

Article: “Value Diversity and Support for Electoral Reform in Canada”

Author: Mebs Kanji and Antoine Bilodeau

Issue: Volume 37, Issue 4 (October 2006)

Journal: *PS: Political Science and Politics*



This journal is published by the American Political Science Association. All rights reserved.

APSA is posting this article for public view on its website. APSA journals are fully accessible to APSA members and institutional subscribers. To view the table of contents or abstracts from this or any of APSA's journals, please go to the website of our publisher Cambridge University Press (<http://journals.cambridge.org>).

This article may only be used for your personal, non-commercial use. For permissions for all other uses of this article should be directed to Cambridge University Press at permissions@cup.org.

Value Diversity and Support for Electoral Reform in Canada

Political representatives in Canada have traditionally been selected using a first-past-the-post electoral system. The major problem with this process of determining “who governs” is that larger parties are often rewarded the majority of seats in legislatures without winning a majority of popular support. Recently, the debate on electoral reform in Canada has begun to gain steam, as several provinces have started to look more seriously at alternatives (Milner 2004). Declining voter turnout may explain why even governments that benefit from the current electoral system are finding it increasingly difficult to simply sideline this issue. But what accounts for the Canadian public’s more recent frustration with their traditional electoral system?

Part of the explanation may lie in the evolution of Canadian society and its implications for party politics and party support. Canada is a deeply divided society with several historically rooted cleavages, which makes both campaigning and public policy-making particularly contentious. Moreover, various structural and lifestyle changes resulting from the rhythms of late industrialism are altering the socio-cultural mix of Canadian society, possibly contributing to greater value pluralization, intensifying new social divides, and elevating the overall degree of value diversity between different social groups. Such a transformation may be increasing the level of intra-societal stress on the political system and further constraining the ability of larger brokerage parties to respond adequately to citizens’ increasingly varied needs and issue demands.

Dissatisfied voters have few alternatives but to turn to smaller parties. However, under the current first-past-the-post electoral system, smaller parties typically face enormous challenges while trying to convert their popular support into a proportionate number of seats. It is possible, therefore, that this added pressure on the current party system generated by the changing socio-cultural mix of Canadian society may be contributing to a more disgruntled citizenry and depressing levels of political support (Easton 1965; Dalton 2004). Recent dissatisfaction with the traditional electoral system may be part of the result. To this point, however, few studies have actually examined this proposition using direct empirical evidence.

The purpose of this paper is to employ data from the World Values Surveys and the Cana-

dian Election Studies to investigate two main questions. First, is there any evidence to suggest that the socio-cultural mix of Canadian society is becoming more value diverse? And second, does value diversity pose negative implications for political support, particularly support for the current first-past-the-post electoral system?

Canada’s Changing Cleavage Structure

During the late 1960s, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argued that the underlying cleavage structure that takes root within a society is usually the product of various historic and formative events, resulting from processes such as nation-building and economic development. Canada is certainly no exception to that rule. There are basic foundational reasons to suggest that ethno-religious, regional, and class differences play a significant role in contributing to levels of Canadian intra-societal stress and party competition (Hartz 1964; McRae 1964; Schwartz 1974; Elkins and Simeon 1980; Porter 1965). There are reasons to suppose, however, that cleavage structures within societies may in fact be more dynamic than originally conceived, and that such old cleavages may no longer be the only significant value divides in Canadian society.

Census data, for instance, indicate that the proportion of foreign-born residents in Canada has increased to its highest level in 70 years. More importantly, the ethnic composition of Canada’s immigrants has shifted considerably. Prior to the 1960s, most immigrants arriving in Canada were primarily of European descent and from culturally similar backgrounds. Currently, the majority of immigrants come to Canada from such non-traditional sources as Asia, the Middle East, the Caribbean, Central and South America, and Africa. There are now more than 200 different ethnicities in Canada and over a 100 different languages spoken (Statistics Canada 2002a; 2003a). Because immigrants from non-traditional source countries have been socialized in less culturally similar societies, there are strong reasons to suspect that the increased presence of these newcomers may be contributing to the formation of a new value divide in Canadian society between immigrants and native-born Canadians.

