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The Political Science of Peter J. Katzenstein

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Peter Katzenstein is a prodigiously productive scholar. As a comparativist, a student of international relations, an historian, and one who has successfully bridged the qualitative and quantitative divide in our discipline, he has made signal contributions to general international relations, political economy, security studies, European and German studies, Asian and Japanese studies, and political science in general. In this brief résumé, seven of his friends and collaborators highlight his major contributions.

One of the defining characteristics of Katzenstein's work has been his ability to move seamlessly between international and comparative politics. All students of international politics recognize that the state is not just a black box, but few have been able to open that box with confidence. Some international relations scholars have written books about both the international system and variations in na-

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tional behavior, but these have been different books. What no one has done better than Katzenstein is to integrate different levels of analysis in the same book, something that he accomplished in both his earlier studies of small states and his later ones on Japanese security and world regions.

Katzenstein has been a pioneer in two major international relations literatures: international political economy and international security. At the same time, in the comparative politics field, he has been a path breaker in our understanding of comparative political economy and in comparative regional analysis, both in Europe and, more recently, on a global scale. But more important than his contributions to either subdiscipline has been his capacity to bridge the two, and the growing reach of his work from Europe to Asia, and more recently to the United States. Before discussing the vast amount of substantive work that Katzenstein has published during a career of almost 40 years, we discuss five major themes that motivate and unify his work.

Persistent Themes

Katzenstein's work has reflected four signature themes, from his first article in *International Organization* in 1971 ("Hare and Tortoise: The Race toward Integration") to his latest books and articles.


First, Katzenstein has always emphasized the distinctiveness of national societies, with their historically conditioned domestic structures and particular cultures. He began his career as a Europeanist and moved determinedly into Asia in the last decade but he is also in the long line of analysts of the United States, dating from Tocqueville, who see America as so fascinating because it is

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so different from the societies in which they were brought up. He therefore sees differences between the United States and other societies that Americans may miss, since they take American practices for granted. And he sees, acutely, the tensions and contradictions in American practices and beliefs—what he and Robert O. Keohane, following David Laitin, called the "polyvalence" of America in their book on anti-Americanism (2007).

Second, there is his enduring interest in the legacies and transformations produced by history. To understand the variety of policies pursued by societies toward other societies, it is essential to understand the history of the societies involved, with their residues of attitudes, practices, and expectations about their relationship to the world outside. This theme is evident from his Ph.D. dissertation onward.

Third, and increasingly, Katzenstein has sought to link structural with cultural analysis. His work during the first 15 years of his career was largely structural: to understand patterns of policy, one needs to understand political structure. Yet he was not satisfied with structural explanations. Indeed, he came around to the view that what goes on in people's heads is crucially important. Why, he asked, did postwar Germany and Japan, despite being so similar structurally, behave so differently toward terrorism? His answer:

they were “informed by different norms” (1993, 266). Yet in embracing cultural explanations, he did not reject structural ones, but rather sought to understand how domestic structures are rooted in cultural practices.

Fourth, truth, for Katzenstein, comes from attention to minute political details and not from the abstraction of central tendencies found in statistical models or the core strategic interactions highlighted in formal models. He is determined never to short circuit the complexity of the international system or that of domestic politics. As an analyst of societies’ interactions with their external environments, he has adopted a dual vision—understanding interdependence without forgetting that convergence is precluded by difference.

These themes have produced an intersecting and portentous realization that one cannot understand societies without understanding the regional and global contexts within which they exist; and one cannot understand regional and global politics without understanding the distinctiveness of the societies that compose them. In his work on foreign economic policies and on the policies of small states, Katzenstein insisted on the importance of understanding the variety of capitalist states. *A World of Regions* (2005) restates the theme that regions and societies are porous to the global system, which also depends on the actions of its component parts.

