

Workshop Proceedings

Workshop on Democracy & Elections
June 21-July 10, 2009
Accra, Ghana

**Hosted by Institute of African Studies at the University of Ghana, Legon
Sponsored by American Political Science Association**

**Proceedings of APSA Workshop on Democracy and Elections
Accra, Ghana
June 21- July 10, 2009**

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Participants Biographies

Name: James Arrey Abangma

Country: Cameroon

Education: PhD, Public Administration, University of Benin, Nigeria

Interests: Research Methodology, Social Statistics, Government and Politics in Cameroon, Civil and Military Relations

Currently: Lecturer at the University of Buea

Name: Henry Amadi Odongo

Country: Kenya

Education: M.A. in International Relations (MAIR) at the University of Nairobi

Interests: International Relations, Public Administration and Political Sociology

Currently: Currently pursuing a PhD in Leipzig University, Germany. His PhD research is entitled: "In Search of Good Governance: The Participation of the Non-State Actors in the Provision of Security Services in The Neighbourhoods of Nairobi".

Besides the PhD research, he is also in the process of writing a research paper entitled: "Kenya's Grand Coalition Government: An Agent of Change or Status-Quo Maintenance?" along with teaching at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Nairobi

Name: Jasper Ayelazuno

Country: Ghana

Education: MSc (Research Methods) University of Sussex; MA (Rural Development) University Of Sussex

Interests: Comparative Politics, International Relations, Ghana Politics

Currently: PhD Candidate (Year IV), Political Science, York University

Name: Sulaiman Balarabe-Kura

Country: Nigeria

Education: PhD, International Development Department, University of Birmingham, UK

Interests: Political Party Institutionalisation in Nigeria

Currently: Lecturer, Department of Political Science, Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto, Nigeria, 2002-Date

sulaimankura@yahoo.co.in; sybkura@gmail.com

Name: Mohammad Bakari

Country: Tanzania

Education: PhD, Political Science with distinction in Philosophy, University of Hamburg

Interests: Public Bureaucracies, Public Administration, Public Policy Analysis and Elections

Currently: Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science & Public Administration, University of Dar es Salaam

mubakar@udsm.ac.tz

Name: Maame Gyekye-Jandoh

Country: Ghana

Education: Ph.D., Comparative Politics with specialization in African Politics, Political Behavior, Ethnic Politics, Democratization and Civil-Military Relations in Africa, and Politics of the Developing World, Temple University.

Interests: African Politics, Political Behavior, Ethnic Politics, Democratization and Civil-Military Relations in Africa, and Politics of the Developing World

Currently: Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Ghana, Legon, Accra.

mgyekyej@yahoo.com

Name: Victor Adefemi Isumonah

Country: Nigeria

Education: Ph.D. Political Science, University of Ibadan

Interests: Comparative Federal Systems, African Political Thought, Political Behavior

Currently: Director of the Department of Political Science's Undergraduate Program
Senior Lecture at the University of Ibadan

isumonah@yahoo.com

Name: Eliud Nyawino Biego Lubanda

Country: Kenya

Education: Ph.D., History, Archaeology and Political Science, Kenyatta University,

Interests: To extend frontiers of knowledge in the discipline of African Political History

Currently: Lecturer in History at Kenya Methodist University (KEMU), Meru

biegonaca@yahoo.com

Name: **Ziblim Iddi**

Country: Ghana

Education: Ph.D. Political Science, Clark Atlanta University

Interests: African Government and Politics, Political Economy of Africa, American Government, International Relations

Currently: Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of Ghana

Ziddi48@hotmail.com

Name: **Henry Kam Kah**

Country: Cameroon

Education: PhD History, University of Buea

Interests: Football, listening to the radio, reading and research

Currently: Lecturer, Department of History, University of Buea

ndangso@yahoo.com

Name: **Peter O. Mbah**

Country: Nigeria

Education: Ph.D Political Science, Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka

Interests: Public Financial Administration, Methods of Political Inquiry, Comparative Public Administration, Comparative Federalism, Public Policy Analysis, Public policy Analysis

Currently: Lecturer: Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka

ombah2006@yahoo.com

Name: **Clive J. Napier**

Country: South Africa

Education: D Litt et Phil Politics, Unisa

Interests: Constitutionalism and public participation in Africa, African Politics

Currently: Senior Lecturer – Department of Political Sciences and Subject Head of African Politics

napiecj@unisa.ac.za/

Name: **Cornelius Ncube**

Country: Zimbabwe

Education: PhD in Public Policy, University of Birmingham, United Kingdom—on going research

Interests: Qualitative Research Methods, Statistics for Urban and Regional Studies, and Making Policy, Africa in the Contemporary World, Political Economy of Resources and Development, Sustainable Security and Stability

corneliasbncube@yahoo.co.uk ; cxn423@bham.ac.uk

Name: Nna-Emeka Chibueze Okereke

Country: Nigeria

Education: PhD in Political Science, University of Nigeria

Interests: Foreign policy and national security in Nigeria, issues and prospects strategizing for enduring peace in the Niger Delta and conflicts and integration in West Africa.

Currently: Research fellow at the National Defense College and facilitator of Peace & Conflict Studies at the National Open University

emekaokereke@ndc.gov.ng; emekaeffiong@yahoo.com

Name: Freedom C. Onuoha

Country: Nigeria

Education: MS in Political Economy, University of Nigeria, Nsukka

Interests: Environmental Degradation, Livelihood and Conflict, Lake Chad, and the struggle over Bakassi and the changing face of diplomacy between Nigeria and Cameroon.

Currently: Pursuing a PhD in Political Economy from the University of Nigeria, Nsukka and a research fellow at the African Centre for Strategic Research and Studies, National Defense College.

chufreedom@yahoo.com

Name: Mashood Omutosho

Country: Nigeria

Education: MS in International Relations

Interests: Democratic Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa and United Nations and Conflict Management

Currently: Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife and awaiting oral defence of PhD dissertation.

mashomotosho@yahoo.com; momotoso@oauife.edu.com

Name: El Hassan Ould Ahmed

Country: Mauritania

Education: PhD in English, Université Cheikh Anta Diop De Dakar, Senegal

Interests: Social and political corruption of African regimes as depicted in the novels of study, power and leadership in Africa, who rules who and for what good reason on the continent and the role of African intellectuals in awakening the masses.

Currently: A faculty at the English Department, University of Nouakchott

hasmsn@yahoo.com

Name: **Abdoul Karim Saidou**

Country: Niger

Education: MA in **Public law and Political Science**

Interests: Post conflict management in Niger and Poverty, economic marginalization and political conflicts in contemporary Africa

Currently: **Secretary General** of the Institute for Governance and Development (IGD) and **researcher** in the Center for Democratic Governance (CGD) under the supervision of Pr Augustin Loada

akarims40@yahoo.fr

Name: **Bertrand Tchantcho**

Country: Cameroon

Education: Ph.D., Applied Mathematics to Social Sciences

Interests: Game Theory (Cooperative and non cooperative games) and Social Choice Theory

Currently: Senior Lecturer, Department of Mathematics, Advanced Teachers. Training College, The University of Yaoundé I, Cameroon.

btchantcho@yahoo.fr

Name: **Sita Zougouri**

Country: Burkina Faso

Education: PhD in Cultural Anthropology, Uppsala

Interests: Sociology applied to migration, mobility, HIV prevention, land tenure, monetary land transactions. Cultural and political anthropology applied to natural resources management, (gender and development, forest policies, rural enterprises (wood as commodity), rural poverty. Local powers, decentralization and environmental change and climate change adaptation and local knowledge

sita.zougouri@gmail.com, sita_zougouri@yahoo.fr

Name: **Keith Weghorst**

Country: USA

Currently: PhD candidate, University of Florida

keith.weghorst@ufl.edu

Name: **Jaimie Bleck**

Country: USA

Education: MA in Government, Cornell University

Interests: Education, State-building, and Democratic Consolidation in Africa, Comparative Politics and International Relations

Currently: PhD Candidate in the Department of Government, Cornell University

jb462@cornell.edu

Name: **Kristin Michelitch**

Country: USA

Education: M.A. in Politics, New York University, 2008

Interests: Elections and Voting, African Political Economy of Development and Experimental Methodology

Currently: Ph.D. Candidate in Politics, New York University

kgm254@nyu.edu

Name: **Sybille Ngo Nyeck**

Country: USA

Education: B.A. High Honors, Swarthmore College, 2007

Currently: Ph.D. student in Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles

sngonye1@ucla.edu

The 2009 APSA Workshop on Elections and Democracy Report

Workshop Leaders:

Beatrix Allah-Mensah, University of Ghana, Legon

Kevin S. Fridy, University of Tampa

Daniel A. Smith, University of Florida

Ukoha Ukiwo, University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria

The 2009 APSA Workshop on African Elections and Democracy was convened in Accra, Ghana, from June 22 through July 10. Generously supported by a grant from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the workshop was the second annual residential program APSA has organized in Africa. The workshop series is intended to increase research linkages between U.S.-based scholars and their African colleagues and advance the research of scholars in Africa. The sessions took place at the Institute for African Studies at the University of Ghana, Legon. APSA staffer Helena Sæle provided invaluable administrative and logistical support during the three week program. Volunteer Natalie Wenzell recorded workshop proceedings.

The workshop was co-led by two America-based political scientists, Kevin S. Fridy (University of Tampa) and Daniel A. Smith (University of Florida), and two Africa-based political scientists, Beatrix Allah-Mensah (University of Ghana, Legon), and Ukoha Ukiwo (University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria). The workshop was comprised of 20 African-based scholars from across the continent and four America-based Ph.D. students. Participants presented current research during plenary

sessions, discussed in small-groups a large body of scholarly readings, interacted with guest speakers involved in Ghanaian politics, and began collaborative research efforts. Site visits included discussing politics with officials from Ghana's Electoral Commission, the national headquarters of Ghana's two major political parties, representatives of the Coalition of Domestic Election Observers and AfroBarometer, and members of Parliament. Participants also took weekend excursions to Kumasi, the heart of the Asante Kingdom, a slave castle in the coastal town of Elmina, and a canopy walk at Kakum National Park.

When Two Continents Meet, It's the Variables that Get Trampled

Kevin S. Fridy, University of Tampa

Early on in the 2009 APSA Workshop on African Elections and Democracy in Accra, Ghana, a pattern was established that would dominate discussions throughout the three week meeting. Whether the topic of a session be elections, social cleavages, party organizations, or campaigns the same debate arose time and again. Sometimes heated though often playful, the recurring disagreement surreptitiously seeped into dinner conversations, social outings, and bus rides.

