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The Framers of the U.S. Constitution created a compound republic by delegating broad regulatory and tax powers to Congress and reserving powers not prohibited to the states ensured both a fluid federal system and the ability to manage local challenges with local solutions. But these lines are not hard-drawn. The July PS symposium -- brought together by guest editor Joseph F. Zimmerman and containing essays by Timothy J. Conlan and Robert L. Dudley, Paul Teske, and Paul L. Posner -- studies the expanded congressioinal use of preemption powers to remove regulatory powers from the states and the occasional congressional devolution of one of its powers to the states. The articles reveal the current inadequacies of the theories of dual and cooperative federalism and the need for a broader theory. The Nature and Political Significance of Preemption--Introduction Janus-Faced Federalism: State Sovereignty and Federal Preemption in the Rehnquist Court Checks, Balances, and Thresholds: State Regulatory Re-enforcement and Federal Preemption The Politics of Preemption: Prospects for the States Congressional Preemption: Removal of State Regulatory Powers These archives contain selected articles for public view from the APSA journals American Political Science Review, PS: Political Science & Politics, and Perspectives on Politics. APSA journals are fully accessible online to APSA members and institutional subscribers. For details, consult the membership pages of this site or information provided by your institution. To view only the table of contents or abstracts from this or any of APSA's journals, please go our publisher's website: Cambridge University Press (http://journals.cambridge.org). These articles may be used for personal, non-commercial, or limited classroom use. For permissions for all other uses of this article please contact Cambridge University Press at permissions@cup.org.
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