We now turn to the major areas of political science in which Katzenstein has made an impact: international relations, including international political economy and security; the comparative politics of Europe, with a special emphasis on Germany; and the study of regionalism, focused on comparisons among Asia, Europe, and the United States. We conclude by re-emphasizing some overarching themes that Katzenstein has brought to political science and international studies with his professional and institutional contributions.

Qualifying Globalization: Katzenstein on International Relations

Structural explanations of politics, rooted in industrialization and modernization, have had a powerful hold on the imagination of analysts for over a century and a half. These explanations range from Marxist class analysis to the focus on the material incentives for collective action of contemporary political economists. In their most simple form they posit that since politics follows economics and economic globalization is occurring,

politics worldwide will become increasingly homogeneous. This global political economy view, with many variations, has deeply affected work on European political integration, economic interdependence and foreign policy, the comparative politics of wealthy countries, and the politics of globalization. In the realm of security politics, structural views have also prevailed, notably in the structural realism of Kenneth W. Waltz.

In his work on international relations, Katzenstein has consistently criticized this structural conception of a homogeneous world. In *Disjoined Partners* (1976a) he showed that political integration in culturally similar societies—in this case, Germany and Austria—is far from assured. Indeed, he wrote, “multiple mutually reinforcing counter pressures . . . make for the persistence of political autonomy” (220). Similarly in his edited book, *Between Power and Plenty* (1978a), Katzenstein and his co-authors emphasize the divergence, not convergence, of the foreign economic strategies of advanced countries, which he explained as “due principally to differences in domestic structure” (297).

If global structural explanations are false or at least incomplete, what accounts for the persistence of difference—for the *absence* of homogeneity? For Katzenstein, the answers are *history and culture*:

In the 1980s, Katzenstein emphasized history. In what is surely one of his most important works, *Small States in World Markets*, he employed an historically informed comparative method to show that “the distinctive strategy by which the small European states adjust to change derives from corporatist domestic structures that have their historical origin in the 1930s and 1940s” (1985, 210). Originally, *Small States* was part of an unwieldy manuscript along with what became *Corporatism and Change* (1984), which argued that Austria and Switzerland, despite their political differences, both constituted varieties of democratic corporatism—a social variant in Austria and a liberal one in Switzerland. As in *Small States*, Katzenstein traced democratic corporatism back to the politics of the 1930s and 1940s.

After these impressive works embedded in history, Katzenstein turned his attention to culture. He spent much of the next decade working on Germany and Japan, as discussed elsewhere in this essay. When he returned to international relations in book form, it was with an important edited volume, *The Culture of National Security* (1996), which attacked head-on the prevailing structural orthodoxy, especially of realism, in security studies. In that book, Katzenstein and

his colleagues argued that much important behavior in world politics cannot be understood without understanding norms, culture, and identity. They sought both to define these terms clearly and to show that neither realism nor liberalism could be persuasive without being embedded in a broader sociological perspective. That is, they called for a “sociological turn” in the study of world politics, a call that has contributed to a large and growing literature seeking to show how social norms affect the conduct of international relations.

Katzenstein’s most recent single-authored work is *A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium*. In this major study, Katzenstein emphasizes not only regional distinctiveness but that, in his view, “globalization and internationalization make today’s regions porous” (2005, 19). That is, transnational flows of money, people, and goods, coupled with interstate institutional orders, promote connections among these regions without destroying their diversity. But to understand a “world of regions,” one has to understand the power dimension as well, since it is “embedded in the American imperium” (209). Economic and political structures; history, norms, and culture; interests and power: all of these components are part of Katzenstein’s rich conception of world politics.

International Political Economy

Katzenstein is one of the creators of the modern field of international and comparative political economy. His edited book, *Between Power and Plenty* (1978a), swiftly became a classic, and a defining milestone of a field. Foreign economic policy now became the object of explanation, a sharp break from the primacy of security policy, of national interest defined in military terms, as the major preoccupation of the international relations scholarly community. Countries need wealth to sustain whatever they do, including the promotion of their security concerns. To get wealth, they make choices about how to relate to the world economy: how open or closed their economies should be to trade, how to manage economic competition, and how to strengthen their economies internally. With this shift in focus, Katzenstein also shifted the key explanatory variables. To explain how countries differ in their foreign economic policy, he argued, we need to examine state structure and policy networks. Strong states lead their economies, while weak states allow economic interests to operate on their own; dense networks involve high degrees of coordination, while loose networks

cannot avoid unit autonomy.

