Congressional scholars can reasonably be held to have taken the lead in developing theory about delegation of authority from the legislative to the executive branch.   KiewietÕs and McCubbins's The Logic of Congressional Delegation broke new ground in explaining the rational foundations of congressional behavior and its consequences for the bureaucracy.  Like many other studies of the Congress over the past two decades, these authors adopt a rational choice framework for explaining congressional action.  Such studies have provided real insight into the Congress, but none have been able to produce a general theory of legislative action because their focus has been restricted to the Congress.  There is a real need to test hypotheses derived from congressional studies in other legislative venues.

           To the rescue come Huber and Shipan.  Deliberative Discretion examines the relationship between legislatures and executives in a comparative context.  Taking as their primary source of data the text of laws, the authors offer a theory of legislative discretion and design, and in consequence the extent to which legislators in drafting law choose to delegate discretionary power to bureaucrats. Observing variation across regimes, they seek to understand why legislators may choose to delegate authority to bureaucrats and how the extent of delegation may vary according to regime type. They also address the question of, who is empowered by legislative delegation of authority to executives?  Legislators? Bureaucrats? Chief Executives? Interest Groups?

           To explore these questions the authors review existing theories of delegation, provide a justification for using statutes as a basis for examining delegation, and offer their own theoretical perspective.  A chapter addresses medicaid policy in the state of Michigan, and then separate chapters are devoted to a comparative analysis of delegation across state legislatures in the United States and to a comparative analysis of delegation across parliamentary regimes in Europe.  A concluding chapter offers models of legislative delegation pertinent to separation of powers and parliamentary regimes respectively. 

           This book offers interesting and testable theory and a number of interesting conclusions.  Its most general finding suggests that legislative delegation is conditioned by regime type and institutional environment.  Legislative scholars will find much here to guide future research. As importantly, the authors offer a model of comparative legislative research that we may hope will be emulated in the future. 

Ronald M. Peters, Jr.

Regents Professor of Political Science

University of Oklahoma

The European Parliament and Supranational Party System: A Study in Institutional Development, Amie Kreppel, Cabridge University Press, 2002.  ISBN 0521806259, $60.00, cloth, 280 pages.

           Kreppel presents a thorough treatment of the origins and development of the European Parliament's supranational party system.  Using both the micro and macro models of congressional development, she works to formulate a general theory of institutional development within the European Parliament.  She finds that "the overall pattern of internal E.P. development has been movement away from egalitarian internal structure and strongly ideological coalitions toward increased internal centralization of power and ideological moderation" (2002:10). Additionally, Kreppel finds that the party system changes, moving from an ideologically distinct spectrum of parties toward a semblance of a bipartisan cooperative system.

           This work is an important contribution to the literature on comparative legislatures. The book is divided into nine chapters and provides an index and appendices.  The appendices include tables concerning the rules of procedure and the rules reforms, as well as the ideological spectrum of the party groups over time.  The introductory chapter concisely develops her argument and outlines the plan of the book.  In chapter two, Kreppel traces the theories of legislative development and applies these to the European Parliament.  In the subsequent two chapters, Kreppel provides an historical accounting of the party groups and the European Parliament. 

           In the following three chapters Kreppel systematically demonstrates how the European Parliament's internal development, its party groups, ideology, and rules have been impacted by external changes in the function of the parliament and internal movements toward a party system constructed to be more capable of achieving its primary power goals of policy realization.  Drawing from Copeland and Patterson (1994), Kreppel defines the external "critical moments" as those changes which are large enough to require internal reform or result in diminishment.  She demonstrates a definite link between these changes and reforms in the structure of the parliament.  Kreppel demonstrates that the macro model is inadequate at this point to explain the changes in internal rules.  The macro model would suggest that all benefits of the changes would be collective (Polsby 1968), but Kreppel finds that as the parliament gained more legislative power, the micro model of congressional development became more relevant.  The changes in the rules tended to increase the power of some groups over others and favor a more bi-partisan cooperative structure within the parliament. 

           Using the changes in the structure of the European Parliament as the external critical moments impacting party groups, Kreppel finds that "the change in coalition patterns was a direct result of the institutional transformation of the European Parliament from a chamber of debate to a legislative body" (2002: 151). Interestingly, the application of the micro model to the party groups would predict that the internal structure of the party groups would restrict member behavior and increase the power of party elite; however, Kreppel finds that this consolidation of power has been restricted within the party groups themselves. The increased party control of members primarily manifests itself within the institutional changes of the E.P.  Kreppel then speculates on the future development of the party groups and internal development and draws conclusions about the structure and future development of the European Union and the party group system.

