The Electoral College Primer 2000. Lawrence D. Longley and Neal R. Pierce. Yale University Press, 1999. ISBN:0300080360, $16, paper, 224 pages. This is a brief, yet colorful, monograph describing the legal and institutional framework that comprises the Electoral College. Longley and Pierce employ historical analysis, simple statistical analysis, and anecdotes to reveal the inadequacies and quirks of the Electoral College and some potential implications upon future elections. Exemplifying their fluid prose and ability to captivate, Longley and Pierce begin their book with an electoral scenario in which the Electoral College rules allow the Speaker of the House to become an acting president in the 2000 election. Although such a scenario seems ridiculously implausible, the illustration clearly and succinctly illuminates how the Electoral College works and some of its shortcomings. The strength of the book, as seen in this story and subsequent chapters, is its ability to clearly describe what the Electoral College is and how it works. For example, the authors discuss, among many things, the number of electors, who picks electors, who becomes an elector, how states nominate electors, how electors vote, whether electors are bound, and how the votes of electors are counted. The authors contradict the notion that the Electoral College was an intentional product of a sound political philosophy. Rather, they believe it to be the result of pressure to produce an expedient short-term solution to the problem of presidential selection. Yet, the college has entrenched itself in custom, law, and political necessity and endures in a manner not foreseen by the Founding Fathers. Longley and Pierce conclude that the Electoral College is a "faltering and potentially dangerous mechanism" (40). They argue that the popular vote does not equal electoral votes; hence, the people's president does not necessarily reflect the people's will. The proof is in three elections where the electoral vote reversed the popular vote, two elections decided by the House, 17 elections decided by a plurality, and 22 "hairbreadth" elections where subtle shifts could have produced deadlock. Not only do the authors concisely review this history, but they also perform a statistical analysis to uncover biases in the Electoral College. They demonstrate that the Electoral College over-represents super-small states, super-large states, and urban areas. Longley and Pierce do not hide their disdain for the Electoral College; in fact, they clearly demonstrate its inadequacies and defects. Nevertheless, they contribute a coherent and lucid explanation of the rules and workings of the Electoral College. Josh Stockley Honor in the House: Speaker Tom Foley. Jeffrey R. Biggs and Thomas S. Foley. Washington State University Press, 1999. ISBN: 0874221730, $25, paper, 384 pages. In this biographical account of the life of former House Speaker Tom Foley, Biggs and Foley himself take a close look at both the political life of the person and the personal life of the politician. The book is uniquely written, combining Biggs' narrative of the Speaker inter-spliced with detailed accounts in Foley's own words of his life as a politician. This book sheds a welcome perspective that portrays our elected representatives in human terms not solely as strategic pursuers of re-election. It offers a look at a man who represented the Fifth District of Washington State yet who refused to relinquish his own moral judgment even when it would cost him political capital. As the book demonstrates, Foley viewed the privilege to serve as a responsibility that requires the member to balance between duty to district, to country, and to conscience. From his initial run for Congress, unseating 22-year incumbent Walt Horan, to the time of his own defeat in 1994, Foley demonstrated grace, dignity, and integrity. During a time when negative campaigning appeared to be both popular and effective, Foley explains why he would never do an opponent the dishonor of public ridicule. Honor in the House details the struggles that faced Foley when he rose to positions of leadership under the Reagan administration. A master at consensus-building, Foley used his roles as party whip, leader, and finally Speaker of the House to bring the factions on both sides of the aisle to compromise. As former Speaker "Tip" O'Neill said of Foley, he could always see "three sides of every question." This part-biography, part-autobiography will add much to an understanding of the life of Tom Foley. Perhaps more important, however, is its contribution to understanding political life as a multi-dimensional and dynamic process. Lynsey Morris Horses in Midstream: U.S. Midterm Elections and Their Consequences, 1894-1998. Andrew E. Busch. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1999. ISBN 0822957051, $19.95, paper, 288 pages. "Midterm elections," says Andrew E. Busch, "are not the poor stepchild of the American electoral process." They are important in their own right because their results, which are usually detrimental to the president and his party, serve as an additional check in the American system. Midterm elections change the dynamics of government, most obviously because they change the partisan makeup of Congress. However, midterms often change the internal composition of the two parties. They alter dynamics within the president's party and leave him in a less powerful position among his own. Midterms are also more likely either to produce or strengthen divided government. In addition, the president's mandate, claimed with his election, is undercut with increases in the opposition's strength. Gains for the opposition provide unique opportunities with which they can gain momentum, develop issues, and propel leaders into the national spotlight. Finally, Busch identifies the midterm effect as extending to the states. To illustrate