There are also reasons to suppose that the values of younger generations of Canadians may be gradually diverging from those of older cohorts. Inglehart’s (1977; 1990; 1997) theory of postmodern value change, for instance,

by

Mebs Kanji,

Concordia University

Antoine Bilodeau,

Concordia University

contends that increased economic development contributes to an intergenerational shift in the value priorities of mass publics in advanced industrial states. Because younger generations of Canadians have been socialized during a period of relative affluence, their views toward “politics, work, family life, religion and sexual behavior” are likely to be different from those of older generations who were raised during periods of greater economic scarcity, and whose priorities, as a result, were focused toward making ends meet as opposed to issues such as environmental protection and the quality of life. It is possible, therefore, that this process is contributing to the development of a new generational value divide within Canadian society.

Lastly, the value divide between men and women in Canada may be more relevant now than it has been in the past. Societal modernization and human development in advanced industrial states have resulted in a rising tide of gender equality (Norris and Inglehart 2003; Inglehart and Norris 2003). “Throughout history, women in virtually all societies have had their life options restricted to the roles of wife and mother. Increasingly today, in postindustrial societies, almost any career and almost any lifestyle is opening up to them” (Inglehart and Norris 2003, 159).

One result of this transformation is that women are no longer as dependent on men as they may have been in the past. Another, Inglehart and Norris (2000) argue, is that the modern gender gap reflects a divergence in men and women’s value orientations. The evidence indicates that Canadian women have undergone the same kinds of structural and lifestyle changes as those experienced by women in other postindustrial states (Nevitte 1996). For example, Canadian women are more educated today than they have been in the past. And they are more likely to join the paid labor force and work outside the home (Statistics Canada 2003b). There is no reason to suppose, therefore, that the trajectory of the value divide between men and women in Canada would be much different from other advanced industrial states.

Value Diversity and Political Support

Forty years ago, Easton (1965) proposed that social cleavages in a democratic society can increase the level of intra-societal stress on the political system and make governing and responding to citizens’ varying concerns more difficult. There are many ways in which this might occur, all of which could have negative implications for political support. For example, recent evidence from both the United States and several other societies shows that increased community heterogeneity can interfere with the prospects of developing strong social networks as well as the production of social capital. People living in more value-diverse communities, Costa and Kahn (2003) argue, are less likely to interact and build bridges socially. And in societies where social interaction is limited, the prospects of developing the dense social networks and sufficient stocks of social capital necessary to lubricate social life and make democracy work are likely to be significantly diminished, and political support may suffer as a result. Moreover, because social capital fosters a spirit of cooperation and concern for the collective good by establishing “generalized” norms of reciprocity and building strong levels of trust, this may also make it more difficult to implement and sustain broad-based collective initiatives.

In addition, dense social networks, Putnam (2000) argues, can also serve as important training grounds for developing the practical and civic skills necessary to foster greater democratic participation. Greater value diversity, therefore, might also detract from the enhancement of people’s capacity to participate in politics. This is relevant because in order for politicians and parties to respond to citizens and broker coalitions of support,

they need to know what citizens want. And research shows that political authorities are more inclined to respond to those citizens who voice their opinions the loudest and those who are the most politically active (Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995; APSA Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy 2004). This is another way, therefore, in which greater value diversity might make it more difficult for policy makers to consider and respond to peoples’ respective needs, thereby contributing to lower levels of political support.

Lastly, increased value heterogeneity may introduce new issues onto the political agenda and create an amalgamation of traditional policy concerns and new policy debates. This might make it more difficult for parties to reconcile the issue preferences of different groups and to satisfy a winning coalition of citizens. Democratic governing in multidimensional issue space, according to Dalton (2004), constitutes an uphill battle. When citizens are on the losing-side of one too many policy decisions, or feel ignored entirely by unresponsive political authorities, they are likely to develop feelings of cynicism and political discontent. “Voters dissatisfied with successive governments,” for instance, “may come to the conclusion that elections do not select a better government, but just a different government that struggles with the same policy challenges. This dynamic itself creates the potential for substantial negativity towards the politicians, parties and parliaments that are making government policy” (Dalton 2004, 147).

Data

To examine whether Canada has become a more value diverse society, this investigation draws on data from the Canadian World Values Surveys (WVS). The WVS are ideally suited for this type of analysis because they contain a variety of variables designed specifically to measure attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors across a broad range of domains. With the WVS it is possible to explore a broad spectrum of value orientations and to track values and value change across time. This analysis, for example, incorporates data from both the 1990 (n = 1,730) and the 2000 (n = 1,931) Canadian WVS.