           Amie Kreppel places the study of the European Union and its parties in its proper place in the study of legislatures and sets an important precedent for the future study of international legislative bodies.  This is an important book that addresses the structure of the world decision-making bodies and produces generalizable theories of institutional development to be applied to other legislative bodies and party systems.

Melody Huckaby

Carl Albert Center Graduate Fellow

University of Oklahoma

Fair Representation: Meeting the Ideal of One Man, One Vote, Michel L. Balinski and H. Peyton Young, Brookings Institution Press, 2001. ISBN 081570111X, $22.95, paper, 195 pages.

           This book seeks to answer the question as to how to divide the seats in a legislature in a fair way proportional to the population of the states.  The idea of apportionment of seats is explicitly political in a representative system of government because it gets at issues of power. The more seats a state holds, the more power it can yield.  Absolutely fair apportionment of seats is not possible, however, due to the indivisibility of seats.  As such, some states will be necessarily over-represented and others under-represented. 

           The central issue becomes how to work with fractions.  What should be done when a state's proportion of seats in the House is 4.5?  Do they get 4 seats or 5 seats? Balinski and Young conclude that the method created by Daniel Webster, noted American statesman, is the fairest in its treatment of small and large states, is the least biased method, and therefore the best for a federal system.  They also make certain recommendations for apportioning seats in proportional representation systems. 

           Balinski and Young say their work is "an example of mathematical reasoning applied to a problem of public policy" (ix), and this is an apt description.  Fair representation, for these authors, is both a mathematic and political problem. Over 60 pages of the book (Appendix A) are devoted to a mathematical and analytical discussion of their "Theory of Apportionment". The book is simultaneously, moreover, a thorough historical account of the representation problem of apportionment of legislative seats. 

           Balinski and Young's book is useful and interesting for scholars interested in both the Constitutional history and the early American experience of what fair representation means in the practical sense of how to apportion legislative seats.     

Aleisha Karjala

Ph.D. student in political science

University of Oklahoma

Going Home: Black Representatives and their Constituents, Richard F. Fenno, The University of Chicago Press, 2003.  ISBN 0226241319, $18.00, paper, 304 pages.

           Using his well-honed skills of observation and insight, Richard F. Fenno provides a fresh look at representation by black members of Congress in Going Home and discovers both similarities and differences in the constituent connection.  Based on interviews spanning more than three decades, Going Home examines the congressional careers and district connections of Louis Stokes (D-Ohio), Barbara Jordan (D-Texas), Chaka Fattah (D-Penn.) and Stephanie Tubbs Jones (D-Ohio).

           Fenno's access to each of the MCs varies in duration and depth, and he qualifies his findings as "unusually tentative" in part because he is a "white researcher immersed, briefly, in the affairs of black communities" (10).  Nonetheless, the portrait he weaves draws adeptly on personal interviews, first-hand observation and biographical material, and he credits the influence of contemporary work on black representatives by Carol Swain (1993) and David Canon (1999). Fenno steps beyond the concepts of ÒdescriptiveÓ and "substantive" representation and describes the web of connections -- electoral, policy, personal and organizational -- of his subjects.

           Fenno finds some distinctive aspects of the representational connection between African American members of Congress and their districts.  For example, he professes surprise at the "high-priority preoccupation with education" that the four representatives share (258). Fenno notes that the "educative" function of political representation takes on a distinctive character for these four members of Congress who not only stress the importance of educational opportunity to their own careers but also emphasize education as the key to future progress in their districts.

           Fenno also suggests that the symbolic and organizational significance of black representation differs from what he has found among white representatives.  Because of initial white political resistance to the candidacy of these MCs, all four congressional members featured in Fenno's study had to maintain a degree of local political involvement -- from the design of the districts (Jordan) to the development of independent party structures (Fattah and Stokes) -- in ways that are neither expected or required of white representatives (261).

           In a discipline focused on elections and legislative outcomes, FennoÕs Going Home  reminds readers of the importance of the "representational process" and suggests that students of American politics too often under-appreciate its significance or nuances as an analytical category. 

