| Volume 29, Number 1, January 2006 |
The relationship between
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Congress has been
understudied in the current literature and yet the relationship is
particularly important for understanding past and current debates in
foreign policy. In his work, The CIA and Congress: The Untold Story
from Truman to Kennedy, David Barrett traces
the development of the relationship between the CIA and Congress from
the inception of the CIA under Truman during the 1940s through the
1950s and into the beginnings of the 1960s, ending with the Bay of Pigs
Invasion under the Kennedy administration. This book provides not only
the detailed story of the decisions and congressional oversight
relations between these two bodies, but also provides some antecedents
for understanding their current relationship.
Barrett's
work is historical in perspective and based upon countless hours of
research. Unfortunately many of the source documents on the
relationship between the CIA and Congress are classified or
unavailable. However, Barrett's research provides a picture of the
relationship and methodically unfolds a story that is both interesting
and insightful. Barrett lays out his work chronologically and provides
some conclusions about the whole of the relationship between the CIA
and Congress over the three decades.
The
beginnings of the CIA lay in the wake of World War II and the perceived need of
congressional leaders to have an intelligence agency that was founded
upon constitutional principles and legally instituted. The current
Central Intelligence Group did not meet these criteria in the eyes of
the legislators. Barrett does indicate the fears of numerous members of
Congress during this period, and in fact, throughout the Truman
administration, about the role and extent of the CIA. During its
first few years the CIA had several rocky encounters with both the
Truman administration and Congress, including failing to predict the
Soviet Union's testing of an atomic bomb.
The
1950s and the Eisenhower administration brought about some changes and
more confidence in the CIA. Congress continued to struggle with the
notion that members of Congress should be secondary in the practice of
developing foreign policy. The lack of a consensus about the role of
Congress led to inconsistent oversight of the agency, although
oversight functions grew over time. During the late 1950s and the early
1960s the Congress was anxious about the growing power and influence of
revolutionary Cuban leader Fidelo Castro. Congress increasingly
pressured the CIA for more covert action. Under Kennedy the crisis with
Cuba grew to new heights and the Bay of Pigs invasion was launched.
Unfortunately, the Bay of Pigs, in early 1961, is considered one of the
agency's largest failures. Barrett argues that while numerous
individuals have considered the role the president (both Kennedy and
Eisenhower) and their respective administrative officials had in
shaping the policy, no one has studied the influence of a hostile
Congress which may have led to the Bay of Pigs failure.
Barrett
ends his study of the relationship between the CIA and Congress with
several conclusions. First, "much of the conventional wisdom about
Congress and the CIA is accurate" (458). Members of Congress not only
lacked knowledge about the CIA but also felt they were secondary actors
in the foreign policymaking process, leading to the Congress deferring
to the president. Furthermore, the debates about the CIA were not
bipartisan events. Second, "much of the conventional wisdom is wrong or
incomplete" concerning the CIA and Congress (459). Congressional
oversight varied, both in quantity and quality; however, Congress often
urged for concealment and supported covert action. Finally, the
responsibility of the CIA is not fully attainable, although it is clear
that Congress, through its
inconsistent oversight and deference to executive or CIA officials,
gave the CIA more freedom to engage in questionable behaviors during
this time period. Overall Barrett's work provides some important
caveats for understanding the current relationship between Congress and
the CIA given lack of intelligence pre-9-11 and the bad intelligence
leading to the deployment of troops to Iraq. While this study primarily
focuses on the development of the CIA from a fledgling institution to
an important fixture in American foreign policy, Barrett is careful to
recognize that the role of Congress goes beyond oversight and that
institutional relationships do matter and shape the future.
Kate
E. Carney
Carl
Albert Graduate Fellow
Ph.D. student of
Political Science
University
of Oklahoma
The Indirect Effect of Direct
Legislation: How Institutions Shape Interest Group Systems, Frederick J. Boehmke, The
Ohio State University Press, 2005, ISBN 0814209963, $39.95, cloth, 217
pages.
This study attempts to
harness the effects of direct legislation, outside of the actual effect
of passing or rejecting a public ballot referendum. "Direct
legislation" is considered the enactment (or attempt thereof) of
legislation within individual states through public ballot, thus the
public enacts policy while circumventing the state legislature. In this
study, Boehmke generates a model of "interest group influence" in order
to assess the indirect effect that ballot access has on interest
groups. Due to the fact that "direct legislation" or the initiative
process is an institutional issue that varies across states, Boehmke
attempts to determine how government institutions influence interest
group development and action.
Over
the past twenty-five years the initiative process has become a
prominent part of state politics. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s (with
1996 being the high point year) the nation saw its greatest amount of
initiative activity. This trend slowed in 2002 with the fewest number
of initiatives occurring since 1986. These initiatives range from
extremely controversial issues, to some of the most mundane. State
requirements on the initiative process vary greatly. Different states
can have different regulations for signature collection, distribution
of signatures, length of time a petition may circulate, and
verification of signatures just to name a few. Thus the goal of
Boehmke's model becomes specifically to determine how the nature of
access to the initiative process can be utilized to generate
predictions about how interest groups will approach the process.
