"The Sick Legislature Syndrome": What the Diagnosis Can Tell Us About Both the Patient and the Doctor Christopher Z. Mooney West Virginia University |
| The movement of U.S. state legislatures from part-time, "horse and
buggy" institutions toward professional, deliberative law-making bodies
was among the most rapid and seemingly well-coordinated set of reforms
ever undertaken by independent political institutions in the U.S. (Pound
1992). From the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, state legislatures raised their
pay, lengthened their sessions, improved their support services, and revamped
their internal rules and procedures. While all states did not reform their
legislatures to the same degree, all state legislatures moved in this direction.
This quick-step march of the states toward legislative professionalism in this period is due to the convergence of many well-understood factors: U.S. Supreme Court reapportionment decisions, the frequently flush finances of state governments due to improved revenue systems and General Revenue Sharing, the heightened awareness and interest in domestic politics instigated by the civil rights and anti-war movements, and urban unrest. But perhaps just as important in directing the energy of this movement was the unanimity of opinion in the political press and among good government reformers of the time about what needed to be done (e.g., Burns 1971; Herzberg and Rosenthal 1972; Miller 1965). No longer were the state legislatures merely ridiculed as being collections of out of touch rubes who spent a couple of months every year drinking too much and debating the merits of silly resolutions. They began to be seen as being important to the provision of public services to U.S. citizens, and became the subject of serious and consistent prescriptions for reform, in the tradition of commentators like Upton Sinclair and Walter Lippmann. Charles Mahtesian's article on the "sick legislature syndrome" follows in this tradition of serious, analytical political journalism, but he represents a new generation with new concerns about the legislature. Mahtesian uses anecdotal evidence to raise important questions about the impacts of legislative professionalism. Along with Alan Rosenthal (1996), who pursues this line of argument more systematically and more thoroughly, Mahtesian gives voice to the concern that legislative professionalism has bad effects. The recent popularity of term limits initiatives and other anti-professionalism reforms, such as Colorado's GAVEL initiative, are evidence that legislative professionalism is not merely a technical issue that allows progress toward a commonly held goal. Rather, it speaks to Americans' deeply held political values. At issue are basic questions of what government should do and how policymaking should be conducted. Thought of in this way, the major benefit of Mahtesian's article for political scientists is that it suggests a multi-faceted research agenda for us. First, and most obviously, we must assess empirically and systematically the various impacts of legislative professionalism. Many of the concerns raised in Mahtesian's article arise from assertions about these impacts which are substantiated only with anecdotal evidence, and empirical rigor must be brought to bear to assess these and similar assertions. And second, we can use the published debate about the legislative professionalism movement to learn about the values of political commentators and citizens. An analysis of the arguments made for and against legislative professionalism may well tell us as much about those making the arguments as it tells us about state legislatures. The Effects of State Legislative Professionalism It is likely that legislative professionalism has had a wide range of impacts, and over the past three decades, there have been several empirical studies of legislative professionalism's affect on, for example, state expenditures (Grumm 1971; Ritt 1973), internal legislative procedures (Thompson 1986), the demographics of state legislatures (Squire 1992), and divided government (Fiorina 1994; Squire 1997). But what is needed is a concerted effort to generate hypotheses of these effects in a variety of areas, and to test them systematically. And it is of both practical and theoretical importance that such an evaluation be done. After all, this is an historic and expensive set of reforms. Should we not care how this has affected governance and policy in the states? Mahtesian's article raises questions about several potential effects of legislative professionalism, but there are also many he has not touched upon. Some of the questions that political scientists should pursue include: How does legislative professionalism affect the internal processes of the legislature? Does it lead to more partisanship in voting, committee assignments, and bill success? Do legislatures go so far as to reorganize their working spaces to reflect this, as Mahtesian suggests? How are such things as committee assignments, leadership position assignments, and bill referrals different in professional and "citizen" legislatures? How does professionalism affect leadership and followership in the state legislature? What are the mechanisms with which legislative leaders have more and/or less control in a professional legislature? Do we get different types of legislators in professional and citizen legislatures? Are their backgrounds different? Are their occupations different? Are their attitudes and values different? Are their aspirations and post-legislative career paths different? How does professionalism affect legislative behavior? Do legislators in professional legislatures vote the same way, decide the same way, and relate to one another in the same way as legislators in citizen legislatures do? How does professionalism affect state legislative elections? Does professionalism affect campaign costs, the participation of PACs, the conduct of campaigns, the type and behavior of challengers, and the closeness of election outcomes? How does legislative professionalism affect state policy? Are certain types of policy more likely to be addressed or avoided by professional legislatures? Does professionalism legislative innovativeness, and the propensity to spend money? Do some interests fare better in professional versus citizen legislatures? Is there a difference in the influence of lobbyists and interest groups between these types of legislatures? How does professionalism affect legislative relations with the governor, the bureaucracy, and the judiciary? Is there more or less inter-branch conflict with a professional state legislature, and does professionalism affect who wins these conflicts? It is also important to note that the study of state legislative professionalism also provides uniquely advantageous research design possibilities for political scientists investigating these compelling questions. For example, when Polsby (1968) studied