These frames of analysis continue to the present. The institutional school in political science examines the formal properties of political systems that define the way preferences are aggregated (e.g., the range of veto gates, majoritarian vs. consensus institutions). Conversely, the civil society school stresses the way interest groups and social structures are organized. These lines converge in the “varieties of capitalism” school, which contrasts models of the market along the lines of organized vs. liberal economies, weaving together elements of finance, corporate governance, labor relations, social welfare systems, education and training, market competition, and producer associations, all variables that first appeared in Katzenstein’s work.

In his work on small states, Katzenstein led the way along a related line of inquiry: the smaller the democratic state, the more extensive the welfare state—except, of course, in Switzerland—and the more open its economy to trade. This contradicted an expectation that state intervention was unidirectional: the more it intervened in one direction, the more it intervened in all arenas. But another logic was at work here too: strong state action for social insurance provided the safety net for employees so that they felt secure to experience open trade, thereby avoiding strikes and conflicts that would be disruptive to trade. Small states thus had much to offer as a distinctive type of political economy, with parallels to large states.

Later, in his writing on Asia, Katzenstein moved toward the study of a more integrated “global” international relations. The inclusion of a Japan chapter in *Power and Plenty* (1978a) by T.J. Pempel, at the time his colleague at Cornell, widened the North Atlantic focus of IR and comparative politics. It marked the globalization of political economy, integrating issues about “Asian patterns” into European ones, connecting both to stages of growth theories, as in the work of Walt W. Rostow, and to theories about sequences or changing environments as in the work of Alexander Gerschenkron and Barrington Moore.

Katzenstein kept moving. In the 1990s he became a leader in the advent of constructivist theories, exploring the role of identity, of meanings, of the logic of appropriate action. This could be read as a break with his political economy past, and Katzenstein to some degree intended it to be. But it could also be read as the continuation of his challenge to the traditional IR field where he began. Rather than security alone, economic policy was the dependent variable and economic interests mixed with institutions served

as the explanatory variables. Rather than seeing the state as a unitary actor, domestic variables matter. And if national interest is not the sole source of utility, with economic concerns at play in shaping what is being defended or pursued, why not continue the questioning by posing other conceptions of identity? If people have goals associated with their religion, ethnicity, value systems, notions of self and nation, aren’t these also utilities that can be optimized? And, for that matter, why not challenge the materialist view of what economics is all about by looking at the cultural foundations of economic behavior? These “new” constructivist issues are, for Katzenstein, “old” concerns. In helping to found the modern subdiscipline of international political economy, Katzenstein laid the groundwork for greater attention to domestic politics, to global comparisons, and to a wider range of issues that shape what countries seek to optimize in the international arena.

International Security

Katzenstein’s work on security and other issues is singular in the depth of knowledge that he possesses about individual countries as well as about the international system as a whole. When Katzenstein writes a sentence, the reader always knows that he could have written many additional paragraphs to support his conclusions. He has always been a fearsome empirical researcher and has amassed a depth of knowledge about a variety of political systems, which has allowed him to write authoritatively across the divide that has often separated international relations from foreign policy analysis.

In several influential articles and books, from *The Culture of National Security* (1996) to “Same War: Different Views” (2003), Katzenstein has pointed out that Germany and Japan are in similar structural positions in the global system. Both have been allied with the United States for more than 50 years; both have played a less prominent role than might be expected by a realist analysis emphasizing relative power capabilities: they have not, however, reacted in the same way to security threats, internal or external. In combating terrorism both before and after 9/11, Germany relied on high technology surveillance and new laws, while Japan relied on low technology, police visits to individual homes, and integration with the community. In Germany it was laws that dictated policy behavior; in Japan it was social norms.

