In 1950, the American Political Science Association's (APSA) Committee
on Political Parties published a report designed to promote the emergence
of responsible two-party government in the United States. The report greatly
influenced the ways that political scientists view political parties, but
its impact on the American party system has been minimal. This article
provides an overview of the committee's goals, examines its recommendations
and describes changes in the American party system that conform to them,
and then explains why the United States has not developed a programmatic
two-party system.
Responsible parties, as the committee defined them, would "provide the electorate with a proper range of choice between alternatives of action. " The majority party, or party in power, would "bring forth programs to which they commit themselves and . . . possess sufficient internal cohesion to carry out these programs." The opposition party would act "as the critic of the party in power, developing, defining, and presenting the policy alternatives which are necessary for a true choice in reaching public decisions" (APSA 1950, 1-2). This system would provide voters with a high degree of accountability because it would enable them to hold the party in power responsible for its actions and the state of the nation. It conforms to a strongly majoritarian view of democracy, which allows the majority party to implement its program roughshod over the objections of the minority party, rather than a pluralist conception of democracy, which places more emphasis on accommodating minority interests.
The form of government that was the inspiration for the committee's goals and recommendations was the British parliamentary system, sometimes referred to as the Westminster model or the cabinet system of government (Kirkpatrick 1971; see also Epstein 1980, 1986). This system is defined by an executive comprised of a prime minister and cabinet that serve at the pleasure of the majority party in the legislature. The executive can be forced out of power if the majority of legislators withdraw their support for it or if it loses its legislative majority following an election. Party platforms are the central focus of most political activity. They provide the electorate with a clear conception of the programs each party would pursue and each party's vision for society's future. Voters cast their ballots on the basis of the parties' programs and vision, and the performance of the current government. Once the election is over, the winning party works to follow through on its campaign promises, and the losing party criticizes the government's program and attempts to demonstrate the superiority of its own policy alternatives.
Parliamentary systems emphasize the collective responsibility that members of the cabinet have to the majority party in the legislature that selected them. Political programs are considered to be the foundation for electoral majorities. The cabinet is expected to introduce public policies that will promote its party's program. Members of the majority party in the legislature are expected to vote in favor of those policies. The defining element of the system is the parties' emphasis on enacting programs; on the contrary, the American political system is largely defined by the emphasis that parties and individual candidates place on capturing and retaining public office.
The committee's admiration for the Westminster model of government and
its understanding of the notion of collective responsibility caused it
to refer to the parties operating within that form of political system
as responsible parties. The word responsible is a loaded term, and it implies
that parties that do not behave like those described above are somehow
irresponsible and that the political systems in which they operate are
somehow defective. Yet, history is replete with examples to the contrary.
The term responsible also elevates majoritarian systems of democracy over
pluralistic democratic systems without taking into consideration the fact
that both systems have their merits, and that each is suited to a different
set of social and historical circumstances. The committee probably should
have used the term programmatic (or some similar term) in lieu of the word
responsible, because what it was primarily interested in doing was finding
a way to make American political parties behave more programmatically.
For these reasons, the term programmatic will be used to describe the parties
and the party system that the committee favored; the term pragmatic will
be used to describe the parties that are indigenous to the United States,
which the committee wished to reform.
The APSA committee proposed a number of recommendations that it believed would result in the development of programmatic parties. Most of these were designed to improve a party's ability to reach a consensus on a political program, to campaign on that program during elections, and to enact that program should it capture the organs of government or to oppose the competing program should it not. A second set of recommendations was aimed at increasing voter participation and improving the political process in other ways.
A number of the recommendations outlined in the committee's report were eventually put into practice by the parties' extragovernmental organizations and congressional leaders, and through statutes designed to change political institutions. A few developments ran counter to the committee proposals. Some committee proposals proved inconsistent with each other when put into practice. It would be impossible to detail all of the relevant changes that have occurred in the limited amount of space allotted here. The following paragraphs, however, highlight the major changes that have taken place since the committee first published its report.
