The new Congress faces a daunting set of governing circumstances. The United States Senate, an institution in which 60 votes are needed to pass major policy (with the exception of budget reconciliation), is split 50-50. Republicans hold a very narrow House majority, such that attendance on voting determines the extent to which the majority party can call the shots on the floor. Indeed, for effective Republican rule in the House, the Tuesday to Thursday club is actually required to be punctual! Moreover, the White House is occupied by a president who lost the national popular vote, gained office through the Electoral College after a heated 5-week protest/contest of the Florida election, and still says "DC" after Washington. Add to all of this our structure of shared powers, which infuse into the equation a strong measure of fragmentation in the name of deliberation. The result, some might say, is policymaking chaos. How will the 107th Congress and its successors accomplish anything? I would suggest, however, that they will get things done. The question that I will take up here is how they will go about doing it.

While it is an organization steeped in tradition, Congress is also an adaptive set of institutions operated by creative lawmakers. In the face of challenging governing circumstances, congressional members find interesting ways to keep the lawmaking process going (Mayhew 1991). This has been especially apparent in the period since World War II. In this time period, the trend has been toward tougher governing circumstances, including the rise of divided government, the specter of deficit politics, a rise in partisanship, increasingly fragmented committees, and a more complex issue agenda. Further, internal changes in both chambers led to some decentralization (Sinclair 1997). While 2001 does not technically bring divided government (the Republicans control the House and the presidency and with Vice President Cheney also have a Senate edge), the narrowness of the House majority and the split in the Senate create an equally difficult scenario for governing. In response to these types of pressures, lawmakers look for creative ways to make policy. Congress typically increases the use of special procedures, often centralized with party leaders, to retain some degree of policy responsiveness.

Which types of procedures can we expect to be employed in the first decade of the 21st century? We can expect to see the many types of "unorthodox" procedures that help assure legislative success, which Barbara Sinclair so excellently documents (2000). These techniques include post-committee adjustments, special floor procedures, omnibus bills, and the use of budget reconciliation as a policy tool. While the other techniques help move bills through Congress, omnibus legislating, in particular, is a method to clear both hurdles of lawmaking--getting through Congress and past the president. Through omnibus bills, new policy initiatives that face opposition may be placed alongside a nucleus that enjoys widespread support (Krutz 2001). By incorporating additional riders, the coalition can be expanded quite easily to bring on more members and the president. Soon enough, the pivots that Keith Krehbiel (1998) and David Brady and Craig Volden (1997) describe are cleared. Omnibus legislating, therefore, provides a tool to reach a grand compromise for all involved: members-at-large, party leaders, and the president. While it leads to extra stuff being thrown into bills (which the press keys on in their coverage of the Hill), it is arguably a better alternative than policy stalemate.

What will the legislative coalitions that support the use of these procedures look like? The answer is that the legislative coalitions will likely vary by chamber. With the institutional resources available to the majority in the House, the Republicans could run the House if all party members vote together and show up for all important votes. Hence, party leaders will more likely than not increase coalition size by appealing to majority party members. I predict that Republican back benchers realize this and will bargain all they can to have their preferences satisfied, for future committee assignments, and for various other favors. Omnibus legislating allows leaders to fold in items that these folks want.

Because of its rules and traditions, the Senate is quite a different matter. Senate leaders do not enjoy the lawmaking tools that their House counterparts possess. Leaders have to use persuasion and compromise to bring Senators into a coalition. Moreover, because of the Senate filibuster, 60 votes are needed in the Senate to do anything of major consequence. Therefore, the coalition building process led by Republicans will have to reach across to moderate Democrats to obtain that magic number. Omnibus bills again are a helpful method for adding in something in order to cut a political deal. Democratic leaders will try to persuade the rank-and-file of their party to resist the deals offered by the Republican leaders no matter how much they help the particular Senator in his or his state. The backdrop of election 2000, which suggests bi-partisan compromise, will add fuel to the Republican's fire.

The exception to this bi-partisan strategy in the Senate will be budget reconciliation (in effect an omnibus technique), on which filibusters are not allowed. If Republicans march in lockstep on reconciliation, they will get what they want with Vice President Cheney breaking the tie. Republicans will also dominate reconciliation in the House and they can further count on Republican President Bush. Hence, annual budget reconciliation measure, which typically containing major policy readers, are likely to contain straight Republican programs.

Berke, Richard L. 2000. "The Election; Five Lessons We Had No Time to Learn." The New York Times, December 10, D3.

Brady, David W. and Craig Volden. Revolving Gridlock. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Krutz, Glen S. 2001. Hitching a Ride: Omnibus Legislating in the U.S. Congress. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press.

Mayhew, David R. 1991. Divided We Govern. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Sinclair, Barbara. 2000. Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress, 2d edition. Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.