Germany has been resolutely multilateral in the post 9/11 world, supporting the

war in Afghanistan but opposing American actions in Iraq. Japan, in contrast, has been determinedly bilateral. Japanese political leaders, Katzenstein argues, have used the challenges presented by the post-9/11 world as an opportunity for *gaiatsu*, deploying American pressure to break domestic logjams that have prevented Japan from playing a more active role in world affairs. For Japan, 9/11 was an opportunity to demonstrate that it could be a cooperative player.

Structure cannot account for these different reactions to similar if not identical security threats. To understand why Japan and Germany reacted so differently, Katzenstein has insisted that it is necessary to understand norms, identity, and institutions and not just international structure. Germans, both leaders and publics, see Germany’s domestic polity as fragile but at the same time embedded in a Grotian multilateral world anchored in Europe. Japan sees its domestic polity as robust but views the international system as a Hobbesian state of nature.

These differences are the result of divergent histories. Just as Katzenstein attributed similarities and variations among small European states to the crisis of the 1930s and to earlier trajectories of industrialization and ethnic disputes, he has emphasized that the security policies of Germany and Japan, and other countries as well, reflect the impact of particular historical moments on norms, identities, and institutions that in turn shape foreign policies. Germany’s contemporary stance is a reflection of the semi-sovereign status imposed upon it by the winners in the Second World War, a status that Germans ultimately embraced. Japan’s security policies reflect not only the American occupation but also political struggles among contending groups.

The most elegant theories of international relations have been associated with rationalist perspectives, realism, or liberal institutionalism, with which Katzenstein has become increasingly disenchanted. Threats and opportunities do not, he argues, nakedly present themselves to policymakers. Constitutive and regulative norms influence both how policymakers and publics understand the world and what they can do about it. 9/11 was an act of war for the United States; for most of the rest of the world, including Germany and Japan, it was a crime.

Like many foreign scholars who made intellectual careers in America, Katzenstein has been fascinated by his adopted country, seeking to understand both its differences from Europe and the role that it has played as the dominant state in world politics during his lifetime. It is not

surprising, therefore, that he has been intrigued by how America is viewed abroad: that is, in anti-Americanism. In examining what they call “anti-Americanisms,” Katzenstein and his co-author, Robert Keohane, emphasize differences, not similarities (2007). There is anti-Americanism in many parts of the world, but the basic nature of these anti-Americanisms and the reasons for them are not the same. At least in part, this reflects the polyvalence of the United States, a country of many different parts, at once the most religious polity in the industrialized world and the home of a pop culture that is relentlessly hedonistic and materialistic. Different kinds of anti-Americanism reflect reactions to different parts of America. The rational unitary state of realism and liberal institutionalism may be an elegant analytic assumption, but this assumption cannot, Katzenstein argues, provide us with an adequate understanding of an international security environment that reflects both the way in which norms and identity have affected the deployment of American power and the way in which other states, guided by their own unique histories, have responded.

Europa Europa

Though mainly trained in international relations, Katzenstein’s substantive interests—like those of his mentor, Karl W. Deutsch—have centered mainly on Europe. Of the 34 (count them!) books and occasional papers listed on his CV, 16 focus entirely on Europe and another six are at least partly European in substance. His newest book (co-edited with Jeffrey Checkel) will deal with the politics of European identity (2009), as did his first article, “Hare and the Tortoise” (1971). But like Deutsch, Katzenstein is not fundamentally an area specialist—understanding that term in its traditional sense—but an empirically based comparative theorist whose early theoretical explorations and his embedding in domestic structures were grounded in the European experience and have returned him there repeatedly.

