

Appendix B — Methodology

J. Quin Monson and Stephanie Perry Curtis

Case Study Methodology

The methodology employed in this symposium is designed to draw upon multiple sources of information, both quantitative and qualitative, to investigate noncandidate campaign activity in congressional elections. Using a set of case studies that employ multiple methods of data collection, we seek to systematically investigate the causes and consequences of campaign spending “within its real-life context.”¹ We believe this provides the richest, most feasible, and most accurate method of understanding the phenomenon of campaign spending by noncandidate entities in congressional elections.

The research reported here builds on similar projects the Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy organized to study the 1998 and 2000 federal elections. During the 1998 and 2000 elections, colleagues within competitive states or districts monitored thirty-eight congressional contests or presidential primaries.²

The research design for these case studies is based on three assumptions. First, noncandidate campaign activity is most likely to occur in competitive races. In the 2002 study we added numerous noncompetitive races to our study as a control group, in part, to test this assumption. We found overwhelming evidence that very little, if any, outside money is spent in noncompetitive races. Second, because much of noncandidate campaign activity is not disclosed, it is best uncovered and understood by someone with knowledge of the local context. To understand the full impact and reach of noncandidate activity, academics knowledgeable about the competitive race were recruited to carefully monitor each campaign. The academics in each competitive race oversaw the collection of campaign communications including the extent of mail, telephone, and personal contact; they also collected as much information as possible on broadcast advertising. They monitored voter mobilization efforts conducted by candidates, parties, and interest groups. Data on campaign communication in the states/congressional districts were enhanced by a network of informants organized by the local academics. The informants agreed to collect their political mail and keep a record of other campaign activities that they encounter.³ Our third assumption is that political professionals would be willing to be interviewed and discuss their decision making and funding allocation strategies. Elite interviewing in the district/state and in Washington, D.C., helps “connect the dots” of our data collection efforts and helps us better understand the outside money communications strategy. Each case is also enhanced by interviews with informed elites and campaign professionals from the interest groups, political parties, and candidate campaign staff active in the district/state. All interviews were conducted “on the record” and with few exceptions the information from those interviews is fully attributed in this monograph.

Case Selection

The sampling pool of competitive races we monitored was developed based on a combination of lists of competitive races published in the early spring of 2002 by the *Cook Political Report*, the *Rothenberg Political Report*, and *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*. This list was enhanced by conversations with current and former party and interest group professionals, reporters, and other political experts who helped identify contests in which outside money was most likely to be important.⁴ There were eighty potentially competitive races mentioned by at least one of these sources in April 2002. In the final stages of sample selection in the early summer of 2002, we quantified the input from our contacts and published sources by computing an additive score for

each race. Each score was comprised of a combination of the ratings in the published reports together with the likely competitive races named by the Republicans and key allied groups as well those named by the Democrats and key allied groups. Once scored the list was sorted in rank order and divided into quintiles. Twelve of the sixteen races in the top quintile⁵ and six of the sixteen races in the second quintile are included in our sample as well as one from the third quintile. Except for two races, Pennsylvania's Fourth and Sixth Districts, our control races were not included on the full list of potentially competitive districts. While largely based on the potential for a competitive race, the selections took other considerations into account as well. An effort was made to stratify the sample in terms of incumbent and open-seat races and for contests which would permit us to tap into a wide variety of interest group and party strategies. This was done by compiling a short demographic profile of each district as well as listing the races where the experts from a variety of interest groups indicated they or others were likely to become involved. Thus we were able to include races from different geographic locations, others with significant minority populations, and still others where the National Rifle Association (NRA) or unions (to name just two important groups) were likely to become involved. The academics recruited to monitor the contests were selected based on their scholarly reputations and knowledge of state electoral politics.

