Doing Congressional History

Jeffery A. Jenkins
Michigan State University

Certainly, doing congressional history has never been an especially "sexy" endeavor. Flipping through old, dusty journals, digging around in poorly-organized archives, and growing dizzy scrolling through old newspapers on microfiche has left a lot to be desired. Nor has congressional history traditionally been considered "cutting edge." In fact, it has not been unusual for some political scientists to question the worth of doing historical research at all, suggesting that little can be learned from events and interactions that took place 100, 150, or 200 years ago. To understand why members of Congress vote, interact with constituents, and organize congressional institutions as they do, scholars have generally immersed themselves in the changing dynamics of the contemporary legislative environment. 

This tendency to focus almost exclusively on the contemporary Congress is understandable. Most theories of congressional behavior and organization in recent decades, after all, have been designed in the "here and now," and it is only natural that most empirically-driven political scientists have concentrated on deriving and testing hypotheses from those countervailing theories. Yet, beginning a little more than a decade ago, more and more political scientists began directing their energies toward the study of congressional history. This was due, in part, to new data gathering efforts that had begun to develop, which would eventually produce complete voting histories and "ideology" measures for all members (Poole and Rosenthal 1997), as well as fuller constituency "snapshots" (Parsons et al. 1986, 1990) and more complete electoral accountings (Dubin 1998). Yet, this data "windfall" was only part of the explanation. Perhaps more importantly, students of Congress began to realize that congressional history was a lush, untapped resource that could be used to advance a number of intellectual agendas. 

The use and application of congressional history has taken three general forms (which are not necessarily mutually exclusive, as scholars have sometimes traversed these boundaries in their scientific endeavors).

(1) Testing the Robustness of Existing Theories

Congressional history can be used to test the robustness of existing theories, because certain behavioral conditions or institutional arrangements that offer different "cuts" on theoretical questions may have only existed in the past. In other words, history can offer "new" ways of studying a particular theoretical issue, which may lead to the extension or refinement of the general theory.

One example is the notion of the "electoral connection," which holds that members of Congress are held accountable for their actions/behaviors by their constituents through the electoral process. Until recently, the electoral connection had always been considered a relatively contemporary phenomenon, the assumption being that electoral accountability required constituents to possess the ability to punish candidates selectively, a scenario only in place since the rise of the Australian ballot in the 1890s. (Prior to the Australian-ballot movement, constituents were forced to vote by party ballot, which made it difficult, if not impossible, to punish a given individual without voting against an entire party.) Moreover, Mayhew (1974) has argued that the electoral connection has grown appreciably stronger in recent decades, as parties-in-elections have grown weaker and candidate-centered campaigns have grown in prominence. However, recent research by Bianco, Spence, and Wilkerson (1996) and Carson, Jenkins, Rohde, and Souva (2001) suggests that an "electoral connection" was present much earlier during the nineteenth century, when party ballots were the norm and congressional parties controlled campaigns with an iron fist. In both cases, congressional incumbents were punished by their constituents for their policy choices (in the Bianco et al. case, the policy choice was support for a congressional pay-raise, while in the Carson et al. case, the policy choice was support for ineffective war legislation). These cases suggest that the "electoral connection" is more robust than was originally thought, and may simply require the existence of regular, district-level elections without the additional assumptions of the Australian ballot and candidate-centered campaigns.

Another example is the degree to which parties influence member behavior in Congress, which stems from a lively debate that has raged in the congressional literature over the past decade regarding whether partisan or majoritarian influences more strongly shape the institution (see Krehbiel 1991 and Cox and McCubbins 1993 for the beginnings of this debate). While most of the participants in the debate have used contemporary data to make their respective cases, some scholars have recently turned to congressional history for a fresher angle. Perhaps not surprisingly, historical research has not converged on a definitive conclusion in the partisan-majoritarian debate. Jenkins (1999), in a comparative analysis of the partisan U.S. Congress and non-partisan Confederate Congress during the Civil War, finds evidence of significant party effects. Schickler (2001), in an investigation of the determinants of institutional change in Congress between 1867 and 1998, finds stronger evidence for majoritarian influences than partisan influences. Finally, Binder (2001), in a critique of Schickler, extends the institutional-change data series back to 1789 and finds that partisan influences were stronger than Schickler had claimed, especially during the antebellum period.