Katzenstein’s empirical grounding is a good place to start. Some IR specialists may think they have dipped deeply into domestic politics when they refer airily to “domestic structures”: not Katzenstein the Europeanist! Work your way through *Policy and Politics in West Germany* (1987) or *Corporatism and Change* (1984) and you will find the deep immersion of a well-trained European area specialist. His empirical range runs from the very macro “International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of

Advanced Industrial States” (1976b) to his very micro fugitive paper “Austria and Kleinwalsertal” (1978b). And although he works mainly in a qualitative/historical vein, he can use quantitative data when appropriate (e.g., “West Germany as Number Two,” 1982; “Europe as Number Two,” 1981).

What best characterizes Katzenstein’s empirical methodology is what he calls “analytical eclecticism.” His impatience with claims that only one approach is scientific has led him increasingly to argue that only by using a variety of methods can a political scientist produce a sufficiently multidimensional analysis of complex phenomena. Second, his eclecticism is accompanied by a persistent method of paired comparison in various forms and at various levels. From the “hare and tortoise” metaphors of his first article (1971), to the Germany/Austria comparison in his first book (1976), to the pairing of Austria and Switzerland in his political economy work (1984), to Europe and Asia in relation to the American hegemon (2005), Katzenstein is one of the premier pairing comparativists of our generation.

Despite his empirical penchant and his recurrent use of comparison, Katzenstein’s contributions have been deeply theoretical. Europe has provided a foundation—not a cage—for his theoretical contributions. Take his insistent interest in power: it was his original interest in Austria—a weak state in uneasy symbiosis with a stronger one—and his books on Germany (1987; 1997b)—a strengthening state that chose to limit its own power—that fed his preoccupation with the taming of power. This interest broadened into globalized form in *A World of Regions* in 2005. Undergirding his musings on the nature of Europe and Asia as world regions is his interest in the relation of each to the American hegemon: an untamed power that is at least partially restrained by its relations to these two areas of the world.

Even as he developed into a scholar of world politics, Katzenstein remained concerned with the taming of power in Europe. His writings on the European Union reflect the fundamental ambivalence that is embedded in the history and the dynamics of the European project. His basic question is: “can the same set of institutions that effectively tamed German power avoid the accumulation of power that appears to be necessary to move from economic to social and political power?” This takes us to his vision of Germany.

Germany and the Taming of Power

To understand the driving concerns be-

hind Katzenstein’s scholarship, one must undertake a deep reading of his successive engagements with the German case. Not much imagination is required to suspect that it was his family’s German experience that made him a post-Westphalian theorist of the state *avant la lettre*. His key concept of “semi-sovereignty,” introduced to characterize the condition of the West German successor state to the Reich after 1949, straddles the border between the internal and external, between domestic and international politics, and between political economy and international relations. Germany served as Katzenstein’s principal demonstration case that the blurring of that border in the postwar era was a recipe, and perhaps a necessary condition, for both prosperity and peace. In this sense, and paradoxically enough, Germany was and perhaps continues to be for him, although for quite different reasons, what it was in the 1980s for so many others also: a “model.” In his case of a state that had learned a lesson all other states should learn as well: to accept internal constraints and external interdependence as fundamental conditions of their operation, and to flourish with and regardless of them.

The message of Katzenstein the political economist was, in a nutshell, that *not* having command of full state capacities—being constrained by effective federalism, strong interest associations, powerful courts, and dense international obligations—afforded West Germany more effective economic governance than other comparable countries. Semi-sovereignty protected the West German state from counterproductive illusions of omnipotence other states at the time still held, and forced it to cultivate other means of public policy than direct state control—means that turned out to be much better matched than traditional state intervention to the evolving problems in a changing, increasingly interdependent world. A fragmented, decentralized, weak state, West Germany had to learn to make deals with a multiplicity of actors in civil society who commanded their own sort of sovereignty that could not be ignored. Distributed intelligence and responsibility, and an evolving culture of cooperation in the production of collective goods between social actors forced to substitute for a strong state, turned out to be ideal prerequisites for national economic success.