Both parties' national organizations have altered a number of their practices in directions indicated by the APSA committee (see table 1).[1] The Democrats held biennial national conventions between 1972 and 1986 before repealing the practice in 1988. Democratic National Committee Chair Paul Butler created a party council called the Democratic Advisory Council in 1956 to provide a collective voice for Democrats who were unrepresented in Congress and to formulate policy alternatives on economic, foreign policy, and civil rights issues (Sundquist 1968; Klinkner 1991a). Several Republican leaders also formed national party councils. In 1961, former President Eisenhower created the Republican Citizens Committee to help formulate GOP policy, criticize the Kennedy administration, and counter his party's rightward drift. Four years later, Republican National Committee Chairman Ray Bliss developed the Republican Coordinating Committee to broaden the GOP's advisory base on national party policy, to stimulate communication among party members, and to make policy recommendations for dealing with national problems (Klinkner 1991b). None of these organizations performed the full range of functions, or accrued the power or prestige advocated by the APSA committee.
Following the Democrats' tumultuous 1968 national convention, they enacted sweeping reforms that restructured their presidential nominating process and drastically changed other party activities in some of the directions favored by the APSA committee. The Democrats increased opportunities for citizen participation in the presidential selection process and in party politics in general, and restructured the composition of their national convention and national committee. The Democratic National Committee also developed a formal set of rules to govern its presidential delegate selection process and to regulate other party activities, including many conducted by state and local Democratic organizations (see, e.g., Crotty 1983; Shafer 1983).
The Republican National Committee did not engage in the same type of wholesale rules reform that the Democrats did. The GOP adopted some minor, less controversial reforms to encourage minority representation at future Republican national conventions in 1972. Nevertheless, the GOP was affected by the Democratic reform movement because Democratic legislative majorities succeeded in changing election laws in some states and Republican state committees copied Democratic reform initiatives in others. As a result, both parties took steps in directions that are similar to those championed by the APSA committee.
Following the Watergate scandal and the Republicans' landslide defeats in the 1974 and 1976 elections, the GOP committees in Washington, D.C., initiated major party-building activities. The Republican national, congressional, and senatorial campaign committees greatly increased their financial strength and organizational capacities and developed the wherewithal to play important roles in presidential, congressional, senatorial, and other statewide and local elections. The Democratic national, congressional, and senatorial campaign committees imitated the GOP's party-building activities after their electoral trouncing in 1980 (see, e.g., Herrnson 1988; Herrnson and Menefee-Libey 1990).
As a result of their institutional development, both parties are now well financed, have permanent national headquarters, and possess large professional staffs. The national parties have developed programs to assist state and local party committees with modernizing their operations. Party committees in Washington recruit candidates, analyze vote trends, and provide candidates involved in competitive elections with large amounts of campaign money and services in areas of campaigning requiring technical expertise or in-depth research. They also help candidates obtain money and other resources from political action committees (PACs), political consultants, and individuals who give large contributions. In addition, the parties disseminate newsletters and issue papers to candidates and party activists. They also broadcast generic, party-focused campaign commercials designed to convey a general message about themselves to voters nationwide (see e.g., Herrnson 1988).
The development of state and local party organizations is more difficult to gauge because of their tremendous diversity. Most of these organizations have become stronger since the 1950s, demonstrating a remarkable adaptive capacity to changes in their political environment. Many state party organizations have experienced developments that parallel those at the national level. They have permanent headquarters, professional staffs, substantial budgets, and programs to support local party committees and to assist candidates and officeholders. Most local party committees also have improved their organizational capacities and electoral influence. Most hold regular meetings, recruit candidates, distribute campaign literature, mobilize voters, make campaign contributions, and carry out other grassroots campaign activities (Cotter, Gibson, Bibby, and Huckshorn 1984).
