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Provincialism, Personalism, and Politics: Campaign Spending and the 2002 U.S. Senate Race in Arkansas

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The explanation for the unprecedented spending in the 2002 Arkansas U.S. Senate race between incumbent Republican Tim Hutchinson and Democrat Mark Pryor lies in the confluence of a set of circumstances inclusive of national, state, and individual-level factors. Nationally of course, the one-seat margin between Democrats and Republicans in the U.S. Senate significantly raised the stakes of any one contest. In Arkansas, the situation was further compounded by an increasingly-competitive partisan environment (at least at the top of the ticket), a vulnerable incumbent, and a high-profile challenger. This “tri-fecta” of national significance, potential partisan competitiveness, and candidate quality resulted in candidate and non-candidate expenditures that devoured previous records for spending in an Arkansas political race. The outcome – an eight point margin for the challenger – was primarily a product of the state’s peculiar blend of provincialism and personalism in politics, but the multi-million dollar air and ground wars were crucial in activating these factors.

With just 2.7 million residents, mostly concentrated in two population centers (Little Rock/Pulaski County and Northwest Arkansas), the state can be characterized as a “cozy” one in which personal relationships remain central to political campaigns.² Demographically, Arkansas’s population is less ethnically diverse than that of most of its southern peers; eighty percent of its residents are white, nearly 16 percent are black, and just over 3 percent are Hispanic or Latino.³ The state is also poorer on the whole than its neighbors. Chronically 49th or 50th in the various indicators of economic well-being, Arkansas recently tied with Mississippi for 2nd in its two-year average poverty rate (17.1%) and bested only West Virginia in its median household income (\$31,932).⁴ But such conditions do not afflict all Arkansans equally. Observers of the state’s development – economically, politically, and culturally – long have noted the invisible line stretching from Texarkana in the southwestern corner to Jonesboro in the Northeast. It is a line that separates the ethnically homogenous, increasingly urban, and – at least recently – more prosperous Ozark region from the more diverse, heavily rural, and largely impoverished Delta.⁵

Arkansas in many ways has remained more stalwartly Democratic than its southern neighbors. The partisan balance of the state legislature still heavily favors Democrats (the House is 70-30), three-quarters of Arkansas adults continue to identify themselves as either Democrats or Independents, and only three Republicans have ascended to the Governor's Mansion since Reconstruction, all—at least at first—under rather peculiar circumstances.⁶ Equally telling is the fact that after Democrat Mike Ross unseated Republican Jay Dickey (the first Republican to serve Arkansas's Fourth Congressional District) in one of the most hotly contested races of 2000, the much-anticipated rematch of 2002 was a dud. The seat was returned firmly to the Democratic column after markedly little outside spending and a 60-40 win for Ross.

Given this lopsided legacy, it should come as little surprise that Tim Hutchinson was the first post-Reconstruction Republican elected to the U.S. Senate from Arkansas, or that he was identified as “vulnerable” by state and national news sources very early in the election cycle. A member of the state House of Representatives from 1985-1993 and of the U.S. House from 1993-1997, Hutchinson had defeated Democrat and then-Attorney General Winston Bryant for retiring Democrat David Pryor's Senate seat by a margin of 53-47 percent in 1996. The race was, by Arkansas standards, rather lackluster and led many to attribute the Republican's win to Bryant's less-than-glittering personality.

Six years later, Hutchinson was faced with a different situation indeed. Asked in late October by a *Washington Post* reporter why he was fighting for his political life, Hutchinson quipped, “How long have you got?” In the incumbent's view, his battle was uphill from the start. “It's a Democratic state,” he said. “I'm a first-term senator. I have an opponent with a very well-known name and very famous father.... We (also) have a soft economy.”⁷ Hutchinson's difficulties were compounded by competing perceptions that he was either too conservative or – allegedly in anticipation of a reelection bid – no longer as conservative as he should be. Congressional Quarterly Weekly's “party unity” ratings for January 2002, for example, showed that Hutchinson's score had dropped to 88% from 98% two years earlier.⁸ His American Conservative Union rating likewise dipped during the same period.⁹

Hutchinson also faced a damaging primary challenge. Despite the active dissuasion efforts of the state's Republican leadership, state representative Jim Bob Duggar officially declared his intention to challenge Hutchinson for the party's nomination in April of 2001.¹⁰ A Christian conservative known chiefly for the size of his family (he had 13 young children at the time of the election with another on the way), Duggar told reporters only that he had been called by God to run. Observers attributed his decision to a more earthly motivator: Hutchinson's much-publicized 1999 divorce and subsequent marriage to a former staff member. As a high-profile Christian conservative in the state, the incumbent anticipated criticism about this aspect of his personal life. In fact, campaign manager Richard Bearden revealed in a post-election interview that Hutchinson's inclination was initially not to run, knowing that it would be a “brutal campaign” for himself and for his new wife. In 1999, when the Senator should have begun thinking about reelection, Bearden continued, he actively avoided coming back to

the state because he “didn’t want to go to the Third District,” home to Arkansas’s largest concentration of Christian conservatives, a group that included Hutchinson himself.¹¹

The divorce would indeed haunt him. When Duggar declared in speeches and interviews throughout the spring of 2002 that he was “not going to talk about the senator’s divorce,” he not only guaranteed it would remain on voters’ minds, but also relieved the Pryor campaign of that onerous, yet irresistible, task.¹² Though Duggar was handily dispatched in the primary by Hutchinson (22 to 78 percent), his most obvious impact as a same-party challenger was predictable. As Hutchinson was forced to move right to appeal to voters in the Republican primary, offering humble apologies and reassurance about his commitment to “family values,” Pryor already was staking out the political middle so critical to general election campaigns.¹³ A second consequence of Duggar’s insurgency, one noted by both Republican and Democratic strategists, was that Duggar’s support in Northwest Arkansas sent a signal to the Pryor campaign. Buoyed by both the soft support for Hutchinson in his own backyard and a respectable performance in the region by a lesser-known conservative Democrat in a November 2001 special congressional election, Pryor supporters were notably more active in the northwestern counties than most pundits expected.¹⁴

A less obvious consequence of Hutchinson’s divorce – beyond the demoralization of his base of Christian conservatives and the primary challenge by Duggar – may have been the energy it gave to progressive voters who might otherwise have been rather tepid in their support for Mark Pryor’s campaign. Bill Clinton supporters in particular were quick to issue a charge of hypocrisy toward the avowed defender of “family values” who had voted to convict Bill Clinton on both articles of impeachment in 1999 (and was the brother of Asa Hutchinson who managed the House impeachment case), and then divorced his wife of nearly 29 years to marry a former member of his staff.¹⁵ The opportunity to retaliate by handing Hutchinson a defeat became a crusade of sorts, one that afforded Pryor more money, time, and enthusiasm than he might otherwise have attracted, especially from liberal voters.¹⁶

Mark Pryor, just 38 when he filed in the race, came to the contest as the anointed heir of a political legacy. Pryor’s father, David Pryor, spent several decades as a high-profile figure in Arkansas politics, including eighteen years in the very Senate seat occupied by Hutchinson. Despite the fact that the younger Pryor had been a state legislator and was elected attorney general by a wide margin in 1998, Republicans tried to paint him early in the race as an undeserving inheritor of the family mantle. In an oft-repeated remark, the executive director of the state Republican Party, Marty Ryall, asserted for example that “Pryor has ridden his daddy’s coattails about as far as he can, and if his last name wasn’t Pryor, he’d be a busboy at a Taco Bell.”¹⁷

Though Pryor’s own people also recognized the utility of David’s reputation for Mark’s candidacy, the son brought his own strengths to the contest.¹⁸ Chiefly, he was ideologically suited to run a campaign geared masterfully toward Arkansas’s moderate-to-conservative majority.¹⁹ Evidence of this disposition was found in Mark’s membership at Little Rock’s Fellowship Bible Church, the state’s largest nondenominational church.