Unlike the main branch of the “varieties of capitalism” literature, however, Katzenstein never suggests that German semi-sovereignty had been invented to promote the prosperity of the Germans or the “competitiveness” of Germany as

a country. That semi-sovereignty contributed to prosperity was certainly welcome, as it made it more unlikely that Germans would rediscover their past preferences for effective state control; indeed, Katzenstein's work on Germany can be read as a continued attempt to reassure his German readers that more advantages were to be gained from less than from more power. Still, the real reason for semi-sovereignty was not German desires for prosperity but the desires of Germany's neighbors for security. Ultimately, politics is about more important things than prosperity, and even where Katzenstein the theorist of the state dresses up as a political economist, he is primarily concerned with the potential for violence vested in the modern state and hidden behind the facade of a peaceful pursuit of economic happiness.

Every worthwhile theory in the social sciences entails an element of utopian thinking in that it presents its conceptual constructions of a good society, or system, as real possibilities. The inherent possibilism of social theory may be seen as rhetoric aimed at bringing about a desired state of affairs by presenting it as rationally conceivable and therefore realistic. Katzenstein's work on Germany—on the country's historical success in spite of, and perhaps because of, the domestic and international semi-sovereignty of its post-war state—conjures up the possibility of a peaceful world order in which interests in prosperity displace once and for all the passion for power. It is this underlying theme—the hoped-for taming of the Leviathan by both an organized domestic society and institutionalized international obligations—that explains why Katzenstein's work on Germany later extended to both the German response to terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s and to European integration. It cannot be surprising, then, that that same theme remained strongly alive even when, in the 1990s, the limits of domestic semi-sovereignty for the defense of German prosperity became increasingly visible. Unlike neo-liberal economists and political scientists, Katzenstein regarded the demise of German corporatism with suspicion, and the same holds for the increasing unilateralism of the Schröder reforms—not necessarily because he was a good Social Democrat, but because he prefers to see the state—and above all the German state—in shackles rather than roaming about; not to mention the fact that to him, it is not prosperity that is the ultimate object of politics but security from aggression.

From Europe to Asia

“Why is there no NATO in Asia?” This

was a question that needed a comparativist and Europeanist to ask. For nearly 30 years, Katzenstein has been making consistently powerful and paradigm-shifting contributions to the study of both Japan and Asia. Beginning without the traditional linguistic and area studies training, he approached Asia with the eager student's voracious appetite to learn from others through collaboration, auditing courses, joint teaching, editing volumes, and joint authorship. In the process he began by raising previously unexplored questions, then doing voluminous empirical research to resolve them. (More than one of us has experienced the excitement of his “Eureka!” moments as he found answers to the problems he posed). The questions emerged from his extensive comparative background and his intolerance for ad hoc country-based “explanations” that made little analytic or comparative sense. Like all great students his insights have often stunned his alleged teachers, and his work has changed the terms of intellectual debate on both Japan and the Asian region.

Katzenstein's Asian adventure began with his inclusion of Japan as a mainstream case in *Between Power and Plenty* (1978a), and continued with his co-editorship of the seven-volume series *Policy and Politics*. Both projects focused on how power is organized in different industrial democracies, prioritizing the relationships between state and society. This broadly comparative framework generated more intellectual rewards than either essentialist Japan-centric explanations or the then prevailing but constricting comparisons of Japan and the United States. Simultaneously his nuanced examination of the country's dynamic inside-outside relationships offered insights far beyond any generated by prior explorations of Japanese foreign policy or domestic responses to external pressures. The result was a powerful repositioning of Japan and its political economy away from the esoteric periphery of comparative politics and into its mainstream.