We added a set of noncompetitive control races in 2002 to test some of the assumptions about where noncandidate money is spent thus establishing a baseline against which to compare the competitive races.⁶ Many of our control races were selected because they are adjacent to the competitive races already sampled. In many cases they share the same media market with the competitive race and thus provide us a chance to compare spending between two races in a similar market, sometimes with constituencies that share similar demographics. We also selected some control races in states that had competitive races in the previous cycle so that we can contrast the role of outside money in the same state or district over time. Our sample of control races in 2002 includes several contests that we previously monitored such as the California Twenty-ninth (formerly the Twenty-seventh), Delaware Senate, Michigan Senate, Montana Senate and At-Large House seat, and Pennsylvania Fourth) and also included some control races that are within the same media markets as competitive races we were otherwise monitoring in 2002 (Arkansas First, Colorado Fourth, Connecticut First, Maryland Fifth, Mississippi Second, New Mexico Senate and Third, North Carolina Ninth, New Hampshire Second, and Utah First and Third). One race which we considered a control race became very competitive, Pennsylvania Sixth.

Elite Interviews

In addition to interviews conducted by academics at the local level we conducted extensive interviews in Washington, D.C. A list of interviews conducted for this study at the national level is found in Appendix C. In some instances, individuals were interviewed multiple times throughout the election cycle. These interviews were expressly "on the record," and the post-election interviews were tape-recorded. Information from the interviews is frequently cited throughout the symposium. Data gathered from these interviews concerning organization involvement in a particular race, were incorporated into their respective case studies. The interviews were also supplemented with materials provided by the interview subjects, analysis of the web sites of the groups we were interviewing, a careful reading of national media, the Hotline, information from email lists of the national party committees, and from activities that had been disclosed to the Federal Election Commission or the Internal Revenue Service. There were a few groups who despite repeated efforts to set up interviews refused our request or were not responsive. In 2002 this list included National Right to Life; United Seniors Association; and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME).

Election Advocacy Database

Each group of academics was responsible for collecting and cataloging campaign-related communications produced and distributed by candidates, political parties, and interest groups in their respective races. They recorded these observations in a database through a password-protected website interface. The data can be divided into two major groups: unique communications observed in various media and ad-buy data collected from television and radio stations.

It is infeasible to gather and quantify the exact breadth and depth of any organization's activity in terms of total number of mailings sent or phone calls made in any given race. However, it is possible to track and estimate an organization's number of unique communication (i.e. how many unique mailers they created for distribution). The academics recorded activity in the following media: mail pieces, television advertisements, radio advertisements, telephone calls, person-to-person contacts, newspaper/magazine advertisements, e-mails, and banner ads on the Internet.

In order to monitor their races, the academics set up reconnaissance networks to help collect unique ads and conducted elite interviews with consultants and party and candidate operatives. Efforts were made by the academics to include people in the reconnaissance network that represented a broad range of groups including: pro-choice/pro-life supporters, labor union members, senior citizens, NRA members, small-business owners, ethnic and racial minorities, environmental activists, and religious group members. We also received help from BYU alumni, local university alumni, students, League of Women Voters, and Common Cause members in our sample.

The academic investigators in our races were data scavengers and were very creative in their data collection efforts. In addition to their reconnaissance network's efforts, the academics joined party and interest group mailing, e-mail, and fax lists. They also scrutinized campaign, party, and interest group websites and analyzed FEC and IRS data for their races. Data from the Election Advocacy database are summarized in each of the respective case studies.

Broadcast Television Data

To gather cost information on television advertising for the case studies we relied upon two complementary sources. First, the academics contacted local network affiliates and cable companies to collect ad-buy information that stations must make available to be in compliance with Federal Communication Commission regulations.⁷ These data were part of the Election Advocacy database discussed above. Second, for contests in our sample within the top one hundred media markets, we also relied on data collected by the Campaign Media Analysis Group (CMAG). Using both of these methods, a more complete picture was drawn of the use of television advertising in the races we monitored. Academic researchers also obtained information on what organizations actually spent in a race from elite interviews. This information was compared with the ad-buy data gathered from stations and the CMAG data, and then incorporated into the case studies.

Ad-Buy Data. Participating academics visited radio and television stations in their races to retrieve ad-buy data (i.e. the number of spots run by a given group and the cost of those spots). Although some stations were unwilling to cooperate in providing data on groups other than candidates, this study constitutes the most complete existing tally of money spent by organizations and parties in the races we sampled.

When complete, seeing the dollar amounts in the actual ad buys of various organizations is better than any estimate. Unlike the CMAG data, the ad-buy data also includes radio stations and cable and television stations outside the largest one hundred media markets. From the ad-buy data gathered in each race, academics can accurately calculate what organizations spent on radio and television advertising.