Another benefit of working with these data is that the most recent round of the Canadian WVS contains a supplementary survey of recent immigrants—The New Immigrant Survey (NIS)—intended specifically for conducting more detailed investigations of Canada’s immigrant population.¹ The overall effect of the NIS is to add another 563 immigrants to the 665 immigrants already sampled as part of the core WVS conducted in 1990 and 2000. It also boosts the proportion of the sample of more recent immigrants who have been in Canada for only a short time and who have come from non-traditional source countries.

Although the WVS contain several variables tapping different levels of specific and diffuse political support, they do not allow us to look specifically at support for the current electoral system. For this purpose, the latter part of this analysis turns to the 2000 Canadian Election Study (n = 3,651). Similar to election studies conducted in other states, these data contain variables that deal primarily with voting and elections. More importantly for the purposes of this analysis is that these data allow us to look directly at how Canadians feel about the first-past-the-post system and its often distorting effects.

The Structure of Value Orientations in Canada

Because values play a commanding role in structuring people’s “functionally integrated belief systems” (Rokeach

1968), they are a more “economically analytical tool for describing and explaining similarities and differences between persons, groups, nations, and cultures” than either attitudes or behavior (157–8). However, values are difficult to analyze directly because they are embedded in what people say, in how they think, and in how they act. As van Deth and Scarbrough (1995) indicate:

“We can conceptualize values as separate from these other things, but we cannot ‘get to them’ separately from their place in other things. Values cannot be researched on their own because they do not stand on their own. So we have to decide where, in the forest of activities which engage values, we look for evidence of the empirical relevance of values” (31).

The strategy in this analysis was to follow the lead of our European counterparts (see van Deth and Scarbrough 1995) and to utilize non-observable latent constructs to identify and measure values. This approach assumes that values are “a simple but general consistency generator” (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991, 269) and that people’s value orientations serve as an underlying mechanism for structuring their attitudes, behavior, and beliefs across various contexts.

We began this investigation, therefore, by subjecting a wide spectrum of comparable indicators from the Canadian WVS² to an exploratory factor analysis. The findings reported in Table 1 show that Canadians structure their orientations about religion distinctly from their outlooks toward the family and their orientations toward work. Also, moral considerations are structured independently from outlooks toward economic and technological progress and postmodern concerns. In all, the evidence shows signs of at least 19 different value patterns.³

In the religious domain, three different value clusters emerge. One unites orientations on basic outlooks toward religiosity. A second brings together views toward the institutional adequacy of church leadership. And a third encompasses views toward spirituality. Similarly, Canadians’ moral orientations are organized in distinct ways. The moral permissiveness dimension unites reflections on abortion, divorce, homosexuality, prostitution, euthanasia, and suicide. And the civil permissiveness dimension incorporates views on more public matters, such as the justifiability of claiming unentitled government benefits, avoiding a fare on public transport, accepting a bribe, and cheating on taxes.

Orientations toward economic and technological progress divide into three separate value structures. Views toward economic competition and privatization combine to reflect values toward the core principles of market economics. Orientations toward income equality and personal responsibility represent values toward economic fairness, and orientations toward technology development and scientific advancements come together to represent values toward technological and scientific progress.

With respect to the work world, there are at least five different sets of value patterns that appear: traditional workplace conditions; workplace participation; higher level workplace motivations; orientations toward money and work; and orientations toward teaching children about hard work.

With regards to family values, there are three specific value clusters that emerge: orientations toward women and work; orientations toward teaching children independence; and orientations toward single parenting. Likewise, three separate dimensions emerge under the domain of postmodern values: orientations toward environmental protection; orientations toward friends and leisure; and materialist and postmaterialist orientations.

Value Diversity and Support for the First-Past-the-Post Electoral System

The next step in the analysis was to examine the extent to which different social groups on opposing sides of various new and old cleavages differ on the 19 value dimensions identified above. Has the degree of value diversity in Canada increased, decreased, or remained the same over time?

The data summarized in Table 2 begin by looking systematically at the value differences across various old cleavages, such as the religious, ethno-linguistic, regional, and class divides. Overall, the combined evidence indicates that the proportion of significant value discrepancies across various old cleavages is greater (58%) than the proportion of shared values (42%). This implies that on balance, groups on opposing sides of old value divides in Canada have more value differences than similarities.