Affiliation with a conservative church added to his credibility with the state's large religious population. He had, according to Hutchinson's campaign manager, "one foot in there with us."²⁰ Finally, Pryor's candidacy was advantaged by the state Democratic Party's decision not to contest Republican John Boozman in the Third Congressional District and, conversely, by Republican challenges in the heavily Democratic First and Fourth Districts. In the first case, the party opted to leave Boozman unchallenged despite the fact that he was only barely an incumbent congressman because, as Hutchinson's Bearden observed, a Democratic candidate would have served only to enliven the district's otherwise-disillusioned Republican voters, hindering Pryor but not producing a district victory. Similarly, the First and Fourth District challengers – who should have been strong contenders as both were former Congressman – shared the potential for increasing Democratic mobilization in the state's already-Pryor-friendly regions.²¹

Still, it didn't hurt that Mark Pryor adopted not only his father's old logo (although supporters were offered a camouflage-patterned option in 2002 in addition to the traditional red/white/blue), but also his motto for public service: "Arkansas Comes First."²² This was no accident, according to Pryor, but was a reflection of a "theory of the race" he and media consultant Karl Struble developed early on. Hutchinson, Pryor said, was too heavily emphasizing "the Republican cause."²³ An effective counter—especially considering Arkansas voters' independent streak—would be to keep his own themes close to home. Speaking to a political science class at the University of Arkansas in March, for example, the challenger insisted that the race should not be about partisan control of the U.S. Senate. Instead, he said, it was about electing a senator "who goes to Washington and works every day for the people of Arkansas."²⁴ Upon officially filing for candidacy he added that he had no plans to invite national Democrats in to boost his party base. "Our plans," he said, "are to talk about Arkansas issues and Arkansas values."²⁵

The Arkansas contest, then, quickly took on an "incumbent v. incumbent" quality (a description Hutchinson himself often used), and a contest that should have favored the incumbent was characterized from the start as too close to call. Though the first poll conducted by the Pryor team revealed that Arkansas voters would support "a moderate Democrat over a conservative Republican" 45-38, polling conducted by the senatorial campaign committees and on behalf of the state's largest newspaper, the *Democrat-Gazette*, repeatedly characterized the race as a "dead heat."²⁶ (The first such reference occurred on April 24 of 2001, the last on election day.) Only one polling source, Opinion Research Associates (based out of Little Rock and contracted by *Democrat-Gazette* competitor Stephens Media Group), consistently reported Pryor to have a sizeable lead. The Stephens poll released on September 25th showing Pryor up by 10 points was of particular importance according to Michael Cook, the executive director of the state Democratic Party. Cook said reports of such a large margin for Pryor just two weeks in advance of the pair's second, and last, debate meant that "Hutchinson was toast in peoples' minds."²⁷ But, by that point, millions had been spent in the state, and the parties and groups who felt invested stayed around to spend millions more, even though, in the words of Hutchinson's campaign manager, "This may have been an impossible race to win."²⁸

The Candidates and Parties on the Air

Because of the primary challenge by Duggar, the Hutchinson campaign was the first out of the blocks in the ad war just after the start of the year. The candidate's past accomplishments in the Senate, especially work on the "No Child Left Behind" education bill, and a message that the election was about "the future," were treated in the spots. The Pryor campaign's first television spot in April (re)introduced voters to the Attorney General. After reviewing Pryor's record, highlighting his relationship with his father, and noting his partisan independence, the ad closed with Pryor raising the plaque from his father's Senate office desk saying "Arkansas Comes First"; it was to be the omnipresent tag line for the Pryor campaign. Subtly emphasizing Pryor's stable homelife, other early Pryor advertisements also featured Pryor's wife, Jill, in speaking roles, including one where she joked that he was "cheap." Pryor's children, his battle with cancer, his religiosity, and his affinity for hunting all humanized the Attorney General and placed him firmly in the mainstream of Arkansas.

Covered on the negative end by party and other noncandidate expenditures,²⁹ both candidates' own advertisements remained distinctly positive. Both spoke directly to the camera in almost all of their ads, a high-tech version of Arkansas's traditional retail politics. According to the state Democratic executive director, Hutchinson ("not the most masculine, tough-guy") was "surprisingly good" in this venue: "The race tightened up when the ads came up of Hutchinson talking to the camera."³⁰ But Hutchinson was not as good in this format as was the eminently likable Pryor. As Hutchinson's campaign manager put it, "Pryor just made himself likable. . . . We're still a personality state, and Mark Pryor has a good personality."³¹ In the closing days, the Pryor campaign went with a rare sixty-second ad that reiterated the personal attributes of the man rather than issues. Indeed, panel survey data demonstrate a consistent rise in Pryor's favorability ratings during the homestretch of the campaign. His five-point advantage on Hutchinson (58 to 53) during the first week of September had increased to twelve (60-48) by election day.³²

Pryor put that personality to use in talking most assertively about issues of importance to seniors, including a spot that opened with Pryor holding two identical "stomach medicine" pills and noting, with controlled anger, the differing prices of the drug in the U.S. and Canada as he talked to seniors around a kitchen table. "The election" according to Hutchinson's campaign manager, "was about prescription drugs and seniors," and Pryor talked consistently and authoritatively on those issues while Hutchinson's performance was variable. When the latter focused his own ads on seniors' issues, for instance, he closed his gap with seniors to just 6 points. But, when he moved to other topics – mixing humanizing ads of his own (featuring his grandson) and ads emphasizing Hutchinson's support for the military and the President – his seniors' deficit ballooned to 21 points. In the end, Bush's popularity and voters' support for him on Iraq and the "war on terror" were less important in Arkansas than Pryor-friendly bread-and-butter issues like prescription drugs (as well as the economy and education). As Hutchinson's manager put it, "Iraq is 3000 miles from here."³³ This was especially true for seniors

because, according to both Bearden and Ryall, “you never buy ‘em, you rent ‘em for a bit.”³⁴

As indicated by the spending data in Table 2.1, candidate spending on TV and radio in the race was essentially even. The Hutchinson campaign spent more early in the year “to assure a solid primary win.”³⁵ In the latter weeks of the campaign, the Pryor fundraising advantage revealed in monthly Federal Election Commission (FEC) reports also showed itself in Arkansas living rooms. That said, the overall expenditures in the campaign were decidedly higher for Hutchinson (\$4.9 million to \$4.4 million), as shown in Table 2.2.³⁶ Spending by the national parties was about even. National Democrats transferred over \$5.6 million to the state party while the NRSC spent \$5.2 million centrally and in transfers to state entities. Although the state and national GOP organizations did outspend their Democratic counterparts on the air, the gap—just over \$600,000—was not insurmountable. Perhaps this was because the Democratic Party bought a much greater number of ads at less expensive airtimes than did the Republicans.