the importance of midterm elections, Busch formulates four descriptive types: preparatory, calibrating, exceptional, and normal. Preparatory midterms launch the opposition party into the White House in the next election as happened in the midterms of 1918, 1950, 1958, 1966, 1974, 1978, 1990. A calibrating election puts a brake on a president's initiatives, as was the case in 1938, 1982, and 1986. The exceptions to the rule that the president's party loses seats at midterm are the elections of 1934, 1962, and 1998. Busch classifies all other midterms as normal, where the loss of seats harms the president to varying degrees. Midterms are vital to the American system because they seem to maintain an equilibrium by giving the out-party an automatic boost every four years, except in the rare cases where the president's party gains seats. Other factors combine with the midterm effect to determine whether it will be preparatory, calibrating or normal and the impact it will have on the next election. Donna R. Hoffman
In what sense does congressional deliberation represent the American electorate as a whole, and not just as a collection of special or partial interests? Is there such a thing as a considered "national interest" on most questions that Congress takes up? William Granstaff asks his readers to consider these fundamental questions of American governance: ones that rarely get asked or seriously considered in the congressional literature, despite a renewed focus on the act of deliberation itself. In order to get at this broad set of questions, Granstaff selects three cases of congressional deliberation over sending U.S. troops abroad, viz., Lebanon, the Persian Gulf and Somalia, because these debates should deal with the national interest. In each instance, Granstaff finds that congressional deliberation was "a fakery" engaged in by sophisticated member-linguists whose primary purpose is to preserve the mere facade of democratic representation while advertising themselves to constituents. Instead of true deliberation, members put forth "palaver," or "talk that charms and beguiles." He concludes from these debates that the "American constitutional system is usually dysfunctional as a democratic republic" (13, 194; italics in original). Granstaff utilizes straightforward methods: analysis of logical fallacies, "common sense," the founders' political philosophy, and a content analysis of the debates using the sentence as the unit of analysis. He frames his analysis around two "questions of governance." The questions of governance purport to describe the most fundamental aspects of the "national interest" in any debate: (1) is this difficulty a threat? and (2) should we do this? Each sentence of each debate selected is studied applying these methods, yielding quantitative tables. According to Granstaff, the only way to legitimately arrive at the "national interest" is for both houses of Congress to engage in "full-representative-deliberation," meaning that every member of both houses must both deliberate over, and vote on, the same question during the same time frame. Anything less would mean that congressional output will be "counterfeit." Primarily a work of political philosophy, the book offers a theoretical argument that some will interpret differently. The Federalist (Nos. 57, 70-77) provides evidence that the founders believed that the president would be a significant player in deciding foreign affairs and that members of Congress would represent the "partial interests" of their constituents. Nonetheless, this book contributes valuable insight by highlighting the logical fallacies of congressional deliberation and the lack of interaction in congressional speeches. John Van Doorn Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government. Shawn Bowler, David M. Farrell, and Richard S. Katz, editors. Ohio State University Press, 1999. ISBN: 0814250009, $24.95, paper, 304 pages. Bowler, Farrell, and Katz expand the field of knowledge of comparative legislative studies in this collection of essays. The idea of party discipline in parliamentary democracies is a rarely studied phenomenon in the literature. Bowler, Farrell, and Katz and the contributors enter this breach and provide the reader with a better understanding of party cohesion and discipline, essential elements in the maintenance of parliamentary democracy. The newer democratic regimes of Spain and Hungary are studied and compared with the well-developed, established democracies in Britain, Finland, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland. The authors also go one step further by placing an excellent analysis of the European Parliament (EP) in the theoretical mix. They state that "the EP does have the potential to exercise influence with the European Union" (209). The challenge for the EP is for the members to "act in concert," a feat required of any legislature, especially a transnational entity like the EP. The authors not only debunk the "automatic" nature of party discipline in parliamentary democracies but also extend the comparison of democracies beyond the well-traveled Anglo-American road. The inclusion of an eastern European and Scandinavian example in the model are wise choices and allow for interesting analysis and comparisons. The value of this book is the examination of larger questions, like the EP and conservative dissent throughout Europe, juxtaposed with the individual cases. By going beyond a simple comparison of the individual cases, and articulating the larger theoretical template of transnational democracy and dissent as a guide, the authors make a splendid contribution to a better understanding of contemporary parliamentary democracy. Furthermore, they allow the reader to peer into the future of parliamentary democracy through their analysis. Mitchell F. Fuller, II Politics, Parties, and Parliaments: Political Change