Moreover, the cross-time evidence shows no signs of these value differences disappearing. On the contrary, there is more consistent evidence of diverging value gaps (64%) across old cleavages than converging gaps (36%). On a majority of the old cleavages tested (9 out of 11, or 81%), the findings show that the number of significant value discrepancies between opposing groups has increased from 1990 to 2000. However, the average size of these significant value discrepancies, in a majority of cases (6 out of 11, or 55%), has declined. Certain old cleavages, therefore, may be somewhat easier to reconcile now than they were in the past. Still, the bulk of the evidence pertaining to value differences across old cleavages shows more signs of value differences and increased divergence than value similarities and convergence.

In addition, the core findings pertaining to various new cleavages indicate that immigrants from traditional source countries share more values in common with native-born Canadians than immigrants from non-traditional source countries. Similarly, males and females in general share more value similarities than differences, but when men are compared to working women, the values gap becomes much more striking. And pre-1945 and post-1960s generations have even fewer values in common than men and working women. On the whole, the combined evidence for social groups on opposing sides of various new cleavages shows more value similarities than differences, however, the cross-time results indicate more signs of value divergence than convergence.

For example, the trends over the 1990s consistently indicate that the number of significant value discrepancies for all the new cleavages for which we have comparable data has increased. In 80% of these cases, the average magnitude of these value gaps has also increased. The bulk of evidence, therefore, suggests that in addition to various old cleavages there also appears to be a broad-based trend toward greater value diversity across various new cleavages.

But does this increase in value diversity pose implications for political support and, more specifically, support for the current electoral system? Increased value diversity in Canada may be making it more difficult for traditional brokerage parties to satisfy the public’s varying interests and issue demands and maintain a broad-based coalition of support. For dissatisfied voters, the alternative is to turn to smaller parties. The current electoral system, however, typically discriminates against minor parties by rewarding them with a disproportionate number of seats relative to their popular vote. Faced with these types of alternatives, it is possible that public support for the current electoral system in Canada may be negatively affected as a result.

In order to examine this possibility, the final phase of this investigation explores whether there is a systematic link between value diversity and support for the current electoral system. The findings reported in Figure 1 test this proposition by analyzing the evidence from 15 different geographic

Table 1
Factor Analysis^a—The Structure of Value Orientations in Canada

Values, Dimensions and Indicators ^b	Factor Load. ^c	Com. ^d	Values, Dimensions and Indicators	Factor Load.	Com.
Religious values			Values toward work		
<i>1. Basic outlooks toward religiosity</i>			<i>9. Workplace conditions</i>		
(V179) Frequency of prayer outside of religious services	.81	.73	(V105) Good hours—important aspect of a job	.71	.55
(V176) Importance of God	.76	.75	(V108) Generous holidays—important aspect of a job	.70	.57
(V177) Derives comfort and strength from religion	.72	.64	(V99) Good pay—important aspect of a job	.59	.43
(V9) Importance of religion in life	.71	.70	(V101) Not too much pressure—important aspect of a job	.54	.42
(V178) Takes moments for prayer, meditation, contemplation	.69	.57	Eigenvalue: 2.01; variance explained: 3.52%; Cronbach's alpha: .6		
(V234) Encouraging children to learn about religious faith	.58	.52	<i>10. Workplace participation</i>		
Eigenvalue: 3.76; variance explained: 6.60%; Cronbach's alpha: .7			(V127) Following instructions at work—must be convinced first		
<i>2. Orientations toward the institutional adequacy of church leadership</i>			(V126) Employees should be involved in decision-making		
(V153) Churches give adequate answers: family problems	.82	.72	Eigenvalue: 1.26; variance explained: 2.21%; Cronbach's alpha: .3		
(V152) Churches give adequate answers: moral problems	.82	.72	<i>11. Workplace motivations</i>		
(V155) Churches give adequate answer: social problems	.73	.61	(V106) Using initiative—important aspect of a job		
(V154) Churches give adequate answers to spiritual needs	.71	.56	(V110) Feeling achievement—important aspect of a job		
Eigenvalue: 2.62; variance explained: 4.59%; Cronbach's alpha: .8			(V113) Using abilities—important aspect of a job		
<i>3. Orientations toward spirituality</i>			(V111) Responsibility—important aspect of a job		
(V167) Belief in life after death	.70	.56	Eigenvalue: 1.83; variance explained: 3.21%; Cronbach's alpha: .6		
(V168) Believe that people have a soul	.68	.57	<i>12. Orientations toward money and work</i>		
(V170) Belief in hell	.64	.58	(V264) Less importance placed on money is a good thing		
(V171) Belief in heaven	.63	.66	(V265) Less importance placed on work is a good thing		
Eigenvalue: 2.12; variance explained: 3.72%; Cronbach's alpha: .7			Eigenvalue: 1.26; variance explained: 2.21%; Cronbach's alpha: .3		
Moral values			<i>13. Orientations toward teaching children about hard work</i>		
<i>4. Moral permissiveness</i>			(V228) Teaching children about hard work is important		
(V309) Abortion is justifiable	.76	.68	(V233) Teaching children about determination is not important		
(V310) Divorce is justifiable	.74	.60	Eigenvalue: 1.14; variance explained: 2.00%; Cronbach's alpha: .2		
(V307) Homosexuality is justifiable	.70	.60	Family values		
(V308) Prostitution is justifiable	.66	.55	<i>14. Orientations toward women and work</i>		
(V312) Euthanasia is justifiable	.64	.50	(V223) Both spouses should contribute to family income		
(V313) Suicide is justifiable	.57	.44	(V218) A working mom can establish relations with kids		
Eigenvalue: 3.47; variance explained: 6.09%; Cronbach's alpha: .8			Eigenvalue: 1.35; variance explained: 2.37%; Cronbach's alpha: .4		