The
Indirect Effect of Direct Legislation takes a new and highly
influential approach to the study of initiative and referendum
politics. While previous research on this topic has focused on how
interest groups utilize the initiative process, Boehmke shows that the
implications of the initiative process reach far beyond the actual
execution of initiative politics. Boehmke utilizes a general model
discussed in chapter 2 to set up an analytical foundation for the
empirical testing of nine different predictions and implications
regarding mobilization and diversity of groups, policy outcomes,
representation, resources, lobbying tactics, lobbying strategies, the
resources and tactics of groups in states with initiatives versus
states without them, and finally the use of inside versus outside
lobbying and the effect that initiatives have on the ability to inside
lobby.
This
study is a must read for scholars of interest groups within states, as
well as scholars of the initiative and referendum process. Boehmke
takes a new, well theorized approach to this process that sheds a great
deal of light on what shapes interest groups and how they act, in
addition to the true effects that the initiative process has on state
politics.
Curtis Ellis
Carl Albert Graduate
Fellow
Ph.D. student of
Political Science
University of Oklahoma
Issue Politics in Congress, Tracy Sulkin, Cambridge
University Press, 2005, ISBN 0521671329, $21.99, paper, 207 pages.
Issue Politics in Congress, a
terrific book by Tracy Sulkin, creatively defines and explores the
important topic of "issue uptake." Issue uptake sits at the heart
of the representative process; stated plainly, it is the idea that a
representative who is successfully elected or reelected to Congress
endeavors to push issues that were raised by the challenger. That
sounds simple, yet the concept is critical to understanding how issues
that are discussed in elections are pursued once in office. A long line
of research from the Michigan school of electoral research puts party
ID at the center of a voter's decision calculus, with issues relegated
to a distant third (after indeed the candidate characteristics). On the
other side of the divide in legislative studies, those of us who study
issue processing in institutions have for years seen an interesting
array of patterns in terms of the types of issues pursued by members
and processed by committees on the Hill. Hence, this idea that issues
didn't matter much in campaigns always seemed troublesome given the
range of issues that did not seem always to tie to the party. An
important source of these patterns, Sulkin demonstrates, comes from the
politics of issue uptake.
Chapter 1
begins with an interesting case example of Senator Bob Graham of
Florida and then proceeds to define the concept of issue uptake and
locate it within the various research literatures. In chapter 2, the
author develops a theory of issue uptake baced on strategic
considerations and context. Chapter 3 discusses important matters of
measurement and data. In chapter 4, Sulkin reveals her dependent
variable or descriptive statistics on issue uptake. Chapters 5 and 6
then get down to the business of analysis of that variation, with the
former looking at individual activity and the latter plumbing the
location and timing of issue uptake. In chapter 7, the author takes
time seriously by examining how issue uptake varies over time. Chapter
8 examines whether issue uptake matters in the legislative process. In
chapter 9, Sulkin pulls it all together through the consideration of
normative implications.
This book is excellent
for several reasons. First, Sulkin provides a true linkage between
elections and governance in terms of both theory and evidence. As she
correctly points out, legislative scholars tend to run in one of two
camps: elections or institutions. Sulkin eschews this dichotomy and
provides a truly integrated project and product. The pathways of
representation are critical to understanding American politics and it
is a pleasure to see young scholars contributing to this literature (a
research tradition that in the early 1990s was rumored to be dead!).
Second, the research design is well conceived. In addition to having
the elections and governance dimensions noted above, the author also
pursues cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses. The evidence for
issue uptake and its explanations is robust as it is revealed in all
manner of different analyses. Third, Sulkin shows the theoretical and
empirical power of an issue-based approach to understanding Congress.
Congress scholars have tended, until recently, to assume away issues
and policy contect and focus on positions on votes (in elections or on
the floor), committee attributes, and other neater and tidier
institutional units of analysis. Much can be gained by following issues
in studies of the Congress. That is how the Congress is indeed
organized. One need only look at the staff structure to see this fact.
legislative assistants and committee staff are organized by issue.
Senior staffers become known in certain issue areas and get to know
other staff, interest group representatives, and bureaucrats from that
same area.
The
shortcomings are few. I am not as of yet entirely persuaded of the
legislative impact of issue uptake. It might very well be there. It is
an empirical question. The analysis in chapter 8 shows that bills tied
to issue uptake do as well (or a bit better) in the legislative process
than other bills. While suggestive of impact, all that this analysis
directly demonstrates is that such bills are normal. It doesn't show
that issue uptake bills in general have true legislative impact. This
is not a major flaw; in fact, it could be taken up in subsequent work.
And, other than this issue, the book stands tall to theoretical and
empirical criticism. Issue Politics in Congress is a book that even the
most senior of scholars will learn from and which I highly recommend to
all students and scholars of American politics and public policy. I
look forward to future work from Professor Sulkin.