in Norway. William R. Shaffer. Ohio State University Press, 1998. ISBN 081420788X, $19.95, paper, 290 pages. William Shaffer presents an ambitious study that explains the Norwegian parliament's role in political change in Norway in the past fifteen years. The author proposes that parliaments do matter when discussing political and social change, even in states where at first glance it does not appear that parliaments have much power. He presents an in-depth description of the historical background of parliamentary government in Norway as an antecedent to understanding the political changes. Shaffer identifies the routes to public policy in Norway and, for good reason, tends to emphasize the electoral channel rather than the corporate path. In the post-World War II period, Norway preferred corporatist decision making in its consensual democracy; however, in the last two decades, there has been a change in the structure of policy making. In the period from 1981 to 1994, Shaffer posits, the centrist and right-of-center parties have taken on a larger role and shifted power away from socialist/leftist-oriented parliamentary control. As a result, he argues, the Storting, the Norwegian parliament, has gained visibility and vitality. The growth in disparity of policy preferences between the parties invigorated the parliament and made citizens take notice that the electoral channel of policy making was growing in importance once again. Shaffer outlines the various pieces of the puzzle of political change by identifying and examining aspects of the parliamentary process from committee participation to role call voting. His analysis results in an interesting and enlightening look at the political change in Norway. Shaffer's book advances our understanding of parliaments, Norwegian politics, and some key aspects of comparative politics. The chapter that explains the electoral structure in Norway is particularly interesting in its thoroughness and clarity. For the instructor or student of comparative politics, this book also provides a good example of how single case studies are put together. Christopher Grossman The Populist Paradox: Interest Group Influence and the Promise of Direct Legislation. Elisabeth R. Gerber. Princeton University Press, 1999. ISBN 0691002673, $17.95, paper; 171 pages. Although the introduction of referenda and initiatives were originally advocated by Populist and Progressive reformers as a way to circumvent the influence of economic interest groups in state legislatures, scholars argue that these same interest groups have been able to manipulate the direct legislation process to pursue their narrow policy preferences. However, these recent accounts are largely based on the enormous level of spending in direct election campaigns and the suspicion that this increased spending creates an advantage for monied interest groups. In The Populist Paradox, Elisabeth Gerber challenges this argument and provides the first systematic study of how interest groups and citizen groups actually affect direct legislation. Using surveys of the activities and motivations of interest groups and the campaign finance records from 168 direct legislation campaigns in eight states, Gerber finds that economic interests and citizen interests have different objectives and pursue different political activities to achieve those objectives. While economic interest groups are more likely to use monetary resources to preserve the status quo or pressure the legislature, citizen groups attempt to pass initiatives by capitalizing on their personnel resources. Furthermore, the differing motivations and activities undertaken by citizen and interest groups are reflected in the policies created by direct legislation. Citizen groups are much more successful than interest groups at modifying policy through the direct election process. However, economic interest groups are more successful at blocking measures through opposition spending. Because the laws passed by direct legislation are likely to reflect the interests of citizen groups, it appears that economic interest groups do not dominate the direct legislation process as critics have argued. Gerber believes that direct legislation has still not lived up to the expectations of Populist and Progressive reformers. While the success of economic groups in the direct legislation process has been somewhat conservative and highly constrained, these interest groups have been able to block a number of citizen initiatives and to use the direct legislation process to enhance and protect their interests by influencing state legislatures. Although the populist paradox may not be as dangerous as critics have argued, it remains a viable phenomenon in American politics. Carrie M. Palmer Representation: Theory and Practice in Britain. David Judge. Routledge, 1999. ISBN 0415081971, $29.99 paper, 230 pages. Concerned with the "several seismic upheavals" forecasted to take place in the British parliament by 2002, David Judge explores the historical dimensions of British representation (201). Specifically, he examines "the political dimensions of representation and the interconnections of the theory and practice of political representation in Britain" (1). Stemming from an intense belief that the wisdom of both theorists and practitioners is crucial to a thorough analysis of representation, this book thus poses as a critical addition to the legislative literature. Judge grounds his treatment of representation in the linguistic analysis of Hannah Pitkin (1967) and the theoretical treatises of Mill, Bentham, and Burke, but extends the analysis to encompass a thorough case study of Britain. (Consequently, each chapter in the book can be divided analytically into two parts: theory and practice.) Judge bases his analysis on three classic questions central to the concept of representation: Are the people conceived as individuals or a collectivity? Are the representatives conceived as individuals or a collectivity? And finally, what do representatives represent? Individuals? Collectivities? Opinions? Interests? One of the crucial arguments Judge makes in his analysis of the British case is that there is a significant difference between a representative government and a representative democracy. He suggests that whereas Britain has had a representative government for centuries, it has only developed a representative democracy in the last several decades (15). He states that "representative government in Britain has traditionally been conceived, and functioned, as a means of legitimating executive power through the condition of responsiveness. The emphasis has been upon consent and the legitimation of the change of governors by a representative body encompassing the 'political nation.'