Congressional reforms, including the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, the "subcommittee bill of rights," and the "sunshine rules," sought to change the legislative process in directions recommended by the APSA committee (see table 2). One thrust of the reforms concentrated on improving the responsiveness and accountability of Congress. The seniority rule for selecting committee and subcommittee chairs was replaced by procedures that gave party caucuses in both chambers the power to cast secret ballots in elections for committee chairs. Limits were placed on the number of committee and subcommittee memberships and chairs individual House members and Senators could obtain.[2] Subcommittees were given formal jurisdictions, budgets, and the power to elect their own leaders, write their own rules, employ their own staffs, and hold meetings and hearings. The minority party was given the right to hire committee staff. Sunshine reforms opened up committee proceedings and floor activities to greater public scrutiny. These changes broadened the distribution of desirable committee and leadership assignments, decentralized power and resources, made key congressional panels more representative of the parties' congressional memberships, and increased congressional responsiveness. The reforms had a greater impact on the House than on the Senate because the lower chamber had been dominated by a small number of committee chairs and party leaders, whereas the upper chamber had a greater tradition of individualism (see, e.g., Sinclair 1983; Rieselbach 1986; Hinckley 1988).
A second thrust of the reforms sought to make Congress more responsible and effective. The Legislative Reorganization Act, War Powers Act, Congressional Budget and Impoundment and Control Act, and other reforms increased Congress's power vis-a-vis the president in various policy areas. The reforms also increased the amount of staff, research services, and other resources available to House members, Senators, and especially congressional leaders. Other procedural changes sought to enhance the majority party's ability to enact its legislative program and to reduce the resources recalcitrant members could use to impede the legislative process.
Most of the procedural changes made in the House sought to consolidate power under the Speaker. The Democratic Caucus empowered a new Steering and Policy Committee, which is dominated by appointees of the Speaker and other party leaders, to distribute committee assignments (subject to caucus approval). The Speaker also was given the power to nominate Democratic members to the Rules Committee (also subject to caucus approval). The compositions of the Appropriations, Rules, and Ways and Means Committees were changed to give Democrats a two-to-one advantage over Republicans. The Speaker was authorized to refer bills to more than one committee, and the whip system was enlarged to improve communications among House leaders and the rank-and-file membership (see, e.g., Rieselbach 1986; Dodd and Oppenheimer 1989).
Moreover, under Speaker Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill, Jr., informal task forces were regularly used to increase the number of House members participating in the legislative process (Sinclair 1983). O'Neill's successor, Jim Wright, used the Democratic caucus to formulate policy and adopt restrictive floor rules to get Democratic proposals passed on the House floor (Sinclair 1989).[3] Tom Foley, the current Speaker, has held many party caucuses, used special task forces, and increased the size of the party leadership apparatus.[4] Some of these changes are credited with helping Democratic leaders build support for party policies and improving the effectiveness of Congress.
Senate reforms were aimed more at reducing the dilatory powers of intransigent minorities than at strengthening the hands of party leaders. The key reform where this took place was the revision of the Senate's cloture rule. Under the new rule, sixty votes are needed to terminate a filibuster, rather than a majority of those present. Other changes have focused on improving the ability of the majority party's leaders to build a consensus among its members. Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell and Democratic Policy Committee Cochair Tom Daschle have worked to transform the long dormant Senate Democratic Policy Committee into a working organization to improve party research and communications. The policy committee holds weekly meetings for Senators and staff when Congress is in session.
Efforts by House and Senate Democrats to bolster the effectiveness of congressional majorities have not been carried out in a political vacuum. Republicans have increasingly utilized resources at their disposal to increase their ability to develop alternative policy proposals, criticize Democratic bills and programs, and frustrate the majority's ability to enact its core legislation. GOP House members have used the Republican Policy Committee and their new Committee on Planning and Research to conduct policy research and disseminate reports on major policy issues. Republican committee members have held special committee and subcommittee hearings to criticize Democratic programs and proposals. House Republicans, led by members of the Conservative Opportunity Society, have used television to blast Democratic policies on the House floor, both when the House is meeting and after-hours, under special orders. Republican House members have used excessive quorum calls, requests for roll-call votes on routine matters, and other "guerrilla tactics" to delay congressional proceedings, to frustrate House Democrats, and to force the Democratic majority to compromise on both procedural and substantive issues (Pitney 1988a, 1988b). All but the last set of activities would have met with the APSA committee's approval.