Cindy Simon Rosenthal

Associate Professor of Political Science

University of Oklahoma

Legislative Politics in Latin America, Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif, Cambridge University Press, 2002. ISBN 0521792193, $65.00, cloth, 528 pages.

           In this volume, Morgenstern and Nacif have compiled twelve extensive studies concerning the power, structure and policy making existing in four Latin American legislatures. Morgenstern creates a comparative model of legislative performance and structure which is utilized by the scholars in this work.  Together this model and the research done by the authors effect an indispensable resource and the most comprehensive and systematic comparative work concerning the legislative politics of Latin America.

           The four nations selected for inclusion in this study were Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico.  Through the systematic research in each legislature by country specialists in three areas: the relationship between the executive and the legislature, the policy making process of the legislature, and the degree of party discipline and role of political parties, Morgenstern is able to draw generalizable conclusions and distinguish important institutional factors that indicate the role of the legislature in these four nations.  The work of the authors and Morgenstern and Cox's epilogue clearly establishes that Morgenstern's model is a useful framework for future studies in Latin American legislatures. 

           In the opening chapter, Morgenstern explains the components of the legislative model.  The model and book are divided into three sections.  In each of these three sections, a scholar conducts a study of each nation's legislature.  In the first section, Mustapic, Amorim Neto, Siavelis, and Amparo Casar demonstrate the executive-legislative balance and relationship in each of the four target nations.  While each legislature appears to be generally reactive, this research shows that in each nation the legislatures have a degree of strength.  The exercise of power, both formal and informal, by these legislatures demonstrates that they are critical to the democratic governance of each nation.  

           In the second section, Jones, Ames, Carey, Nacif explore the role of political parties in each nation.  They show that the varying degrees of party loyalty in each institutional setting has a profound effect on the function, power and structure of the legislature.  In the third section, Eaton, Samuels, Londegran, and Weldon explore the policy making functions of each legislature.  Using the budgetary process, they demonstrate that reactive power is a substantial weapon.  The executive budget exits the legislature a significantly different policy than that which entered the legislature.  In the concluding section, Morgenstern ties these works together, and draws conclusions from the chapters.  He reiterates that while these legislatures are generally reactive in nature, there are many differences.  He argues that it is institutional differentiation that causes the spectrum of effects observed by the authors (2002: 413).  In the epilogue, Morgenstern and Cox use the findings and conclusions in conjunction with the role of the president in these countries to better explain the reactive relationship.   

           This work is an important addition to the legislative studies literature and an invaluable resource for scholars of Latin American politics.  The systematic application of the model created by Morgenstern to other Latin American legislatures and presidential systems worldwide would offer important insight into the institutional factors affecting the power, function, and policy-making ability of legislatures. 

Melody Huckaby

Carl Albert Center Graduate Fellow

University of Oklahoma

Mary Parker Follett: Creating Democracy, Transforming Management, Joan C. Tonn, Yale University Press,  2003. ISBN 0300096216, $45.00, cloth, 623 pages.

           In 1978 I began to look into the prospect of writing a book on the speakership of the U.S. House of Representatives. My first step was a trip to the library where I found, in the old Dewey Decimal section, a book called The Speaker of the House by Mary Parker Follett.  The book had been published at the turn of the century, and I figured that it would not much inform my interest; but in reading it I was soon disabused of that expectation. I can recall saying to myself, "this is a good book." Parker's take on the speakership said a lot about the office and a lot about the development of political science as an academic discipline. She was the first student of the Congress, Woodrow Wilson notwithstanding, to argue for an explicitly political (what later would be called a "behavioral") understanding of this important political institution. Her interpretation of the speakership fundamentally shaped my impression of it.  To take but one example, scholars have argued for decades about the true nature of Henry Clay's speakership.  Some suggest that he revolutionized the office by shaping the committee system to fit his needs; others have suggested that he temporized his leadership by conforming it to the expectations of his members.  I always have had the impression that Henry Clay was first and foremost a charismatic leader who led by the force of his personality.  I got that idea from Follett and found it confirmed by other sources.  This explanation is mostly unsatisfying to a political science that seeks nomothetic explanations, but I still think Follett was right.  She, at least, had one big advantage over us: she actually interviewed men who knew Clay and had worked with him. Her use of the personal interview was, by the way, another important contribution to research methodology.