In terms of style and content, the Democratic Party of Arkansas (DPA) – according to most observers – did more with the money they spent. For instance, the early DPA-funded ads made effective use of the “B-roll film” (the excess footage from the campaign’s shots of Pryor) purchased from the campaign in both positive and contrast ads to create a “warm, fuzzy blending” of messages. In contrast, to the frustration of the Hutchinson campaign, the GOP did not use their B-roll film and instead went with decidedly negative ads, often focused on issues not addressed at all in Hutchinson’s spots. Indeed, as National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC) political director Political Director Chris LaCivita said, “We fought like hell...I ran eighteen negative ads. The most negative ads run anywhere in the country.”³⁷ As a result, according to Hutchinson’s campaign manager, “we got tagged with going negative” because of the absence of stylistic message blending.³⁸ Indeed, polling data reveal that the Pryor campaign was perceived as both more “fair” and more “accurate” than its competitor.³⁹

Republican attacks, almost all paid for by the state party through transfers of funds from the national party, were varied. They began with a focus on Pryor’s relationship with so-called “payday lenders” and his tax votes while in the state legislature. The attacks were followed in July with a set of four ads criticizing the contributions Pryor accepted from the “radical” group Council for a Livable World. In response to these attacks, the Pryor campaign launched the first of several “reassurance” ads, this one emphasizing Pryor’s support for President Bush on the War on Terror and for a missile manufactured in the state, and, most importantly, his distinction from “some Democrats.” This response ad also furthered the “Arkansas Comes First” theme. As a result, while Hutchinson maintained a polling advantage on defense related issues, it was not a “decisive” one.⁴⁰

As the fall campaign began, the DPA began a series of ads with the tag line “Washington Has Changed Tim Hutchinson.” In keeping with the practice of mixing up offensive and defensive strategies, the issues in the spots—education, prescription drugs, and Social Security—were also those highlighted by Pryor’s positive ads. This became the second half of the one-two punch for Pryor and the Democrats. The focus on Hutchinson’s

“change” since leaving Arkansas was a way to make the case that Hutchinson was “not one of us.”⁴¹ It also did something more. While the divorce was “off-limits” for the Democrats, the attacks on Hutchinson’s “change” became a double entendre with an eye to the alteration in the senator’s personal life.⁴² Predictably, just as the positive media outreach worked to advance Pryor’s favorability ratings, panel data show that the DPA attacks increased the incumbent’s negatives; by the end of the game, Hutchinson’s negatives actually slightly outpaced his positives in the sample surveyed.⁴³

A significant share of state GOP television attacks during the fall came on hot-button social issues including abortion and guns, pointing to contradictions in Pryor’s record. Though senior advisor Paul Johnson noted that the Pryor team did not respond to several of the ads, they “did respond on guns... We weren’t going to concede to the NRA.”⁴⁴ In the face of multiple Republican Party of Arkansas (RPA) attacks on Pryor’s Second Amendment position, the Pryor campaign quickly went on the air with a hunting spot that expressly reiterated his differentiation from national Democrats on the issue of gun rights. “A lot of what we did during the fall was reassure people we weren’t outside the mainstream of Arkansas values,” said Johnson.⁴⁵ The GOP attacks actually provided the foil for that reassurance.

While television stations around the state were the primary beneficiaries of the 2002 Arkansas race, it is crucial to recognize that radio persists as an important vehicle for campaign communication because of its ability to narrowly target specific demographic groups. Table 2.1 also includes radio spending in Arkansas by or on behalf of Hutchinson and Pryor. Along with talk radio stations, “urban” stations with a heavily African American audience were a focus of this spending. Both sides mixed positive and negative spots on African American radio, including, as discussed below, some of the hardest-edged communication of the campaign.⁴⁶

Interest Groups on the Air

As indicated in Table 2.1, Democratic-allied interest groups spent more than twice as much as Republican-allied groups. Players on both sides agreed that the Pryor-allied interest group communications were also markedly more effective. Pryor’s biggest-spending ally, for example, was a brand new Boston-based 527 organization, the Reform Voter Project (RVP). Though a Pryor strategist said, “I had never even heard of Reform Voter before their ad popped up” in mid-July,⁴⁷ RVP spent just under \$700,000 in Arkansas. “We wanted,” said coordinator David Donnelly, “to make sure we spent our time focusing on a small number of places to be sure we could make a difference rather than spreading ourselves too thin.”⁴⁸ A pro-campaign-finance-reform group, RVP’s efforts consisted mainly of paid media attacks connecting Hutchinson’s campaign contributions with his votes. While some (including candidate Pryor) thought the ads a bit “silly,” DPA director Michael Cook noted that the “South Park”-styled animated ads “stood out.”⁴⁹ The second flurry of RVP ads—run in the closing two weeks of the campaign—linked Hutchinson’s corporate contributions to his votes to “privatize” Social Security; the timing of additional ads on those issues “helped” on that decisive issue.⁵⁰ The single spot run by the National Education Association (NEA), also during the last

two weeks of the race, was similarly effective. Education was consistently mentioned by panel survey respondents as a high-priority issue, so the authoritative NEA voice contrasting the incumbent's education votes with Pryor's decidedly different commitments was a stylishly packaged message that broke through the crowded airwaves.⁵¹

These two groups outspent the two most relevant pro-Hutchinson groups, United Seniors Association and Club for Growth, by nearly \$450,000, as shown in Table 2.1. Moreover, the effectiveness of the Hutchinson-allied groups' efforts was dubious. Club for Growth's primary ad went on the air in late October showing bobble-head dolls of Tom Daschle, Hillary Clinton, and Ted Kennedy. The idea was to unfavorably link the three to Pryor, simultaneously nationalizing the campaign and energizing the Republican base. By that time in the election cycle, however, Pryor's "Arkansas Comes First" message had taken hold. Such communication thus actually furthered the suggestion that Hutchinson and his allies cared more about Washington than Arkansas. Pryor strategist Johnson called the spot "stupid," charging that it completely failed to break through with Arkansas voters.⁵² Even Republican Bearden admitted, "Nobody knows who Tom Daschle is and nobody cares."⁵³ The positive tone of the pharmaceutical industry's United Seniors Association (USA) ads on Hutchinson's support of a prescription drug plan also flopped. Campaign polling data suggest that Pryor's more personalized communication on the issue (one reiterated in mail, as noted below) was able to trump this more detached, traditional ad by USA. In fact, when the USA ads were on the air, Pryor's lead on the issue grew.⁵⁴