Associate Professor of
Political Science
Associate Director of the
Carl Albert Center
University of Oklahoma
It
Takes a Candidate: Why Women Don't Run for Office, Jennifer Lawless and
Richard Fox, Cambridge University Press, 2005, ISBN 052167414X, $22.99,
paper, 203 pages.
Jennifer Lawless and
Richard Fox's new analysis sheds important light on the puzzle of
stalled progress in women's representation in elected office. Beginning
in the early 1970s, leaders of the women's movement touted the steady
upward progress in the number of women serving in state legislatures
and in Congress.
Since 1997, however, the number of women elected to state legislatures
and statewide elected offices has remained essentially flat, according
to data from the Center for the American Woman and Politics. Scholars
and advocates ask why, especially in the face of increasing numbers of
women who comprise the professions from which most political candidates
are drawn.
Lawless and Fox offer an
explanation that is both convincing and disturbing. While the results
of their work have been published previously in journal articles, this
book brings together the full analysis and a persuasive argument for
why women don't run for elected office.
The two political
scientists base their work on a unique nationwide survey of 3,800
potential candidates and in-depth interviews with a representative same
of some 200 respondents who are part of their Citizen Political
Ambition Study. The study attempts to provide new insight into
political ambition and the role of gender in the candidate emergence
process by focusing on individuals who occupy professions or
backgrounds most prevalent in politics. These "eligibles" include
lawyers, business persons, educators and activists. The survey explored
social and economic factors, family arrangements, political activism
and experience, and political outlook and willingness to run for
office. The mailed survey elicited a very respectable 60 percent
response rate.
Lawless and Fox find both
similarities and differences among the men and women who are
"eligibles." On the one hand, levels of political interest,
attentiveness and participation vary little. But when the survey turns
to the question of political ambition, the differences are striking and
significant. Among the "eligibles" men outnumbered women, two to one in
terms of those who have actually sought elected office. Further, women
are half as likely to have "seriously considered" running for office
(ch. 3). The women in the sample were more likely to have discounted
their qualifications for office (ch. 5) and were less likely to have
been recruited by party officials, elected officeholders or non-elected
political activists (ch. 4).
Lawless and Fox argue
that these differences are a product of traditional gender
socialization which they suggest constitutes two main factors -- first,
the complexities of women's lives and notions of traditional family
roles, and second, the gendered nature of politics itself and the
"masculinized ethos" ingrained in political institutions. These two
factors, in turn, foster in women a "gendered psyche," which subtly
discourages some of the attributes necessary for political candidacy.
While their survey mostly offers indirect evidence of the origins of
women's psychological doubts, the argument makes sense and seems the
best fit of the data which Lawless and Fox marshal.
This book is accessible
and well constructed for a wide variety of audiences. For students,
Lawless and Fox's book ties together a number of important themes in
gender and politics. For scholars, the book makes an important
contribution to understanding the gendered nature of political ambition
and identifies key questions for future research especially in the area
of recruitment by political elites.
For persons interested in
solving the pipeline problem, the authors' analysis is probably most
pessimistic. Lawless and Fox admit that the task of dismantling
masculinized political norms and changing deeply embedded gender roles
will be daunting. They conclude: "Barring radical structural change in
the institutions of politics and the family, achieving gender parity in
the U.S. government is not on the horizon" (152).
Cindy Simon Rosenthal
Professor
of Political Science
Director of the Carl
Albert Center
University of Oklahoma
Money
and Free Speech: Campaign Finance Reform and the Courts, Melvin I. Urofsky,
University Press of Kansas, 2005, ISBN 0700614036, $29.95, cloth, 320
pages.
As one would expect of a
legal historian, Urofsky gives us an extensive historical view of
campaign finance laws in America. But Money and Free Speech is of particular interest
to legislative scholars, as it is one of the few campaign finance texts
that offer more than a cursory look at the role of Congress. Urofsky
understands that the courts would have a significantly smaller role to
play if there were no law for the public to challenge.
Urofsky
adequately (though briefly) summarizes each of the two sides of the
debate and even admits his own change of perspective in the course of
this project. Arguing that the Supreme Court has never adopted either
position in the extreme (preferring to settle to the less well-defined
middle ground), Urofsky gives a great deal of historical background to
help make sense of the ambiguity that comes from many decisions. His
own change of heart in the midst of this work allows for a fair
treatment of both defined positions. And with the exception of the
final chapter, Money and Free Speech is relatively free of the
normative commentary one would expect to receive from an author with
such clearly stated and decided preferences.
As
stated earlier, perhaps the greatest strength of this work is the equal
attention paid to both Congress and the courts. Of course, Urofsky
sufficiently tackles the confusing mass of court decisions (especially
Supreme Court decisions) stretching back to Buckley v. Valeo. And there are a full
three chapters devoted to the district court and Supreme Court
considerations of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission. But the first few
chapters are focused almost solely on Congress and the evolution of
campaign finance law inside that institution. The final chapter also
provides an interesting look at how political parties and other
interested groups have made the transition since McCain-Feingold became
law and brings to light some potential uncertainties that may require
further clarification.
