Recipient: Christopher Berry, Harvard University

Dissertation: "Imperfect Union: Fiscal Externalities in Multi-Level Governments."

Dissertation Chair: Mark Hansen, University of Chicago

Citation: This dissertation begins with a very interesting empirical observation, which is that although the Tiebout model of horizontal competition dominates scholarly thinking about the political economy of local government, in fact territorially overlapping jurisdictions in America have proliferated over the last half-century, leading to a great deal of vertical competition and related common pool resource problems. Recognizing the realities of horizontal intergovernmental relations, Berry deals with the vertical competition introduced by overlapping governmental units as they compete for the same tax base. In particular, he develops quantitative models of the impact of institutional changes (The proliferation of local special districts as competitors in the tax "market place,") demonstrating upward trends, i.e. higher aggregate taxes.

Dr. Berry presents a formal model of taxation incorporating overlapping local government jurisdictions, and then an empirical analysis of taxation and spending in US counties, which shows a positive relationship between jurisdictional overlap and the size of the local public sector. Finally, he analyzes parties as a way of institutionalizing and governing the local fiscal commons, so as to avert a "tragedy of the commons."

After demonstration of each component of the main model, the alternative explanations of endogeniety, differential service levels, and economies of scale are explored and factored in. The choice of political party as a common pool mediator does demonstrate effects on mitigating the prisoner's dilemma.

The primary strength of this thesis is the innovative and parsimonious idea in considering vertical as opposed to horizontal competition only. It is a very focused analysis, methodologically smooth, and supported by adequate empirical analysis.