the Temporary National Economic Committee considered dangerous to our democracy, the multiplication of agencies of self-help among the economically weaker members of the community, the tenacity with which groups and classes cling to their asserted rights, the problem of fitting such groups into the democratic pattern, the question of the extent to which government should itself take charge of resolving the difficulties and conflicts of labor and other economic groups, the question of how much farther government should seek, or permit itself, to be drawn into banking and other business, the problem of what to do with an economy that for awhile plunges forward and then sputters and stops, of what to do about our forty million people sub-normal because ill-fed and lacking proper medical care—all of these are socio-economic challenges which our democracy will have to face in post-war days. Right-wing and left-wing critics of representative institutions rose to power in Europe because they convinced enough restless men and women that no adequate and lasting answers to such challenges could be expected from popular government. In days to come, our cherished system of free enterprise tempered and disciplined by government regulation will continue under fire from similar directions. And we as political scientists will serve the interests of the nation in no way more effectively than by turning our best thought to this unquestionably most difficult domestic problem on the long-term American scene—the relations of government and socio-economic life in the more symmetrically developed democracy that we hope to achieve.

V

One other domain in which democracy has faltered, but in which it must vindicate itself if it is to live, is international relations. It is sometimes forgotten that eighteenth-century democracy started off with the avowed purpose of bringing the world not only liberty
but peace; and it is no fortuitous circumstance that the early democratic movement was fertile in ideas concerning the abolition of war, or that the French Revolution led, in its later stages, to a conception of European federation not far removed from some that find expression at the present day. In its application to international affairs, however, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century democracy had to contend with other ascendant concepts of the time, namely, national self-determination and national sovereignty, both highly provocative of friction and war; and the contest was never waged on equal terms. To be sure, there were mollifying influences. One such was the mid-century Cobdenite idea of free trade, which John Stuart Mill fondly believed to be rendering war a thing of the past; another was the tolerant, cultural, cosmopolitan liberalism that went along with nationalism in the thought of leaders like Mazzini. But even at the time, such ameliorating correctives did not guarantee peace; and in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, a more sinister ideology captured the field completely. Capitalism grew nationalistic (as evidenced by the rise of protective tariffs); nationalism grew imperialistic (as evidenced by rampant colonialism); concepts of a democratic world order faded under the scorching sun of “power politics.” The consequences are written in letters of blood in the pages of recent history.

Prior to the first World War, there was no dearth of proposals and plans for the sort of a world order that democracy had always presumed. Useful materials for constructing such an order—liberal nationalism and free-trade internationalism—were available, at least in memory. But proposals went the way utopias are supposed to go; and the world order actually existing continued to be such as had sprung casually from decades of adventuring, ambition, rivalry, and war among the peoples of the earth. Nobody had conceived it and planned it and established it. Much progress was made under it; indeed, the world was better off while it lasted than at any time since. But for all that, this fortuitous order was unsound at bottom; and it broke down in war and revolution and economic chaos and social misery.

The greatest lesson learned from the war of twenty-odd years ago was that mankind had finally arrived at a stage where conscious, deliberate direction of international affairs was desirable, necessary, and in the long run unavoidable; and in pursuance of this discovery, we witnessed the first serious attempt to project,
ordain, and create a world order on a jural basis. The significant thing is, not that the effort failed of eventual success, but that it was made; for it meant that at last men had come by the idea that, in international as in other matters, they might hope to be masters rather than victims of destiny. No nation in 1919—at least no major one—was ready for a genuine League of Nations; perhaps none is ready today. It accords with all experience that even the most advanced democracies should have toyed with the idea long before they were prepared to organize and discipline themselves to carry it out. One essential feature of that preparation would have been a willingness to do away with prohibitive trade barriers and to institute a freer world economy. But not only was such willingness everywhere completely lacking; the League itself was guilty of its most signal failure in neglecting to achieve a positive economic program. Instead, rampant economic nationalism (for which we in this country, with our insistence on a favorable trade balance and our mounting tariffs, were as much responsible as anybody) induced, aggravated, and prolonged the world depression, and after 1930 started the League itself on the downward phase of its history.