Overall,Money
and Free Speech is a thought-provoking,
though sometimes overly detailed, treatment of the arguments
surrounding campaign finance in the United States. It seems appropriate
reading for advanced undergraduates in this subject area, as it does
provide a great deal of material for discussion and further research.
Courtney Cullison
Carl Albert Graduate
Fellow
Ph.D. candidate in
Political Science
University of Oklahoma
Parties,
Rules, and the Evolution of Congressional Budgeting, Lance T. LeLoup, The Ohio
State University Press, 2005, ISBN 0814251447, $21.95, paper, 250
pages.
The practice of budgeting
or the "power of the purse" is arguably one of the most important
functions of Congress. Lance T. LeLoup in his work, Parties, Rules
and the Evolution of Congressional Budgeting, argues that the
development of the macrobudgeting process over the last three decades
has changed the way Congress operates and has aided in the polarization
seen in the current system. LeLoup approaches this study in an
innovative manner, using both quantitative and qualitative tools to
explain and gauge the influence of changes in the macrobudgeting
process on the Congress. He approaches this study from the perspective
of a historical institutionalist and seeks to intertwine budgeting into
the larger field of theories explaining Congressional behavior. His use
of historical institutionalism allows him to take a more expansive view
of the changes in Congressional budgeting and their interactions with
the events and political culture that helped bring them about.
LeLoup considers several
major budget acts from the 1970s through the first George W. Bush
administration. This study analyzes evolutions in congressional
budgeting chronologically beginning with the 1974 Budget Act, which
represented a shift in power back to the Congress and a reassertion of
congressional authority over the budget process. Other changes to
congressional budgeting that LeLoup analyzes include the Reagan tax
cuts in 1981, the mandatory deficit reduction plans
(Gramm-Rudman-Hollings) of 1985, several deficit reduction plans in the
1990s including the Bush plan in 1990 and Clinton plan in 1993, the
balanced budget agreement In 1997, and the tax cuts under George W.
Bush in 2001 and 2003. Each of these developments and policy changes in
Congressional budgeting came about as responses to particular
evolutions within Congress or the larger political landscape. LeLoup
argues that the changes in Congressional budgeting, particularly the
evolution of macrobudgeting, have combined with other institutional
changes to create the increased partisan behavior evident now in the
Congress in policymaking.
While this work examines,
in detail, what brought about changes in the macrobudgeting environment
and the effects of these changes, LeLoup also seeks to place the
budgeting process in a larger body of research that explains
congressional change and development. He examines the impact of budget
rules and trends in party cohesion and divided government to assess the
impact of congressional budgeting on the institution as a whole. LeLoup
concludes that "not all changes in rules have been consistent or
effective" (204). Particularly in times of deficit spending, Congress
has had trouble attempting to reach ambitious deficit reduction and
other policy objectives. LeLoup reports the increase in omnibus budget
bills that place a higher burden on party leaders for passage, as well
as the abandonment of PAYGO and budget reconciliation procedures.
However, he argues that Congress remains the central fixture in the
budgeting process. LeLoup argues that while party unity and divided
government have led to increasing polarization in Congress and
contentious budget battles, that increasing deficit spending,
particularly over the next few years, could decrease party loyalty. He
also concludes that Congress has reestablished itself as an effective
answer to the president in budget battles in times of divided
government or as an important ally in unified government.
This work not only
attempts to trace the evolution of congressional budgeting, but also to
place an understanding of budgeting and its impact on the Congress as a
whole in a wider body of literature. His work is interesting with
compelling theoretical arguments, and it also has important
implications for the future of budgeting in Congress.
Kate
E. Carney
Carl
Albert Congressional Fellow
Ph.D. student of
Political Science
University
of Oklahoma
The
Press, edited by Geneuva Overholser and
Kathleen Hall Jamieson, The Annenbert Foundation Trust at Sunnylands,
Oxford University Press, 2005, ISBN 0195172833, cloth, $65.00, 433
pages.
The role of the press in
our constitutional democracy has been an oft-discussed issue. In recent
years media related stories have dominated the news. Changes in
technology and communication have added additional haze to this "fourth
estate."
The
Press is
an important compilation discussing numerous aspects of this changing
and complicated necessity. Utilizing the contributions of over thirty
journalists and scholars, The Press is another significant
addition, along with The Public Schools, The Legislative Branch,
The Executive Branch, and The Judicial Branch, in the Institutions of
American Democracy Series.
The
Press covers
the basic issues relating to the press and the media in four main
categories: the press and democracy in time and space, the functions of
the press in a democracy, government and the press, and the structure
and nature of the American press. Given the rise of globalization,
instantaneous global communication, and the frequent discussion of the
transportability of democracy, this first section is instructive. The
work of Schudson and Tifft on the historical perspective of American
journalism is insightful if one desires the proper context within which
to place today's media.
