Mahtesian's conclusions are particularly troubling because they follow a remarkable record of improvement. During the 1970s and 1980s reform and professionalization of state legislatures revitalized these bodies. Rosenthal (1993) writes that state legislators "increased the time they spent on their tasks; . . . established or expanded their staffs; . . . streamlined their procedures, enlarged their facilities, invigorated their processes, attended to their ethics, disclosed their finances, and reduced their conflicts of interests" (115). 

Despite their progress, reformers had little time to bask in the glow of revitalization before concerns emerged about its consequences. In particular, careerism and the politicization of legislative processes it seemed to exacerbate created concerns for scholars, the public, and legislators themselves. In their 1994 NCSL report, Strengthening State Legislatures, the task force of legislators and staffers recommended that legislatures, "consider carefully any changes in operations that will further professionalize the legislature" (14). 

Mahtesian draws our attention to the potential problems associated with professionalized bodies, but he does not attempt to place these problems in a broader context--this is not his objective. He simply states that "professionalism, partisanship, and incivility are linked to each other in some unholy way." His analysis examines neither context unique to Minnesota and Tennessee nor external forces creating problems beyond the capabilities of professionalization to solve. 

In this essay I will discuss how circumstances in these two states precipitate from historical, demographic, and cultural features that are only tenuously related to professionalization. I will also describe how other external forces--forces that are particularly potent in highly industrialized, urbanized, and moralistic states--signify that professionalization of these state legislatures is both a welcomed necessity and a necessary evil. 

Ideology and Partisanship 

The political history and tradition of Minnesota and Tennessee are strikingly different. These differences existed long before the reform and/or professionalization of state legislatures in the 1970s. Theodore Rueter's (1994) thorough study of the Minnesota legislature describes a long history of strong disciplined parties and partisan competition spurred by the "street-level radicalism" that emerged in the Farmer-Labor party in the 1940s and 1950s. Rueter writes that in the Minnesota House, "one's party affiliation is everything--socially, politically, ideologically, and organizationally" (90). This political tradition translates into well-established organizational norms: unquestioned control by the majority party and thus the Speaker; loyalty of party members particularly on procedural matters; and a vital role for the party in reelection campaigns. 

Minnesota's partisan alignments follow historical patterns of rural-urban divergence. The result of a fusion between the Catholic communities in the state's urban areas and Scandinavian farmers in the northwestern part of the state, the Democratic Farmer-Labor party has a long history of support for liberal social and economic policy. As Mahtesian points out, the party conference has been on a collision course with the Republicans who represent conservatives from affluent suburbs and other rural areas. 

On the other hand, Tennessee is emerging from the tradition of Southern politics: a nonideological one-party system where factions were generally centered around personalities rather than ideology, and civility was an inviolable norm. In the wake of economic, social, and political transformations, the Republican party in Tennessee is emerging as a viable alternative, and, as Mahtesian notes, partisanship is beginning to stir, particularly in the House. Even against this backdrop of emerging two-partyism, however, there is a great deal of ideological overlap between holdover conservative Democrats and new Republicans. 

Thus while partisan bickering may be exacerbated by professionalism or careerism, it occurs in the absence of either or both. Political traditions, social cleavages, and distinct political cultures are potent external forces that bear on a legislative body's ability to fashion consensus. 

The Erosion of Boundaries: Deinstitutionalization 

While we can argue that the capacity of legislatures to create consensus, to foster deliberation, and to avoid excessive politicization is linked to contextual forces, it appears that this capacity is diminished by professionalization. In a series of anecdotes, Mahtesian documents problems in professionalized states such as California, Pennsylvania, New York, Illinois, and Florida, and says that the "'sick legislature' syndrome is spreading." 