One side of this epic divide was populated primarily by the Africa-based scholars. Those in this camp argued that the concepts we as political scientists are, or at least should be, interested in are deeply experienced and not easily reducible to election results or Freedom House scores. Though the argument took many nuanced forms over the course of the workshop, two variants were more prevalent than the rest. Version one posited that in Nigeria things are just different. Our large contingent of Nigerians was more than happy to lead this charge in any and every venue. Democracy? Human rights? Development? Different, different, and different in Nigeria. Version two adopted sub-alternity as its lens. No matter how many people a particular analysis takes into consideration, there are a large group of Africans, several participants argued, who remain unseen and unconsidered and on the subject of democracy in particular this is a sin. Without taking into account the opinions and concerns of market porters, bush meat hunters, and illiterate widows living far off the beaten path our research is little more than status quo reconfirming propaganda.

On the other side of the workshop chasm the four workshop leaders and America-based graduate students took the lead. “Sure Nigeria is an interesting case,” I said in more than one break-out session, “but is there nothing we can learn from Ghana, or South Africa, or Mali, or the United States for that matter, that can help us better understand Nigerian politics?” The point here was that case studies done in isolation run a grave risk of turning into erudite anecdotes. Though the conference did not have a methodological agenda, participants taking up this mantle argued for more systematic studies be they quantitative, qualitative, or experimental and pushed those on the other side of the divide to think more “scientifically” about the projects they presented to the group. If I had a pesewa for every time a paper presenter was asked to add more cases, better explain how variables are functionalized, or find some way to account for a possible problem with endogeneity I could buy several bags of groundnuts with the proceeds.

It took very little time for the substance of these disagreements, namely variables, to become to stuff of workshop legend. After asking two particularly pointed questions about variables in successive sessions, one participant became our honorary Minister of Variables. For the long trip back to Accra from Lake Bosomtwe several participants imbibed an “independent variable” in the form of palm wine with the hypothesis that it would make the journey home less arduous. Our closing social event was held at a popular Accra nightclub at which point a sign appeared on the dance floor reading “Bring on the Variables.” While we had plenty of fun at variables’ expense, the levity complemented what I think was a deeper message for us all. Validity in a variable is *extremely* important and reliability is *equally* so.

When I teach my introduction to political science course I stress to the students early on the merits of variable validity and reliability. I tell my students how important validity is because if they are interested in better understanding freedom, or poverty, or regime stability it makes little intuitive sense to look at a country's FIFA world ranking. We then revisit the concept from time to time in reference to a scholarly article that deals, usually statistically, with a particularly abstract variable like democracy or development. Reliability, on the other hand, we spend several weeks on. If any of my students decide to go on to advanced degrees in the social sciences I think it extremely important that they know how to select cases and make comparisons systematically and within the boundaries of "good" science. Though we do not get into many of the methods that are so prevalent in the pages of the American Political Science Associations' journals at this introductory level, my goal for the largely first year class is to diminish the role of anecdotes in building causal arguments.

This pattern of praising variable validity and reliability as equal components of well done political science while simultaneously privileging reliability in our disciplinary discourse is a characteristic I come by honestly. It is a characteristic that problem-solving political scientists coming out of U.S. institutions of higher education have by-and-large either been self-selected for, or have been trained to accept as the status quo. There are notable exceptions within political science, especially within the field of theory, but it is this norm that makes these exceptions notable. My Africa-based colleagues taught me time and again at the workshop that the tables are reversed for them. Their institutions train and reinforce a very critical lens when concepts that embrace multiple meanings and interpretations are

encountered. This inclination is reinforced when the concepts are foisted upon the continent by foreign academics, funding agencies, and governments.

The take-away message for me was that this continental clash of ideas *needs* to make all the workshop attendees a little more self-reflective in their own research. For me this means not just tucking my variables' social constructedness into a footnote, at least not without some serious internal dialogue and full disclosure. Having dealt with ethnic identities as an independent variable in the past I know the literature I need to cite about the construction of ethnic identities to assuage criticisms of primordialist interpretations. While taking a snapshot of ethnicity given some roughly constructed categories in a particular state should not be off limits for scholarly investigations, such an approach comes with built in biases and it is a good idea for those doing this research to at a minimum be aware of these biases and take them seriously into account before coming to any programmatic conclusions. Anyone doing research with surveys or indexed variables constructed by "experts" would do well to follow suit and put serious effort into pushing our well-worn variables closer to the "real" concepts they purport to abstract. And my Africa-based colleagues are not without their own bit of work to do. It is not enough to simply fluff off statistical analysis, formal models, or survey techniques as not useful. While they may, or may not, be of use to an individual researcher, the need for reliability remains. How great would it be for Africa-based political scientists to come up with, or reinvent, systematic techniques of case selection, data collection, and analysis that moves us closer to the ideal of reliability without sacrificing so much validity in the process? If we can all embrace

these criticisms the discipline of political science and all of our beloved variables cannot help but be better off for our efforts.

Toward Developing a Framework for the Study of Electoral Commissions and Democratic Consolidation in Africa

Ukoha Ukiwo, University of Port Harcourt

I was socialized into the scholarship tradition that privileged political economy in explanation of social reality. This tradition assigned primacy to material conditions in attempts to proffer explanations and solutions to social problems. Membership of the Port Harcourt School, as this tradition was once called, appealed to me for two reasons. First, as an indigent student who labored during the holidays but still had to skip some meals to survive when the school was in session, I could not agree more with my mentors that humankind's most fundamental needs were economic in nature. Second, keeping up with the Joneses was a very pragmatic thing to do as I came to realize in my undergraduate years that it stood you in good stead of convincing your assessors.

As commencement of graduate studies was contemporaneous with the third wave of democracy, one could not resist the urge to enlist into the exciting field of studies on democratization. The thesis for my M.Sc. in Political Theory demonstrated how economic hardships dialectically generated democratic transition but undermined democratic consolidation. Again this was the quintessential political economy argument which resonated in debates such as that on the nexus between democracy and economic development. Normatively, this was posed in the context of what the right to ballot meant to poor hungry souls. Political economy analysis of democratization also emerged in the debate of the implications of natural resource dependence for democratization with scholars postulating an inverse relationship between resource endowment (especially hydrocarbons) and

democratic consolidation. Thus, from the accounts of both the (old) political economy and new political economy perspectives, these underpinning economic factors are insalubrious for democratic consolidation in most of the newly democratizing countries.

Political economy approaches are valuable because they provide insights to the difficulties of entrenching democracy in challenging economic terrains. They are however limited by the inherent inability to account for the differential performance of different countries, namely why some poor countries fare worse than some poorer countries, and why some resource rich countries escape from the resource curse and enjoy democratic stability in the long run. This limitation suggests the need to also explore the significance of 'superstructural' factors such as political institutions.

Elections may not be the A to Z of democracy but electoral rules and agencies have easily become the bugbears of democratic reversals. Everywhere democratization has stalled or derailed, angry citizens, exasperated politicians and powerless observers have put the blame on the doorstep of non-transparent and unfair electoral processes. The best predictor of democratic decay and flourish of authoritarianism is the degree to which election administrators are beholden to incumbents. Democracy seldom takes root in settings where the electoral commissioners are tied to the apron-string of the incumbent leader of government. It is against this background that I developed a research interest in Africa's election commissions. My agenda is to develop some kind of composite index where quality of elections can be used to predict possibilities for democratic consolidation.

Little wonder therefore that I saw the invitation to co-lead the 2009 APSA Workshop on African Elections and Democracy in Ghana as manna from heaven. I came to the University of Ghana, Legon with great expectations, hoping that the three week interaction with scholars from North America and sub-Saharan Africa would enrich me epistemologically, empirically and methodologically. I must confess I was not disappointed at the end.

To start with, Ghana was the best choice for hosting the workshop. It had just concluded its fifth post-military elections and the second election, which recorded regime alternation- a rarity in a region notorious for harboring *long duree* despots. This rarity was underscored by the fact that the ruling party conceded defeat in an election it lost with a very close margin. Clearly, this was not a perfect election- a point a hot-blooded Ghanaian colleague who was so concerned about the ordeal of subalterns to be impressed by Ghanaian electocracy pressed *ad nauseam*. However, it was exciting to observe Ghanaians relish in accomplishing a feat which had eluded their West African Big Brother, Nigeria. We were not only in the right place, we were there at the right time. We witnessed Ghanaians catapulted to the seventh heaven with President Obama's visit to Ghana instead of Nigeria, the major oil well of the U.S. in Africa, and Kenya, the country of the father of the U.S. president. The unhidden message of the 'rock star' U.S. president as he gave Ghanaians from all walks of life a pat on the back, is that in the emerging new world order, the ballot-ink is as thick as, if not thicker than oil and blood. Pundits who posit that the driving forces of international politics in the post cold war world are the clash of civilizations and anxieties over energy security also need to factor in amity among world democracies.

Back to the workshop, which doubled as field trip for me and I am sure many other participants. Whether the source of data was observation, official documents, key informant interviews or focus group discussions, the single variable that emerged as most critical for explaining democratic consolidation in Ghana was the independence of the Ghanaian Electoral Commission (EC). Citizens from different political traditions, politicians from the winning and losing sides, liberal and radical scholars alike as well as independent pollsters and election observers believed the EC was a trusted impartial administrator. Field reports indicated that Ghanaian politicians were not more saintly than their counterparts elsewhere. Politicians attempted to steal elections, or to put it more mildly—manipulate the electoral process. There were incidents of electoral malpractices but these malpractices were not sufficient to discredit the process and outcomes. This is because the EC was not and more importantly was not perceived by any of the major stakeholders as being in cahoots with any party or candidate to perpetrate electoral fraud. Undoubtedly, the EC had lived up to expectations. Inglorious history of fraudulent elections had motivated Ghanaians to insist on an independent EC. The public perception of independence derived partly from the fact that the EC made the electoral process transparent, participatory and conciliatory. Thus, evidently apart from the independent variable of independence of the EC, other intervening variables to feature as indicators should include transparency, participation and conciliation.

The workshop interactions in the auditorium of the Kwame Nkrumah Hall venue at the University of Ghana, Legon, underscored for me the saliency of the comparative approach to the study of politics. Although most of the participants, including North Americans who are accustomed to using data sets, presented case

studies, the discussions that ensued compellingly elicited comparative analysis. The merit of this approach was that it dissolved the brick-walls that emphasized exceptions to expose commonalities. Thus, beyond depictions of political enigmas who ride roughshod institutions and orchestrate democratic mimicry often buoyed by foreign support, oil wealth and mass poverty, was the saliency of political institutions in structuring behavior of political actors. Even when dictators sack institutions the message they inadvertently send out is that institutions matter. The challenge of building democracy in Africa as elsewhere is that of building, consolidating and fortifying institutions that would constrain anti-democratic forces and moderate undemocratic behavior. Our discipline of political science will contribute to this process by training the searchlight on both institutions that augur well and institutions that do not bode well for democratic consolidation.