Katzenstein's subsequent contribution was to Japanese security studies and here again he began from a distinctive starting point. Taking a different slant from the predominant academic and journalistic debates over the causes of Japan's rising GNP, he asked instead about the seeming insouciance of Japanese officials toward traditional security. And in a second important break, he examined “security” not merely as protection from foreign enemies through military capabilities but also as comprehensively including economic, food, energy, and other security challenges. In addition, he recognized that security required protection from

domestic threats under the auspices of the police. Weaving these threads together, Katzenstein asked why Japan had not expanded its military forces in parallel with its rapidly rising GNP and why both of its security forces chose instead to rely on largely non-violent mechanisms in pursuit of their missions. Deeply entrenched norms arising in response to defeat in war and a strongly pacifist public were his key answers. Building from this insight, he then confronted a third body of literature, namely that of international relations theory. Japan's complex but largely anti-violent approach to the two faces of security, like that of Germany, challenged the prevailing security studies paradigms of realism and institutionalism, along with their various subtypes and variations. Japan's modest security aspirations defied neo-realist predictions, while formal rules of institutionalism did little to explain Japanese behavior. His norms-based explanation was also to prove a fertile seed for his subsequent contributions to the alternative paradigm of constructivism.

Insights from these early works on Japan led logically to increased attention to Asia. Together with Takashi Shiraishi, Katzenstein organized a group of specialists to examine what they called “Network Power,” viz. the economic linkages woven across Asia by huge Japanese conglomerates along with smaller ethnic Chinese businesses (1997a). The result combined insight into the political as well as economic forces undergirding the “Asian miracle” with still another challenge to presuppositions in international relations. Rather than rehearsing balance of power and multipolar instability theories, Katzenstein portrayed an Asian region whose member states were driven far more by a variegated mixture of domestic politics, incipient Asian regional institutions, and a preponderant elite attention to national and regional economic development. He and Shiraishi pushed their analysis of Asia further with *Beyond Japan* (2006), which prioritized the region as a whole and its intersecting influences from Japan, China, and the United States. To be understood, they argued, the Asian region had to be seen as socially constructed and porous rather than geographic and unchanging. In the process he was also able to shed light on the question of “Why is there no NATO in Asia?”

Insights gained from his work on the Asian region combined with work he had done on into a far more comprehensive argument addressing American hegemony, global politics, and the role of regions in *A World of Regions* (2005). There he argued that Japan in Asia plus Germany in Europe provided regional military and

economic outposts that were pivotal in sustaining America's global power. He thus integrated Asia into a fresh global schema showing once again that he could approach Japan and Asia with exciting questions and provocative answers.

The Themes of Katzenstein's Work: A Concluding Reprise

Three interrelated intuitions lie behind Peter Katzenstein's empirical masterpieces—an insistence on the *distinctiveness* of political experiences and institutions, a preference for *smallness*, and a passion to *tame power*. These intuitions provide his work with normative coherence.

Provoked by grand theories associated with Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye highlighting transnationalism in the 1970s, and guided by a moral vision that values diversity, Katzenstein has long insisted on the wide varieties of institutional responses to these forces that were forecast as promoting a common world culture. In his political economy work in the 1980s, he analyzed a double distinction—not only between small and large capitalist states, but between two distinct types of small corporatist states—with liberal and social variants. Years later, in collaboration with a young generation of security scholars that led to *The Culture of National Security* (1996), Katzenstein pushed them to emphasize how distinct national cultures can trump realist and liberal interests to sustain distinct foreign policies. In his most recent book, *A World of Regions* (2005), Katzenstein counters the vision of globalization by addressing the distinct developments in Asian and European regional institutions. As should be clear, a keyword sweep of Katzenstein's works would surely find *distinct* among his favorite non-capitalized words.

Standing against his grand predecessors in the study of nationalism, most especially his teacher and friend Karl W. Deutsch, and guided by a moral vision that small is beautiful, Katzenstein never had even a vicarious nostalgia for the gargantuan Austro-Hungarian Empire. As we learn from his dissertation-turned-first-book *Disjoined Partners* (1976), Katzenstein found favor (and stability) in an Austria and East Germany as separate *small* states. In *Small States and World Markets* (1985), Katzenstein reveals his admiration for the openness and adaptability of Europe's small states and their national economies. And in that book, he forecasts that with the changing world economy, the U.S., becoming relatively smaller, would have a lot to learn from these small states, and he implies that this would make his adopted country a better one.