The ad buys gathered from television and radio stations also have some limitations. It is usually not possible to determine from an ad buy the content of the ads run including whether the ad was pure issue, electioneering, or express advocacy. We are also unable to disaggregate the data for specific races. We can only ascertain how much money was spent by a group at a particular station and how many spots they purchased. We cannot know from the ad-buy data whether ads sponsored by a political party or interest group were run on behalf of one or more candidates. This becomes especially difficult when tracking ad buys made by state party committees in states with more than one competitive race.

The ad-buy data are limited to the stations that our academics researchers were able to visit and which were willing to provide us with the relevant information from their public interest and political files. Stations are required to share ad-buy information on candidates, but not on ads purchased by parties or groups. Also, in some states there are so many television and radio stations that the academics cannot possibly visit them all. In other states the stations are geographically spread out. In these cases there is also the possibility of data entry error on the part of the academic teams.

CMAG Methodology. The CMAG data are gathered using software that recognizes the electronic seams between television programming and advertising. Analysts then code the advertisements into particular categories—by product for commercial clients, by candidate or sponsor for political clients—and tag them with unique digital fingerprints. Thereafter, the system automatically recognizes and logs that particular commercial whenever it airs.⁸ The result is a data set containing a record of individual broadcast ads aired during the election campaign. When the system encounters a new unique sound pattern in a particular commercial spot, it is recorded. CMAG monitors the transmissions of the six national networks (ABC, CBS, NBC, FOX, UPN, and WB) and twenty-six national cable networks (such as CNN, ESPN, and TBS) in the country's top one hundred markets.⁹

In 2002 we coordinated our efforts with Professor Kenneth Goldstein's Wisconsin Advertising Project at the University of Wisconsin, Madison¹⁰ to obtain the CMAG data during the course of the election. Two types of data were provided. First, for each political ad produced and aired, we received a storyboard. Storyboards include a full audio transcript and still shots of every four seconds of video. These storyboards were coded by students at the University of Wisconsin to analyze ad content on a wide range of topics. The second set of data that CMAG monitored are the day-to-day tracking of the political ads in the top one hundred media markets. For each airing of a unique ad, the data include information on the time the spot was aired, the length of the spot, the station the spot aired on, the program the spot aired on, and a cost estimate of a commercial during that time period. This targeting information was merged with the coded content from the storyboards to produce a single, comprehensive database.¹¹ The cost estimates of commercials during specific time periods were calculated based on the time slot, media market, and latest industry spending data as well as CMAG historical data.

Table B.1 provides the list of media markets for which we have obtained the CMAG data for the 2002 election cycle for our sample of competitive races. Combining the CMAG data with the data

we collected directly from stations provided a more comprehensive picture of television advertising for our races.

Table B.1
Media Markets Monitored by CMAG in our Sample Races

Race(s)	Media Market(s)
AR Senate, 1, 4	Little Rock-Pine Bluff, Shreveport LA, Springfield MO, Memphis TN
AZ 1	Phoenix, Albuquerque-Santa Fe NM
CA 29	Los Angeles
CO 1, 7	Denver
CT 1, 5	Hartford-New Haven, New York NY
DE Senate	Philadelphia PA, New York NY
IA Senate, 1, 2, 3, 4	Des Moines-Ames, Omaha-Council Bluffs NE-IA, Cedar Rapids-Waterloo-Dubuque, Quad Cities (Davenport-Rock Island-Moline)
IN 2	Chicago IL, South Bend-Elkhart, Indianapolis
MD 5, 8	Washington DC-Hagerstown, Baltimore
MI Senate	Detroit, Flint-Saginaw-Bay City, Grand Rapids-Kalamazoo-Battle Creek, Toledo OH, South Bend-Elkhart IN
MN Senate, 2	Minneapolis-St. Paul
MO Senate	St. Louis, Kansas City, Springfield, Omaha-Council Bluffs NE-IA, Paducah (Cape Girardeau-Harrisburg-Mt Vernon) KY-IL-TN
MS 2, 3	Memphis TN, Jackson, Baton Rouge LA, New Orleans LA
MT Senate, AL	Denver CO
NC 8, 9	Charlotte, Greensboro-High Point-Winston Salem, Raleigh-Durham (Fayetteville)
NH Senate, 1, 2	Burlington-Plattsburgh, Boston (Manchester) MA, Portland-Auburn ME
NM Senate, 1, 2, 3	Albuquerque-Santa Fe, El Paso TX
PA 4	Pittsburg
PA 6, 17	Harrisburg-Lancaster-Lebanon-York, Philadelphia, Wilkes Barre-Scranton
SD Senate, AL	none
UT 1, 2, 3	Salt Lake City