. . only in the twentieth century did the 'political nation' come to approximate 'the people'" (ibid). Judge's analysis is invaluable in that it provides a new conceptual framework for understanding the dynamics of changing representational systems both at home and abroad. Jocelyn Jones Senates: Bicameralism in the Contemporary World. Samuel C. Patterson and Anthony Mughan, eds. Ohio State University Press, 1999. ISBN 0814250106, $19.95, paper, 360 pages. Patterson and Mughan discuss the origins and continued existence of bicameralism in terms of democratic theory and function. Their introductory chapter contains a table which compares the nine bicameral case studies which are undertaken in this book. In this table, Patterson and Mughan describe each upper house by its governmental system, the length of each senate's terms, the method by which seats are selected, and the constitutional powers of each upper house. The bulk of the book revolves around individual case studies written by a distinguished group of scholars. The book includes analyses of the U.S. Senate by Barbara Sinclair, the German Bundesrat by Werner J. Patzelt, the Australian Senate by John Uhr, the Canadian Senate by C. E. S. Franks, the French Senate by Jean Mastias, the British House of Lords by Donald Shell, the Italian Senato by Claudio Lodici, the Spanish Senado by Carlos Flores Juberias, and the Polish Senat by David M. Olson. In addition to the senate characteristics that are described in the aforementioned table, each chapter also examines internal structure and decision-making, party structure and leadership, and the capacity for change within senates. These case studies provide a depth of insight from which Patterson and Mughan are able to draw their conclusions. Patterson and Mughan place the study of senates into a comparative perspective. They argue that senates are an important and overlooked institution within democratic nations. Further, they conclude that these upper houses have significant democratic ramifications for the legislative process in terms of redundancy and representation. This is a timely book which underscores the importance of and invites further senate studies. Melody Huckaby A Two-Way Street: The Institutional Dynamics of the Modern Administrative State. George A. Krause. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1999. ISBN 0822941023, $45, cloth, 256 pages. Do politicians control the bureaucracy or does the bureaucracy possess authority independent from political institutions? Krause explores this important research question through a broader lens than traditional theories of agency-political relations. Traditional theories generally fall under two competing perspectives: (1) bureaucratic autonomy theories, which posit that agencies have considerable discretion from elected officials; and (2) political control theories, which argue that agencies respond to the wishes of elected officials. Most agency-political relations fall somewhere between the two extremes. Therefore, relying solely on these narrowly defined theories produces a literature of agency and policy specific findings. Krause provides a more comprehensive framework for analyzing the relationships between the presidency, the Congress, and administrative organizations. Krause's dynamic systems model of policy administration rests on three assumptions. First, mutual adaptation may exist between elected officials and bureaucrats where bureaucratic behavior influences the behavior of elected officials and vice versa. Second, political institutions may influence each other. Third, institutions engage in and respond to deviations from expected behavior, often referred to as policy innovations or perturbations. Thus, the dynamic systems model is a process of feedback or "two-way street" between administrative agencies and elected officials. These institutions respond to one another, to events and conditions within each institution, and to the larger policy environment. By using extensive quantitative analysis and case studies of two federal regulatory agencies (the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice), Krause finds support for such a dynamic relationship of institutional interdependence. This book is an interesting addition to the literature on agency-political relations. It suggests that political scientists need to create new theories of administrative politics that are more comprehensive in nature than existing theories. The dynamic systems model is such an attempt at creating a common theoretical ground for explaining not only regulatory policy, but distributive and redistributive policies as well. Kim Hoffman
New books related to legislative studies are generally acquired directly from the publisher for inclusion in Book Notes. In addition, any author who wishes to have a new book featured in Book Notes may send the request with a copy of the book to: Book Review Editor, LSS Newsletter, Carl Albert Center, University of Oklahoma, 630 Parrington Oval, Norman, OK 73019. |