(2) Building New Theories

Congressional history can also be used to build new theories. For example, modern theories often take certain institutional features, such as the committee system, rules of procedure, and the party system as "givens," in order to pursue more contemporary theoretical questions. Yet, these institutional features are endogenous, resulting from institutional choices made by members of Congress in bygone eras. This has opened the door for students of Congress to use congressional history to develop new theories of institutional development.

The development of the standing committee system was an obvious candidate for an extended theoretical examination. Cooper (1970) first tackled the subject (with regard to the House) in a rigorous way using an organizational theory approach, but little additional work followed over the next two decades. Recently, however, Gamm and Shepsle (1989) and Jenkins (1998) revisited Cooper's work, using a rational choice (more specifically, a New Institutionalist) approach. They argue that standing committees became predominant in chamber politics not so much because of increased external demands (as Cooper had argued), but because a stronger standing committee system corresponded to the mutual interests of both Henry Clay, the House Speaker, and the general membership. Jenkins and Stewart (1997) build on Gamm-Shepsle-Jenkins approach, but in a more nuanced fashion, arguing that standing committee emergence occurred in stages over time for a variety of reasons, such as efficiency and oversight, in addition to self-interest. Finally, Canon and Stewart (1998) have moved beyond the House to study the development of the Senate committee system.

The development of congressional rules of procedure was a woefully understudied topic for nearly a century. Scholars interested in the subject were left to consult Harlow (1917), a historical treatment hopelessly out of date. Finally, several studies emerged to fill this gaping hole in the literature, all of which focus on the role of the majority party in instituting change. Binder (1995) examines the adoption of the "previous question" rule in the House, and finds that it was a calculated move by the Jeffersonian majority to control floor debate by suppressing the procedural rights of the Federalist minority. Binder (1997) and Dion (1997), in separate analyses of rules changes during the first part of the nineteenth century, argue that the governing party in Congress (regardless of whether it was the Jeffersonians, Democrats, or Whigs) routinely used its majority status to restrict the procedural rights of the minority party. Lastly, Fink (2000), in an analysis of rules changes during the first twenty-eight Congresses, finds that the majority party mainly initiated restrictions when it either viewed itself as growing weaker or perceived the minority party as growing stronger.

The origin of the political party system in Congress was another subject begging for a thorough examination. Aside from two works by Hoadley (1980, 1986), students of Congress who were interested in the genesis of congressional parties had to rely largely on sketchy historical accounts, many of which were biographies only tangentially interested in the topic. However, Aldrich (1994) emerged to tackle the subject in force, and has provided a definitive account of the early development of parties in Congress. Relying largely on theories of social and collective choice, Aldrich argues persuasively that members of Congress established parties as "organizational devices" that would allow them "win" more often, in both the policy and electoral arenas. Aldrich examines roll-call voting over the first several Congresses and shows how first the Federalists, then in response the Democratic-Republicans, became much more cohesive in their collective behaviors.

(3) Explaining Historical Events

Congressional history is also ripe for social-scientific investigations. This constitutes a sort of "normal science" approach, which involves a substantive, case-specific inquiry, rather than an attempt at theory building or theory extension/refinement. In short, historical events have often been documented and interpreted by historians, who perform admirably in the areas of fact-gathering and story-building, but often are not trained in the skills of social science. Political scientists, on the other hand, have the ability to apply statistical techniques to historical questions, to determine if scientific findings jive with historical explanations. As such, positive political science can "shed light" on the often-murky historical world. 