Of
particular importance to today's scholars will be the discussions of
the relationship between the government and the press. While there are
surprises (Who knew Silent Cal Coolidge had 521 press conferences? 239)
and reminders (of how dependent the government and the press are upon
one another, 248-262), the role of the media during military conflicts
take center stage. Churchill's famous phrase, "In wartime truth is so
precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies," is
frequently mentioned, but less so is the impossible task of
articulating clear public policy between the first amendment and
national security. William Prochnau's piece on the press in time of war
is particularly informative. While some will take issue with his short
discussion regarding the Vietnam War and the media, his look at the
relationship between the government and the media throughout American
military history is nevertheless insightful. Given that the United
States has "been at war or had troops in action in all but 37 of 225 of
its history," this issue is not likely to be resolved in the near
future (329).
Also
given considerable space is discussion of the current state of the
American media. While many are not ready to sound the alarm bells,
others are concerned about the return to a partisan press and the
homage the media must pay to advertisers, shareholders, and shifting
entertainment-seeking demographic audiences. As Jaroslav Pelikan states
in his introduction, "periodically throughout its history the press has
been willing to sacrifice its primary responsibility to the idols of
voyeurism and the marketplace, and at least sometimes no less
flagrantly than it has in recent decades" (xviii). Likewise, the
internet poses its own benefits and problems. Given that communication
is now sometimes comparable to instantaneous rolling public opinion
polls, the necessities of context, perspective, and perception for an
informed and educated citizenry and government are sometimes forgotten.
What this means "for the future of constitutional representative democracy is one of the
most troubling questions coming out of this entire enterprise" (xxiii).
What
is the difference between a responsible press and a free press during
times of war? How does American journalism compare to journalism around
the world? How has American journalism (particularly First Amendment
jurisprudence) evolved over our history? Is there an escape hatch out
of the trap between "the economics of journalism and its mission"
(xxv)? Which function of the press in a democracy is most important:
watchdog, agenda setter, marketplace of ideas, mobilizer, or
information disseminator? These are but some of the questions and
issues discussed in this important work. Overholser and Jamieson have
provided an invaluable source for those interested in understanding and
engaging the press in this dynamic new century.
Matt Field
Carl Albert Graduate
Fellow
Ph.D. student of
Political Science
University of Oklahoma
Revolving Gridlock: Politics and Policy from Carter to Bush, Second Edition, Craig Volden and David Brady, Westview Press, 2005, 0813343208, $20.00, paper, 242 pages
In this second edition of Revolving Gridlock, Brady and
Volden are able to extend their theoretical framework by adding as a
comparative dimension the first term of President George W. Bush. Their
analysis now covers presidencies from Carter to Bush 43 and their
corresponding congressional majorities. The latter offer a mix of
Democratic, Republican, and divided control. Thus, they now claim that
their theory is sustained across the various permutations that the
separation of powers and bicameralism might offer. Since I raise a few
questions about their approach below, let me at the beginning say that
I admire greatly the rigor with which they seek to provide an empirical
foundation for theory building across time.
Their theory,
“revolving gridlock,” is grounded in rational choice. The authors argue
that members of Congress can be arrayed along a single ideological
spectrum from liberal to conservative. The “gridlock zone” in the House
and Senate is defined by the policy positions of members constrained by
the median member, the president’s position (since he might veto a
bill), and the super-majorities required to override a veto or to
impose cloture in the Senate. These “pivot points” define the range of
available policy action. Because both the country and the Congress have
been divided in their policy preferences, policies are developed within
or dragged into the gridlock zone. Hence, major policy change is
foreclosed.
This
theoretical approach is by now au courant in congressional studies,
marked by such well-known work as that of Cox and McCubbins (whose
emphasis on the role of political parties Brady and Volden reject) and
the Khrehbiel oeuvre
(especially his Pivotal Politics,
which Brady and Volden accept). The strength of this kind of approach
is that it drives for parsimonious explanations which, because of their
very simplicity, cut to the core of the matter at hand. If “revolving
gridlock” theory in fact explains the pattern of policymaking, then we
need seek no further for an explanation.
But does it? I
travel outside of my limited competencies here, but offer some
questions that occurred to me. First, what is gridlock? It would appear
to me that if policy making is in fact dragged inside the zones
identified by Brady and Volden, it may nonetheless proceed
incrementally. If policies outside the gridlock zone are bound to fail,
this does not necessarily mean that gridlock has occurred if in fact
incremental policy change over time is consequential and consistent
with the preferences of a majority of voters for a moderate pace of
change. One might ask what the counterpoint would be? That the only
thing that counts as substantial policy change would occur when the
preference distribution is skewed to the right or left?
Second, can we
say that some new policies are quite substantial without necessarily
conceding that they reflect the preferences of a majority of members, a
majority of voters, or even the pivot point voter in the House or
Senate? One wonders, for example, if the No Child Left Behind Act, the
last major farm bill, the last transportation bill, the last energy
bill, the late bankruptcy bill, the prescription drug benefit bill, or
other recent policy changes in fact reflected the true policy
preferences of, well, anyone. They were engineered by a party regime
that was able to strong-arm the votes.