An Americanist in Africa

Daniel A. Smith, University of Florida

For three weeks this summer I became an Africanist again, momentarily shelving my research agenda on American politics and thinking solely about the politics of sub-Saharan Africa. Unlike the other two-dozen scholars who participated in the 2009 APSA Workshop on African Elections and Democracy (including my co-leaders, Beatrix Allah-Mensah, Kevin Fridy, and Ukoha Ukiwo), my research focuses largely on sub-national politics, specifically direct democracy in the American states.

Although I'm an Americanist, this was neither my first, nor my longest stay in Africa. In the early 1990s, I lived on-and-off for more than a year in the northern-most corner of the country with my wife, Brenda Chalfin, a cultural anthropologist. We led several summer study abroad programs to Ghana, collaborating with Ghanaian faculty to introduce our students to the culture, history, and politics of Ghana. During the 2000-01 academic year I served as a Senior Fulbright Scholar, splitting my time teaching American politics at the University of Ghana, Legon, and working on various projects as a Research Fellow at the Center for Democratic Development—Ghana (CDD—Ghana). At CDD—Ghana I was fortunate to be included on an ongoing study of the coverage of the state-owned and private media during Ghana's historic 2000 elections. As part of the University of Ghana's Political Science department, I was invited to participate in a national survey administered and wrote about the electoral politics of the often-neglected, but highly volatile Upper East Region. I even found time to conduct a study of the (mal)apportionment of Ghana's (then) 200 parliamentary seats, which helped prompt the Electoral Commission to recommend expanding Parliament by an additional 30 seats.

My Fulbright year was also a humbling experience. In the classroom that year my students were ever-inquisitive about American politics. Their thirst became nearly insatiable with the spectacle, then utter debacle, of the 2000 U.S. presidential election and the protracted legal battle that ensued. My students peppered me with incisive questions about the intricacies of the Electoral College, federalism and electoral law, separation of powers, and due process. As the American political system teetered, Ghanaians from all walks of life simultaneously celebrated their own country's peaceful transition of governmental power from one political party to another in their own hotly contested presidential election. The ironies were delectable. Ghanaians, rightly so, unceremoniously teased me about the failure of the U.S. to uphold its own democratic ideals. I came home still an Americanist, but with a much greater knowledge and appreciation of African politics.

In many ways, my return to Ghana this past summer as the sole Americanist in the workshop funded by the Mellon Foundation turned out to be more intense than my Fulbright year. Though only three weeks long, the workshop became an intimate setting, with our mix of African scholars and American-based Ph.D. students readily casting aside customary deference to academic rank and seniority. Unfettered conversations during our small breakout sessions were the norm, with participants eagerly criticizing a mountain of cutting-edge scholarship. Discussions ranged from the mundane operationalization of independent and dependent variables, to more scintillating debates about the causes and consequences of electoral fraud and ethnic violence, to a hushed acknowledgement of homosexuality in Africa and the resultant demonization of marginalized groups, and to the commitment to more ethnographic research on the secretive "nocturnal" (political

and otherwise) activities that often pervade, and sometimes de-legitimate, democratic contests in Africa. During the plenary sessions, participants spoke freely about their own research projects and were equally receptive to constructive criticism from their colleagues.

During the workshop, my African colleagues were quick to question many assumptions that Americanists often take for granted. They asked why partisan identification is so privileged in the study of American politics and why it is frequently understood as an “unmoved mover” in western democracies. Surely partisan identification is as mutable as ethnicity, some argued, and at best is a social construction calibrated along multiple dimensions and subject—much like ethnicity—to manipulation by elites. Others openly questioned conventional survey methodologies used by the scholarly community to ascertain levels of partisan identification, including the standard Afrobarometer question asking respondents, “Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party?” The Ghanaian, Burkinabè, and Nigerian workshop participants readily offered examples of how citizens living in these neo-patrimonial regimes willingly shift their partisan allegiances for strategic reasons in order to reap the spoils of government control, perpetuating a “politics of the belly.” Others raised fundamental questions about both the reliability and validity of responses gleaned from cross-national surveys conducted in Africa. They pointed out the limitations of sampling by households in countries with extreme levels of homelessness, especially in urban environs with high numbers of “subalterns,” the difficulties in obtaining accurate responses when survey questions are pre-translated into a handful of national (but not enough local) languages, the constraints of cultural transivity (such as response acquiescence and

satisficing by some respondents), the possibility of enumerator effects with face-to-face questionnaires, and even the conspiratorial suggestion that biased or non-responses might stem from respondents suspecting “Afrobaromespionage.”

Other participants were quite troubled with the underlying supposition of many western scholars who blithely assume that elections beget more democracy; that practice makes perfect. When discussing the topic, the contingent of Nigerian scholars in attendance uniformly responded that the 1999 presidential elections were freer, fairer, and more transparent than the 2003 and 2007 elections, respectively, and that despite successive elections, the country has experienced a steep decline in democratic and accountable governance over the past decade. Not to be outdone by their neighbors to the west, the Cameroonian participants pointed to their own country’s democratic slide, despite holding multiparty, transparent elections. For these political scientists, the “thin” definition of democracy (grounded in electoral rights and civil liberties) advanced by “democratization” scholars is not only teleological, but crumbles under the empirical weight of their own experiences. And who can doubt them? Their colleagues were quick to corroborate, pointing to Ghana’s West Africa neighbors, including Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Niger, as examples of how the West’s imprimatur of a “free, fair, and transparent” election can sanction oppression, as the ruling elite are given a green light (and often financial aid) to impose a more totalitarian and violent political environment.

By the same token, after reading ample studies on the peculiarities of the American political system, several participants became intrigued with the differential role that electoral institutions play, and how Uncle Sam has quite a bit to learn from the African experience. A fundamental concern for many of the African

academics was the accountability and transparency of elected officials charged with administrating elections in the US. Troubled by the disjointed and partisan institutions regulating local, state, and federal elections in the US, they openly questioned how American elections could ever meet the international standard of being free, fair, and transparent. After all, Democratic and Republican state legislators typically gerrymander their own legislative districts and partisan Secretaries of States register voters, update (and cleanse) the voter rolls, and tally the votes. Despite the quite exceptional case of Ghana, and its well-regarded Electoral Commission, many of the participants were unconvinced that institutions alone could produce different outcomes, as nonpartisan election officials are not beyond temptation or influence. Listening and learning from their direct experiences provided me with a reality check and raised new questions about sub-national American political institutions.

As an Americanist, then, the alternating contrasts and convergences in accepted wisdom that occurred during the workshop stirred me to rethink many of the analytic and methodological priors that inform my own study of American politics. In a sense, the daily formal sessions and informal interactions stimulated my “sociological imagination,” to borrow from C. Wright Mills. Since the workshop, I have begun to “re-arrange”—and even “dump out”—many of my preconceived, well-entrenched epistemological and ontological “files” that I have carried around with me since I began my career nearly two decades ago. In particular, being exposed to the thought processes and in-depth knowledge of the accomplished African scholars, whose thinking about democracy, elections, and political parties is informed by very different historical, political, and cultural experiences than my own, has raised for me new insights into the immediacy and import of the substantive questions I tend to ask. Political scientists—Americanists in particular—should regularly try to avail themselves not only to radically alternative theoretical and methodological perspectives and research agendas, but also to do so within contexts where inchoate ideas germinate freely, research agendas become crafted, and realities of empirical claims are palpable. In the words of Mills, such experiences help re-arrange and mix up the contents of our many “heretofore disconnected folders,” allowing us to become more “receptive to unforeseen and unplanned linkages.”

WEEK 1: Electoral Systems and Elections

Monday, June 22, Morning Session: Electoral Systems (Theory)

- Lijphart, Arend. 1994. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. [Chapter 1 & 7]
- van de Walle, Nicolas. 2002. "Elections without Democracy: Africa's Range of Regimes," *Journal of Democracy* 13: 5-21.
- Joseph, Richard. 2008. "Challenges of a 'Frontier' Region," *Journal of Democracy* 19 (2): 94-108.
- Lindberg, Staffan. 2006. *Democracy and Elections in Africa*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. (first and concluding chapters, with Appendices)
- Collier, Paul. 2009. *Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places*. New York: HarperCollins Publishers. [Introduction and Chapter 1]

Monday, June 22, Afternoon Session: Electoral Commissions (Theory)

- Pastor, Robert A. 1999. "The role of electoral administration in democratic transitions: Implications for policy and research." *Democratization* 6(4): 1-27.
- Mozaffar, Shaheen, James Scarritt, and Glen Galaich. 2003. "Electoral Institutions, Ethno-political Cleavages and Political Parties in Africa," *American Political Science Review* 93 (3): 379-390.
- Norris, Pippa. 2004. *Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. [Chapter 11]
- Persson, Torsten, Guido Tabellini, and Francesco Trebbi. 2003. "Electoral rules and corruption." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 1(4): 958-989.

Tuesday, June 23, Morning Session: Electoral Commission of Ghana (Field Trip)

No Readings

Tuesday, June 23, Afternoon Session: Redistricting and Gerrymandering (New Methodological Approaches)

- La Raja, Raymond. 2009. "Redistricting: Reading Between the Lines," *Annual Review of Political Science* 12 (forthcoming).
- Samuels, David J. and Richard Snyder. 2001. "The Value of a Vote: Malapportionment in Comparative Perspective." *British Journal of Political Science* 31(4): 651-671.
- Owen, Guillermo, and Bernard Groffman. 1988. "Optimal partisan gerrymandering." *Political Geography Quarterly* 7(1): 5-22.
- Smith, Daniel A. 2002. "Consolidating Democracy? The Structural Underpinnings of Ghana's 2000 Elections." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 40 (4):621-50.
- Todd Donovan. 2007. "A Goal for Reform: Make Elections Worth Stealing," *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 40: 681-686.

Wednesday, June 24, Morning Session: CODEO (Field Trip)

No Readings

Wednesday, June 24, Afternoon Session: Electoral Moments--Gender, Race, and Sexuality (New Theoretical Perspectives)

- Hayes, Jarrod. 2001. "Queer Resistance to (Neo-)colonialism in Algeria." *Postcolonial, Queer: Theoretical Intersections*. Ed. John C. Hawley. State University of New York Press, 79-97.
- Abrahams, Yvette. 2009. "Womanist Notes Towards Living in the "New" South Africa II," *International Resource Network Outliers, a Collection of Essays and Creative Writing on Sexuality in Africa* 2 (spring).
- LaVon, Rice. 2007 "Queer Africa," *Color Line Magazine* 38 (May/June).
- Cohen, Cathy. 2004. Deviance as Resistance: A New Research Agenda for the Study of Black Politics," *Du Bois Review* 1: 27-45.
- Van Binsberger, Wim. 1995. "Aspects of Democracy and Démocratisation in Zambia and Botswana: Exploring African Political Culture at the Grassroots," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 13: 3-33.
- Albertyn, Catherine. 2003. "Contesting Democracy: HIV/AIDS and the Achievement of Gender Equality in South Africa," *Feminist Studies*. 29: 595-615.