A number of these "normal science" investigations have appeared in recent years. I mention just a few below. Fink (1995) investigates the creation of the Bill of Rights, and finds that it was less a simple democratic initiative than a strategic ploy by the Federalist majority to forestall a growing Anti-Federalist movement. Jenkins and Sala (1998) investigate the House election for president in 1825, and uncover little evidence of a "corrupt bargain," finding instead that members' votes for president were consistent with their underlying ideological positions. Krehbiel and Wiseman (2001) investigate the revolt against House Speaker Joseph Cannon in 1910, and find evidence that Cannon was not a party "czar" or tyrant, as historians generally contend, but rather was a majoritarian. Finally, Theriault (2001) investigates the passage of the Pendleton Act in 1883, and finds that civil-service reform was driven as much by public pressure as by the self-interested machinations of members of Congress.

Conclusion

I have attempted in this essay to cover the major developments in historical congressional research over the past decade. Space constraints have prevented me from conducting a complete and thorough accounting of all of the work that has been produced. Thus, I have no doubt failed to mention some important and influential studies, and for that, I apologize. Nonetheless, I believe my point is clear: congressional history has emerged from the dark recesses of political science and lurched uncontrollably into the mainstream. Doubts about the benefits of historical research have vanished, to the point where congressional history is now viewed as a "hot" field. Whether this will continue or not, only time will tell; yet, the transformation has indeed been remarkable.

References

Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why Parties?: The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bianco, William T., David B. Spence, and John D. Wilkerson. 1996. "The Electoral Connection in the Early Congress: The Case of the Compensation Act of 1816." American Journal of Political Science 40: 145-71.

Binder, Sarah A. 1995. "Partisanship and Procedural Choice: Institutional Change in the Early Congress, 1789-1823." Journal of Politics 57: 1093-1118.

Binder, Sarah A. 1997. Minority Rights, Majority Rule: Partisanship and the Development of Congress. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Binder, Sarah A. 2001. "Parties and Institutional Choice Revisited." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.

Brady, David W. 1973. Congressional Voting in a Partisan Era: A Study of the McKinley Houses and a Comparison to the Modern House of Representatives. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.

Brady, David W. 1988. Critical Elections and Congressional Policy Making. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Canon, David, and Charles Stewart III. 1998. "The Development of the Senate Committee System, 1789-1879." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.

Carson, Jamie L., Jeffery A. Jenkins, David W. Rohde, and Mark A. Souva. 2001. "The Impact of National Tides and District-Level Effects on Electoral Outcomes: The U.S. Congressional Elections of 1862-63." American Journal of Political Science. Forthcoming.

Cooper, Joseph. 1970. The Origins of the Standing Committees and the Development of the Modern House. Houston: Rice University Publications.

Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1993. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Dion, Douglas. 1997. Turning the Legislative Thumbscrew: Minority Rights and Procedural Change in Legislative Politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Dubin, Michael J. 1998. United States Congressional Elections, 1788-1997: The Official Results of the Elections of the 1st Through 105th Congresses. McFarland & Company.

Fink, Evelyn C. 1994. "Institutional Change as a Sophisticated Strategy: The Bill of Rights as a Political Solution," Journal of Theoretical Politics 7: 477-510.

Fink, Evelyn C. 2000. "Representation by Deliberation: Changes in the Rules of Deliberation in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1789-1844." Journal of Politics 62: 1109-25.

Gamm, Gerald and Kenneth Shepsle. 1989. "Emergence of Legislative Institutions: Standing Committees in the House and Senate, 1810-1825." Legislative Studies Quarterly 14: 39-66.

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Parsons, Stanley B., Michael J. Dubin, and Karen Toombs Parsons. 1990. United States Congressional Districts and Data, 1883-1913. New York: Greenwood.

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Schickler, Eric. 2000. "Institutional Change in the House of Representatives: A Test of Partisan and Ideological Power Balance Models." American Political Science Review 94: 269-88.

Theriault, Sean. 2001. "Patronage, the Pendleton Act, and the Power of the People." Working paper. Stanford University.