This raises a
third question. Other recent work, for example that of Fiorina (Culture Wars) and of Hacker and
Pierson, argues that the policy process is severely off track,
reflecting no gridlock at all. In Off
Center, Hacker and Pierson suggest that the congressional
Republicans, acting in concert with the Bush administration, have used
techniques of agenda control to ramrod legislation that is
substantially at odds with the preferences of the American people or
the median or pivot point member. The Republicans accomplish this in
part by limiting the alternatives that can be considered. As David
Price has suggested in his book The
Congressional Experience and related articles, the House
Republican leadership often heads to the floor with a narrow whip count
and then holds the vote open until enough arms are broken to pass the
bill. If the House-passed bill is revised in the Senate, then the GOP
simply rewrites the bill in conference, denying participation to the
Democrats, and rams through the conference report. These procedural
abnormalities lead me to think that procedure and party are important
variables that stand independent of the preference schedules of
members. Members’ preferences can only be given life by the
alternatives that they are offered.
It is perhaps
for this reason that Brady and Volden spend more time on the Senate
than they do on the House. The Senate is a more decentralized body and
each senator has power under its rules. The result is that senators
have more latitude to act on their preferences than do representatives.
They can filibuster or threaten to. They can offer non-germane
amendments. They can offer entire bill substitutes. This greater
flexibility makes it more likely that the Senate process will produce
outcomes defined by the positions of pivot point senators than would be
the case for their House counterparts. If pivot point members
controlled policy in the House, then why do moderate Republicans so
often toe the line?
Given the
underlying dynamic of their “revolving gridlock” theory, I would like
to learn more about how that dynamic is affected by the use of agenda
control and other devices by party leaders to shape the context within
which the preferences of members are allowed to be expressed.
Setting
the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of
Representatives, by Gary W. Cox and
Mathew D. McCubbins, Cambridge University Press, 2005, ISBN 0521619963,
$24.99, paper, 336 pages.
What role does the
majority party play in the organization of the House of
Representatives? Political scientists developed two broad approaches to
answer questions of congressional organization and behavior. One
approach explains congressional organization as serving non-partisan
goals such as reelection, providing information, and legislative
bargaining, which focuses little on majority party activity. A second
approach describes congressional organization and behavior as serving
partisan objectives (e.g. responsible party government, conditional
party government) (1-5). In Setting the Agenda, Gary W. Cox and Mathew
D. McCubbins situate themselves between these two literatures by
expanding their argument in Legislative Leviathan to formulate Procedural
Cartel Theory. This theory posits that political parties form in the
House of Representatives to monopolize the legislative agenda, because
"even though voting power in democratic legislatures is everywhere
equal, proposal and veto power are everywhere unequal" (9). The purpose
of Setting the Agenda is twofold: to respond to
criticisms levied by the nonpartisan approach to legislative
organization and behavior (e.g. Krehbiel), and to alter the research
agenda of political parties in Congress.
The authors argue that a
political party must attain legislative success in order to maintain
the party's brand name, which, in turn, helps to satisfy congressional
members' goals of reelection, policy, power, and majority party status.
To attain legislative success, the political party must strive to
overcome the collective action problem (the political party's brand
name is considered a public good for politicians), and do so by
delegating powers to central authorities. Cox and McCubbins add to this
argument, hence adding to theories of party government, by analyzing the
incentive to become majority party -- control over the legislative
agenda (21-24).
According to Procedural
Cartel Theory, majority party leadership presiding over offices of
agenda control (e.g. committee chairpersons, speakership) will utilize
positive and negative agenda powers based upon the degree of
homogeneity within the majority party. Positive agenda powers include
the ability of majority party leadership to push bills to the floor,
and negative agenda powers include the ability to block bills (delay,
veto) that are unfavorable to the majority party. Cox and McCubbins
hypothesize that, when the majority party's preferences are relatively
homogeneous, leaders will exercise positive agenda control, but when
the majority party's preferences have a high degree of heterogeneity,
leaders will utilize negative agenda control by blocking bills that may
cause public cleavages within the party. The majority party exploits
their agenda control to manage conflict before it starts.
Cox
and McCubbins used an extensive data set (all bills reaching the floor
on the House of Representatives from 1877 - 1999) and multiple
methodologies (historical description, statistical techniques, and
formal modeling) to test empirically Procedural Cartel Theory against
the Floor Agenda Model (89-105). Their findings indicate that agenda
setting powers reside in the majority party, not the House floor, and
that the majority party rarely endures the passage and enactment of a
bill that is contrary to its wishes (221). In addition, Cox and
McCubbins show: (1) majority parties have not significantly changed
Reed's rules, and when they have been altered, the rules merely
redistribute power within the majority party, (2) in the rare occasion
the majority party loses agenda setting control, it is usually during
times of divided government, and (3) these rules allow policy to shift
toward the majority party's policy preferences (225-226).