The CMAG storyboards supplemented academic researcher's efforts to monitor their races by tracking unique ads. The storyboards were useful as a means to identify new ads in each race.

Access to the CMAG data was particularly helpful in our ad-buy data retrieval efforts from stations because it provided a listing of ads run which prompted queries of station advertising managers about ad-buy data for various groups, permitting us to request information from stations on those advertisers.

While the CMAG data are a valuable addition to our study, they are not perfect. The CMAG data are limited to ads run in the top one hundred media markets. In addition to the lack of coverage in small markets (such as South Dakota), occasionally we learned from our academics about ads in the top one hundred markets and on the national networks that were not captured by CMAG. For example, in Table 1.11 in the overview of this symposium, CMAG, for whatever reason, did not record ads from several groups listed in ad-buy data collected by academics.

Because of the substantial volume of ads tracked by their system, there are bound to be some coding or other errors in the CMAG data. A notable difficulty with the CMAG data lies with the use of so-called “cookie cutter” ads, mostly by interest groups. Oftentimes a group will run an identical ad in multiple races and media markets, altering only the final few seconds and mentioning a different candidate in each version. Because of the “fingerprint” technology used to code the ads, these ads were coded in the CMAG data for the race in which they first appeared, and subsequent appearances of a similar ad in a different race were miscoded. In 2002, “cookie cutter” ads were run by the United Seniors Association, the AFL-CIO, the Club for Growth, Business Roundtable and the Sierra Club. The data were checked and cleaned by looking at what markets the ads aired in and then correcting the candidate for whom the ad should have been coded. Sometimes it was obvious which race the ad should have been coded in, but other times it was not. We used our knowledge of the competitive races as well as media accounts and elite interview information to help the Wisconsin Advertising Project accurately recode cookie cutter ads whenever possible.

CMAG’s estimates of the likely cost of an ad aired during a particular time slot also have limitations. CMAG uses a model based on average rates for each media market and not for individual stations. The differences between the cost of an average ad in a particular media market and the actual rate charged by the stations in that market vary according to market share and other unique circumstances. CMAG’s cost estimates typically under-reported actual costs. These estimates also do not include any costs beyond media buys, such as production costs or parameters in which buys were made (i.e. placement lead times, media packages, special negotiations, etc.) and do not include all media markets. In addition these estimates may not accurately reflect the inflated rates that are charged when the market is saturated with political advertising as Election Day nears. Because television stations may reserve the right to preempt advertisements at the last minute and without warning, groups often pay premium prices to ensure that their ad will run during specific time slots. These premiums, not accounted for by CMAG, ensure that an ad will not be preempted by another buyer.¹² This sometimes caused huge discrepancies in the CMAG data and what we gathered from television stations. In the 2002 election cycle, CMAG made some adjustments in their model because of the increase in issue costs.¹³ Many of our academic researchers thought the CMAG frequency data was useful for overall summaries, especially for the groups and parties and for totals by station. When there was a big discrepancy, the academics usually relied upon the ad-buy data they gathered; however, the CMAG data provided quick counts and information about the content and tone that the ad-buy data do not contain.

Explanations for All Tables Using the Election Advocacy Database

The two categories of data gathered by the academic researchers in our sample races are summarized in two types of tables. The ground war and unique ads tables highlight the unique communications observed in various media and the air war tables summarize the ad-buy data collected from television and radio stations and the CMAG data. Each case study chapter has both types of tables for the races involved. Overall summaries of these tables can be found in the overview. These tables summarize the involvement of all candidates and political parties and the most active interest groups in our sample races. Neither the air war or ground war and unique ads tables are intended to represent comprehensive organization spending or activity. Finally, the most complete picture of a party or group can be obtained by examining the air- and ground-war tables together.