Thursday, June 25, Morning Session: Panel Presentations

No Readings

Thursday, June 25, Afternoon Session: Panel Presentations

No Readings

Friday, June 26, Open Collaboration and Research

No Readings

WEEK 2: Parties and Partisanship

Monday, June 29, Morning Session: NDC and NPP Party Headquarters (Field Trip)

No Readings

Monday, June 29, Afternoon Session: Institutionalization of Political Parties (Theory)

Maurice Duverger, "Factors in a Two-Party and Multiparty System," in *Party Politics and Pressure Groups* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1972), pp. 23-32.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," *Journal of Political Economy* 65: 135-50.

John Aldrich. 1995. *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) [chpts 1-2].

Kuenzi, Michelle, and Gina Lambright. 2001. "Party System Institutionalization in 30 African Countries," *Party Politics* 7(4): 437-468.

Carrie Manning, "Assessing African Party Systems after the Third Wave." *Party Politics*. (2005), 11: 707-27.

Lindberg, Staffan I. 2007. "Institutionalization of Party Systems? Stability and Fluidity among Legislative Parties in Africa's Democracies" *Government and Opposition*. 42(2): 215-41.

Tuesday, June 30, Morning Session: Political Parties as Mass Organizations (Theory)

Katz, Richard S. and Peter Mair. 1995. "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: Emergence of the Cartel Party," *Party Politics* 1: 5-28.

van de Walle, Nicolas. 2003. "Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa's Emerging Party Systems," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 41(2): 297-321.

Paul Frymer. 1999. *Uneasy Alliances: Race and Party Competition in America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press) [chpt 1]

Masket, Seth E. 2009. *No Middle Ground: How Informal Party Organizations Control Nominations and Polarize Legislatures* (University of Michigan Press) [chpt 1].

<http://www.press.umich.edu/pdf/9780472116898-ch1.pdf>.

Allah-Mensah, Beatrix. 2005. *Women in Politics and Public Life in Ghana*.
Accra: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. [chpt 2] <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/ghana/02989.pdf>

Tuesday, June 30, Afternoon Session: Ghanaian Political Parties in the New Millennium (Roundtable of Invited Guests)

No Readings

Wednesday, July 1, Morning Session: Parties and Social Cleavages (Theory)

Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1967. "Class, Tribe, and Party in West African Politics." In *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, ed. S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan. New York, NY: The Free Press.

Ukiwo, Ukoha. 2003. "Politics, Ethno-religious conflicts and democratic consolidation in Nigeria," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 41: 115-38.

Posner, Dan. 2004. "The political salience of cultural difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas are allies in Zambia and adversaries in Malawi." *American Political Science Review* 48.

Chandra, Kanchan. 2005. "Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability." *Perspectives on Politics* 3(2): 215-33.

Fridy, Kevin. 2007. "The Elephant, Umbrella, and Quarrelling Cocks: Disaggregating Partisanship in Ghana's Fourth Republic," *African Affairs* 106: 281-305.

Fridy, Kevin and Victor Brobbey. 2009. "Win the match and vote for me: the politicisation of Ghana's Accra Hearts of Oak and Kumasi Asante Kotoko football clubs," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 45(1).

Wednesday, July 1, Afternoon Session: Experimental Research on Partisanship (New Methodological Approaches)

Humphreys, Macartan and Jeremy Weinstein. 2009. "Field Experiments and the Political Economy of Development." *Annual Review of Political Science* (forthcoming).

Green, Donald, and Alan Gerber. 2002. "Reclaiming the experimental tradition in political science," in *Political Science: State of the Discipline*. Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner, eds. New York: W.W. Norton.

Wantchekon, Leonard. "Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin." 2003. *World Politics* 55 (April): 399-422.

Dunning, Thad, and Lauren Harrison. 2009. "Cross-Cutting Cleavages and Ethnic Voting: An Experimental Study of Cousinage in Mali," Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 107, April.
<http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=ISN&fileid=0C4241B6-5442-C701-DA2B-8D6A80DA0E6F&lng=en>

Collier, Paul and Pedro Vicente. 2009. "Votes and Violence: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria." Working paper.
<http://users.ox.ac.uk/~econpco/research/pdfs/VotesandViolence.pdf>

Thursday, July 2, Morning Session: Panel Presentations

No Readings

Thursday, July 2, Afternoon Session: Panel Presentations

No Readings

Friday, July 2, Open Collaboration and Research

No Readings

WEEK 3: Voting and Elections

Monday, July 6, Morning Session: Partisan Identification and Voting Behavior (Theory)

- Lewis-Beck, Michael S., William G. Jacoby, Helmut Norpoth, and Herbert F. Weisberg. 2008. *The American Voter Revisited*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press [chpts 2 and 6].
- Johnston, Richard. 2006. "Party Identification: Unmoved Mover or Sum of Preferences?" *Annual Review of Political Science* (9): 329-351.
- Morris P. Fiorina. 2002. "Parties and Partisanship: A 40-Year Retrospective," *Political Behavior* 24: 93-115.
- Ishiyama, John, and and Krystal Fox. 2006. "What Affects the Strength of Partisan Identity in Sub-Saharan Africa?" *Politics and Policy* 34: 748-73.
- Moehler, Devra C. 2009. "Critical Citizens and Submissive Subjects: Election Losers and Winners in Africa," *British Journal of Political Science* 39: 345-366.

Monday, July 6, Afternoon Session: The 2008 Ghanaian Election (Roundtable of Invited Guests)

No Readings

Tuesday, July 7, Morning Session: Afrobarometer/CDD (Field Trip)

No Readings

Tuesday, July 7, Afternoon Session: Survey Research on Voting and Elections (Roundtable: New Methodological Approaches)

- Heath, Anthony, Stephen Fisher, and Shawna Smith. 2005. "The Globalization of Public Opinion Research." *Annual Review of Political Science* 8:297-333.
- Bratton, Michael. 2004. "The 'Alteration Effect' in Africa." *Journal of Democracy* 15 (4): 147-158.
- Moehler, Devra C. and Lindberg, Staffan. "Narrowing the Legitimacy Gap: The Role of Turnovers in Africa's Emerging Democracies," *Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 88*.
<http://polisci.msu.edu/afrobarometer/papers/AfropaperNo88.pdf>

Garcia-Rivero, Carolos. 2006. Race, Class and Underlying Trends in Party Support in South Africa, *Party Politics* 12: 57-75.

Wednesday, July 8, Morning Session: Comparative Campaign Strategies (Theory)

Plasser, Fritz. 2002. "American Campaign Techniques Worldwide." *Safundi* 3(1): 1-20.

Sussman, Gerald and Lawrence Galizio. 2003. "The Global Reproduction of American Politics," *Political Communication*, 20: 309-328.

Farrell, David. 1998. "Political Consultancy Overseas: The Internationalization of Campaign Consultancy," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 31: 171-76.

Farrell, David, Robin Kolodny, and Stephen Medvic. 2001. "Parties and Campaign Professionals in a Digital Age," *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 6: 11-30.

Wednesday, July 8, Afternoon Session: Parliament (Field Trip)

No Readings

Thursday, July 9, Morning Session: Panel Presentations

No Readings

Thursday, July 9, Afternoon Session: Panel Presentations

No Readings

Friday, July 10, Open Collaboration and Research

No Readings

WEEK 1: Electoral Systems and Elections

Monday, June 22, 2009

9:00 – 12:00: Theory of Electoral Systems (Kevin Weigost)

14:00 – 17:00: Theory and Practice of Electoral Systems (Ukoah)

16:00: Readings

van de Walle, Nicolas. 2002. "Elections without Democracy: Africa's Range of Regimes," *Journal of Democracy* 13: 5-21.

Jasper Ayelazuno:

Main argument: Pessimism is unwarranted when assessing African democratization. The main theory that van de Walle critiques is modernization theory (more development=more democracy). Van de Walle argues that this concept does not apply to Africa. Using various indicators, van de Walle categorizes African democracies into 'status quo' 'contested autocracy' 'dominant executive' and 'consolidating'. More generally, he speaks of autocracies, democracies and 'hybrid' regimes in Africa. He is optimistic for the hybrid regimes.

Criticism: Van de Walle's measures of 'democracy' are not necessary transparent. What does he mean by a 'full-fledged democracy' and how exactly can it be measured? Also, do external donors really have an effect on democratization?

Joseph, Richard. 2008. "Challenges of a 'Frontier' Region," *Journal of Democracy* 19 (2): 94-108.

Ziblim Iddi:

Main Argument: Africa is a 'Frontier Region' in which there is both pessimism and optimism. China's presence in Africa will hamper the democratization process. The US is attempting to increase its presence in Africa. Elections, institutions, and rule of law are all important aspects of democratization. Africa's problem is not rule of law, but 'rule of personalities.'

Criticism: The group disagrees with the author's stance on China; they feel that the 'China threat' has been over-hyped. Couldn't US influence be just as harmful as China's if the US comes to Africa with its own national security issues at heart?

Lindberg, Staffan. 2006. *Democracy and Elections in Africa*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. (first and concluding chapters, with Appendices)

Sybille Ngo Nyeck and Nna-Emeka Chibueze Okereke:

Main Argument: Elections are a game; the more you play, the better off you are. Thus, elections will lead to democratization and economic growth. We should applaud African democratization.

Criticism: Elections in Africa are different than those in the US because they can be violent. Also citizens are more likely to vote along identity lines.

Collier, Paul. 2009. *Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places*. New York: HarperCollins Publishers. [Introduction and Chapter 1]

Keith Weghorst (University of Florida):

Main Argument: Elections in the developing world lead to higher levels of violence. 'Demo-crazy'—Paucity of information for voters encourages bad governance.

Criticism: Collier thinks of elections in terms of accountability. Collier does not address how to increase accountability.

16:30: Discussion

Steffan: Two issues: can democracy be treated on a single dimension, or does it have many different dimensions? I work with a very narrow understanding of liberal democracy. Empirically, the states of Africa tend to move together. That does not mean that there is one way to reach democracy; democratization is not deterministic in nature. Democratization is a learning process, and it takes a long time. Elections are markers of this learning, but not the only marker.

Ziblim Iddi: How can you put so much weight on elections when there are examples like Rwanda, where elections have little meaning (they are not competitive).

Guy #1: Elections have been imported to Africa. African grassroots perceptions of democracy can be problematic.

Guy #2: The case of Cameroon and Nigeria disprove the idea of elections acting as institutional learning leading to the consolidation of democracy. Cameroon is moving from bad to worse.

Nna-Emeka Chibueze Okereke: All that is important to the people of Africa is whether 'goods are delivered,' not whether elections are held.

Maame Gyekye-Jandoh: In response to Guy #1, Africa has indigenous democratic institutions. Democratic institutions are not necessarily an import. Second, the main point should be that elections are not sufficient, but they are necessary. Elections can lead to freedom of speech and other democratic institutions. Finally, elections in Africa should be a movement of the people, not simply an exercise of the elite, and this is how Africans on the ground view elections.