By accomplishing the
first purpose of the book, responding to criticisms of the Cartel
Agenda Model, Cox and McCubbins accomplish the book's second purpose of
altering the research agenda of political parties in Congress,
originally established by E.E. Schattschneider's important work on
political parties. Schattschneider believed a highly salient issue could
divide the majority party because its members would vote with their
constituents, and as a result, political scientists have followed a
research agenda that has neglected party organization in Congress,
instead analyzing individual members, committees, and interest groups
(220). Of the literature concerning political parties in Congress, most
of it focused on internal organization and floor voting. The authors
contest existing partisan organizational approaches (specifically
Responsible Party Government and Conditional Party Government) by
claiming that political party influence is not conditional; instead it
results from "an array of procedural advantages enjoyed by the majority
party that are not conditional on its internal homogeneity" (6).
Altering this research
agenda, Cox and McCubbins study the importance of party behavior before
floor voting, because "parties matter, in our view, not so much because
they influence how their members vote on bills (although they do), but
rather because the majority party controls which bills their (and
other) members have an opportunity to vote on to begin with" (221).
This emphasis on the early stages of the lawmaking process coincides
with new research agendas and trends in political science (e.g. Glen S.
Krutz's work on "winnowing").
This book departs from Legislative
Leviathan
in two important ways. First, control over the legislative agenda is the
most important resource to the majority party, because it represents a
less costly way to manage conflict than candidate screening and party
discipline during floor votes (both of these costly devices are
secondary to agenda control); the most divisive issues never reach the
House floor. The cartel can assure party loyalty to bills pushed by
leadership because key votes are those on procedure, not the final
passage. Procedure votes are less visible to the public, and a
congressional member can vote with the majority party on procedure,
which can ensure the passage of the bill while his/her constituents
oppose the substantive language in the bill (29). Second, Cox and
McCubbins posit a new analogy of the political party as a partnership.
Political parties act in a similar fashion as accounting or law firms
with many senior partners, each with autonomy (32-33).
In answering questions
about the role of the majority party in the House of Representatives,
Cox and McCubbins wrote a well-organized book, with excellent usage of
sub-headings and appendices. Setting the Agenda has an efficient
literature review to situate the argument and to further the debate on
congressional organization, which will make this book a welcomed
addition to graduate student seminars.
Paul Jorgensen
Ph.D. student in
Political Science
University of Oklahoma
The Shadowlands of Conduct: Ethics and State
Politics, by Beth A. Rosenson,
Georgetown University Press, 2005, ISBN 1589010450, $26.95, 256 pages.
Part of the American
Governance and Public Policy Series, Shadowlands of Conduct plumbs the rise and
diffusion of legislative ethics laws at the state level. Combining
historical narrative and multivariate regression analysis, Beth A.
Rosenson concisely explores the circumstances and factors that prod
state legislators to pass laws that limit or proscribe their behavior.
The book looks at the period 1954–2004 and focuses on the different
steps state legislatures have taken to regulate potential conflicts of
interest of their members. Readers who are statistically faint-of-heart
will particularly appreciate the book's organization. An appendix for
each chapter is provided and contains the models and data sources which
underlie that chapter, leaving the text a flowing and persuasive
account.
Rosenson's
principal conclusion is that ethics reform is a punctuated policy
process that is scandal-driven and principally the product of external
forces. The actions of federal prosecutors (especially in the decades
following Watergate), the media, public interest groups, and governors
have cast the policy spotlight on ethics reform and brought outside
pressure to bear on state legislatures. The richness of this conclusion
is supported by the book's consistent consideration of scandal
alongside a wide range of other independent variables in explaining
passage or failure of ethics legislation (the dependent variable).
Independent variables are: political scandals and corruption;
legislative compensation; interparty competition; a state's ideology
and political culture; policy of neighboring states; the presence of a
voter-ballot-initiative mechanism; and whether a state has previously
adopted other related ethics reforms. Rosenson clearly defines her
variables and crafts a number of research hypotheses to test these
variables.
Opening
with revealing case study analysis of ethics reform in three states
(California, Massachusetts, and New York), the greater part of Shadowlands consists of broader and
more quantitative analysis of state legislative ethics reform measures.
The book divides its analysis into two periods: Pre-Watergate
(1954–1972) and Beyond Watergate (1973–1996). Before summarizing its
findings in the final chapter, Shadowlands takes a particular look
at state independent ethics commissions. Established in a number of
states to enforce legislative ethics laws, these commissions, Rosenson
concludes, are a "mostly toothless tiger." Rosenson aptly
diagnoses the situation as a principal-agent problem, in which the
legislature (i.e. principal) is reluctant to cede power over its
members to an independent commission (i.e. agent). Also reflecting
interbranch competition between the legislature and executive, the fate
of these independent commissions is cast against a state's larger
political landscape.
Shadowlands provides a practical and
scholarly illumination of legislative ethics reform at the state level.
Martin Hanifin
Carl Albert Congressional
Fellow
Ph.D. student of
Political Science
University of Oklahoma
Spatial
Models of Parliamentary Voting, Keith T. Poole, Cambridge
University Press, 2005, ISBN 0521851947, $65.00, cloth, 230 pages.
Researchers analyzing
roll call data or interested in designing their own roll call indexes
will find Keith T. Poole's latest book, Spatial Models of
Parliamentary Voting, useful in their pursuits.