The air war tables in the overview and case study chapters summarize the ad-buy data gathered from television and radio stations in our sample races. In the states where CMAG data was

available, these data are also included as a comparison to our television ad-buy data. Due to the sheer volume of television and radio stations in any given race and varying degrees of compliance in providing ad-buy information, data on spending by various groups might be incomplete. Because ad-buy content was often non-descriptive and sometimes difficult to distinguish between different races, the data is typically combined for all races studied in each state.

The ground war and unique ads tables in the overview and case study chapters summarize the unique ads tracked in our sample races. Data in these tables represent the number of unique pieces or ads by a group that we gathered and do not necessarily represent a count of total items sent or made. The overview table combines the counts for all of our sample races. The candidate and party categories have complete counts of what we monitored in our races. However, the interest group categories only summarize the data from the most active organizations in our races.

Allied Interest Groups. Interest groups have been classified as Democratic or Republican Allies or nonpartisan. In many cases, organizations are openly supportive of a certain party, or ideology, and its candidates. Certain organizations, however, publicly maintain neutrality and occasionally support candidates of both parties, such as the National Education Association (NEA) and the National Rifle Association (NRA). Upon further examination of their communications, it was usually possible to categorize the groups as partisan allies based on which candidates they supported or attacked, or whether their communications were anti- or pro- conservative or liberal.

Affiliate Consolidation. Data that are collected from multiple races will contain observations from state-level organizations and their national affiliates. In our sample-wide totals (see Tables 1.10 and 1.11), some state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better depict the organization's overall activity. For instance, the Iowa State Education Association data have been included in the NEA totals.

The Labor category listed in the air war and ground war and unique ads tables consists of all labor groups including the AFL-CIO and affiliates, such as local AFL-CIO chapters, other state labor organizations, and organizations whose election activities are not directly connected with the AFL-CIO, such as AFSCME and the Service Employees International Union.

Survey Methodology

Three Wave Panel Survey

Our 2002 project included for the first time a systematic effort to assess public opinion toward elections and campaigns in contests with substantial candidate, party, and interest group spending. Among the issues we explore with these data are the level of exposure to broadcast, mail, phone, and personal contact; the reaction to the tone and content of the candidate and noncandidate campaign; and overall assessments of disclosure, accountability, and other key dimensions. Panel studies are well suited to our research purposes because the same respondents are reinterviewed at different points in time throughout the campaign permitting us to assess change because of events or stimuli. For each wave of the panel survey we interviewed registered voters in each of four campaigns—Senate races in Arkansas and Missouri, House races in Connecticut's Fifth and Colorado's Seventh Districts, and in a national sample. The national sample provides a baseline of comparison for our four competitive races.

We managed the project and oversaw the data collection. Throughout this study we have closely consulted with a panel of prominent national pollsters who helped in the design of the research,

the selection and wording of questions, and the analysis of the data. To avoid any conflict of interest with our consultants and their work for other clients, the actual data for all three waves of research were not shared with them until after the election on November 5th. The participating pollsters were Linda Divall, Bob Carpenter, and Randall Gutermuth of American Viewpoint; Ed Goas and Brian Tringali of The Tarrance Group; Mark Mellman of the Mellman Group; and Fred Yang of Garin-Hart-Yang Research Group. We commissioned Western Wats Center, a large data collection firm based in Utah, to conduct the actual interviewing. A report summarizing these data was previously released at the National Press Club on November 13, 2002, and at the U.S. Capitol on November 14, 2002.¹⁴

We began interviewing in August in an effort to measure opinion before most election advertising began in earnest. The initial sample for wave one was a Random Digit Dial (RDD) sample generated by GENESYS Sampling Systems using their MOD1 method of generation with the measure of size set to Total Households. Respondents were selected within each household using the next/most recent birthday method of respondent selection. We only completed interviews with selected respondents who said they were registered to vote. Interviewing for the first wave began August 25 and ended September 15. In wave one, we completed interviews with one thousand registered voters in each of the five samples. Second wave interviewing occurred over a two week period from October 14 to 27 and we reinterviewed six hundred of the original respondents in each of the five samples. The third wave interviewing occurred on November 5, 6, and 7— election night and the next two days. We recontacted 500 respondents in the post-election stage, except for the national sample (481) and the Connecticut's Fifth District sample (452). Finally, to check for possible panel effects we added a fresh sample of new respondents that were interviewed in wave three using an abbreviated questionnaire. This fresh sample equaled three hundred in each of the five settings. In the end, these data represent nearly twelve thousand interviews with 6,500 survey respondents.