Jasper Ayelazuno: Steffan, why do you use the minimum definition of democracy? Why should African democracy be modeled after Western democracy? Popular democracy may be better for Africans than liberal democracy.

Steffan: Individual cases should not be used to disprove his theory. Probabilistically, elections will help to consolidate democracy. Exceptions such as Rwanda, Cameroon or Nigeria do not disprove the rule. One of the exceptions to the rule, however, is oil and ore exporting countries. Why was there no violence during the 2008 Ghanaian elections? Because of the NGOs who were keeping peace across the country. I use the minimum definition of democracy because societies are different and different electorates want different things from their democracies. Variation in democratic systems should be maximized. The meaning of democracy is essential. Overall, Africa has come extremely far in the past two decades

Tuesday, June 23, 2009

9:00 – 12:00: Field Trip to Ghana Electoral Commission (Dr. Afari Gyan)

David Kandah (Introduction): There are seven members of the Electoral Commission (EC), which takes the political pressure off of one individual, lessening the possibility for corruption. The Ghanaian people stand behind the EC, especially when it comes in confrontation with the government. Clive J. Napier: 1) Who appoints the commissioners? 2) How is the EC funded? 3) What is the Party Advisory Committee (PAC)?

David: 1) The EC was established by the 1992 constitution. The President appoints the commissioners under the ADVICE of the Council of States. Commissioners are appointed for life. 2) The EC is primarily funded by the government. Its budget is approved by Parliament. However, many EC

activities are funded by foreign donors. 3) The PAC is a forum. Parties should be key stakeholders in the electoral process; the PAC is meant to provide a place for dialogue for the parties.

Guy#1: In Nigeria, there are many commissioners on the EC (similar to Ghana), but there, the Chairman can be manipulated. Why hasn't that happened in Ghana?

David: The difference between Nigeria and Ghana is that the President has no authority over the EC in Ghana. The Ghanaian EC also has low visibility; high visibility turns commissioners into politicians.

Guy #2: 1) What were your major challenges in the 2008 elections? 2) What is going on with 'E-voting'? 3) What are the major accusations raised against the EC? 4) To what extent do you judge the performance of electoral observers?

David: 1) The main challenges of the 2008 elections was mistrust among the political actors. Politicians are always suspicious opposition politicians. The main goal is to make the process as transparent as possible. 2) The EC is very cautious about adopting new technologies. E-voting is extremely expensive and there can be a lot of abuse. Additionally, e-voting is inappropriate in a country like Ghana that has a high illiteracy rate. 3) There is a lot of criticism stemming from the aforementioned mistrust. 4) Election observers have been very important. Ghana has adopted domestic election observer groups to encourage citizens to take part in civic vigilance. This will give citizens ownership of the community.

Guy #3: In the constitution, what is the relationship between the Council of States and the President?

David: The Council of States should be a second chamber.

Abdoul Karim Saidou: What is the composition of the EC?

David: The members of the commission are appointed strictly on their personal merits—they should be independent from party affiliations.

Eliud Nyawino Biego Lubanda: How do you ensure the integrity of the national tallying process?

David: The critical point of vote tallying is at the polling station. Counting is only done at the polling station and the collation station of the constituency.

Mohammad Bakari: What is the power of the EC to regulate corruption (of the media, etc.) during the election?

David: The Media Commission is in charge of regulating the media during elections. The EC is responsible for the misuse of funds. But it is hard to keep

track of funds because money changes hands in Ghana easily without receipts, etc.

Jasper Ayelazuno: Concerned over the level of rejected votes in the 2008 election. Concern over voter ability to properly vote. Is this problematic considering the closeness of the 2008 election?

David: The Ghanaian people are highly capable of voting. What constitutes a rejected ballot is very complicated. Rejected ballot do not interfere with the will of the people. 2.4% of the ballots were rejected, however, and we must work to decrease this number.

14:00: Ukoha Ukiwo presentation on electoral commission in Nigeria

16:30: Readings

Pastor, Robert A. 1999. "The role of electoral administration in democratic transitions: Implications for policy and research." *Democratization* 6(4): 1-27.

Maame Gyekye-Jandoh:

Main Argument: There is a gap in the literature concerning the role of electoral administration in democratization. Electoral administration has been neglected because Westerners dominate the research the agenda, and Westerners take electoral administration for granted. Two problems with electoral administration: technical irregularities and political suspicion. Ineffective electoral administration can derail democratization. The public cannot differentiate between impartial irregularities and political manipulation. Electoral commissions are extremely important to democratization; they must be strongly autonomous from politics and perceived as so.

Mozaffar, Shaheen, James Scarritt, and Glen Galaich. 2003. "Electoral Institutions, Ethno-political Cleavages and Political Parties in Africa," *American Political Science Review* 93 (3): 379-390.

Keith Weghorst and Peter O. Mbah:

Main Argument: Both electoral rules and ethnicity shape the party system of a state. The two factors are mutually reinforcing. Therefore, ethnicity should not be considered the main obstacle to democratization in Africa.

Norris, Pippa. 2004. *Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. [Chapter 11]

Main Argument: What is the effect of rules on institutions, individuals and democratic processes? Formal rules shape incentives. Electoral systems can affect governmental stability, ethnic cleavages, and party systems. Different electoral rules can achieve different goals in the shaping of a government.

Persson, Torsten, Guido Tabellini, and Francesco Trebbi. 2003. "Electoral rules and corruption." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 1(4): 958-989.

James Arrey Abangma and Kristin Michelitch:

Main Argument: Do certain institutions such as proportional representation vs. majoritarianism affect levels of corruption? Majoritarian electoral systems have less corruption than other systems because elected politicians are more accountable. More representatives per district = less corruption. Open party lists have less corruption than closed party lists.

Critique: What is corruption? Is this applicable to Africa (esp. the thesis on district magnitude).

17:00: Discussion

Clive J. Napier: Electoral systems should be viewed on a continuum with majoritarianism on one extreme, and proportional representation on the other extreme. There are MANY permutations in between these two extremes.

Daniel Smith: Rules do matter. But if rules are ignored why should we socially engineer the electoral process? Are there more important things to battle over if these rules are only going to be subverted and manipulated?

Ziblim Iddi: Agreed, rules matter, but personalities and other factors strongly affect outcomes. They also affect the formation of the rules themselves.

Ziblim Iddi: The Ghanaian electoral system has the ability to suggest new electoral institutions to parliament. It is interesting that Parliament uniformly rejected these changes. Incumbents do not like change. However, rules do change sometimes. Why? How much have electoral rules changed in your own countries?

Kevin Fridy: If you're going to change the system, you're either running towards something or away from something. What is the objective? What are the main priorities? Avoiding ethnic cleavages? Gaining economic development?

Kristin Michelitch: A lot of times ethnic identity is actually endogenous to rules and institutions. Institutions can affect ethnicity. Has this happened in Ghana? Has the Akan/Ewe divide been caused by the electoral institutions?

Peter O. Mbah: Rules are manipulated for personal interest.

Ukoha Ukiwo: Rules are not just laws and regulations, but incentive structures. All things being equal, this is how politicians will act if the opportunity cost is low. Rules should mobilize actors to act in a certain way by using incentives. This perspective downplays the problem of politicians manipulating the rules.

Jasper Ayelazuno: Can we transplant institutions from one cultural context into another? Or do these institutions grow out of indigenous cultures? Should we even expect these institutions to be perfect? We should be cautious about romanticizing the effects of rules.

Ukoha Ukiwo: You would expect that these rules are not transplantations because people have debated over them at constitutional conventions. Not an issue of imposition because the process is negotiated.

Jasper Ayelazuno: There is an ideal institutional model in the literature, and this is problematic.

Ukoha Ukiwo: Human agency is strong and can shape their own institutions as well as reshape and renegotiate these institutions. We must always contextualize when creating out institutions.

Guy #1: I found that the majority of Nigerians in a particular state are highly uneducated about electoral processes. So how much do electoral rules actually affect the people? We need to look inward and address real problems at the grass roots level.

Ukoha Ukiwo: The point is not that rules are central to politics, but that they influence aspects of governments. Rules do not solve all the problems, but that it can moderate political behavior. Manipulation of these rules can help us to achieve certain political outcomes.

Wednesday, June 24, 2009

9:00 – 12:00: CODEO Field Trip

14:00: Readings on ‘Electoral Moments: Gender, Race, and Sexuality’

Thursday, June 25, 2009

9:00 – 12:00: Morning Panel

Abdoul Karim Saidou: Niger and the impact of electoral systems on instability. Historical background of Nigerien politics. How did the electoral system become a source of conflict? As a result of the PR system, there were many small parties sitting in the Parliament. Conflict erupted between the three parties over the control of resources. This conflict ended with a military coup. The coup leaders implemented the same PR system, but put a cap on small parties. Theoretical framework: neoinstitutionalism— institutions have the ability to confine the behavior of actors. Electoral systems are not neutral. Institutions have the tendency to reproduce themselves. Because of the difficulties associated with the electoral system that makes it difficult for small parties to find representation, small parties have been operating only on the local level. At the national level, small parties have been forming coalitions, which encourages cooperation within the electoral system. This validates the theory of neoinstitutionalism. We can explain the voting behavior of citizens who vote for small parties in Africa through the framework of electoral systems. In Africa, political behavior can be described by rational choice theory.

Henry Kam Kah: Gender considerations on local elections in Cameroon from the 1990s-present. Three concepts: “Sit-tightism”, “gender-based decision approach”, “when greed and gluttony make people go crazy”. Men continue to be in the majority in Parliament and local councils. People have been focusing on women’s groups in an effort to make elections more free and fair. How are women using ethnicity to vote?

Ziblim Iddi: Election-related violence in the 2008 Ghanaian election. The 2008 election was a high-stake election for Ghanaians. Three reasons why the stakes were high: 1) for the first time, none of the candidates were incumbents, and all three parties felt they had a chance, 2) Oil was recently discovered, and the winning party would be able to be the first party to control the oil revenues, 3) The disastrous elections in Kenya and Zimbabwe put Ghana in the spotlight. Thus, there was a lot of potential for violence. 25

constituencies as case studies across the country (from a list of potentially violent constituencies). Independent variables: the media, civil society groups, law enforcement, and political parties. Preliminary findings: undercurrent issues (ethnicity) contributed strongly to violence. Forms of election-related violence. The intensity of peace-education has reduced violence in Ghana. From October to December, violence decreased as peace education increased.

14:00: Afternoon Panels

Jasper Ayelazuno: The Political Agency of Subalterns in Ghana: Resistance and Political Accountability from Below in the Neo-liberal State. Neo-liberal capitalism (imported to Africa) has not made African subalterns better off. Ghanaian society is divided into the very rich and the very poor. Oppression and exploitation cannot change by themselves; the people must do something to change their condition. Marxist approach to Ghanaian resistance to poverty.