In light of the huge outlays by these four organizations, it is somewhat surprising that more groups were not part of the air campaign in Arkansas. Some political operatives suggest that this is because the candidates and parties were able to inundate the relatively inexpensive state media with their own air messages. Though Hutchinson's voting record was ardently opposed by environmental and pro-choice groups, for example, neither element ran issue ads. And, though Hutchinson was identified as one of the League of Conservation Voters' "Dirty Dozen," the group felt Pryor had the race "in hand" and reserved their resources for other races.⁵⁵ And Pryor, who went so far as to reject an endorsement by Voters for Choice during the campaign, was not seen as a reliable ally by pro-choice groups.⁵⁶ The general absence of business groups from the air war is even more striking. While the AFL-CIO did run two well-funded waves of issue advocacy spots, including one on Hutchinson's opposition to ergonomics regulations, Pryor's strategist said, "I had thought they might do more."⁵⁷ While a group calling itself the National Coalition of Ergonomics responded on the radio to the AFL-CIO ad, noting the similarity of Hutchinson's position on the issue to that of Senator Blanche Lincoln (Arkansas's other U.S. Senator and a Democrat), business groups generally stayed away from the Arkansas television airwaves.

To be sure, a bevy of other groups did invest in the state's inexpensive radio airwaves; (some spots were purchased for as little as \$15). This list is also included in Table 2.1. Four radio-only groups—three allied with Hutchinson and one with Pryor—merit further discussion because of their level of activity. The first two—the National Rifle Association (NRA) and the National Right to Life PAC—are long-time participants in

activating crucial components of the GOP base. The former bought heavily on talk radio stations in the state. The latter, as expected, focused its energies on Christian radio. Each combined its narrowcasting with significant ground-war activity. The other two players—the pro-GOP Council for Better Government and the pro-Democratic Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare—were new to the Arkansas scene. Perhaps the most interesting group active in the campaign, Kansas City-based Council for Better Government spent over \$40,000 on “urban” radio stations in the state. The group ran a series of seven radio ads suggesting not only that the Democratic Party was taking African Americans for granted, but also that certain GOP policies benefited the black community. Raising accusations of black voter suppression, some of the ads were exceptionally hard-edged, including an abortion ad that featured this content: “Each year the abortion mills diminish the human capital of our community by another 400,000 souls. The Democrat Party supports these liberal abortion laws that are decimating our people.”⁵⁸ The generally negative and hard-edged tone of these ads raises questions about whether the ultimate goal of the advertising campaign was to promote African American support or suppress turnout in the black community.⁵⁹ Spending by the Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare was far more traditional. In striking synchronicity with the message of the Pryor campaign, the group spent \$17,000 on the radio.

In the end, spending by the candidates, parties, and interest groups was enough to thoroughly saturate the media markets of the state (and to bleed into markets in the bordering states of Tennessee, Louisiana, and Missouri), eating up airtime and driving up prices. One Little Rock television station, for example, and one of the larger radio companies restricted political ad buying to the federal races (required by law); another TV station, the highest rated in the state, extended the purchase privilege to gubernatorial and lieutenant gubernatorial candidates only.⁶⁰ In the final days of the campaign, voters saw two expensive, 30-second prime time spots on Little Rock’s highest-rated station. The Saturday spot was offered for \$10,000; the election-eve spot (during Monday Night Football) for \$25,000.⁶¹ It is worth noting that such limitations on time and money did not just affect Pryor, Hutchinson, and their allies. Other races, including several ballot initiatives, were elbowed out of many media buys, making democracy at the grassroots one victim of the high-dollar U.S. Senate race.

The Ground War: “Team Arkansas” vs. “Our Arkansas Republican Team”

As Hutchinson campaign chief Bearden put it, “Grassroots makes a difference if you’re even.”⁶² While likely not as sharp a gap as in the air war, the Democrats appear to have had a ground-war advantage as well. Rather than relying on individual candidates’ campaigns, 2002 marked the first time Arkansas Democrats instituted an expansive field operation. In early summer 2001, Democratic Party of Arkansas officials approached the DSCC with a plan—budgeted at \$300,000—to develop a sophisticated field operation for the state. The DSCC, Democratic National Committee (DNC), Democratic Governors’ Association, the NEA, and organized labor anted up the money for the operation. It was up and running by Labor Day 2001 (eventually growing into a dozen offices around the state staffed by 75 paid, full-time employees)⁶³ and was supplemented by the fact that the Democrats in contested races became funding partners in the coordinated campaign.⁶⁴

The melding of candidates' mail/phone lists, as well as those of Senator Blanche Lincoln and unchallenged Second District Congressman Vic Snyder, were put to heavy use by the coordinated campaign.⁶⁵

Once the coordinated campaign was in place, the Democratic ticket – under the name “Team Arkansas” – made numerous joint appearances beginning with a Fourth of July bus tour around the annual festivals of northeast Arkansas. The team – ranging in age from 39 to 76 and including an African American male and one woman – provided “a very strong ticket that supported Mark Pryor.”⁶⁶ While the Democratic gubernatorial nominee, state Treasurer Jimmie Lou Fisher, eventually lost, her aggressive attacks against a governor passionately disliked by the Democratic base were widely considered helpful to Pryor. Together with his own missteps (as well as the candidacy of his wife for Secretary of State which “was a brilliant idea for about four and a half minutes”), Fisher muted the enthusiasm of the Republican Governor’s formidable base.⁶⁷ She also raised the enthusiasm of the other team.⁶⁸ Even Pryor strategist Johnson admitted, “Jimmie Lou excited an element of the party that Mark didn’t.”⁶⁹

In contrast to this frenzy of Democratic activity, the state GOP may have become “fat, dumb, and happy” in an era of relative success for the party.⁷⁰ The state Republicans certainly had the basic infrastructure in place for the race, especially an extensive database developed early in 2002 which included the voting history, party, and abortion and gun stances of registered voters across the state.⁷¹ But, the Republican team lacked the early coordinated campaign organization and statewide breadth of the Democratic effort. In addition, the Republican ticket – all white and almost entirely middle-aged males – did not congeal into a team for mutual benefit. Only in October did mailings and handouts appear featuring President Bush and promoting “Our Arkansas Republican Team.” In addition, while President Bush, Vice President Cheney, and other national figures made visits to the state throughout the fall – and panel survey respondents reported being influenced by at least the President to a degree rivaling the candidates and the parties – even these efforts yielded little boost to Hutchinson according to Democratic tracking polls.⁷²

Both state parties employed a similar mixture of recorded and live phoning and mail on behalf of their candidates. Table 2.3 indicates some of the specifics of these ground war efforts. Employing the recorded voices of President Bush and Barbara Bush, among others, the GOP spent about \$100,000 on automated calling on behalf of Hutchinson.⁷³ NRSC officials estimated party spending at \$200,000 on phone calls.⁷⁴ The Democrats used the voices of former President Clinton (in African American precincts), former Arkansas Senators Bumpers and Pryor, and Second District Congressman Vic Snyder (including one controversial call just moments after a local judge ordered the Pulaski County polls stay open an extra two hours because of a shortage of ballots and other irregularities) in their phone campaign.⁷⁵