Poole asserts, "Anyone can construct a spatial map [of roll call
voting]....But the maps are worthless unless the user understands both
the spatial theory that the computer program embodies and the politics
of the legislature that produced the roll calls" (209). Poole addresses
the former problem, lending thorough and necessarily technical insight
into the spatial theory underlying statistical models of roll call
voting.
Those well versed in
advanced statistical methods and with solid grasp of matrix algebra
will be able to understand and employ the computational aspects of the
book, which essentially serve as tutorial for the construction of roll
call models. For those wishing to design models similar to the Poole
and Rosenthal NOMINATE data sets for state or foreign legislatures,
Poole's discussions of the geometry of parliamentary roll call voting
(Ch. 2), his optimal classification method based on chapter two's
spatial geometry (Ch. 3), and probabilistic spatial models of
parliamentary voting (Ch. 4) will serve as a guide to both
understanding and constructing roll call models. Poole also addresses
practical statistical issues researchers may encounter in constructing
these models (Ch. 5), and even presents several general natural
experiments which can be conducted with data sets constructed using his
methods (Ch. 6).
Poole stresses that his
"talents lie in the engineering side of the discipline,
not in the theory side" (202), but readers
will recognize that Poole's work on spatial models is both grounded in and an exhaustive
mathematical representation of a theory of roll call voting guided by
rational choice theory. In this sense, the book has relevance beyond
its immediate application as an example of a truly scientific social science method.
Granted, roll call votes are but one political behavior in a discrete
and highly institutionalized venue, but the efforts of Poole and others
to accurately capture and measure these behaviors is both impressive
and commendable.
Although the empirically
gifted will certainly take the most from Spatial Models of
Parliamentary Voting, legislative scholars
using roll call data will find the book generally useful for better
understanding the nature, uses, and limitations of their data.
Political scientists more generally may find Spatial Models of
Parliamentary Voting interesting for its
theory-grounded empiricism.
Walter Wilson
Carl Albert Graduate
Fellow
Ph.D. student of
Political Science
University of Oklahoma
Uncompromising Positions: God, Sex, and the
U.S. House of Representatives, Elizabeth Anne Oldmixon,
Georgetown University Press, 2005, ISBN 158901071X, $26.95, paper, 244
pages.
Elizabeth Anne Oldmixon has taken on a
formidable challenge in analyzing the role of culture in policymaking
concerning what are typically described as "moral issues." This book
details her research on how legislators legislate when policy conflicts
are defined in explicitly cultural terms, and concludes that while
certain patterns do emerge, overall the process remains very personal
and individualistic, even to the exclusion of partisan preferences.
The author begins with
the development of the two dominant cultures in contemporary American
politics, progressive sexuality and religious traditionalism, devoting
a separate chapter to each. Advocates of progressive sexuality view
certain previously unconventional social practices as appropriate, such
as the use of contraception by both married and unmarried individuals,
federal funding of family planning programs, legalization of abortion
with limited restrictions, and the existence of civil unions, domestic
partnerships, and gay marriage. Religious traditionalists are more
supportive of grounding public policy in Christian values, and assert
the feminist and gay rights movements are the result of inattention to
basic values. This culture promotes the belief that social
relationships are defined by Christian values, and moral decisions
should be made in that same context. Religious traditionalists strongly
support prayer in schools, oppose abortion and gay rights, and strive
to overcome the growth of progressive sexuality as an appropriate
culture in the United States.
The real value of this
book lies in the evaluation of the manner in which members of the House
address the conflict between these two cultures. Through elite
interviews of both Republican and Democrat representatives and staff,
and analysis of roll call votes, the author captures the difficulty
legislators encounter when forced to address nonnegotiable issues which
do not fit into the normal legislative process, those issues which
leave compromise unattainable. Decision making on gay issues,
reproductive policy, and school prayer exhibit different motivations
than issues such as highway funding or taxation. Normal considerations
such as electoral connections or partisan loyalty are not the most
significant factors. The author conducts a logit analysis to measure
legislator's support for progressive sexuality and for religious
traditionalism through both roll call votes and
sponsorship/co-sponsorship decisions on reproductive policies,
gay-related policies, and prayer policy for the 103rd through the 107th
Congresses, and concludes party, ideology, and religion are significant
to a limited degree and in different combinations for each issue area.
The bottom line is that legislators make their decisions based on their
own internal values rather than economic or electoral considerations,
and usually find other ways to keep from confronting the most
controversial questions, such as committee delays, reshaping the issue
to become an appropriations question rather than a cultural issue, and
when all else fails, simply standing by their principles. Given the
finding that aggregate policy preferences of most Americans tend to
support a middle-ground approach, Congress has learned to take the
least confrontational approach available in dealing with these cultural
issues.
The material in this book
is very well-organized, concisely written, and provides a plethora of
information on legislative decision-making, the role of interest groups
in the policy process, and social regulatory policy. As the author
openly acknowledges, it does not fully address the topic, but it does
provide a solid foundation for those seeking a theoretical framework to
adopt in examining the management of moral issues in the contemporary
political arena.
Margaret Ellis
Professor of Political
Science