Senate Republicans work in a more individualistic, more competitive,
and less partisan environment than their House counterparts. Republicans
controlled the Senate between 1981 and 1986, and they do not view their
minority status as a permanent feature of the modern Congress, as do many
GOP members of the House. As such, Republican Senators view themselves
as players in the legislative process and act accordingly. They use their
policy committee to develop partisan programs and improve communications,
but they have not developed the same oppositional posture or stirred up
the same degree of acrimony as have Republicans in the House.
In summary, many of the recommendations proffered by the APSA committee have been put into practice. Extragovernmental party organizations have improved their institutional capacities, increased their campaign activities, and opened new avenues for participation to their supporters. Party leaders have also been given new resources to help them better organize Congress, centralize control over the legislative process, and build cohesive majorities.
The impact of these changes has been mixed. The initial impact of the party's organizational development was to make congressional elections more competitive. The Republican party's head start in party building helped GOP candidates to run more competitive campaigns, pick up substantial numbers of House seats in the 1978 and 1980 elections, and win control of the Senate in 1980. The Republican successes, however, were short-lived, as Democrats began to close the gap in party organizational development and imitate many of the GOP's most successful campaign programs. Although party activity is thought to have tipped the balance in several elections, no cases have been recorded where a party actually ran a candidate's campaign in lieu of the traditional candidate-centered campaign organization. A number of successful candidates have stated that party money and campaign services were critical to their victories, but they have not reported emerging from their election feeling beholden to the party organizations that provided them with assistance. National party staff aides emphasize that their committees do not seek to establish such a relationship (Herrnson 1988).
The immediate effect of the congressional reforms was to further decentralize Congress. At first, the reforms made it more difficult for Democratic congressional leaders to coordinate the legislative process and build policy majorities in their respective chambers. The change was greatest in the House, which had traditionally been the more hierarchical of the two chambers. The subcommittee bill of rights and the sunshine rules contributed to this new dynamic. They increased the number of actors who were necessarily involved in formulating bills and opened up members' activities to greater scrutiny. Lacking a Democratic consensus on many issues and possessing a party leadership that was unwilling to fully utilize its new powers, Democratic cohesiveness in Congress remained low (Rohde 1991).
By the 1980s, the elements of the reforms that sought to centralize power under the leadership became more important. The composition of the House Democratic Caucus had become more homogenous, helping a consensus to emerge on a broad range of issues.[5] The caucus also elected leaders who were more willing than many of their predecessors to use the tools of leadership bestowed upon them to actively pursue a Democratic agenda. This confluence of factors--enhanced leadership resources, increased homogeneity within the party, and leaders who were willing to use their resources to build partisan majorities--combined with other developments to produce a steady increase in Democratic party unity in the House.[6] Party unity also increased in the Senate but the change was not as great, reflecting differences in the electoral constituencies, institutional arrangements, and agendas of the two chambers (Rohde 1991).
Although party campaign activity and cohesiveness in Congress have increased during the last decade, the parties continue to fall far short of the standard set forth in the APSA committee's report. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that the United States will develop a party system that even comes close to approximating the programmatic two-party system touted by the APSA committee. The basic constitutional structures of the American political system provide formidable barriers to the development of programmatic parties. The separation of powers and bicameralism can lead to divided government. When one party wins the presidency and the other controls one or both chambers of Congress, the exigencies of governing force the parties to compromise their positions in a way that is at odds with party government.
Even when one party controls both executive and legislative branches, programmatic party government is unlikely to occur because individual legislators and chief executives who belong to the majority party have the freedom to disagree with each other without fear of losing control of the government. Individual elected officials are responsible for their own tenure in office, and they each operate with the knowledge that they will remain in office even if their party suffers a major legislative defeat. Legislators who belong to the minority party also are free to abandon the role of the loyal opposition and to support majority party programs when it suits their individual purposes. These institutional arrangements result in the not-too-infrequent passage of bipartisan policy, in the watering down of party policy, and in the frequent blurring of party lines. Because most state constitutions are similar to the federal constitution, party government is difficult to achieve at the state level as well. Stronger extragovernmental party organizations and legislative reforms that increase the resources available to elected party leaders have not overcome institutional barriers to party government in most states.