Between 2.5 and 2.6 million pieces of mail came out of the Democratic Party of Arkansas on behalf of Pryor, most including images from the same B-roll film as in the Pryor television advertisements.⁷⁶ The three pieces with the widest circulation were stylistically

similar with covers stating, “Washington Has Changed Tim Hutchinson,” accompanied by old and new photos of the Senator; inside were specifics of Hutchinson’s votes on key issues, especially those most important to seniors. These mailings, along with others targeted at women voters, focused on Hutchinson votes against funding programs to combat breast cancer and to help children who witness domestic violence. Each piece “made Tim look callous” and meshed nicely with the Democratic Party television message the Party was placing on the voters’ television sets.⁷⁷

On the Republican side, although the state GOP did most of the mailing, the Hutchinson campaign sent more mail than did Pryor’s team, spending about \$200,000 on about 358,000 pieces.⁷⁸ The most widely distributed pieces included a scattering of positive and negative messages and, as was typical of the Republican effort, lacked a unifying theme. President Bush’s photo appeared in three of the party mailings, including one (a version of which was distributed by both the campaign and the party) with a cover showing the President and Senator in a strong embrace. Both sides also employed fairly sophisticated efforts, combining mail and phone, to boost their support through absentee voting. In fact, almost one in four respondents to our panel survey data recalled being asked by a candidate, party, or group to vote absentee.⁷⁹

The most interesting ground-war battles for subsets of voters were those for African American voters and for gun rights advocates. As mentioned previously, the Hutchinson campaign, the GOP, and the Council for Better Government did reach out to African American voters over the radio airwaves. However, no pro-Hutchinson mailing targeted at African Americans appeared. Still, much was spent on the GOP ground effort in the black community. As Bearden revealed, “We had vans running and the whole caboodle.”⁸⁰ The state GOP also spent money on “Democrats for Hutchinson” yard signs that were placed in African American neighborhoods. In all, Republican money was “flowing like water” in the Delta, but with little effect.⁸¹ According to post-election surveys, Hutchinson received the votes of only about one in ten black Arkansans. As Richard Bearden quipped, the Democrats “turned their base out better than we cut into it.”⁸²

In addition to radio advertisements and door-to-door efforts in African American precincts, the DPA targeted six different mailings to 85,000 African American households (accounting for about one-fifth of the total DPA mail).⁸³ One included photos of a 1950s segregationist rally. Another included photos and an appeal from a man with a “90 percent approval rating” among Arkansas African Americans, Bill Clinton.⁸⁴ While, “among the undecided voters, he’s a net negative,” Clinton’s energizing force in the black community of his home state remains remarkable; evidence for which is in the strong crowds that he drew to “Team Arkansas” rallies (including one in Pine Bluff attended by Pryor against his chief strategist’s advice) in the Delta on the closing Sunday of the campaign.⁸⁵ As Richard Bearden, it’s “amazing” to turn out 1000 folks in Forrest City “for anything.”⁸⁶ In the end, Johnson of the Pryor campaign said, “The coordinated campaign made a huge difference. The turnout was higher than anticipated and the coordinated [campaign] gets some credit for that.”⁸⁷

When cohesive in their support for a Republican, gun rights advocates are a group large enough in Arkansas to offset Democratic success in the African American community. While the state GOP mailed one piece on guns, the Republicans counted on allied groups to do the heavy lifting on the issue. The NRA did “the whole works,” including phoning (using the voice of Charlton Heston), a major rally featuring Heston, and mail in what was a priority race for the organization nationally.⁸⁸ The Hunting and Shooting Sports Heritage Foundation also sent mail on behalf of Hutchinson. But, neither organization had “an easy target to shoot at.”⁸⁹ About ten percent of the DPA mail on the Senate race was focused on guns and hunting. Four mailings – which coupled Pryor’s respect for the Second Amendment with his own love of the sport – were sent to a 60,000 household mailing list that had been developed by the party from the hunting and fishing license holders in the state.⁹⁰ This targeted mailing, conjoined with the camouflage-clad Pryor’s television spots, loosened Hutchinson’s hold on the issue.

While both business and labor groups were relatively quiet on the airwaves, both were active on the ground. The NFIB put its “strong grassroots game” to work for Hutchinson, sending a coordinator to Arkansas to work its significant membership, focusing on phoning and mailing.⁹¹ Similar assistance came from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Associated Builders and Contractors, and BIPAC (Business Industry Political Action Committee). The two sides differed on the potency of organized labor in the campaign. While the Republicans argued that organized labor “shipped money and people in” on a scale larger than all of the pro-business groups combined, Democrats contended that, besides their funding of the heightened Democratic coordinated campaign, labor did no more than usual.⁹² But aside from sophisticated mailings by the Carpenters Union and other internal union communications and a fair amount of member contact for Pryor from the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, few signs of organized labor’s work were revealed.

The Christian Right and pro-life forces also engaged on the ground. Voter guides distributed to churches by the Arkansas Family Council, for example, helped make the case that, despite Pryor’s obfuscation on the issue, there was a pro-life/pro-abortion vote to be cast.⁹³ In addition, the National Right to Life PAC sent mail on Hutchinson’s behalf.

In the end, perhaps the biggest disappointment for the Hutchinson forces was the candidate’s poor performance in heavily agricultural east Arkansas. Hutchinson had worked tirelessly for a federal farm bill advantageous to Arkansas farmers and had campaigned hard in the spring and summer in east and northeast Arkansas as well as currying the favor of agricultural groups, including, for example, the Arkansas chapter of the Catfish Producers of America. But, as Bearden noted, “[Hutchinson] had ag groups, but it didn’t translate into counties.”⁹⁴

Conclusion

Two tag lines—“Arkansas Comes First” and “Washington Has Changed Tim Hutchinson”—were the mantras of the winning side in Arkansas’s 2002 Senate race. Both emphasized Arkansas’s provincial tendencies (i.e., that Arkansas is better than the

remainder of the country, especially the nation's capital) and preference for personal relationships with their politicians (one national journalist was struck by the fact that Arkansans consistently refer to both men by their first names).⁹⁵ They also both allude to distinctly personal elements of the campaign (such as Pryor's popular father and benefactor of the first slogan and Hutchinson's problematic divorce). Together, these skillfully choreographed messages allowed Pryor to stay simultaneously positive and parochial ("Arkansas Comes First"), while his allies effectively echoed the parochial and poked subtly at the personal ("Washington Has Changed Tim Hutchinson"). Disadvantaged when it came to his own likeability and with a base troubled by his personal life, Hutchinson allowed Republican Party entities and key groups to make the race a referendum on control of the U.S. Senate and on support for a Republican president. These attempts at nationalization failed to resonate with Arkansas voters. Thus, the spending on behalf of Hutchinson may only have further handicapped a difficult candidacy.