And now, as we meet here, the topmost human concern is once again the building of a jural, democratic, workable world order. Democracy is, of course, at some disadvantage in such an undertaking. The "New European Order" of the Nazis, the Japanese "New Order for Eastern Asia," springs from a single source, proceeds according to a simple formula, is authoritatively blue-printed to the last detail, and requires only the sanction of fiat. In democratic countries, there is, and will continue to be, a plethora of proposals, plans, programs, both for Europe and for the world, with anything approaching concensus still far below the horizon. This, of course, is in the democratic tradition; and the most we can hope for is that out of a swirl of competing, freely exchanged ideas will in time emerge—not as a full-orbed and completed structure, but as something substantial with which to start—arrangements oriented to clearer objectives, supported by more realistic perceptions, and animated by firmer resolves than existed in 1919. There will have to be a free world of free states; most or all of these states will have to be linked up in what has been aptly termed a "higher federalism" (not necessarily through the machinery of a reëstab-

7 Charles E. Merriam, op. cit., p. 59.
lished and universalized League, but at least through some device or understanding guaranteeing against international anarchy); there will have to be a new economic internationalism, with wider distribution of raw materials and freer arrangements for trade, else we may as well make up our minds to another war after the present one is over; because "if soldiers are not to cross international boundaries, goods must do so." Most of all, there will have to be recognition and acceptance of the fact—so dimly perceived by the creators of the peace machinery of two decades ago—that peace is not simply a negative condition maintaining itself in the absence of war, but that it consists rather in the continuous creation of positive international solidarities.

The United States will have a share in the decisions made. It could hardly have been less than a major share in any case; as matters now stand, it doubtless will be a preponderant share. And the forbearance, farsightedness, and determination which we display in the coming day of decision will test to the full our democratic instincts, attitudes, procedures, and capacities. The rest of the world will be pardoned some slight skepticism concerning our staying power. But in a degree we have atoned for shirking our obligation of leadership on the earlier great occasion of opportunity. Through the paramount part which our country took in belated endeavors in recent years to institute a new economic internationalism—notably through the intelligent and constructive line of policy embodied in Secretary Hull's trade agreements after 1934—we made a good start toward plotting out a more wholesome world order. The effort came too late, and we had insufficient cooperation. But we imparted a slant which it would seem that any improved world order must reflect. Through pronouncements of the President and Secretary of State, epitomized in the "Atlantic Charter" of last August, we have more explicitly projected the main lines of a democratic post-war order than has any other government or people—although, of course, as yet only in terms of principles, which come easy, rather than in those of the political and economic institutions, coming harder, with which the future world democracy will have to be equipped. Through public agencies like the National Resources Planning Board and private ones like the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, we are to no small extent matching the planning efforts of the totalitarian states, and significantly preparing the way, along with the planners of Britain.
and other democracies, for raising democratic planning procedures and techniques to the international level.

Most important of all, our people at last understand (the events of the past three weeks having supplied the final, clinching argument for those who needed it), not only that a global totalitarian victory would spell disaster for us, but that under the conditions to which technology has brought us no nation can any longer decide for itself whether it will maintain a closed political and economic system; that the United States—across two oceans that have become as ditches, with distance shorn of nearly all its protective value—is inextricably tied to the rest of the world; that no people can long prosper on the misfortunes of others; and that if we want a world order whose cardinal features shall be personal freedom everywhere, economic opportunity and security for all, universal sharing in the gains of civilization, a World New Deal conceived in tolerance and grounded upon essential justice, such an order can be established and kept going only with active and sustained cooperation of the United States.

The test will come when we face the question—and already it looms before us—of whether we are willing to pay the price of such a world order. There will be a price, and it will be high. One small part of it only will be willingness to forego immediate profits and benefits supposedly accruing from an intensified economic nationalism such as we unwisely embarked upon after becoming a creditor nation at the time of the first World War. But surely we shall have paid enough of a price for armed security, and armed victory, to incline us to follow up the investment in whatever ways and to whatever extent may be necessary to assure ourselves and the peoples of the world, if it can be humanly contrived, a dependable promise of decent opportunity to take up again the age-long quest of the finer potentialities of our civilization. “Every war,” some one has remarked, “is decided only after the war.” For America, the great decision may well be, not to become the arsenal of democracy, nor yet to fight on land and sea and in the air, but to discipline her own democracy—after defense, and after war—to the end that a resurgent democracy may live throughout the earth. So disciplining it, we may lend fresh meaning to Carl Sandburg’s words:

“Here is America, strong-hearted—
Keen, aware, alive.”