Campaign Communication Voter Log Survey

We also sought to measure public opinion on intense noncandidate campaigning through a campaign communication log survey by conducting a mixed-mode mail and telephone survey of registered voters in four states: Arkansas, Minnesota, South Dakota, and New Mexico. Respondents were asked to keep a log of their political contact during the three weeks before Election Day. Respondents were also asked to track their political mail, e-mail, phone calls, and personal contacts, including sending their actual mail to us. We contracted with the Social and Economic Sciences Research Center (SESRC) at Washington State University (WSU) for the field work. At WSU Don Dillman, well known in the survey research field for his expertise with mail and mixed-mode survey designs,¹⁵ consulted on the research design of the project and Ashley Grosse managed the implementation of the field work efforts.¹⁶ Our efforts were also inspired by a similar study conducted by Peter D. Hart Research for EMILY's List during the 2000 election cycle in which a group of undecided women voters were recruited to write about their reaction to campaign communications in diaries during the three weeks leading up to the general election.¹⁷

Respondents were contacted six times by telephone or mail in the four week period leading up to Election Day to request their participation, answer questions, and remind them to diligently collect the necessary information. This included an advance letter, a questionnaire packet sent by Priority Mail with a \$5 incentive and an endorsement letter from the League of Women Voters, a supportive telephone call near the beginning of the three-week period, a reminder postcard, a letter during the second week with an additional log booklet and business reply envelope, and a thank you letter that arrived just before the election together with a free pen. After the election,

respondents answered additional survey questions in the log booklet in which they had noted the political communication they received. They provided information on their reactions to the tone and conduct of the campaign, information about group memberships, and answered demographic questions. Two additional telephone calls were made to respondents after the election. The first involved a brief list of additional survey questions especially about their voting decision, early and absentee voting, and influences on their decision to vote or not. A second post-election call was made to ask forgetful respondents to mail back the booklet and other materials. The booklets were returned together with the actual political mail received during the three weeks before Election Day.

Respondents were sampled from lists of registered voters. These were purchased from the Secretaries of State in Minnesota, New Mexico, and South Dakota. Arkansas does not maintain a centralized voter file and so a sample of registered Arkansas voters was purchased from a vendor, Voter Contact Services. Initially we drew a sample of nine hundred in each state.¹⁸ In Minnesota and South Dakota, high-quality voter files combined with the generally cooperative nature of people in the upper-Midwest led to well over five hundred respondents in each state participating by returning the log booklet. The overall number of respondents was lower in New Mexico and especially low in Arkansas, in part because the voter files contained outdated information for many of the names sampled and so the survey materials never reached their destination. The data processing requirements for the large volumes of mail returned to the WSU are labor intensive and are still ongoing. Therefore, data from this survey are reported sparingly and are preliminary estimates only.

Notes

¹ Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2003).

² The 1998 data are summarized in David B. Magleby and Marianne Holt, eds., *Outside Money: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 1998 Congressional Elections* (Provo, UT: Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy, 1999); the 2000 presidential primary data are summarized in David B. Magleby ed., *Getting Inside the Outside Campaign: Issue Advocacy in the 2000 Presidential Primaries* (Provo, UT: Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy, 2000); and the 2000 general election case studies are in David B. Magleby, ed. *Election Advocacy: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2000 Congressional Elections* (Provo, UT: Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy, 2001). Some of the 1998 case studies and expanded analysis of the broader trends in the election can be found in David B. Magleby, ed., *Outside Money: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 1998 Congressional Elections* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000). Expanded versions of the 2000 presidential primary and general election case studies were part of an electronic symposium published by the American Political Science Association in David B. Magleby, ed., "The e-Symposium: Outside Money in the 2000 Presidential Primaries and Congressional General Elections," *PS: Political Science and Politics*, June 2001. At <<http://www.apsanet.org/ps/june01/>>. This was followed by a book with expanded analysis of competitive congressional contests in 2000 with selected case studies; see David B. Magleby, ed., *The Other Campaign: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2000 Congressional Elections* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003).