There was a fundamental irony to the Arkansas U.S. Senate race in 2002. The millions of dollars spent in Arkansas in 2002 funded a previously unimaginable volume of campaign material, including an average of three mailings, five radio spots, and twelve television ads per voter in the last week of the campaign.⁹⁶ Most of the money for this deluge came from outside the state's borders, illustrating that twenty-first century Arkansas is intimately linked to the rest of America whether or not its citizens are fully comfortable with that reality. But the outcome of the election—the only defeat of a Republican incumbent Senator in 2002—demonstrates that Arkansas voters remain deeply provincial in their political decisions. They retain a desire to separate and differentiate themselves from non-Arkansas sources from which those dollars came. Such provincialism remains an effective tool for the South's increasingly challenged Democrats.⁹⁷

Table 2.1
The Air War: Most Active Organizations
Collected Ad Buy Data in the Arkansas Senate
and 1st and 4th Congressional District Races

Democratic Allies

Type	Organization	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent	CMAG TV
<i>Candidates</i>	Mark Pryor For U.S. Senate	\$1,672,081	\$9,508	\$1,681,589	\$2,073,019
	Mike Ross for Congress	\$535,500	\$4,397	\$539,897	\$725,571
	Berry for Congress	\$248,550	-	\$248,550	\$130,254
<i>Political Parties</i>	Democratic Party of Arkansas	\$3,243,170	\$80,000	\$3,323,170	\$1,050,845
	DSCC	-	\$20,550	\$20,550	-
<i>Interest Groups</i>	Reform Voter Project	\$672,245	\$9,030	\$681,275	\$213,926
	NEA	\$348,985	-	\$348,985	\$80,129
	AFL-CIO	\$307,148	-	\$307,148	\$61,815
	Nat'l Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare	-	\$17,300	\$17,300	-

Republican Allies

Type	Organization	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent	CMAG TV
<i>Candidates</i>	Hutchinson For Senate	\$1,787,004	\$44,143	\$1,831,147	\$1,169,115
	Jay Dickey for Congress	\$225,240	\$4,030	\$229,270	\$236,149
	Tommy Robinson for Congress	\$39,950	-	\$39,950	-
<i>Political Parties</i>	Republican Party of Arkansas	\$3,977,195	\$7,460	\$3,984,655	\$1,145,739
	RNC	-	\$15,142	\$15,142	\$29,463
	NRSC	-	-	-	\$58,595
<i>Interest Groups</i>	United Seniors Association	\$334,390	-	\$334,390	\$60,664
	Club for Growth	\$254,558	-	\$254,558	\$80,626
	Council for Better Government	-	\$40,800	\$40,800	-
	Nat'l Coalition of Ergonomics	-	\$22,350	\$22,350	-
	Business Roundtable	\$20,890	-	\$20,890	-
	NRA Political Victory Fund	-	\$18,000	\$18,000	-
	Associated Builders and Contractors	\$14,675	-	\$14,675	\$38,650
	National Right to Life	-	\$13,920	\$13,920	-

Nonpartisan

Type	Organization	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent	CMAG TV
<i>Interest Groups</i>	Every Child Matters	\$28,480	\$8,400	\$36,880	-
	Children's Defense Fund	\$7,925	-	\$7,925	-
	AARP	-	\$5,750	\$5,750	-

SOURCE: Data compiled from the *Election Advocacy* database and *CMAG* data.

- Please see Appendix B for a more detailed data explanation.
- Regarding Democratic and Republican Allies, certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal.
- The ad buy data collected for this study may contain extraneous data due to the difficulty in determining the content of the ads. The parties or interest groups that purchased the ad buys possibly ran some ads promoting House or Senatorial candidates or ballot propositions not in the study's sample but still within that media market. Unless the participating academics were able to determine the exact content of the ad buy from the limited information given by the station, the data may contain observations that do not pertain to the study's relevant House or Senate races. For comparison purposes the CMAG data is included in the table.
- The ' - ' for an organization only reflects the absence of collected data, and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.
- Due to the sheer volume of television and radio stations and varying degrees of compliance in providing ad buy information, data on spending by various groups might be incomplete.
- All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better depict the organization's overall activity. For instance, the Arkansas Education Association data have been included in the NEA totals.
- This table is not intended to represent comprehensive organization spending or activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table with Table 2.3.
- Because ad buy content was often non-descriptive and sometimes difficult to distinguish between the different races, data in this table is combined for all races studied in Arkansas.

Table 2.2
Candidate Receipts and Expenditures 2001–2002

Mark Pryor (D) - AR Senate		Tim Hutchinson (R) - AR Senate	
Contributions from PACs	\$843,572	Contributions from PACs	\$1,693,422
Contributions from Individuals	\$3,347,264	Contributions from Individuals	\$2,810,967
Contributions from Party	\$51,573	Contributions from Party	\$92,007
Contributions/loans from the Candidate	\$0	Contributions/loans from the Candidate	\$0
Other Contributions	\$200,299	Other Contributions	\$261,721
Total Receipts	<u>\$4,442,708</u>	Total Receipts	<u>\$4,858,117</u>
Total Expenditures	\$4,365,349	Total Expenditures	\$4,942,828
Cash on hand as of 11/25/2002	\$77,359	Cash on hand as of 11/25/2002	\$147,489

Source: “2001-02 U.S. House and US Senate Candidate Info,” *FECInfo*, 25 November 2002. At <http://www.fecinfo.com/cgi-win/x_statedis.exe>, 13 January 2003.

Hunting and Shooting Sports Heritage Foundation	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2
The Seniors Coalition	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	2
US Chamber of Commerce	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2
America 21	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Arkansas Family Council	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Business Roundtable	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
National Coalition of Ergonomics	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
NFIB ^g	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
National Right to Work Committee	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
United Seniors Association	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1

Nonpartisan

Type	Organization	Email	Mail	News	Person	Phone	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
<i>Interest Groups</i>	Every Child Matters	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	2
	AARP	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
	Children's Defense Fund	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
	Project Vote	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1

SOURCE: Data compiled from the *Election Advocacy* database.

- ^a Paper fan handed out by campaign volunteer.
 - ^b Linda Lipsen, Association of Trial Lawyers of America Senior Director of Public Affairs, telephone interview by David B. Magleby and Quin Monson, 19 December 2002.
 - ^c Ed Coyle, Alliance for Retired Americans Executive Director, telephone interview by David B. Magleby and Quin Monson, 20 December 2002.
 - ^d Water bottle endorsing Mark Pryor that was handed out at campaign event.
 - ^e Glen Caroline, NRA Director of the Institute for Legislative Action Grassroots Division, interview by David B. Magleby, Quin Monson, Jonathan Tanner, Nicole Carlisle, and Stephanie Curtis, Washington, D.C., 14 November 2002.
 - ^f Ned Monroe, Associated Builders and Contractors Director of Political Affairs, interview by Quin Monson and Jonathan Tanner, Washington, D.C., 9 December 2002.
 - ^g Unspecified race involvement. Sharon Wolff, NFIB Director, Campaign Services and PAC, Dennis Whitfield, NFIB Senior Vice President, Political and Media Communications, and Kristen Beaubin, NFIB, interview by David B. Magleby and Quin Monson, Washington D.C., 8 November 2002.
- Please see Appendix B for a more detailed data explanation.
 - Data represent the number of *unique* pieces or ads by the group and do not represent a count of total items sent or made.
 - Regarding Democratic and Republican Allies, certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was anti- or pro- conservative or liberal.
 - This table is not intended to portray comprehensive organization activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table together with Table 2.1.