the institutionalization of Congress, he could only examine a single institution. It was, therefore, difficult for him to distinguish between idiosyncratic and systematic causes of change. For example, was the institution of the committee seniority system due to systematic historical and political factors, or was it just a reaction to a particular individual's handling of the position of Speaker? Further, the changes occurred in Congress over the course of 150 years, making the collection of appropriate data on potential causes and effects difficult or impossible. Students of state legislative professionalism, on the other hand, are in the enviable position of having 50 very similar units of analysis to study over 20 to 40 recent years. There is variation across both time and units of analysis at a single time, providing powerful leverage for explanation. In addition, states typically keep very good data on variables internal and external to the legislature that could be important in measuring and assessing the effects of professionalism. Of course, citizens' and legislators' attitudes might be difficult to gather, and many legislative characteristics of interest, such as committee membership, leadership backgrounds, and legislative voting, might be kept differently from state to state. But a team of creative researchers with sufficient resources could do far more in studying the effects of legislative reform in the U.S. states than in any other venue in the world. Citizens' and Elites' Values The state legislative professionalism movement also provides a unique opportunity to investigate another fundamental issue--citizens' and elites' values regarding government. One problem in understanding the legislative professionalism debate is the lack of common evaluation criteria. For example, the basic question, "What makes a good legislature?" cannot be addressed without clarifying one's values. A systematic assessment of journalists', academics', and citizens' reaction to state legislative professionalism could provide great insight into their values. An historical assessment of political journalism on state legislatures, such as the Mahtesian article, would be a good start on such a project. What language was used in the early and mid-1960s during the period of advocacy for professionalism? What was seen as bad about the then-current legislatures? Was it a lack of technical expertise, the need for more time and resources for legislative deliberation, or concerns about equity and fairness? In what ways was legislative professionalism meant to address these issues? Likewise, one could evaluate recent political journalism to see how values have or have not changed. The Mahtesian article implies many values. Why does he think that an increase in partisanship is bad? What is the problem with weakened legislative leadership, reduction in comity, entrenchment of incumbents, increased campaign expenditures, and young state legislators who have no "real world experience," all of which Mahtesian suggests are the negative effects of legislative professionalism? What do journalists imply about their values when they make these sorts of normative judgments? Similarly, the rhetoric of advocates of recent anti-professionalism reforms, such as term limits, could be analyzed. What do these reformers' very successful arguments imply about the political values of Americans? Why do these arguments resonate so well with voters? I believe that such an analysis would reveal a fundamental inconsistency in the values of Americans regarding their government. We want fair, competent, and active representation before the government, and yet we have a deep distrust of politicians that dates back to at least the founding of the republic, and which has been sustained by the immigration of people fleeing repressive regimes since that time. Legislative professionalism represents the nexus of these values. What could be more competent than a full-time, professional legislature? But how can we trust a person who would actually want to be a full-time politician? The normative debate over legislative professionalism may well turn out to be a debate over these competing values. Conclusion Political scientists have already begun to look into some of the questions I have raised (e.g., Squire 1993; Thompson 1986; Roeder 1979; Fiorina 1994), but more needs to be done. The serious and systematic study of state legislative professionalism offers a unique opportunity for the understanding of politics. Through it, we can learn much not only about how states make law, but also about the effects of institutional change, legislative behavior, and the values Americans hold about government. However, this is an opportunity that may not be seized, since the states are often ignored by political scientists in favor of the greater cachet of national governments. We owe a debt to journalists like Charles Mahtesian and political reformers in the area for bringing to our attention the importance of these reforms, and the importance of their careful evaluation. References Burns, John. 1971. The Sometime Government. New York: Bantam Books. Fiorina, Morris P. 1994. "Divided Government in the American States: A Byproduct of Legislative Professionalism?" American Political Science Review 88:304-16. Grumm, John G. 1971. "The Effects of Legislative Structure on Legislative Performance." In State and Urban Politics, ed. Richard I. Hofferbert and Ira Sharkansky. Boston: Little-Brown. Herzberg, Donald G., and Alan Rosenthal, ed. 1972. Strengthening the States. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books. Miller, James N. 1965. "Hamstrung Legislatures." National Civic Review 54:178-87. Polsby, Nelson W. 1968. "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives." American Political Science Review 62:144-68. Pound, William. 1992. "State Legislative Careers: Twenty-Five Years of Reform." In Changing Patterns in State Legislative Careers, ed. Gary F. Moncrief and Joel A. Thompson. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Ritt, Leonard. 1973. "State Legislative Reform: Does It Matter?" American Politics Quarterly 1:499-510. Roeder, Philip W. 1979. "State Legislative Reform: Determinants and Policy Consequences." American Politics Quarterly 7:51-70. Rosenthal, Alan. 1996. "The Legislature: Unraveling of Institutional Fabric." In The State of the States, 3d ed., ed. Carl Van Horn. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Squire, Peverill. 1992. "Legislative Professionalization and Membership Diversity." Legislative Studies Quarterly 17:69-80. Squire, Peverill. 1993. "Professionalization and Public Opinion of State Legislatures." Journal of Politics 55:479-91. Squire, Peverill. 1997. "Another Look at Legislative Professionalization and Divided Government in the States." Legislative Studies Quarterly 22:417-32. Thompson, Joel A. 1986. "State Legislative Reform: Another Look, One More Time, Again." Polity 19:27-41. |