5. Civil permissiveness				15. Orientations toward teaching children independence			
(V296) Claiming unentitled government benefits is justifiable	.81	.68		(V236) Teaching children about obedience is not important	.77	.70	
(V297) Avoiding a fare on public transport is justifiable	.76	.64		(V227) Teaching children about independence is important	.64	.65	
(V306) Accepting a bribe on duty is justifiable	.75	.60		Eigenvalue: 1.28; variance explained: 2.24%; Cronbach's alpha: .4			
(V298) Cheating on taxes is justifiable	.74	.63		16. Orientations toward single parenting			
Eigenvalue: 2.54; variance explained: 4.46%; Cronbach's alpha: .8				(V214) A child needs a home with both parents to be happy	.74	.62	
Values toward economic and technological progress				(V217) Approval of women seeking to be single parents	.55	.48	
6. Orientations toward economic competition and privatization				Eigenvalue: 1.41; variance explained: 2.48%; Cronbach's alpha: .4			
(V254) Competition is good vs. competition is harmful	.79	.66	Postmodern values				
(V251) Private ownership vs. government ownership	.78	.65	17. Orientations toward environmental protection				
Eigenvalue: 1.47; variance explained: 2.59%; Cronbach's alpha: .5				(V13) Increase taxes to prevent environmental pollution	.85	.72	
7. Orientations toward income equality and personal responsibility				(V12) Spend income to prevent environmental pollution	.79	.67	
(V250) Incomes should be made more equal	.78	.66		(V14) Government should reduce environmental pollution	.64	.53	
(V252) People should take more responsibility for themselves	.74	.62		Eigenvalue: 1.84; variance explained: 3.23%; Cronbach's alpha: .7			
Eigenvalue: 1.32; variance explained: 2.31%; Cronbach's alpha: .4				18. Orientations toward friends and leisure			
8. Orientations toward technology and scientific advancements				(V6) Importance of friends	.77	.65	
(V266) More emphasis on technology development is good	.78	.65		(V7) Importance of leisure	.77	.65	
(V271) Scientific advancements will help mankind	.76	.62		Eigenvalue: 1.37; variance explained: 2.40%; Cronbach's alpha: .4			
Eigenvalue: 1.34; variance explained: 2.35%; Cronbach's alpha: .4				19. Materialist/postmaterialist orientations (based on Inglehart's standard 4-item battery)			
				(V260) Second most important aim for the next ten years	.82	.71	
				(V259) Most important aim of the country	.77	.68	
				Eigenvalue: 1.31; variance explained: 2.30%; Cronbach's alpha: .4			

^aThe preceding results are based on a Principal Component Analysis with Varimax rotation.

^bFor exact question wording, see the World Values Questionnaires at: www.worldvaluessurvey.org. The value in parentheses correspond to the variable names on the survey questionnaire.