           Two decades later I stumbled upon Mary Parker Follett again. This time, it was in the context of our MPA program.  I taught a course called "Classics of Public Administration," grounded in a book by the same title, in which was included a famous essay by Follett on approaches to management.  I learned then that she had become a major theorist in organizational leadership and had been the earliest known advocate of the "soft" approach to leadership, one that stressed persons rather than tasks, the fulfillment of human potential as a means to organizational productivity. Follett developed this perspective at a time when scientific management was in its heyday, and while it might not now seem too hard to offer a benign alternative to Taylorism, Follett was the one who did.  Subsequently, I have taught a course in organizational leadership and I am struck by the extent to which modern leadership theory traces itself to FollettÕs insights. 

           So for me, Mary Parker Follett brings together two intellectual strands that have shaped my research and teaching over the past quarter century.  It is with great pleasure, then, that I welcome the publication of Joan TonnÕs excellent biography of Follett.  This book is rich in historical detail and well textured in its interpretation.  We learn here much about Follett's private life of which I, at least, was unaware.  We also are given a full picture of the range of Follett's scholarship and her impact on public affairs.  In this book we see Mary Parker Follett, and through her, the evolution of American government and administration during the first half of the twentieth century.  From the speakership of the House, to the settlement movement, to the origin and evolution of modern management theory, Follett's life and career provides a path to the American experience.  Her application of psychological principles to an interpretation of that experience places her alongside (and chronologically ahead) of Harold Laswell.  Her revolutionary approach to management is a precursor of Douglas MacGregor, TQM, and its progeny.  And all of us who labor in the vineyard of congressional studies may trace our work to her.  She was a truly seminal thinker, richly deserving of a full length biography.  And of how many American political scientists can that be said?

Ronald M. Peters, Jr.

Regents' Professor of Political Science

University of Oklahoma

Political Consultants in U.S. Congressional Elections, Stephen K. Medvic, The Ohio State University Press, 2001.  ISBN 0814208738, $49.95, cloth, 224 pages.

           In this work on political consultants, Medvic examines the relationship between hiring campaign consultants and attracting votes. He raises three primary questions:  :what consultants do, the effects of their activity, and the normative consequences of those effects" (xi).  Medvic's analysis provides a theoretical framework for understanding the role of political consultants.  His theory of deliberative priming suggests that campaigns use messages to develop themes to appeal to targeted voters.  In this way, campaigns prime voters to think about candidates in certain ways.  Consultants help frame these campaign messages.  While the message can always be misunderstood or misinterpreted by the American public, it is consultants' job "to be aware of the numerous potential decodings of any message they create. . . (and to reduce) the number of aberrant decodings that occur" (63).  Medvic further tests this theory through a sophisticated empirical examination of consultant usage in the early 1990s.

           The primary finding of this analysis is that, independent of candidate spending levels, consultants do significantly influence election outcomes.  Consequently, they have become increasingly marketable in contemporary electoral politics. Those most advantaged by consultants are those candidates most disadvantaged in their races.  Consequently, challengers have much to gain by hiring political consultants to frame their campaigns.  Changes in party identification and ideological orientation occurring between 1990 and 1994 explain many of the trends identified by Medvic's work.  Democratic incumbents who employed consultants in 1990 and 1992 could have largely postponed the inevitable upsets to come in 1994.  Consultants hired by Republicans were also largely responsible for their gains in open seat races during this period.

           Medvic suggests that the normative implications of his work are unclear.  While many feel that the professionalization of politics through the use of consultants is detrimental to our democratic system, Medvic suggests that "consultants serve as intermediaries in a complex of media/cultural/political practices that often seem to have a life of their own" (156).  Whether weakening or substituting for the party system, shaping or responding to media coverage, creating cynicism or conforming to it, consultants are part of the contemporary political scene and deserve much more theoretical and empirical investigation.

           Jocelyn Jones Evans

Assistant Professor of Government

University of West Florida

Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy, edited by Stephan Haggard and Matthew D. McCubbins, Cambridge University Press, 2001. ISBN 0521773040 (cloth), $70.00, ISBN 0521774853, paper, $25.00), 359 pages.