Less impressed by the responsibility of power highlighted by his teacher, Joseph Nye, and being morally troubled by hegemony, Katzenstein has sought ways to promote *Tamed Power* (1997b). As we argued above, in his extensive work on the Federal Republic of Germany, he has been comfortable in finding that it is merely a semi-sovereign state, unable to act autonomously from the many social and institutional networks that crowd the corridors of power. In his long collaboration with T.J. Pempel comparing the international roles of Germany and Japan, Katzenstein is glad to report that many realists (about whom he learned as an undergraduate, serving as a research assistant to Kenneth Waltz) were wrong: neither country has demanded the international power that would be commensurate with their (distinct) economic miracles. Their power had been tamed by their parallel histories.

The source of Katzenstein's intuitions, not unlike that of his three inspirational mentors at Harvard—Karl Deutsch, Stanley Hoffmann, and Judith Shklar—is the fact that Bismarck's Germany had grown too big for Europe, and this meant danger. Taming German power was the key to peace in Europe. Therefore, the distinctive institutions and networks of Austria and East Germany implied that one nation could be peacefully and permanently divided into separate states, and their smallness would play to the advantage of all. To be sure, several of Katzenstein's forecasts went awry—two of the Germans did unite; America did not become a small state in the wake of the 1980s economic crises; Austria's corporatism has begun to look terrifyingly unsocial. But his intuitions about distinctiveness, smallness, and the importance of taming power have remained his normative ballast.

Public Goods and Private Connections

We could not conclude this essay on Katzenstein's contributions without pointing out that he is one of the profession's finest producers of public goods. His contributions to the American Political Science Association have been extensive, including co-chairing the program committee for the 1995 annual meeting. He was also secretary of the association in 2003, APSA lecturer at the Japanese Political Science Association meetings in 1997, and a member of the committee on International Political Science of the Association from 1989–92. His first of many prizes was the Helen Dwight Reid Award of the APSA in 1974 and he is a past winner of the Woodrow Wilson Prize.

Katzenstein's service does not end with

his contributions to APSA. Well known for his successful editorship of *International Organization* during the 1980s, he has steered the highly successful series, Cornell Studies in International Political Economy, for over two decades. He has served on advisory boards at Hong Kong University, Peking University, Princeton University, the Max Planck Institute, and the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin and on the nominations committee for political science of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He has also served on numerous editorial boards, including *ISQ*, *IO*, and the *Handbook of International Relations*.

His contributions to his own university are equally stellar. Winner of several of Cornell's most distinguished teaching awards, to top off this list of accomplishments he recently won the Stephen Weiss Award "for effective, inspiring and distinguished teaching of undergraduates and for outstanding contributions to undergraduate education." His energy and dedication to our profession are nothing short of phenomenal. He has chaired over 50 Ph.D. committees at Cornell, training some of the today's most distinguished specialists in both IR and comparative politics, and has served on the Ph.D. committees of 47 others. His Ph.D.s teach at some of the finest departments of political science both here and abroad.

Katzenstein is also well known for his contributions to diversity and equality. He has been a strong supporter of women and minorities, and a consistent and persuasive voice for equality of opportunity in the profession. He is especially noted for his encouragement of young scholars. The Cornell series that he edits has offered a venue for an array of such scholars, many of whom express heartfelt thanks for his professional advice in the prefaces of their books. His generosity is legion: reading the acknowledgements of virtually every major book in IR and many in comparative politics turns up his name and grateful thanks for his advice.

Finally, all of us who have co-authored this appreciation have profited from his relentless friendship, which has sometimes come across as "tough love." We have occasionally struggled to meet his standards of excellence—both in himself and in his colleagues—but we have always recognized the depth of his friendship, which has never been lacking, despite disagreements, even on fundamentals. To readers of his work, his colleagues, and his students, Peter J. Katzenstein has been a beacon of insight and a pillar of support. As members of the American Political Science Association, we are honored that he is our president.

Note

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