^cFactor Loadings

^dCommunalities

Source: 1990 and 2000 World Values Surveys (merged).

Table 2
Value Diversity in Canada—Summary of Core Findings and Trends

Cleavage Type	Proportion of Shared Values (dimensions on which the percentage of value differences are statistically insignificant) 2000	Value Gap Trends 1990–2000	Number of Significant Value Gaps 1990–2000	Average Size of Significant Value Gaps 1990–2000
OLD CLEAVAGES:				
1. Religious: Catholic/Protestant	42%	More diverging gaps than converging gaps	Increasing	Increasing
2. Ethno-linguistic: Francophone/Anglophone	21%	More diverging gaps than converging gaps	Increasing	Increasing
3. Regional: Quebec/West	37%	More diverging gaps than converging gaps	Increasing	Increasing
4. Regional: Quebec/Ontario	26%	More diverging gaps than converging gaps	Increasing	Increasing
5. Regional: Quebec/Atlantic	21%	More diverging gaps than converging gaps	Increasing	Decreasing
6. Regional: West/Ontario	84%	More converging gaps than diverging gaps	Decreasing	Decreasing
7. Regional: West/Atlantic	74%	More converging gaps than diverging gaps	Stable	Decreasing
8. Regional: Ontario/Atlantic	53%	More converging gaps than diverging gaps	Increasing	Decreasing
9. Class: Manual/Non-manual	37%	More diverging gaps than converging gaps	Increasing	Decreasing
10. Class: <\$20,000/>\$75,000	42%	More diverging gaps than converging gaps	Increasing	Increasing
11. Class: <Post secondary/Post secondary	26%	More converging gaps than diverging gaps	Increasing	Decreasing
NEW CLEAVAGES:				
12. Immigrants from traditional source countries/ Native-born Canadians	89%	More diverging gaps than converging gaps	Increasing	Increasing
13. Immigrants from non-traditional source countries/ Native-born Canadians	63%	More diverging gaps than converging gaps	Increasing	Increasing
14. Pre-1945 generations/Post-1960s generations	37%	More diverging gaps than converging gaps	Increasing	Increasing
15. Male/Female	63%	More diverging gaps than converging gaps	Increasing	Increasing
16. Males/Working females	47%	More diverging gaps than converging gaps	Increasing	Decreasing

Source: 1990 and 2000 World Values Surveys.


configurations—all of which have differing cleavage structures and differing degrees of value diversity.⁴ The findings are clear: the greater the average degree of value diversity, the more likely people are to indicate that it is “unacceptable” that “under our present system, a party can win a majority of seats without winning a majority of votes.”

Conclusion

The traditional first-past-the-post system in Canada has recently become the focus of increased debate. The preliminary evidence presented in this analysis suggests that the Canadian public’s more recent frustration with their current electoral system may be driven in part by the consequences of societal

change. Evidence based on 19 different value dimensions, covering a variety of value domains, including religious values, moral values, values toward economic and technological progress, values toward work, family values, and postmodern values shows that value diversity in Canada across various new and old cleavages is on the rise. Moreover, there is preliminary evidence to suggest that value diversity may be systematically linked to orientations toward the current electoral system. An examination of a variety of different geographic configurations, each with different cleavage structures and differing degrees of value diversity, suggests that the most value-diverse communities are the most likely to reject the disproportionate consequences of the current electoral system. This research is far from complete, however the results of this initial investigation appear promising.

Figure 1
Support for the first-past-the-post Electoral System by
Value Diversity within Various Value Communities
within Canada



Note: The values for the average degree of value diversity reported above represent the average degree of value diversity per cleavage within each value community.

$$\text{Average degree of value diversity per cleavage within each value community} = \frac{\sum \text{significant value discrepancies per cleavage}}{\text{total number of cleavages examined}}$$

Legend: Atlantic = the provinces of Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and New Brunswick; West = the provinces of British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba; Ontario = the province of Ontario; Quebec = the province of Quebec; Canada = all provinces; Quebec/Atlantic = Quebec and the Atlantic provinces; West/Quebec = the Western provinces and Quebec; Ontario/Quebec = Ontario and Quebec; West/Atlantic = the Western provinces and the Atlantic provinces; West/Ontario = the Western provinces and Ontario; Ontario/Atlantic = Ontario and the Atlantic provinces; ROC-Ontario = rest of Canada, excluding the province of Ontario; ROC-West = rest of Canada, excluding the Western provinces; ROC-Atlantic = rest of Canada, excluding the Atlantic provinces; and ROC-Quebec = rest of Canada, excluding the province of Quebec.