Just as the separation of powers and bicameralism discourage the formulation of party policy within a level of government, federalism and the decentralization of state and local offices undermine the prospects for programmatic party activity across levels of government. National, state, and local officeholders from the same party are elected by different constituencies, build electoral coalitions from different sets of interests, and must respond to those interests in order to get reelected. This further impedes the development and implementation of a coherent set of party policies, even when national party organizations provide substantial amounts of assistance to state and local party committees and candidates.
Election laws further foster a sense of individualism among elected officials, which discourages the development of programmatic parties. Single-member simple-plurality districts encourage each candidate to take responsibility for his or her own election campaign. This system of electoral representation gives candidates of the same party little incentive to formulate joint strategies or campaign together. It combines with the institutional arrangements described above to form the institutional backbone of America's candidate-centered election system. Multimember districts, like those used in some other democracies, have the opposite effect of encouraging the formulation of a cooperative, party-focused campaign.
The fundamental missions pursued by party organizations also do not contribute much to the development of party government. The major objective of American party organizations is to contest elections rather than to promote public policy. The parties' organizational structures are largely decentralized, and individual party committees are primarily concerned with the election of candidates who are running for offices located within their geographic jurisdictions. Relations among party committees belonging to the same party are deferential rather than hierarchical (Eldersveld 1964). No one party committee has the power to force another to adopt its platform or adhere to its political strategy. The dispersion of authority, proliferation of party committees, and the differences of opinion that naturally flow from these factors make it hard for party committees to develop a consensus on substantive or strategic issues.
Moreover, even when party organizations are able to come to some agreement on policy and strategic matters, they rarely have the clout to force their candidates to "sing from the same song sheet." The direct-primary nominating system deprives party organizations of the power to select or "deselect" candidates who run for office under their label. The relative weakness of party organizations also makes it necessary for candidates to assemble their own campaign committees in order to wage primary and general election campaigns. The decentralization, weakness, and pragmatism of American parties contribute to the independence of candidates and elected officials. These factors reinforce politicians' local orientations and discourage the formation of programmatic parties.
Committees and the seniority norm continue to fragment political power
in Congress despite the reforms passed during the 1970s. Power is currently
divided among roughly three hundred committees and subcommittees, as well
as numerous caucuses, task forces, leadership organizations, and other
specialized panels. Each of these groups has some claim to jurisdiction
over a particular policy area and a varying degree of autonomy within its
realm of action. Legislators typically request committee assignments that
can help them to improve their prospects for reelection, enhance their
influence in their legislative chamber, or pursue specific policy goals
(Fenno 1973). Rarely do legislators seek a committee assignment for the
purpose of advancing their
party's platform.
The seniority norm, even in its weakened form, continues to play an important role in the distribution of committee assignments and chairs, as do region, popularity with one's colleagues, expertise, and ability. Party loyalty is often a relevant factor, but it is one of many. As such, many committee and subcommittee chairs remain unrepresentative of their party's membership and continue to impede the quest for programmatic party government. Committees can, and occasionally do, produce bills that do not accurately reflect the wishes of the majority party in the legislature, their party platform, or the preferences of their supporters. Committees and subcommittees also may pigeonhole legislation that is central to their party's program, further thwarting the prospects for party government. Committee functions, committee members' goals, and proclivity of committees to defend their "legislative turf" result in the committee system's continuing to buttress the decentralization of Congress.
The existence of thousands of powerful interest groups and an independent, often intransigent bureaucracy also pose obstacles to the development of programmatic parties. Special interests and administrative agencies may provide legislators with factual information and political advice that conflict with that offered by party leaders. Legislators also may feel obliged to support interest groups that contributed to their election campaigns or represent key components of their districts.
