According to Mahtesian, the sick legislature syndrome results from the needs of politically ambitious careerist legislators whose personal electoral needs drive them to ignore institutional norms of civility as they pursue their individual goals. Far fewer violations of good behavior are to be found in less professionalized legislatures because their members are legislators of a different breed: less ambitious, less concerned with their own political futures, and, therefore. more willing to work together for common goals. This relationship seems plausible, but it runs contrary to Polsby's (1968) observation about institutionalization, which holds that norms of civility increase as members adopt long-term perspectives about their service. The notion is that as members serve together longer they have greater incentive to figure out ways to do that civilly. 

The cases Mahtesian studies in depth certainly appear to support his hypothesis. Minnesota, among the more professionalized bodies, has suffered from bitter partisanship and near gridlock for much of this decade. In contrast, the much less professionalized Tennessee legislature has enjoyed a more tranquil atmosphere and, arguably, more productive sessions, despite spending less time in session and having fewer staff resources to support its members' efforts. 

It is California, however, that Mahtesian cites as the "flagship of legislative professionalism" and as the "most dramatic exhibit" of sick legislature syndrome. There is little doubt that Mahtesian's characterization of the current California Assembly as a sick legislature is correct. After all, recent sessions have witnessed numerous uncivil outbursts, with members calling each other names and making rude gestures toward each other. One recent story in the Los Angeles Times (Gladstone 1997) began by noting, "California's 80-member Assembly has been called disorderly, dysfunctional and as unruly as an elementary school playground during a food fight." But, at the same time the Assembly is justifiably held in low regard, the state Senate, while no bastion of exemplary manners, has managed to maintain a reasonable level of civility and productivity. Yet, of course, the state Senate is operating in the same political culture and electoral system as the more troubled Assembly. Thus one possible problem with Mahtesian's analysis of sick legislature syndrome is that if professionalization is the cause, then the problems it causes should be found in both houses in a state and to the same degree. It is not clear if that is the case in California. 

There are, of course, other ways of assessing the possible causes of troubled legislative bodies. One way is to look at the development of the legislature as an institution. In the case of the California Assembly, we know when the professionalization movement took off--the adoption of Proposition 1A in 1966 (Squire 1992). If the Mahtesian thesis is correct, we should see a legislature which is better behaved, and as a consequence more productive, before professionalization than after. Indeed, as the legislature continues to professionalize sick legislature syndrome ought to become more pronounced. 

Looking at the behavior in the California Assembly over time, the picture is actually quite murky. The legislature acquired a poor reputation early in its history. The initial session was called the "session of a thousand drinks" because of the long bars set up outside the meeting chambers by lobbyists, U. S. Senate candidates, and patronage seekers (Goodwin 1916, 261). Things improved little over the next half century. By 1911 the body's reputation was so low that the legislature's chaplain began that year's session by beseeching members to "give us a square deal, for Christ's sake" (Mowry 1963, 139). The Progressive era reforms were intended in part to improve the legislature's reputation and performance. What followed the reforms, however, was a period where the legislature was dominated by the legendary lobbyist, Artie Samish, referred to as the Secret Boss of California (Samish and Thomas 1971). Samish influenced legislative behavior by providing members campaign funds and money to help meet their Sacramento living expenses (Samish and Thomas 1971, 122; Buchanan 1963, 59-60). Even after Samish was removed from the political scene by a conviction for income tax evasion, corruption festered in the legislature. Indeed, at the time Jesse Unruh entered the Assembly in 1955, two former Speakers were under indictment for bribery (Buchanan 1963, 55-6). 

There is little on the record to suggest that the Assembly Unruh took over was a particularly healthy institution. Moreover, even as he endeavored to improve the legislature's lot, there were episodes of sick legislature syndrome. Take, for example, the fight over the state budget in 1963. Assembly Republicans demanded to see an agreement that Speaker Unruh had reached with the state Senate on an education budget. The Speaker denied the GOP a look, and the minority party exercised its prerogative not to vote. (California requires an extraordinary majority to pass the budget, thus giving the minority party considerable leverage.) According to one recounting of the events that followed (Richardson 1996, 114), 

at 1:40 A.M. on July 30, after an evening of heavy drinking, Unruh ordered the Republicans locked into the Assembly chambers until they voted. . . . That night Republican State Chairman Caspar Weinberger swiftly issued a press release denouncing the lockup as the tactics of "Stalin, Hitler and other dictators." . . . Unruh retreated to a bar at the El Mirador Hotel and got even more drunk. . . . Finally, after twenty-two hours and fifty minutes, Unruh caved in and showed the Republicans the school budget. 