           Employing a comparative case study method, this edited volume seeks to move beyond the question of  "Do institutions matter?"  Assuming that this question has been answered adequately in the affirmative by previous research, the works in this volume begin to explore how institutions matter.  How do institutions effect policy change?

           In answering this question, Haggard and McCubbins find the traditional institutional distinction between presidential and parliamentary systems lacking.  In order to narrow the focus, this volume focuses on differences among presidential systems, with no case studies of parliamentary systems.  In this way the title is perhaps misleading, but this in no way detracts from the value of the book.

           Only four countries (Argentina, Taiwan, Chile, and Poland) are studied here.  At first glance, this may seem to be an odd mix.  But the logic behind these choices is well explained.  In addition, the variables and plan of the book are well laid-out in the introduction. Haggard and McCubbins have managed to assemble a collection of works that connect well with each other and that are consistent with the purpose and model presented in the introduction.

           The book does prove to be a frustration, in that more questions are raised than answered.  However, this frustration also makes the book especially useful.  By accepting that institutions do matter, Haggard and McCubbins have opened a new arena of research.  The work brings forth a wealth of areas for future research, most obviously a similar study of parliamentary systems. 

Courtney Cullison

Carl Albert Center Graduate Fellow

University of Oklahoma

Scandal Proof: Do Ethics Laws Make Government Ethical? G. Calvin Mackenzie with Michael Hafken, Brookings Institution Press, 2002.  ISBN 00815754035, $16.95, paper, 196 pages.

The idea that our public servants should act in an ethical and responsible manner is not a very controversial idea.  The methods used to achieve that end, however, have had debatable success, as G. Calvin Mackenzie explains in his work Scandal Proof: Do Ethics Laws Make Government Ethical? His book is both a brief introduction to scandal and corruption in American history and an analysis of the ethics laws and regulations directed at executive branch employees.

The beginning of MackenzieÕs book is devoted to explaining the historical perspective on corruption in American government. He explains that while corruption has always existed, the scope and level of corruption has changed in ways that will make historical comparisons difficult.  The first difficulty is that statistics on corruption are difficult to obtain, because it is only after major scandals that legislation is introduced to counter the problem, and most corruption has gone unpunished.  Moreover, what constitutes true corruption has evolved over time. The idea of Òhonest graftÓ has now gone the way of Tammany Hall, and can no longer claim a place in honest politics. Finally, Mackenzie acknowledges that corruption in the federal government, the focus of his study, is a more recent development, owing to the increasing interaction between the government and corporate America of the late nineteenth century as well as the expansion of the federal bureaucracy that occurred in the wake of the New Deal. 

After his introduction to corruption in America, Mackenzie then details the modern attempts to eliminate it.  Beginning with President Kennedy, he examines the practice of enforcing high standards of ethical behavior on executive branch employees through executive orders.  These rules were finally supplemented by the comprehensive Ethics in Government Act of 1978.  Passed in the shadow of Watergate and signed by President Carter, this act was an attempt to set up enforceable rules that would take the discretion out of ethics.  The idea was that black and white rules would deter unethical activity.

Mackenzie is skeptical about the effectiveness of these rules when viewed against their costs, which he examines in detail.  He acknowledges that there has been a steady increase in legal investigations and convictions of corruption in office, what he considers one of the better measures of corruption in office, but he does not see a vast improvement in the character of our public employees.  Instead, he examines the plethora of paperwork, which can take up to four months to fill out, that is required of some positions. He is not only worried that this, along with the strenuous public financial disclosure required of higher officials, deters those who would make excellent public servants.  He is also unconvinced that the benefit of these programs outweighs their financial costs.
                "The costs are too great, the benefits too scare to sustain the current ethics policies" (159). Whether or not one agrees with Mackenzie's conclusion, the detailed research presented in his book is above par. Presenting both an introduction to ethical problems in American political history as well as an in-depth analysis of recent attempts to enforce ethical behavior on governmental employees,  his work presents a well-rounded picture. It is both a policy case study and an historical analysis of ethics in govenment. This book would be an excellent supplement to any class on American politics.

       Travis Chapman

Undergraduate student in political science

University of Oklahoma

Shades of Gray: Perspectives on Campaign Ethics, Candice J. Nelson, David A. Dulio, Stephen K. Medvic, Brookings Institution Press, 2002.  ISBN 0815706170, $18.95, paper, 262 pages.