Party leaders in Congress and in many other American legislatures have limited resources with which to overcome the decentralization that results from the committee system, the political and financial clout of special interest groups, and the centrifugal pulls that originate in legislators' districts. Although the resources of party leaders in Congress, and especially the House, have increased in recent years, few legislative leaders possess the sanctions needed to overcome the fragmentation that exists in Congress. Party leaders typically have to water down bills that reflect core party positions in order to gain the support of extremely conservative or liberal members and to build winning coalitions within their chamber. For a bill to become law, further compromise is usually needed to overcome differences between bills passed by different chambers or to get the chief executive's assent. Institutional structures play a crucial role in fostering brokered or compromise politics over a programmatic style of governance.
Lastly, historical circumstances and political culture contribute to the pragmatic nature of American parties. An overwhelming majority of Americans support the basic foundations of our current political, economic, and social order. Our nation's heterogeneous population, large middle class, and lack of a feudal legacy contribute to a consensual society that provides little foundation for the ideological or class-oriented divisions found in many other democracies (Hartz 1955). The outcomes of many elections depend on winning the support of voters who are located at the center of the ideological spectrum (Downs 1957). Candidates and parties have strong incentives to become associated with middle-of-the-road positions, valence issues, and favorable personal traits. They have few reasons to campaign on ideologically focused platforms, to take controversial positions on key issues, or to distance themselves from the political center. The pragmatic orientation of political candidates tends to drive the parties toward the center and to blur the distinctions between them, rather than to encourage them to provide voters with what the APSA committee referred to as a "proper range of choice." Historical and cultural conditions pose significant barriers to the development of party government.
The developments that have strengthened the parties in recent years and resemble the APSA committee's recommendations have not been sufficient to overcome the considerable obstacles that exist to the emergence of a programmatic party system. The strengthening of party organizations and the increase in congressional party leaders' resources have not led to the development of programmatic parties. Limited resources, legal ceilings on campaign contributions and expenditures, institutional structures and political processes, and political actors--including political action committees, wealthy individual contributors, congressional committees, and individual politicians--have combined to prevent parties from overcoming the candidate-centeredness of American politics.
Even congressional candidates who receive large amounts of party assistance continue to have little incentive to adhere to a party program once elected. These candidates typically run in marginal districts and have little freedom to "toe the party line" when party positions come into conflict with their constituents' wishes. Party leaders recognize this and routinely instruct members who hold competitive seats that their first priority should be to survive politically and that secondary consideration should be given to supporting party policies.
The highly publicized disagreement over taxes between President George Bush and National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) Cochair Edward Rollins illustrates that different members and factions within each party have different interests. It serves as a reminder that in the present, as in the past, the policy connections between the campaigns waged by the presidential and congressional wings of a party may be extremely weak.
Divisions among (and within) different wings of the Republican and Democratic parties have been commonplace since their formation. The NRCC was formed in 1866 when radical Republican House members who were feuding with President Andrew Johnson believed they could rely neither on him nor the Republican National Committee for campaign assistance.[7] Even President Franklin D. Roosevelt, whose New Deal marks one of the great turning points in American politics, could not prevent members of his party from opposing his policies on the campaign trail or on the floors of Congress once the crisis caused by the Great Depression had subsided. The creation and recent revitalization of party organizations was not intended to overcome differences among the parties' presidential and congressional candidates. In some ways these developments have reinforced the parties' pragmatic tendencies rather than encouraged them to behave more programmatically.
Party organizations now play important roles in many elections, and
legislative party leaders now have improved resources, especially compared
with the 1950s, but recent developments have not resulted in the emergence
of a party-focused election system or in programmatic governmental parties.
Although sharply divided ideological parties have not been the norm in
American politics, the parties can and do act programmatically under some
circumstances. During periods of national crisis, such as the Civil War
and the depressions of the 1890s and 1930s, the parties have staked out
opposing positions based on the different visions of society they believed
our nation ought to pursue. Candidates campaigned on their parties' platforms,
voters have responded to these partisan appeals, and the politicians who
were elected have sought to enact policies that reflected their party's
vision once in office. Episodes of programmatic party government are the
exception rather than the rule in the United States, but they are important
to the dynamic of American politics because they constitute periods of
major policy change.