Peter O. Mbah: Human rights abuses in the 2007 elections in Nigeria. There were many different types of abuses during this election. Much of it stems from the serious militarization of Nigerian elections. The upper class has used force to secure their own political power. Will it ever be possible for Nigeria to have a de-militarized election without human rights abuses?

Clive J. Napier: Africa's constitutional renewal. Four phases of African constitutionalism: pre-colonial era, colonial era, post-colonial era (up to 1990), and 1990-present era. Looking at 1990-present: is constitutionalism continuing and are people on the ground participating in this process? What is public participation? To what extent can people actually participate in this complicated process?

Victor Adefemi Isumonah: How do definitions of norms and power disenfranchise individuals? Formal and informal electoral rules matter in Nigeria. They can marginalize and disenfranchise whole groups of people.

WEEK 2: Parties and Partisanship

Monday, June 29, 2009

9:00 – 12:00: Field Trip to NDC & NPP Party Headquarters

10:00: NDC Headquarters

IAS: How has the ordinary Ghanaian benefited from the party system? Does political accountability exist in Ghana? As a party, have you learned from the dynamic of the voters punishing an unresponsive government?

NDC: As a political party, we do not wish to win an election just because the voters are punishing the opposition. We win elections because people believe in our programs. In Ghana, voters do not vote *against* parties. People who want to punish 'stay away'. We succeeded in arousing interest in our issues. We want to receive information from the people; not just provide it for them. We are able to measure how we are performing as a party with the people because we work at the local level. Currently we are restructuring our 'branch' level offices. Expanded Regional Executive Meeting was an effort to reach out to party offices at the local level. Throughout the course of the year we have outreach programs, and the President has town hall meetings.

IAS: What mechanisms are in place to keep party members 'in line' with party policy? How does the party office manage its supporters?

NDC: When we were in the opposition, our supporters had suffered a lot of brutalities from their counterparts. Supporters who break the law should be punished through the appropriate channels. We should separate criminality from politics.

IAS: Has membership grown?

NDC: It is hard to say. Most registered members only register at election time, and then stop paying dues. By electoral numbers, it seems that support for the NDC has grown, but the number of active members has not significantly grown.

IAS: What is NDC position on IPAC?

NDC: Public financing has been a slippery issue since 1992. The government has always partially funded political parties (NDC governments more than NPP). Public funding should come from states. Corporate bodies who want to fund parties should pay into this fund (not just straight to the parties). Political parties who qualify for this fund should be active and have members

in Parliament. More funds should be given to parties with women office holders.

IAS: What are the major things you would like to see change in the electoral commission?

NDC: It is very difficult to change the laws and rules of the electoral commission, especially because of the life appointments. Nevertheless, the electoral commission should look at the complex body politic of this country, and increase their manpower to address this challenge. The Electoral Commission should conduct their own research.

IAS: Ideologically where would you place the NDC?

NDC: Our party is social democracy. Grassroots, free-market economics mediated by state regulation, social justice (esp. gender equality)

IAS: What is the party's policy towards women? Achievements?

NDC: The Party is very much interested in women playing key roles in our party. We have focused most strongly on grassroots women empowerment. The NDC is committed to all gender issues. We are making sure that women become the champions of our fight against poverty, crime etc. The women came out in strong numbers in the last election.

11:00: NPP Party Headquarters

IAS: What is the history and structure of the Party?

NPP: The NPP derives its origins from Danquah in 1947. UGCC, United Party, Progress Party (Busia, 1969), NPP (1992). Opposition from 1972-2000. The National Chairman, the Steering Committees, the National Executive and the National Congress. National Regional, and Constituency levels. Our tradition stands for free enterprise and open elections (ever since pre-independence). Council of Elders. Currently, the NDC has taken the space (historically) of the CPP.

IAS: How often do politicians change parties?

NPP: This does not happen too often. It happens more often at the lower level or with smaller parties.

IAS: In the last elections, there was a lot of attacking of personalities. Is this bad for democracy?

NPP: There was a lot of confrontation from the NDC, and there are always extremists within your own party that will respond to these confrontations. In order to win presidential elections, you must appeal to floating voters who are turned off by confrontational rhetoric. Therefore, it is not advantageous to attack the NDC.

IAS: How did the NPP succeed in creating the 1992 constitution and pressure Rawlings to step down in 2000?

NPP: After the collapse of the USSR, Cold War politics ceased to affect Africa. Geopolitics became less important, and the West was freer to promote democracy. Additionally, the economy in Africa was weak and the IMF and World Bank pressured African dictators to step down. Finally, internal pressure (such as pro-democracy rallies and demonstrations) forced dictators to open the political system. All of these forces worked together to convince Rawlings to convert the PNDC into the NDC. However, each time the NPP lost (1992, 1996), it learned lessons and fought to make the electoral system better and more fair. It helps to make sure that dictators are promised financial reward for stepping down: "buying peace".

IAS: Why did the NPP lose the 2008 election?

NPP: You need to trace the loss of the election to the beginning of 2007. At that point, the NPP could have won. But a series of issues made the NPP increasingly less popular. For example, buying airplanes for the President. The party organization on the ground had gone soft while the party was in power. Additionally, the party didn't allocate its resources and campaign time well between regions. We lost in places where we should not have lost. Election irregularities may have played a role as well. Finally, the global economic crisis made 2008 a difficult year for incumbents. How did the NDC make up a ten point gap?

IAS: What does the elephant stand for? What would the party have done if it had been in power (historically)?

NPP: The elephant is wise and strong. The NPP is a party that Ghanaians can lean and depend on. Additionally, we are conservative like the Republican Party in the US. When you look at the history of Ghana, the NPP has been in power for 10/50 years of independence. When we took over in 2001, the size of our economy was \$4 billion in 2008 it was \$16 billion. We cut poverty by 1/3 and strengthened infrastructure. If the NPP had been in power for longer, the economy would be stronger today. The military has been in power for 24 years of Ghana's history.

IAS: What is the opinion of the NPP on public funding of parties?

NPP: The NPP, even before the 2000 elections, believes that parties are important, that parties must be supported. The challenge now is first to make sure that the economy can support that, and second that the public will come along with the idea. The public has a negative view of political parties. But without viable parties, democracy will suffer. Oftentimes, viable options fizzle because parties do not have the capabilities to accomplish them. Thus, we must convince the public that parties are worthy of being publicly funded. The importance of this funding even trumps political ideology. You would notice that our ideology is not static, and we have often pursued very socialist policies.

IAS: What are your views on the electoral monitoring team in the last Ghanaian election? What are your views on the electoral commission?

NPP: When these various groups come out with reports, we expect varying opinions. Thus we have disagreed with some of the findings of these monitoring groups. This is especially our view concerning the Volta region. On the whole, we do not have much of a problem with election monitors (both domestic and international), just some individual reports. There have been some issues with the efficiency of the Electoral Commission (EC). Especially concerning the IT of the EC. Outdated technology is a big problem. However, we do not have a problem with the legitimacy of the EC. We believe that the EC has done a very good job. The monitors do not want to rock the boat too much since Ghana is being hailed as a successful democracy. The EC is limited by two things: it does not control forces (it can only appeal to moral force), and it has a small permanent staff (which allows for 'a lot of funny things to happen').

IAS: What do you tell voters to make them vote for you? Ideology, or is your voter base solely based on region?

NPP: Our major tenants are: free enterprise, the protection of free rights, and the absolute support of the rule of law. When talking to voters we talk about education, the economy, and we articulate our position on a number of issues. We have focused our position on the growth of social infrastructure (education, health, etc.). It is not just the NPP that has regional strongholds. Additionally, there are large northern populations migrating to NPP strongholds. The party ideology does not have much to do with ethnicity or with the regional strongholds. The Akan regions (Ashanti, Eastern, and Brong-Ahafo) have been commercial regions, so there may be an inclination for these regions to vote for the NPP. It is important to remember, however, that there are a lot of 'swing regions', and that oftentimes people do not vote logically (*What's the Matter with Kansas?*).

IAS: What was the role of your outside campaign advisors? Was there discussion in NPP that you could win the Presidency by just carrying two regions?

NPP: No. That was never a campaign strategy, especially not of the foreign campaign advisors. We had always hoped to win six regions.

IAS: On one hand, ethnicity doesn't matter, on the other hand, you talk about the NPP and NDC having strongholds. Does ethnicity play a role or not? Do you think you may have lost because of corruption?

NPP: The NPP doesn't believe that ethnicity doesn't matter. But it is a sensitive subject that must be approached gently. The NPP did not fight effectively enough against accusations of corruption. We didn't effectively deal with opposition propaganda against the NPP. If we solve that problem, the NPP will perform better.

14:30: Presentation by Kevin Fridy, "When does 'North and South' Translate into 'Us versus Them?': Exploring a Remarkably Consistent West African Social Cleavage that has Remarkably Varied Political Salience"

Emphasis: How to accurately use the comparative method.

14:45: Feedback for Kevin Fridy

Daniel Smith: Where are the capitals of these countries?

Kristin Michelitch: Thinking about people communicating with each other. How easily can northern and southern ethnic groups communicate with one another? Could easier communication lead to cooperation among the north and south?

Ukoha Ukiwo: Could social inequality be a factor (HDI)? Levels of social inequality are an issue that people can mobilize around. Intensity of economic activities—could affect communication between north and south.

Kristin Michelitch: HDI could be endogenous.

Keith Weghorst: Joint method of difference. More analytical leverage. Pairs instead of gradation.

Jasper Ayelazuno: How do you account for the fluid nature of your variables? With modernization and migration, the divide is not that profound.

Kristin Michelitch: Are there some political parties that are forced to go to the north to get their 50 +1 (like the Ewe must rally the north via the NDC)?

Tuesday, June 30, 2009

9:00: Presentation by Daniel Smith, "Consolidating Democracy in Ghana? A (Very) Preliminary Analysis of the 2008 elections" Looking at the returns of the Presidential election and malapportionment in the Parliament and rejected ballots.

10:00: Presentation by Keith Weghorst, "Effective Electoral Manipulation? New Methodological Approaches for Studying Redistricting in Uganda"

11:30: Feedback for Daniel Smith and Keith Weghorst

Clive J. Napier: To Dan, a loading or unloading factor in voter registration. Wouldn't party agents know why ballots were spoiled?

Ziblim Iddi: To Dan, voter intent is not sufficient in Ghana. If they cannot read your thumbprint, it is considered a spoiled ballot. In the second round elections, parties conducted voter education in an attempt to teach voters how to properly vote. This decreased the number of spoiled ballots. The difference between the voter turnout in Ashanti between voting rounds may have to do with concerted NPP campaign efforts than fraud.

Jaimie Bleck: To Keith, do you plan on use micro-level data?