³ We gratefully acknowledge the participation in this data collection effort of local members of the League of Women Voters and Common Cause as well as many others recruited by the local academics.

⁴ We acknowledge the assistance of Karen Ackerman, Matt Angle, Damon Ansell, Bob Bennenson, Ed Brookover, Bernadette Budde, Martin Burns, Charlie Cook, Chuck Cunningham, Mike McElwain, Greg Giroux, Andy Grossman, John Guzik, Tom Hofeller, Chris LaCivita, Mike Matthews, Bill Miller, Stuart Rothenberg, Scott Stoermer, Deanna White, Derrick Willis, and Sharon Wolff.

⁵ Those in the top quintile that were not sampled include the Alabama Third District, Kentucky Third District, Ohio Third District, and West Virginia Third District.

⁶ We are especially indebted to Janet Box-Steffensmeier, Richard Fenno, and other panel participants who provided feedback on our methodology as part of a panel titled, “Getting Inside the Outside Campaign: Using Collaborative Fieldwork to Study Soft Money and Issue Advocacy” at the 2002 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.

⁷ Sherrie Marshall and Trevor Potter, *What You Need to Know about Political Advertising: A Practical Guide for Candidates and Citizens to Enforcing Broadcast Rights and Obligations*, (Washington, D.C.: Campaign and Media Legal Center, 2002)

⁸ The technology was originally developed by the United States Navy to track Soviet naval vessels, primarily submarines, during the Cold War. It did so by measuring and cataloguing the unique sound patterns of the propellers and screws of Soviet warships.

⁹ For a more complete explanation of CMAG data, see <<http://www.politicsonline.com>> and Craig B. Holman and Luke P. McLoughlin, *Buying Time 2000: Television Advertising in the 2000 Federal Elections* (New York: Brennan Center for Justice, 2001). Although there are more than two hundred media markets in the United States, over eighty percent of the population lives in the top one hundred markets.

¹⁰ See the Wisconsin Advertising Project at <<http://polisci.wisc.edu/tvadvertising/>>.

¹¹ Ken Goldstein and Paul Freedman, *Lessons Learned: Campaign Advertising in the 2000 Elections*, (Political Communication, 19:5-28, 2002)

¹² Holman and McLoughlin, 20.

¹³ Evan Tracey, Campaign Media Analysis Group, President, Personal e-mail communication to Stephanie Curtis, 27 February 2003.

¹⁴ David B. Magleby and J. Quin Monson, “Campaign 2002: ‘The Perfect Storm,’” *Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy*, 13 November 2002. Also available at <<http://csed.byu.edu>>.

¹⁵ Don A. Dillman, *Mail and Internet Surveys: The Tailored Design Method*, 2nd ed., (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2000).

¹⁶ We are also indebted to Paul Lavrakas of Nielson Media Research for his advice on our research design. Our effort to have respondents keep a log of their political contacts is similar to the diary methodology used by Nielson Media Research to gather data on household television viewing habits.

¹⁷ “The Women Voters’ Journal Project,” Memorandum to Democratic Leaders and Interested Parties from EMILY’s List and Peter D. Hart Research and Associates, 12 March 2001, personal communication to Quin Monson from Sheila O’Connell, EMILY’s List Political Director, 17 January 2003. Since our methodology was significantly different from the EMILY’s List study, we conducted a full pilot test in the South Dakota primary election in June 2002 to ensure that the proposed methodology would work. It worked very well, and the same methodology used in the pilot study was only adjusted slightly for the general election.

¹⁸ In Minnesota and South Dakota the voter files contained voting information from prior elections. In order to maximize the number of respondents who would be contacted by political campaigns, we stratified the sample by those who had participated in a midterm election from 1994 forward. They were then over-sampled at a higher rate compared to the rest of the sample. A similar procedure was followed by Voter Contact Services with the file that they provided. New Mexico does not include prior vote in their voter file, thus we did not over-sample recent midterm voters. In the end, a very small number of respondents from the non midterm voter group actually participated. This hampered efforts to weight the data to back to the voter file proportions.