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- ¹ The authors extend their grateful thanks to research assistants Grant Cox and R. Dallas Elms, Jr. for their invaluable contributions to this project.
- ² Diane D. Blair, "The Big Three of Late Twentieth-Century Arkansas Politics: Dale Bumpers, Bill Clinton, and David Pryor," *Arkansas Historical Quarterly*, no. 54 (spring 1995): 53-79; Alan Fram, "Marital Twists May Hurt Arkansas Senator," *Washington Post*, 19 October 2002, at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A52061-2002Oct19.html, 29 October 2002.
- ³ U.S. Census Bureau, "Census 2000: Arkansas Profile," 23 December 2002, at <http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/c2kprof00-ar.pdf>, August 2002.
- ⁴ Associated Press, "Bleak National Economic News Doesn't Bode Well for Arkansas," *Associated Press State and Local Wire*, 25 September 2002 at http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=07f145ff1831c1dd2350f26f915ce39c&_docnum=2&wchp=dGLbVlb-lSlzV&_md5=d7c770dcf1d35f0dead0813d6eda6bb8, 23 December 2002.
- ⁵ Diane Blair, *Arkansas Politics and Government: Do the People Rule?* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1988); Janine A. Parry and William D. Schreckhise, "Political Culture, Political Attitudes and Aggregated Economic Effects: Regionalism and Political Ideology in Arkansas," *Midsouth Political Science Review*, no. 5 (2001): 61-73.
- ⁶ Diane Blair and Jay Barth, "Arkansas," in *State Party Profiles: A 50-State Guide to Development, Organization, and Resources*, ed. Andrew M. Appleton and Daniel S. Ward (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1997); Janine A. Parry, William D. Schreckhise, and Todd G. Shields, "Rising Republicanism in the Arkansas Electorate? A Consideration of Arkansas' Political Attitudes and Participation Rates," *Midsouth Political Science Review*, no. 5 (2001): 1-19.
- ⁷ Lois Romano, "Hutchinson Struggling to Keep Arkansas Senate Seat for GOP," *Washington Post*, 28 October 2002, at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A28272-2002Oct27.html>, 29 October 2002.
- ⁸ Paul Barton, "Hutchinson Loses 'Most Conservative' Ranking," *Arkansas Democrat-Gazette*, 6 February 2002, A7; Paul Barton, "News in Brief: Washington '01 Hutchinson Votes Drift from GOP Line," *Arkansas Democrat-Gazette*, 15 January 2002, A3.
- ⁹ Paul Barton, "Hutchinson Honed, Humbled by Years Spent in U.S. Senate," *Arkansas Democrat-Gazette*, 17 March 2002, A11.
- ¹⁰ Doug Thompson, "Duggar to Seek Senate Seat Held by Hutchinson, Christian Conservative to Mount Challenge in State GOP Primary," *Arkansas Democrat-Gazette*, 13 April 2001, B1.
- ¹¹ Richard Bearden, Hutchinson for Senate Campaign Manager, interview by Jay Barth, Little Rock, Ark., 13 November 2002.
- ¹² *Ibid.*
- ¹³ Marty Ryall, Republican Party of Arkansas Chair and Executive Director, interview by Janine Parry, Little Rock, Ark., 14 November 2002.
- ¹⁴ Doug Thompson, "Duggar to Seek Senate Seat Held by Hutchinson, Christian Conservative to Mount Challenge in State GOP Primary," *Arkansas Democrat-Gazette*, 13 April 2001, B1.
- ¹⁵ Rowett, Michael, "Poll on Senate race rates divorce's effect," *Arkansas Democrat-Gazette*, 11 November 2002, A1.
- ¹⁶ This argument was proposed by Professor Hal Bass of Ouachita Baptist University at the Annual Meeting of the Arkansas Political Science Association, 22 February 2003, Conway, AR.
- ¹⁷ Doug Thompson, "Mark Pryor to Run for U.S. Senate, Hopes to Oust GOP's Hutchinson," *Arkansas Democrat-Gazette*, 24 April 2001, A1.
- ¹⁸ Paul Johnson, senior advisor, Mark Pryor for Senate campaign, Campaign Senior Advisor, phone interview by Jay Barth, 18 November 2002. Johnson noted dryly in interview that David Pryor was "of some help" in the election.
- ¹⁹ Ryall, interview 14 November 2002.
- ²⁰ Bearden, interview, 13 November 2002.
- ²¹ Bearden, interview, 13 November 2002; Johnson, phone interview, 18 November 2002.
- ²² Thompson, "Mark Pryor to Run for U.S. Senate, Hopes to Oust GOP's Hutchinson," 24 April 2001.
- ²³ Mark Pryor, Democratic candidate, interview by Janine Parry, Little Rock, Ark., 17 December 2002.

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- ²⁴ Laura Kellams, "Senate Race about Arkansas, not Party Control, Pryor Says," *Arkansas Democrat-Gazette*, 27 March 2002, B1.
- ²⁵ Kelly Wiese, "Pryor Files for U.S. Senate, Daniels for Secretary of State," *Associated Press and Local Wire*, 28 March 2002. At <http://0-web.lexis-nexis.com.library.ua...V&_md5=312991c9d176ae3db8f634731cc16ffd>, 4 December 2002. Pryor also declined, very publicly, an invitation to appear on NBC's "Meet the Press" in late August. Said a Pryor spokesman: "Going to Washington, D.C. to make an appearance on a national press show is just not a part of our plan at this time." Associated Press, "Pryor Declines 'Meet the Press' Invitation," *Associated Press and Local Wire*, 30 August 2002. At <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=2f38f2377f21578eb375925ece5a181d&_docnum=62&wchp=dGLbVlb-lSlzV&_md5=29ca78bd7b7832550787eb711d258cb3>, 23 December 2002.
- ²⁶ Johnson, phone interview, 18 November 2002.
- ²⁷ Michael Cook, executive director, Democratic Party of Arkansas, DPA, interview by Jay Barth, 19 November 2002, Little Rock, Ark.
- ²⁸ Bearden, interview, 13 November 2002.
- ²⁹ Ryall, interview, 14 November 2002. Interestingly, voters proved to be fairly adept at identifying the primary source of the campaign's negativity. Many more panel survey respondents placed the blame with interest groups and political parties over the candidates' campaigns when asked about relative responsibility. J. Quin Monson and David B. Magleby, 2002 Election Panel Study [dataset]. Provo, UT: Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy, Brigham Young University [producer and distributor], 2002.
- ³⁰ Cook, interview, 19 November 2002.
- ³¹ Bearden, interview, 13 November 2002.
- ³² Monson and Magleby, 2002. Election Panel Study [dataset], 2002.
- ³³ Bearden, interview, 13 November 2002. Bearden's assessment is supported by our panel survey data. In both open and closed-ended questions about key issues in the campaign, Iraq and defense-related issues ranked very low indeed.
- ³⁴ Ryall, interview, 14 November 2002.
- ³⁵ Bearden, interview, 13 November 2002.
- ³⁶ Michael Rowett, "U.S. Senate Bid Most Expensive in State's Annals," *Arkansas Democrat-Gazette*, 6 December 2002.
- ³⁷ Chris LaCivita, NRSC political director, Political Director, interview by David Magleby, Quin Monson, Jonathan Tanner, and Nicole Carlisle, 7 November 2002, Washington, D.C. These eighteen ads may include ads paid for by the state party with funds transferred from the NRSC.
- ³⁸ Bearden, interview, 13 November 2002.
- ³⁹ Monson and Magleby, 2002 Election Panel Study [dataset]. 2002.
- ⁴⁰ Johnson, interview, 18 November 2002.
- ⁴¹ Cook, interview, 19 November 2002.
- ⁴² Johnson, interview, 18 November 2002.
- ⁴³ Monson and Magleby, 2002 Election Panel Study [dataset], 2002.
- ⁴⁴ Johnson, interview, 18 November 2002.
- ⁴⁵ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁶ The Hutchinson campaign did make some decidedly smaller buys on Spanish-language radio stations in northwest and western Arkansas. Latino voters remain less than one percent of the state's Democratic Party of Arkansas voters. Cook, interview 19 November 2002.
- ⁴⁷ Johnson, phone interview, 18 November 2002.
- ⁴⁸ David Donnelly, Reform Voter Project, phone interview by Janine Parry, 18 November 2002. For detail on RVP's efforts in Arkansas see "Reform Voter Project Memorandum," *Reform Voter Project*, November 25, 2002. At <<http://www.reformvoter.org/RVPsummary.pdf>>, 16 January 2003.
- ⁴⁹ Pryor, interview, 17 December 2002; Cook, interview, 19 November 2002.
- ⁵⁰ Johnson, interview, 18 November 2002.
- ⁵¹ *Ibid.*
- ⁵² *Ibid.*