Ukoha Ukiwo: To Dan, In real terms, what do differences in votes per constituency matter?

Kristin Michelitch: To Keith, How are your two hypotheses competing? If politicians want to decrease their vote share at a minimum cost, is it somehow the case that increasing the number of constituencies decreases the cost? Maybe over time you could look to see if there are changes in the internal party structure?

2:00: Roundtable of Guests (Ghanaian Political Parties in the New Millennium)

Kwame: Democracy, given all of its different meanings, is basically a system of government that allows the people to achieve self-determination; a pursuit of government that allows for the expression of all freedoms. It enables people to pursue programs and policies that meet their daily aspirations in terms of improvements in their material conditions. From the 80s in Ghana, the goal of the struggle against the military government was to achieve self-

determination. In that context, political parties are expected to take a certain form informed by the logic of the struggles of the people. Political parties in Ghana have not emerged from struggle, however. They have been constructed around identities and ideologies, and revolve around individuals/personalities. So if parties have been consciously constructed by the elite, the question is, how can parties be linked to the people for them to achieve self-determination? Studies have shown that Ghanaians do not strongly relate to Party-members as cardholders. They only identify with parties during election cycles. The fact of the matter is that the way that parties are organized, and that they have become 'seasonal' organizations, the opportunities to participate in defining party agendas does not exist. It appears that because of the manner that parties originate as elite constructions, the degree of popular participation is extremely limited. This leaves the party management in charge of creating party policy and manifestos. The point of the matter is that if democracy is a system of governance for self-determination, and political parties are meant to be the foremost instruments of the people to realize this goal, it seems that political parties in Ghana must re-engineer themselves to reconnect to the people. The prospects for re-engineering, however, seem to be remote. Increasingly the Parties are consolidating themselves in the hands of elites, leaving little room for accountability and popular control.

Kwasi: At the moment we have 16 political parties in Ghana. In practice however, we are operating in a two-party system. The two parties, in fact, are becoming stronger and larger. Every year the small parties lose more seats to the NDC and NPP. The Political Parties Act and the Constitution say that any Ghanaian over the age of 18 can join any party, that parties must put up candidates for elections, for a political party to operate, it must have offices in two thirds of the districts in Ghana, every party should submit budgets to the electoral commission after every election and also annually, the parties cannot raise money from foreigners. However, most of the parties do not fulfill some of these conditions. The two issues that have been in the media: the underrepresentation of women in the parties and public financing. It is obvious that Ghanaian women are underrepresented in the political system. Out of 230 members of Parliament, there are only 19 women members. Out of 1,065 candidates, 99 women ran for office, but only 19 achieved office. Why do so few women get elected to Parliament? It is hard for women to run for office within the 2 big parties, so most of them run on the small party tickets. Affirmative action for women so that 30% of Parliament is female.

The government does give some money to the political parties now. But now the parties want more money. Draft Law: every party that is able to get 1% of the vote, should get some funding from the state. Kwasi believes that the state should give money to parties, but that the parties should be subject to tough auditing practices.

The identity of Ghanaian political parties:

- 1) Ideological identity: (NPP = center right, NDC = social democrat, CPP = socialist) Kwasi says: do not believe these labels! Both parties have the exact same policies (they follow the ideology of the Washington Consensus).
- 2) Philosophical identity: the history of the party and how the party traces its tradition (CPP = Nkrumahist, NPP = Danquah and Busia, NDC = Rawlings).
- 3) Ethnic/Social identity: Ghanaians identify with political parties based on their identities. The secret that everyone knows.

These parties are not internally democratic. The process by which Parliamentary candidates are selected is very undemocratic. The result is that the two major parties can lose seats because they did not use a democratic system of selection (the candidate was unpopular with his/her constituency, but he/she is rich). How can these undemocratic parties say that they are advancing Ghanaian democracy?

Daniel Smith: Kwame, the NDC said that the NDC is now having town hall meetings. What do you think of that effort to reach out to the people?

Kwame: Poor policy continues, this shows that Ghanaian politics does not reflect the goals of the people as much as we would hope.

Ukoha Ukiwo: To what extent do you think the parties influence the growth of democracy in Ghana? My experience is that elites run political parties everywhere, but that social forces tend to push them in popular directions (especially when they are voted out of office). In my view, the elitist nature of parties does not necessarily hurt democracy.

Kwasi: The elite character of the parties is so structural from the constituency to the national level. The parties always say that they will listen to the people and change their policies accordingly, but instead, they cave to pressure to maintain the status quo.

Freedom C. Onuoha: Did this picture you're painting leads to violence in Ghana?

Kwasi: There is a significant relationship between money and violence.

Guy #1: What can other African countries learn from the Ghanaian experience?

Kwasi: The importance of the increasing role of civil society organization. Civil Society organizations are becoming increasingly important. They were behind voter education, they observed voter registration and balloting, and they petitioned for peace during the election. The other thing has to do with the technical aspects of elections.

Kwame: Elites must learn to talk across the table and agree upon the rules of the game. This helps leaders to concede defeat.

Guy #2: How do we open up the system? Where do we go from here?

Kwasi: There should be primaries. 20 delegates can be bribed, but a whole constituency cannot be.

Kwame: What is increasingly becoming clear is that the political parties are becoming instruments for the elites to gain access to the juicy state resources. There is too much corruption—politicians leave office very rich. More political parties should gain representation in Parliament. Proportional representation will encourage parties to grow and be more competitive—this will make parties more honest. The party system will be less corrupt with more competition.

Guy #3: How can parties that do not fulfill legal obligations continue to operate?

Kwasi: The Electoral Commission always claims that they will get rid of them, but they never seem to. Leaving them there has not caused any harm.

Jasper Ayelazuno: Concerning mass participation in the political parties, I personally believe that elitism is not strange. What is puzzling to me is that there is such a passion among the people about elections. Are people attached to the personalities of the party or its ideology?

Kwasi: Ideology is ignored by the people. One of the major weaknesses of the party system in Ghana is this lack of party political ideology. People are passionate about the parties because of the ethnic undertones of the parties.

Kwame: The ethnic and religious factors play a major role in the mobilization of mass support for political parties. Another basket of factors has to do with the candidates and their personalities.

Henry Amadi Odongo: How will funding of political parties give incentives to parties to be responsive to the people? Shouldn't parties be funded by those who support them?

Kwasi: The point is not to give the parties all the money they need. The government will only supplement donations from the parties' members.

Kwame: I am not in support of state funding. But it may be an important means for demanding accountability from the parties. Although the state requires that the parties file budgetary documents, this is usually ineffective.

Guy #4: What is the role of international organizations? How can other countries develop a consensus approach to make their politicians agree on the rules of the game?

Kwasi: The international community has played a very positive role. They have not supported one faction over the other. There is now a smaller level of direct donors.

Clive J. Napier: What role do political parties play at the local level?

Kwasi: Parties are not allowed to be involved in local elections.

Kwame: Even though parties pretend to abide by the law, they support local politicians secretly.

Wednesday, July 1, 2009

9:30 – 12:00: Presentation by Kristin Michelitch and Bertrand Tchantcho on experimental methods

11:00: Presentation by Kristin Michelitch, “Do Elections Manipulate Patterns of Inter-ethnic or Inter-partisan Discrimination?”

11:30: Feedback for Kristin Michelitch

Jaimie Bleck: If ethnic groups are concentrated in neighborhoods, and taxi drivers give cheaper prices when getting off work, then this might account for certain outcomes. Drivers have a lot of opportunities for negotiating, thus, drivers may be willing to give a lower price to cut down on bargaining time.

Kevin Fridy: Ashanti is more popularly spelled as Asante. July may be affecting these results because the Hearts play around this time. When I think of the two parties, people really strong associate Asante and Ewe with the two parties, but Fante and Ga are much less loosely associated. I think it is more difficult to make out ethnic identities than is often assumed.

Ziblim Iddi: You have a problem with your control variables. There are many aspects that have complicated the issue of ethnicity. I believe that ethnicity is becoming less and less important in Africa. It is easy to come across as a different ethnicity. You should take into account price fluctuation over time.

Daniel Smith: How do you control for bargaining skills? How do you monitor your riders?

Maame Gyekye-Jandoh: How generalizeable? Especially in the rural areas. Not many people use dropping taxis.

Thursday, July 2, 2009

9:00: Morning Panels, Sulaiman Balarabe-Kura

Maame Gyekye-Jandoh: General elections in Ghana under the fourth republic: Enhancing Legitimacy through elections. Emphasis on civil society. Using four cases (the 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 elections) to study election observers' impact on the legitimacy of elections. Domestic observation practices have pushed Ghanaian democracy forward.

Sita Zougouri: Common resource management and traditional power structures in Burkina Faso. Security at the grassroots level (more anthropological approach). How local power is involved in local actors' everyday lives and development.

Freedom C. Onuoha: "Elite Recruitment of Youth and Electoral Violence: Prospects of Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria." The instrumentalization of electoral violence for primitive accumulation of vote portends serious danger to democratic consolidation in Nigeria.

Nna-Emeka Chibueze Okereke: Despite the existence of effective mechanisms to steer Nigeria's political structures and processes, the activities of several critical actors in the system call for question. Consolidation of rules counts.

WEEK 3: Voting and Elections

Monday, July 6, 2009

9:00 – 12:00: Party Identification and Voting Behavior (Theory), Dan and Kevin

11:30: Discussion

Clive J. Napier: Something that was missing in the readings was the role of leaders in getting people to associate with a particular party. For instance, what Mandela did for the ANC. DO leaders have a role in party identification in the US?

Daniel Smith: I would like to hear from people who have done surveys on partisan identification. How successful do you believe you have been?

Sulaiman Balarabe-Kura: What I discovered in Nigeria was that one party had the highest level of membership, and another had the second highest. All I asked was which party the person was a member of.

Keith Weghorst: Afrobarometer asks three questions to gauge party membership and partisanship. A lot of people use the Afrobarometer questions, not necessarily because they are good, but because they can be compared to other data.

Ukoha Ukiwo: You would expect that people would not be afraid to associate with a party if they were asked one-on-one.

Sita Zougouri: Even if it is one-on-one, people will not tell which party they really support.

Henry: It also depends on who is asking the questions.

Jaimie Bleck: I have found that people report they support small parties, when they actually vote for the big party, which is the opposite of what others have reported, that people report that they support the large party when they actually support the smaller opposition parties.

Jasper Ayelazuno: In Ghana, who are the swing voters and who are the core voters?

Ukoha Ukiwo: Before we answer that question, can we answer Clive's question?

Kevin Fridy: You can have strong parties without strong personalities in decentralized systems instead of federal systems because it spreads out rewards in the patronage system.

Keith Weghorst: What Kevin is saying is that there is a gradual move away from charismatic leaders. But I think something has to fill that role. In Africa, since most countries are Presidential, what fills that gap?