The report of the American Political Science Association's Committee on Political Parties may have been a little too harsh in its criticism of American-style, election-oriented, pragmatic political parties. It also may have been a little too optimistic about the impact its recommendations would have on the party system if put into practice. It is doubtful that American politics will come to resemble the party-centered model favored by the committee.
The party system is just one component of a more complex system of government
that attempts to promote majority rule while protecting minority rights.
Although that system has not produced a utopia, it,has, for the most part,
performed admirably. Regardless of its flaws, the APSA committee's report
remains one of the most important statements made by political scientists
about political parties. It sparked a lively debate that has persisted
for the last forty years and that will probably continue for many years
to come.
In addition to the sources cited in the text, this article draws upon
personal interviews with a variety of political practitioners, including
officials at the Democratic and Republican national, congressional, and
senatorial campaign committees, and House and Senate leadership staff aides.
It also draws upon observations I made while working for Congress as an
American Political Science Association Congressional Fellow.
[1.] Tables I and 2 contain recommendations that pertain directly to political parties. Other APSA committee recommendations that have been put at least partially into effect are: committee staff for minority party members of Congress, a less restrictive cloture rule in the Senate, redistricting on the one-person-one-vote principle, enfranchisment of residents of the District of Columbia, and compilation of election statistics by the Bureau of the Census. Committee recommendations that have not been put into effect are: four-year terms for House members, national regulation of nomination rules governing candidacies for the House and Senate, permanent voter registration an election-day holiday or weekend elections, adoption of the short ballot, replacement of the electoral college with a more popularly based system, and government subsidies to help centralize campaign finance through national party organizations. Committee recommendations that are not so easily classified include the elimination of residency requirements (these have been shortened) and increased professorial activity in party politics.
[2.] Senators could serve on a maximum of three committees (including one major and one minor), and chair only one additional full committee and one subcommittee of a major panel. Members of the House were limited to chairing only one full committee and one subcommittee, in addition to serving on a maximum of two full committees or one exclusive committee.
[3.] Many attribute Wright's forced resignation from the speakership to his forcefulness and strident partisanship (see, e.g., Davidson and Oleszek 1990).
[4.] Foley added three new deputy whips and a new floor whip, including a woman, a southerner, and a black.
[5.] The House Democratic Caucus became more homogeneous because of the decline in sectionalism that occurred as "Boll Weevils" were replaced by more moderate Democrats or Republicans in the South, and ultraliberals by more moderate Democrats in the North (Rohde 1991).
[6.] Some of these other forces include the increased ideological tenor of national politics brought on by the election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency, changes in the issues that dominate the political agenda, and the activities of Republican House members.
[7.] The NRCC was originally called the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee.
TABLE 1. APSA Committee Recommendations and Party Organizational Development Recommendation Democrats Republicans Biennial national conventions R N Smaller national conventions O O Reapportionment of national committees to reflect party strength in the states A N National convention delegates should be chosen primarily by direct vote of rank-and-file party members A M National conventions participate in selection of national committee members N N Open primaries should be abolished A,M M Formulate national party platform biennially R N Make national party platform binding N N Creation of a national party council R R Activities to be performed by the national party council: Propose a platform draft of party platform prior to the national convention N N Hold public hearings on platform P P Interpret party platform and enforce state and local party compliance with it N N Screen potential presidential, House, and Senate candidates N N Coordinate different party organizations M,P M,P Govern the party between conventions N N Preprimary endorsement of candidates M M National party controls the collection and distribution of substantial campaign funds M M Permanent national party headquarters A A Full-time national party staff to: Research issues A A Publicize issues A A Analyze voting trends A A Publication of party activities A A Promulgation of party regulations A E Regional party conferences A A Modernize local party machinery M M Frequent local party meetings M M A = recommendation adopted E = recommendation already in effect M = movement in direction of recommendation N = no significant change O = movement in opposite direction of recommendation P = recommendation performed by