Ironically, while the reforms of the 1970s and 1980s that professionalized these state legislatures enhanced their representativeness, independence, and functional capacity, they also initiated the process of deinstitutionalization. Polsby's application of the concept of institutionalization (1968) to the U.S. House is familiar to students of Congress. With few exceptions, there has been little attempt to apply the concept to state legislatures.¹ 

In his adaptation of Polsby's theory, Rosenthal argues that the component most applicable to state legislatures is that of boundedness, that is, "the separation of an institution from its environment." (Rosenthal 1996b, 185). Deinstitutionalization occurs when the institution's boundaries break down, when internal matters are strongly influenced by outside forces, and the institution loses control over internal processes that bring it together. In the last few years, legislatures have become "more permeable and more likely to have outside influences penetrate internal structures and processes"(185). As boundaries are penetrated, that is, as deinstitutionalization occurs, legislatures lose their capacity for resource allocation, problem solving, and conflict resolution. 

The notion of boundedness was originally conceived by Polsby to mean limits on the entrance and exit of members, i.e., personnel differentiation. But scholars have noted that this conception in too narrow (Cooper and Brady, 1981). A breakdown in boundedness occurs when forces in the external environment are reflected in the institution's internal environment. For example, Rosenthal (1996b) states that the imperatives of modern campaigning have eroded legislative norms such as institutional loyalty in state legislatures, much as they have in Congress. In another example, he describes the loss of managerial autonomy, that is, the legislature's discretion over its structure, processes, and conduct. This discretion has disintegrated in those states that authorize voter initiatives. These initiatives have limited terms, reduced the size of the legislature, shortened the session, attempted conversion to a unicameral body, and provided for a part-time legislature. 

Rosenthal's adaptation of Polsby's theory is relevant to Mahtesian's notion of "sick legislatures" because it posits that the sickness comes as much from outside pathogens as it does from internal indigestion. Mahtesian's assertion that professionalism itself is at fault ignores the point that many of the reforms that are the hallmarks of professional legislatures have enabled them to cope with changing conditions in their external environments. However, it is also true that these changes have led to increases in the permeability of legislative boundaries. Here I would like to concentrate on two such trends: the increasing flow of information circulating both from and toward state legislatures, and the significant strides many legislatures have made toward ethics and lobby regulation. 

Increased Flow of Information 

In recent years many legislatures have made concerted efforts to inform and educate the public; at the same time, media scrutiny of legislative activity has intensified. Professional legislatures in particular have instituted activities and services that allow citizens to review and comment on pending issues and that make it easier for the public to know what is happening in a timely fashion. Some are also attempting to educate the public, that is, to promote a deeper understanding of the legislative process in general. In a recent study I used data from 28 states to measure legislatures' attempts to increase public awareness of legislative activities and processes. My findings show that the Minnesota legislature ranked first in its efforts to inform and educate the general public (Opheim 1996). 

There is no guarantee, however, that efforts to increase awareness or contacts with the public enhance the latter's satisfaction with legislative performance. Indeed, some studies show the opposite to be true. Squire (1993) found that professionalization enhances citizen contacts with legislators, but that heightened contact did not result in a better evaluation of their performance. He points out that professional bodies serve larger more diverse constituencies where there are more unmet demands and unsolved problems--thus more exposure to "infectious influences" on the legislature. 

If we have no guarantees that contact initiated by legislators will enhance their images with the public, we can be sure that increased scrutiny by the media has tarnished those images. Some of the same methods professional bodies employ to increase information to the general public facilitate increased media attention as well, and there is little doubt that coverage has become more extensive and more negative. In their survey of state legislators who had served as long as 15 years, Moncrief, Thompson, and Kurtz ( 1996) report that the most frequently cited change in the legislatures' influence structure was the media. Furthermore, relationships with the media were viewed negatively by the overwhelming majority of legislators surveyed. 

Thus increases in the flow of information have made professional bodies in particular more open, but they have also increased the permeability of legislative boundaries and made it harder for legislators to work within a system that fosters deliberation. When Mahtesian labels Tennessee legislative sessions "inconspicuous" and states that "legislators' personal foibles remain largely out of the public eye," we can appreciate that these legislators' ability to fashion a reasonable consensus remains relatively unhampered by the glare of public scrutiny. 