After the reforms of the 1960s, the legislature in general, and the Assembly in particular, enjoyed an excellent reputation. California, for example, placed at the head of the class in The Citizens Conference on State Legislatures (1971) rankings of legislatures. Close observers claimed there were fewer alcoholics and that members were more serious about their duties than in the pre-reform legislature (Fisher, Price and Bell 1973, 69; Salzman 1976, 79-81). A much larger percentage of members live year-round in Sacramento with their families--70% according to one survey (Dodd and Kelly 1989, 25). Decorum and appearance mattered, as evidenced by the uproar over one member's attempt to go without a tie on the floor (Endicott 1975) and concerns with another member's intemperate comments on the floor (Hoover 1989). All of this happened after professionalization took hold. 

Professionalization, then, does not appear to lead directly to sick legislature syndrome. The case of California suggests that the disease may well manifest itself before professionalization. The available evidence suggests that like herpes, sick legislature syndrome flares from time to time and then it seemingly disappears. 

Other possible causes may be suggested by looking across the fifty state legislatures. By most definitions, a handful of state legislatures are professionalized, the rest lag those bodies by a little or a lot. Those that are the farthest along the road toward professionalization--those identified by Mahtesian as the most likely to suffer problems--are not a random sample of all states. The most professionalized legislatures are found in the largest and most socially and economically diverse states (Mooney 1995). Thus, if these are the legislatures that are most likely to have problems it may be that they are the organizations that are most under stress from the multitude of demands being made of them. 

Additional variables that might contribute to sick legislature syndrome are term limits and heightened partisanship. If term limits are a cause, it would appear to substantiate Polsby's (1968) claims; as members are forced to adopt short-term time frames they lose the incentive to establish norms that encourage civility. But it may be the case that term limits in professionalized legislatures creates the best possible scenario for sick legislature syndrome, with ambitious career-minded legislators competing with one another during legislative service of short duration. Heightened partisanship, with the memberships of the two parties anchoring the opposite ends of the political spectrum, may also lead to sick legislature syndrome for obvious reasons. It is not clear, however, if professionalization leads to heightened partisanship or not. 

There is little doubt that sick legislature syndrome as described by Mahtesian is a real malady with real consequences for legislators and the people they represent. What is not clear is the cause of the disease. Professionalization is not a likely source because many of these problems can be found before it took hold. But it may be that for other reasons sick legislature syndrome is more apt to be found in more professionalized legislatures. 

References 

Buchanan, William. 1963. Legislative Partisanship. Berkeley: University of California Press. 

Citizens Conference on State Legislatures. 1971. State Legislatures: An Evaluation of Their Effectiveness. New York: Praeger. 

Dodd, Lawrence C., and Sean Q. Kelly. 1989. "Legislators' Home Style in Traditional and Modern Systems: The Case of Presentational Style." Presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago. 

Endicott, William. 1975. "Meade Takes Case of Attire to the Voters." Los Angeles Times, 28 February. 

Fisher, Joel M.; Charles M. Price and Charles G. Bell. 1973. "The Legislative Process in California." Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC 

Gladstone, Mark. 1997. "State's Lower House Sinks a Bit Lower." Los Angeles Times, 6 June. 

Goodwin, Cardinal. 1916. The Establishment of State Government in California. New York: MacMillan. 

Hoover, Ken. 1989. "Can Pugnacious Ross Johnson Unify Fractious Caucus?" California Journal 20:15-17. 

Mills, James R. 1987. A Disorderly House. Berkeley: Heyday Books. 

Mooney, Christopher Z. 1995. "Citizens, Structures, and Sister States: Influences on State Legislative Professionalism." Legislative Studies Quarterly 20:47-67. 

Mowry, George E. 1963. The California Progressives. Chicago: Quadrangle Books. 

Richardson, James. 1996. Willie Brown. Berkeley: University of California Press. 

Polsby, Nelson W. 1968 "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives." American Political Science Review 62:144-68. 

Salzman, Ed. 1976. "The Deceptive Image of the State Legislature." California Journal 7:79-81. 

Samish, Arthur H., and Bob Thomas. 1971. The Secret Boss of California. New York: Crown. 

Squire, Peverill. 1992. "The Theory of Legislative Institutionalization and the California Assembly." Journal of Politics 54:1026-54.