Kevin Fridy: I think that social characteristics fill that role. How do you change the status quo and capture the swing voters? That becomes the core question. It is very difficult to answer. I have been using ecological data, but this data is problematic.

Daniel Smith: One thing to look at is the discrepancies between parliamentary vote tallies and presidential vote tallies. Small parties do better in parliamentary elections than presidential elections.

Kevin Fridy: I think that the candidate is more important in parliamentary elections.

Daniel Smith: I think it would be fascinating to look at these districts to understand party affiliations. How does the act of voting erode partisanship?

Beatrix Allah-Mensah: If people change their partisan identity based on the delivery of election promises, you would expect the Volta and Northern regions to stop voting for the NDC since they are poorest regions in Ghana.

Kevin Fridy: Social psychology shows that people make shortcuts between identity and a party despite rationality.

Beatrix Allah-Mensah: Why do citizens change parties?

Ukoha Ukiwo: Machine politics is very, very strong. The party that wins is the party that controls the machine.

14:00: Roundtable of Guests (2008 Ghanaian Elections)

Karikari: I think that the 2008 elections were very important for this country, especially for our efforts to build a society based on openness and transparency. In my own estimation, part of the reason that the elections were successful had to do with civil society itself and everyone's desire to have peaceful elections. The churches especially were very critical to the peace. The electoral commission (EC), NGOs, and Labor groups all worked to maintain peace. Individuals such as Afari John of the EC have done their work well. In my own estimation, one of the reasons why the NPP lost has to do with the NPP's own poor sense of organization. The NPP was not very adept

at organizing. The Party's misfortune stemmed from misperceptions of large sections of Ghanaian society. They themselves coined the slogan 'property-owning democracy'. This is problematic because the society is so poor. They were also popularly perceived to have high levels of corruption. They became seen as a party grabbing at property (especially in Accra). On the ground, the NPP had been very successful with social development, especially their promotion of the freedom of expression.

Boafo-Arthur: Ghanaian elections have overshadowed all elections in West Africa. What were the key issues? Number one was the economy. People were complaining that they had no money in their pocket. Unemployment, education, sanitation. But I believe that the key issue of the election was corruption. This key issue was re-hashed in different forms throughout the election. Although not one challenge of corruption was proven, the perception of corruption was very high. On top of the corruption issue was cocaine smuggling by the political elites. Another issue was that the President was traveling too much.

Sybille Ngo Nyeck: Who constructs narratives before election time? To my understanding this is a long process. Could you talk a little more about the policy towards women and reproduction? What did the government want to do? What does it say (if rise above ethnicity) if the Ghanaian electorate is so easily manipulated?

Boafo-Arthur: I believe that as a polity, various issues that come up because voters base their opinion on the behavior of the political parties. It depends on how individuals perceive political actions. It depends on what is going on at particular point of time. I think that the government's reproductive programs have been successful, especially in the rural areas where birth rates are the highest. But no one has done a study on whether this has empowered women.

Guy #1: Can you talk about the personalities such as Kofi Annan or J.J. Rawlings?

Karikari: Kofi Annan is revered in this country. Although it was rumored that he may have a role in the elections, or that he may run for office. But it is good that he has not since he has achieved such a high level of moral authority. Entering politics would drag him down into the mud. I think that people have a lot of faith in Ghana, and want to see it succeed. Rawling's place in Ghanaian politics is important because it acts as a barometer of democracy.

Henry Amadi Odongo: In your opinion, you have said that the NPP lost because of organizational problems, but that on the ground it has done a good job. Does this mean that the NPP has lost faith in fair elections in the future?

Karikari: Well, I am not a member of the party, so it is difficult to know, internally, what their feelings are now. But in the public there has been no expressions in attitudes in that direction. What is curious, however, was that the public took a cynical sentiment which we should all be sensitive too. Many, many people asked how could a government lose an election by such a small margin. Many people believed that the NDC rigged the elections in their strongholds. But what I do know is that inside the NPP party, many of their leaders have shown publicly that they believe in liberalism. Ghana is more supreme than any party or any candidate.

Tuesday, July 7, 2009

9:00 – 12:00: Afrobarometer/CDD field trip

15:30: Discussion

Wednesday, July 8, 2009

14:00 – 17:00: Field Trip to Parliament

Minority Leader of Parliament: My party first entered Parliament in 1997. We were the majority Party 2001-2008. We have suffered a set back since January 2009. We hope to bounce back in 2012. In 2001, I started as the Deputy Whip for the Party Then I became the Chief Whip, and then the Deputy Majority Leader. A year before the elections, I became a minister. I have been Minority Leader since January 2009. We seek cooperation with Majority. Sometimes the majority approaches us to reach consensus on policy. Anything passed needs a simple majority. We are a 230 member, which means we need 116 votes to pass a measure. If it is a matter of policy, we have to rise up and oppose the Majority Party. We restrict debate in Parliament to agreed upon speakers. We want to hold ourselves out there as a credible Party and a credible government. So we always want to put our best foot forward in any debate that ensues in the House. Because the Speaker sets the agenda, sometimes issues that are important to the Minority do not get debated. At the end of the day, we do not want the development agenda of this country to derail. The NPP and the NDC are close to the center, and we are not extreme. This helps to provide us some direction in governance. Our consensus is around 85%. So far I would say we are

together on the agenda of national development. That's how come we are able to be here and we can peacefully exchange power between parties.

Daniel Smith: When I was here in 2001, I did research on malapportionment. The EC tried to add extra seats to deal with this problem. How did your party feel about the creation of these new seats? Also, I wanted to hear from you about the 2008 elections. We have heard that the NPP was arrogant during the election. Also there were some factions during the primaries. What were the politics of this?

ML: The constitution guarantees the autonomy of the electoral commission. The ruling party (NPP) had no influence over the 30 seats. You know there was no influence because the 30 seats went to both NDC and NPP candidates. Second, we wanted to showcase to the Ghanaian people that we were the best Party. We are currently revising our constitution to perhaps move to a two-tiered system. This will change the process of selecting a Presidential candidate. We are programming to have no more than three contestants. However, some people want two contestants. It will be some sort of peer review, and they will be taken to Congress. We realize that our current process of candidate selection is not the best.

Sybille Ngo Nyeck: What is the role of Parliament and your Party in the new oil contracts. There are some accusations of conflict of interest. Apparently there is no law in Ghana that addresses conflict of interest. What does your Party plan to do about conflict of interest?

ML: We do not have hard and fast rules regarding conflicts of interest, but we do have conduct of morality. This is in the constitution. When you have discovered oil, we then need to sit down and do a new job, so post-discovery agreements are very different from pre-discovery agreements.

Ukoha Ukiwo: How do you organize outreach to your constituency?

ML: We do strive to touch base with these people. I have programs to meet the people of my constituency. For the past month every Sunday, I have been meeting with my constituents. Before I go, it is announced, the chief is made aware, Assembly members come, and you arrive in a car that has a PA system. You explain to them in simple terms about certain bills. Sometimes you have people who understand, and offer some very informed responses. This informs your own opinions. This is something that we do continually. There are some MPs from the Northern regions, and it can be difficult for them to reach out to their constituencies. They spend time there over the recess. Then their needs can be brought to the attention of their MPs, and eventually, the Parliament. We do not have constituency offices, but we do have local Party offices. We have not established non-partisan constituency offices because no one knows who should fund it. If the districts have to pay for them, some of the very poor constituencies will not want to pay for them.

People would argue that the money should be used for schools or potable water, etc.

Mashood Omutosho: What do you think of international and domestic observers of the 2008 election?

ML: I have been an observer myself in other countries. In Nigeria, I was at one station, and the ballots never arrived, but I was told within two hours I was gone, 2,000 people voted. In Liberia, I had to flee from my hotel. So there are real difficulties. Many times, international observers do not do their best. But the circumstances are improving.

Eliud Nyawino Biego Lubanda: Do you think that losing the party is a blessing in disguise because they will come back in the next election stronger. Also, What is your opinion on the possible introduction of a Parliamentary system in African politics?

ML: No loss comes easy. We would rather have won and had that time for introspection. Second, we have our own traditions like our chieftancy institutions. These institutions encourage executive systems instead of parliamentary systems. The World Bank has shown that Presidential systems are more prone to corruption than Westminster/Prime Minister system. I think this is because the Prime Minister system encourages peer review. I think that the Westminster system is much better.

Clive J. Napier: Although you have a Westminster system of government, your position is called Royal Opposition. How do you account for this difference? Is it philosophical?

ML: We are a sovereign republic, so we are no longer royal opposition leaders.

Jasper Ayelazuno: One of the problems about Africa is the political class eating and chopping the people they represent. It looks like it is a big problem. What is it about this position that makes people forget their constituents?

ML: I agree with you somewhat. But the mistake is that we may not encourage the best brains to come to Parliament. If you bring someone like a teacher, they will be quicker to chop. It is up to the parties to do their own sieving. What does the person understand about law-making? The military removed the provision in the constitutions requiring proficiency in English. They believed that level of education should not bar people from Parliament.

Victor Adefemi Isumonah: When you visit your constituency, what is your experience? What are their personal problems?

ML: I think that I have responded to this. Parliamentarians are not agents of development. That is the District Assemblies. The role of MP is facilitators. There needs to be further education for citizens against patronage. The problem has not been helped by ignorant candidates who promise their constituents favors.

Keith Weghorst: Party performance in the whip system. Divisions within the political party. The Whip keeps the Party together, but it seems that there is another side of this. It internalizes the divisions. What do you think?

ML: I think that the whip system has its own pros and cons. The whip system is strongest in the Westminster system as opposed to the Presidential system. Because we are a mixed system, the whip in Ghana is not of cabinet rank and he is not strong or weak but in the middle. There are times when the whip is not persuaded by the cabinet members. It is impossible for the whip to make every party member vote with the party. We are still evolving, and we are not there yet.

Thursday, July 9, 2009

9:00 – 12:00: Presentations, James Arrey Abangma and Bertrand Tchantcho

Eliud Nyawino Biego Lubanda: “A History of Voting Patterns in Kenya’s Elections: The Study of Aldai Constituency of South Nandi District; 1963-2002” Attempting to explain why voting patterns changed. This constituency has a history of violence. Is there a relationship between violence and voting outcomes?

Mashood Omutosho: “Election Observation and Monitoring in the West Africa Sub-Region: The Nigerian Experience.” Has election monitoring improved the quality of elections and democracy in Nigeria?

Henry Amadi Odongo: “In Search of Good Governance: The Participation of the non-State Actors in the Provision of Security Services in the Neighborhoods of Nairobi.” Public choice theory. Findings have shown that low income areas have fewer security services and therefore a high level of joy riding.

El Hassan Ould Ahmed: Investigating the phenomenon of the vicious cycle of coup and counter-coups. What is the problem with Mauritania? How independent is the current President from the military?