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- ⁵³ Bearden, interview, 13 November 2002. Bizarrely, Club for Growth made inquiries, but no buy, on the network stations in northwest Arkansas, the part of the state where significant numbers of conservative Republicans who might have responded to such appeals live.
- ⁵⁴ Johnson, interview, 18 November 2002.
- ⁵⁵ Scott Stoermer, Communications Director, and Amy Kurtz, Campaign Director, League of Conservation Voters, interview by David Magleby and Jonathan Tanner, Washington, D.C., 15 November 2002.
- ⁵⁶ Michael Rowett, "Pryor Camp Won't Accept Endorsement," *Arkansas Democrat-Gazette*, 2 October 2002; Kate Michelman, President, and Monica Mills, Political Director, National Abortion Rights Action League, NARAL, phone interview by David Magleby, Quin Monson, and Nicole Carlisle, 19 December 2002.
- ⁵⁷ Johnson, phone interview, 18 November 2002.
- ⁵⁸ Melissa Nelson, "GOP Mounts Radio Effort to Entice Black Voters in LR," *Arkansas Democrat-Gazette*, 11 October 2002.
- ⁵⁹ On this issue, see John B. Judis, "Soft Sell," *The New Republic*, 11 November 2002. Marty Ryall, chairman and executive director of the Republican Party of Arkansas, denied in interview that *the party* (authors' emphasis) had such aims; Ryall, interview, 14 November 2002.
- ⁶⁰ Roby Brock, president of River Rock Communications, River Rock Communications President, phone interview by Jay Barth, 23 December 2002.
- ⁶¹ Johnson, interview, 18 November 2002.
- ⁶² Bearden, interview, 13 November 2002.
- ⁶³ In dramatic contrast, the Democrats' state coordinated campaign for the 2000 campaign (a cycle in which Arkansas's electoral college votes were vigorously contested) opened its single Little Rock office just after Labor Day of 2000. Cook, interview, 19 November 2002.
- ⁶⁴ Congressman Marion Berry of the First District had always resisted such endeavors.
- ⁶⁵ The Democrats' recent trouble in gubernatorial elections likely made the development of such a party-centered operation feasible. As Republican Bearden noted drolly, "not having a governor is the best thing for a political party's organization." Bearden, interview, 13 November 2002.
- ⁶⁶ Cook, interview, 19 November 2002.
- ⁶⁷ Unnamed GOP state party official quoted in David M. Halbinger, "Wedding Ring Is a Millstone in 2 Arkansas Races," *New York Times*, 31 October 2002.
- ⁶⁸ Cook, interview, 19 November 2002.
- ⁶⁹ Johnson, phone interview, 18 November 2002.
- ⁷⁰ Bearden, interview, 13 November 2002.
- ⁷¹ Ryall, interview, 14 November 2002.
- ⁷² Cook, interview, 19 November 2002.
- ⁷³ Ryall, interview, 14 November 2002.
- ⁷⁴ LaCivita, interview 7 November 2002.
- ⁷⁵ Cook, interview, 19 November 2002.
- ⁷⁶ These two numbers were supplied by Michael Cook of the Arkansas Democratic Party and Paul Johnson of the Pryor campaign.
- ⁷⁷ Bearden, interview, 13 November 2002.
- ⁷⁸ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁹ Monson and Magleby, 2002 Election Panel Study [dataset], 2002.
- ⁸⁰ Bearden, interview, 13 November 2002.
- ⁸¹ Ryall, interview, 14 November 2002.
- ⁸¹ Bearden, interview, 13 November 2002.
- ⁸¹ Cook, interview, 19 November 2002.
- ⁸² Bearden, interview, 13 November 2002.
- ⁸³ Cook, interview, 19 November 2002.
- ⁸⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁸⁵ Johnson, phone interview, 18 November 2002.
- ⁸⁶ Bearden, interview, 13 November 2002.
- ⁸⁷ Johnson, interview, 18 November 2002.
- ⁸⁸ Chuck Cunningham, Director of Federal Affairs, Institute for Legislative Action, NRA, interview by David Magleby, Quin Monson, Jonathan Tanner, and Nicole Carlisle, 7 November 2002.

⁸⁹ Bearden, interview, 13 November 2002.

⁹⁰ Cook, interview, 19 November 2002.

⁹¹ Ryall, interview, 14 November 2002.

⁹² Heather Rackley, Budget Director, Republican Party of Arkansas, interview by Janine Parry, 14 November 2002, Little Rock, Ark; Cook, interview, 19 November 2002.

⁹³ Ryall, interview, 14 November 2002.

⁹⁴ Bearden, interview, 13 November 2002.

⁹⁵ Fram, "Marital Twists May Hurt Arkansas Senator," 19 October 2002.

⁹⁶ Monson and Magleby, 2002 Election Panel Study [dataset], 2002.

⁹⁷ Provincialism worked to the South of Arkansas as well. Witness Senator Mary Landrieu's successful use of a near copy of Pryor's winning motto: "We need a senator who will put Louisiana *first*." Michael Crowley, "Sugar Pill," *New Republic*, 23 December 2002, 12-13.