           For some, there is nothing funnier in politics than the phrase "campaign ethics."  All laughter aside, Shades of Gray: Perspectives on Campaign Ethics, edited by Candice Nelson, David Dulio, and Stephen Medvic, addresses critical questions concerning ethics in campaigns from the perspective of actors who play critical roles in today's elections -- candidates, political consultants, parties, interest groups, the media, and citizens.  The release of a book addressing campaign ethics could not be better timed, as public perceptions of campaigns are increasingly negative, political spot ads are progressively growing more controversial, and the media's "horse race" treatment are promoting a paparazzi-like atmosphere. Shades of Gray contains fourteen chapters that attempt to outline, understand, assess, and critique the ethical challenges, roles, and responsibilities of candidates, political consultants, parties, interest groups, the media, and citizens.  Each actor is discussed in two chapters: one written by a scholar and one by a practitioner.  While both the scholars and practitioners talk about the role of actors in fostering ethical campaigns and their success in fulfilling ethical roles, the chapters diverge in one crucial manner.  The scholars accentuate relationships, i.e. how well other actors influence each other.  Yet, the practitioners give more emphasis to providing solutions for how each actor can do a better job nurturing campaign ethics.  For example, Robin Kolodny, an academic, highlights the relationships that political parties have with various other actors and how these relationships compromise the parties' ability to act as ethical agents; however, she concludes that the parties' goal of, and method for, winning elections is not unethical.  It is the system they operate within that is unethical.  In contrast, Mark Siegel, former executive director of the DNC, centers his discussion on how both parties have intentionally circumvented the spirit of electoral laws and how certain types of ethics training could increase participation and restore faith in democracy. 

           One of the stronger, interesting, and more important chapters of this book is the second chapter, "Civic Responsibility or Self-Interest?"  Dale Miller and Stephen Medvic distinguish what the term ethics means to philosophers -- how we are to lead our lives, morality- versus everyday people -- the rules and standards that are use to judge an individuals' actions.  This is important for two reasons: one, it clarifies to the reader what exactly is meant by campaign ethics; two, it allows the authors to provide a framework for evaluating campaign activity.  Two schools of thought buttress the framework.  On one side is the "self-interest" perspective, where individuals and groups look for their own self-interest before serving the public interest.  Adherents to this thought believe that the common good is best served when people protect their own interest.  In contrast is the "civic responsibility" perspective, which argues that the public interest should be served before individual interests and only by serving the public interest can individuals be truly protected.  By specifying the framework, the editors made it easier to understand the varying approaches and conclusions found in Shades of Gray.

           In conclusion, the strength of this book is in the assortment of approaches and conclusions about the role of ethics by the central actors in campaigns.  Although some may be disappointed by the lack of consensus by the authors or the lack of association between the articles, the book does an excellent job of precipitating a larger discussion regarding the role of ethics in politics -- something all of us, scholars and candidates alike, do not do enough.

Josh Stockley

Ph.D. candidate in political science

University of Oklahoma

Stalemate: Causes & Consequences of Legislative Gridlock, Sarah A. Binder, Brookings Institution Press, 2003. ISBN 0-8157-0911-0, $16.95, paper, 202 pages.

           In her study of legislative productivity, Binder embarks on what is essentially an exploration of the recent trends in legislative performance.  Specifically, Binder is concerned with the questions surrounding legislative stalemate -- frequency, causes, consequences, lasting effects on the institution.  In an era when divided government (and presumably stalemate) are the norm, the more important question may be how does anything get done at all?

           Binder begins her study by challenging the traditional notion that the framers desired legislative stalemate and designed a system that would ensure gridlock. However, Binder contends that stalemate is an unintended consequence of the constitutional design -- one which could be rectified in the present without compromising the vision of the framers.  The prime objective of the framers design was to insulate the judiciary and the legislature from executive manipulation. The legislative process, or even the electoral process, could be reformed without opening up the judiciary and legislature to undue executive influence.

           Binder's work rests on three primary findings.  First, divided government is one cause of legislative stalemate, but it is not the only cause.  "Unified gridlock" is also a significant problem.  Second, the polarization of political parties in the American system increases the frequency of gridlock.  This is due to the lack of middle ground (or room for compromise) that is found with highly polarized congressional parties.  And third, conflict between the House and the Senate effect the likelihood of policy change. By treating Congress as a unicameral body, previous studies have missed this important dimension of the legislative gridlock.