Sources: 1990 and 2000 World Values Surveys and the 2000 Canadian Election Studies.

Notes

* We would like to thank Nicki Doyle for her research assistance and Concordia University for its financial support.

1. In most every aspect, the basic features of the core WVS and the NIS are the same: both surveys contain the same questions, which are listed in the same order, using exactly the same preamble and response metrics. The only differences are that the NIS respondents were given (in addition to either French or English) the choice of having the interview conducted in Cantonese or Mandarin—and they were randomly selected from three major

urban centers—Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal. We would like to thank Neil Nevitte and Citizenship and Immigration Canada for providing us with these data. Please note that the authors remain solely responsible for the interpretation of these data.

2. Since the objective is to eventually probe for value change, the selection of variables was limited to only those indicators that are comparable and measurable over time.

3. There is recurring evidence of these same value clusters when the data are analyzed in different ways—both for different time points as well as for different demographic groups and communities within Canada. Moreover, the evidence shows that religious and moral values typically have more consistent underlying structures than other values.

4. An ideal test would be to examine cleavage structures and variation in degrees of value diversity across actual constituencies or communities. At this stage, however, we do not have sufficient data to conduct such an analysis. In this preliminary probe, therefore, we are somewhat limited in what we can explore.

References

- APSA Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy. 2004. *American Democracy in an Age of Rising Inequality*. Available at: www.apsanet.org/imgtest/taskforcereport.pdf.
- Costa, D. L., and M. E. Kahn. 2003. "Civic Engagement and Community Heterogeneity: An Economist's Perspective." *Perspectives on Politics* 1 (March): 103–11.
- Dalton, R. 2004. *Democratic Challenges Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Easton, D. 1965. *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. New York: Wiley.
- Elkins, D., and R. Simeon. 1980. *Small Worlds: Provinces and Parties in Canadian Political Life*. Toronto: Methuen Publications.
- Hartz, L. 1964. *The Founding of New Societies: Studies in the History of the United States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada, and Australia*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.
- Inglehart, R. 1977. *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- . 1990. *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Societies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- . 1997. *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R., and P. Norris. 2000. "The Developmental Theory of the Gender Gap: Women's and Men's Voting Behavior in Global Perspective." *International Political Science Review* 21: 441–63.
- . 2003. *Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lipset, S. M., and S. Rokkan. 1967. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*. New York: Free Press.
- McRae, K. D. 1964. "The Structure of Canadian History." In *The Founding of New Societies: Studies in the History of the United States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada, and Australia*, ed. L. Hartz. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 219–62.
- Milner, H. 2004. *Steps Toward Making Every Vote Count: Electoral System Reform in Canada and its Provinces*. Toronto: Broadview Press.
- Nevitte, N. 1996. *The Decline of Deference: Canadian Value Change in Cross-National Perspective*. Peterborough: Broadview Press.
- Norris, P., and R. Inglehart. 2003. "Gendering Social Capital: Bowling in Women's Leagues." Prepared for the conference on Gender and Social Capital, St. John's College, University of Manitoba.
- Porter, J. 1965. *The Vertical Mosaic: an Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Putnam, R. 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Rokeach, M. 1968. *Beliefs, Attitudes and Values: A Theory of Organization and Change*. California: Jossey-Bass, Inc.
- Schwartz, M. 1974. *Politics and Territory: The Sociology of Regional Persistence in Canada*. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Sniderman, P., R. Brody, and P. E. Tetlock. 1991. *Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Statistics Canada. 2002a. *2001 Census: Analysis Series. Profile of Languages in Canada: English, French and Many Others*. Catalogue no. 96F0030XIE2001005.
- Statistics Canada. 2003a. *2001 Census: Analysis Series. Canada's Ethnocultural Portrait: The Changing Mosaic*. Catalogue no. 96F0030XIE2001008.
- Statistics Canada. 2003b. *2001 Census: Analysis Series. Education in Canada: Raising the Standard*. Catalogue no. 96F0030XIE2001012.
- Van Deth, J., and E. Scarbrough. 1995. *The Impact of Values*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Verba, S., K. L. Schlozman, and H. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.