another party organization R = recommendation adopted and then rescinded, or adopted only temporarily TABLE 2. APSA Committee Recommendations and Governmental Leadership Structures Recommendation Democrats Regularize meetings among party leaders M of the House, the Senate, and the president (if the party controls the presidency) Consolidate party leadership committees in Congress House M Senate M Party leadership of House and Senate A meet together regularly More frequent party caucus meetings House A Senate A Party caucuses make binding policy decisions House M Senate N Dilution of seniority as a criterion for committee and subcommittee chairs and ranking members House M Senate A Increase importance of party loyalty as a criterion for committee and subcommittee chairs and ranking members House M Senate N Party leadership committees submit committee assignments to caucus for approval House A Senate A Increase party leadership's control over scheduling of legislation House A Senate A Recommendation Republicans Regularize meetings among party leaders M of the House, the Senate, and the president (if the party controls the presidency) Consolidate party leadership committees in Congress House M Senate M Party leadership of House and Senate A meet together regularly More frequent party caucus meetings House A Senate A Party caucuses make binding policy decisions House M Senate N Dilution of seniority as a criterion for committee and subcommittee chairs and ranking members House M Senate M Increase importance of party loyalty as a criterion for committee and subcommittee chairs and ranking members House M Senate N Party leadership committees submit committee assignments to caucus for approval House A Senate A Increase party leadership's control over scheduling of legislation House X Senate X A = recommendation adopted M = movement in direction of recommendation N = no significant change X = not applicable
APSA, Committee on Political Parties. 1950. Toward a more responsible two-party system. American Political Science Review 44: supplement.
Cotter, Cornelius P., James L. Gibson, John F. Bibby, and Robert J. Huckshorn. 1984. Party organizations in American politics. New York: Praeger.
Crotty, William. 1983. Party reform. New York: Longman.
Davidson, R oger H. and Walter Oleszek. 1990. Congress and its members. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press.
Dodd, Lawrence C. and Bruce I. Oppenheimer. 1989. Consolidating power in the House: A The rise of a new oligarchy. In Dodd and Oppenheimer, eds., Congress reAconsidered. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press.
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An economic theory of democr acy. New York: Harper and Row.
Eldersveld, Samuel J. 1964. Political parties: A bXehavioral analysis. Chicago: Rand McNally.
Epstein, Leon D. 1980. What ever happened to the British party model? American Political Science Review 74: 9-22.
------. 1986. Political parties in the American mold. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Fenno, Richard F., Jr. 1973. Home style. Boston: Little, Brown.
Hartz, Louis. 1955. The liberal tradition in America. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World.
Herrnson, Paul S. 1988. Party campaigning in the 1980s. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Herrnson, Paul S. and David Menefee-Libey. 1990. The dynamics of party organizational development. The Midsouth Political Science Journal 11: 3-30.
Hinckley, Barbara. 1988. Stability and change in Congress. New York: Harper and Row.
Kirkpatrick, Evron M. 1971. 'Toward a more responsible two-party system': Political science, policy science, or pseudo-science? American Political Science Review 65: 965-990.
Klinkner, Philip A. 1991a. Party theory and political reality revisited: The APSA report and the experience of the democratic advisory council. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the National Capital Area Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.
------. 1991b. The road back: The response of American political parties to election defeats. Ph.D. dies., Yale University.
Pitney, John J., Jr. 1988a. The conservative opportunity society. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, San Francisco.
------. 1988b. The war on the floor: Partisan conflict in the U.S. House of Representatives. Paper presented al the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.
Rieselbach, Leroy N. 1986. Congressional reform. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press.
Rohde, David W. 1991. Parties and leaders in the postreform House. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Shafer, Byron. 1983. The quiet revolution. New York: Russel Sage.
Sinclair, Barbara. 1983. Majority party leadership in the U.S. House. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
------. 1989. The transformation of the U.S. Senate. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Sundquist, James L. 1968. Politics and policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson years. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.
~~~~~~~~
Paul S. Herrnson is an associate professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland. He is the author of Party Campaigning in the 1980s (Harvard 1988) and has written articles on political parties, campaign finance, and congressional elections. He served as an American Political Science Association Congressional Fellow from 1989 to 1990.