           Binder closes her work with a discussion of the consequences of legislative gridlock, including the electoral and institutional impacts, as well as a section exploring the larger dilemma surrounding stalemate.  Binder concludes that some minor institutional reforms are in order, but legislators have little electoral incentive to enact such reforms. 

Courtney Cullison

Carl Albert Center Graduate Fellow

University of Oklahoma

Voting with Dollars: A New Paradigm for Campaign Finance, Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres, Yale University Press, 2002.  ISBN 0300092628, $29.95, cloth, 304 pages.

           Ackerman and Ayres present a unique solution to the problem of campaign finance reform.  Instead of working under the traditional paradigms of campaign finance reform as typified by the debates over the McCain-Feingold bill, they step back to take a look at the problem with different assumptions.  While they still acknowledge that Buckley v. Valeo, the landmark case that established many of the rules constraining campaign finance reform today, still has merits, they reevaluate how to approach these constraints. The book proposes a virtually fully formed new system for financing campaigns.

The "patriot" funding system formulated in the text posits that each citizen will vote with dollars, specifically 50 "patriot" dollars, allocated to them from public funds each election cycle.  Citizens may give more than their 50 "patriot" dollars, but anything above the equal allocation comes out of their own pocketbooks. The key to this system is secrecy and the authors fill most of the chapters explaining and defending this concept.  Essentially the "patriot" dollars system would function like the secret ballot.  Just as each citizen receives one vote that is cast in secret, each citizen's "patriot" dollars would be allocated in secret.  The goal is to eliminate the system of money for influence that many believe corrupts the current political system. The logic is that if candidates are not able to ascertain how much donors gave to them, then they cannot be certain that they should allow donors the appropriate influence over public policy. In the end the authors believe that such a system will encourage candidates to aggressively seek out a wider range of voters and donors. 

           The authors address some of the potential problems with the patriot system including fractionalization of political parties, attempts to circumvent the secrecy aspect, incumbency advantages and so on. The constant, driving principle is that even with some potential problems, the voting with "patriot" dollars system will better address the financing of political campaigns in a democratic manner than the current thinking about campaign finance reform.  One of the more potent aspects of the book is that while they address quite a lot of theoretical concerns, the authors also present a practical system with practical recommendations.  This book would be an appropriate text for advanced courses on campaigns and American politics.  The ideas presented in the book should make for lively discussions and debates in any classroom setting.

Chris Grossman

Ph.D. candidate in political science

University of Oklahoma

Why Americans Split Their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government, Barry C. Burden and David C. Kimball, The University of Michigan Press, 2002. ISBN 0472112864, $52.50, cloth, 205 pages.

           In the last thirty years, there has been an increased frequency of divided government in the United States. Because the incidence of divided government has numerous consequences on the political system, it has become extremely important to understand the reasons for this phenomenon. In Why Americans Split Their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government, Barry Burden and David Kimball explore the causes of divided government by examining the reasons behind split-ticket voting.

           Using new quantitative techniques in their study, Burden and Kimball find that the dominant explanations of split-ticket voting are faulty. Contrary to popular belief, divided government is not a result of strategic balancing by voters who prefer divided government to one-party control. Similarly, the authors also argue that divided government should not be interpreted as a mandate for compromise between the parties' extremist positions. Rather, the authors argue that the absence of competition in congressional races is a major source of ticket splitting in the United States. Supporting their conclusions is a very strong association between ticket splitting and incumbency, campaign spending, and candidate name recognition -- all indicators of candidate quality in congressional elections.
                   In addition to their major findings on the causes of divided government and ticket splitting, Burden and Kimball also note that split-ticket voting has declined in the past ten years. However, this finding is not a result of increased competition in congressional races. Instead, the authors argue that the decline in ticket splitting in recent years is related to the sharpening policy differences between the political parties which make it much less likely for voters to split their tickets.

           InWhy Americans Split Their Tickets, Burden and Kimball contribute a great deal to the discussion over the causes of divided government. Not only do they debunk the popular explanations of ticket splitting, but they also offer an alternative explanation for the reasons behind split-ticket voting. Because of these findings, this book makes a strong contribution to the research on divided government.

Carrie Palmer Sparling

Ph.D. candidate in political science

University of Oklahoma