Increases in Outside Lobbying 

One of the most laudable trends in state legislatures has been the increasing impetus for stronger lobby regulation. Professional legislatures, particularly those with significant staff resources, have made the most rigorous efforts to regulate lobbies, and these regulations have improved both the substance and appearance of ethical behavior in these states (Opheim 1991). But there is also concern that the new ethics environment has broken down the traditional relationships between legislators and lobbyists that characterize "inside" lobbying (Rosenthal 1996a). 

To preserve their credibility, inside lobbyists traditionally provided reliable information; often lobbyist largesse brought communities of legislators together. The breakdown in traditional relationships between lobbyist and legislator forces interest groups to adopt other techniques for influence such as increasing campaign contributions, or "outside" lobbying strategies: grassroots pressure, public relations, or advocacy advertising. Unlike the information from traditional "direct" lobbying, pressure mounted from the outside appears to be adversarial, manipulative, and beneficial to interest groups with the resources to organize grassroots constituencies. 

Our concern here is that the rise of outside lobbying is yet another indication that the boundaries between legislatures and their environments are breaking down. Legislators have become increasingly independent, even isolated, as they respond to these external pressures; they are less connected by the internal networks that encouraged closer relationships and civility. They have also become less eager to adhere to institutionalized norms that, in the past, facilitated decision-making. In short, their autonomy from one another and from the institution in which they serve makes them and the institution itself more vulnerable to the ills and conflicts of a wider society. 

Conclusion 

Mahtesian provocatively describes the symptoms of "sick legislatures," but he neglects to consider the root causes of the condition. We must recognize that there are historical and social forces which affect the culture of the legislative process. We should also appreciate that external forces which encourage the admirable features of professionalization foster the negative ones as well. In responding to external pressures, legislatures increased their capacity to serve more diverse constituencies, address more complex issues, inform the public, and police ethical violations. The challenge for these legislatures now is to fashion procedural strategies and organizational norms that bring their members together. 

Notes 

1. One exception is Peverill Squire's 1992 analysis of California. See "The Theory of Legislative Institutionalization and the California Assembly," Journal of Politics 54:1026-54. 

References 

Cooper, Joseph and David W. Brady. 1981. "Toward a Diachronic Analysis of Congress." American Political Science Review 75:988-1006. 

Mahtesian, Charles. 1997. "The Sick Legislature Syndrome." Governing (February):16-20. 

Moncrief, Gary; Joel A. Thompson, and Karl T. Kurtz. 1996. "The Old Statehouse, It Ain't What It Used to Be." Legislative Studies Quarterly 21:57-72. 

National Conference of State Legislatures. 1994. Strengthening State Legislatures: A Report of NCSL's Legislative Institution Task Force. 

Opheim, Cynthia. 1991. "Explaining the Differences in State Lobby Regulation." Western Political Quarterly 44:405-21. 

Opheim, Cynthia. 1996. "Reinventing Images: State Legislative Efforts to Reach the Public." State and Local Government Review 28:136-46. 

Polsby, Nelson W. 1968. "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives." American Political Science Review 62:144-68. 

Rosenthal, Alan. 1993. "The Legislative Institution--In Transition and at Risk." In The State of the States, 2d ed., ed. Carl E. Van Horn. Washington, DC: CQ Press. 

Rosenthal, Alan. 1996a. "Ethics and Lobbying." In "Extension of Remarks," APSA Legislative Studies Section Newsletter 19, no. 2:6-8. 

Rosenthal, Alan. 1996b. "State Legislative Development: Observations from Three Perspectives." Legislative Studies Quarterly 21:169-98. 

Rueter, Theodore. 1994. The Minnesota House of Representatives and the Professionalization of Politics. Lanham, MD.: University Press of America. 

Squire, Peverill. 1993. "Professionalism and Public Opinion of State Legislatures." Journal of Politics 55:479-91.