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Current Research
The 2005 British Election Study (BES) is being conducted by the authors of this article. A related study by the authors nests the BES surveys in a series of 48 consecutive monthly surveys on the dynamics of party support in Britain.
BES Link: http://www.essex.ac.uk/bes/
Recent Publications on British Elections
Harold D. Clarke, David Sanders, Marianne C. Stewart, and Paul Whiteley. Political Choice in Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
David Denver. Elections and Voters in Britain. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
Andrew P. Geddes and Jonathan Tonge, eds. Labour's Second Landslide: The British General Election 2001. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002.
David Butler. The British General Election of 2001. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.
Anthony King. Britain at the Polls, 2001. Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 2002.
Anthony Heath, Roger M. Jowell, and John K. Curtice. The Rise of New Labour: Party Policies and Voter Choices. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Pippa Norris, ed. Britain Votes 2001. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
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Article by Harold Clarke, David Sanders, Marianne Stewart, Paul Whiteley
The 2005 British general election was held on May 5th. The election pitted the governing Labour Party against two principal rivals, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, and several minor parties. In the run-up to the preceding (2001) general election, Labour was in a strong position-- the economy was robust, pluralities of voters were Labour party identifiers and favored Labour on key issues, and the party leader, Tony Blair, was viewed as having a massive "competence edge" over his rivals. Four years later, Labour's popularity had declined substantially, and the British Election Study (see box) and public opinion polls showed that the opposition Conservatives had a slight lead over Labour (36.6% to 35.0%) when the campaign began. Although Labour remained the favorite, there was a real possibility of a "Tory trend," and that Mr. Blair and his colleagues might lose their parliamentary majority.
There were two principal reasons why Labour's prospects for a third consecutive victory were not assured. First, the issue mix had changed since 2001. "9/11" and subsequent terrorist incidents had spotlighted the issue of immigration. Many British voters view immigration, crime, and terrorism as a complex of inter-related problems. The Conservatives worked to exploit this linkage by making immigration a focal point of their 2005 campaign. They charged that increased crime and terrorist threats were direct results of an uncontrolled flood of undesirable aliens, and that Labour had failed to safeguard the country's borders. The salience of the crime-immigration-terrorism issue complex reduced the impact of issues such as public service delivery and the state of the economy--which worked in Labour's favor.
A second reason why Labour's prospects were more problematic than before concerns changes in their leader's image. Before the invasion of Iraq, Tony Blair strongly endorsed the commitment of British troops. He echoed President Bush's rationale for the war, arguing that Saddam Hussein possessed, and intended to use, weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The issue deeply divided the electorate and the party. Labour's left-wing strongly opposed the conflict, and prominent cabinet ministers and party activists came out against it. The subsequent failure to find WMD's and the widely publicized suicide of British weapons expert, David Kelly, turned public opinion firmly against the war. Blair's image was severely tarnished, with critics branding him as the lying lapdog of a warmongering American president.
Although important, Labour's negatives were not the whole story of the 2005 election. A plurality of the electorate continued to identify with the party. Sizable numbers of voters were still concerned about classic valence issues such as health care and education, and many were convinced that Labour would do the best job in providing these and other cherished public services. In addition, Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown was very popular and widely seen as the architect of the sustained economic growth that enabled Labour to pump large sums into the public sector. And, although Tony Blair was heartily disliked by many, his chief rival, Conservative Leader Michael Howard, was even less popular. Moreover, despite his perceived faults, a substantial plurality still believed that Blair remained the best choice to be prime minister.
Finally, Labour had an "ace in the hole" in the form of its electoral system. Given the geographical distribution of party support, Britain's single-member plurality system was guaranteed to work in Labour's favor. Indeed, Labour's national vote share could fall to 35%, or perhaps slightly lower, and the party could still win a parliamentary majority.
This mix of forces at work clearly indicated that the 2005 election would be a closer call than 2001. In the event it was. As election day approached, it became obvious that the Conservatives' negative campaign was not working; the party was trending downward in the polls, and the Liberal Democrats were moving smartly upward. Most important, Labour had regained the lead, with all the election-eve polls showing the party having 35% to 38% vote share. This was hardly impressive, but it was enough.
On election day, voter turnout was low: less than one percent above the dismal 59.4% recorded in 2001. However, when the ballots were counted Labour had captured 35.2% of the vote, with the Conservative and Liberal Democrat shares being 32.3% and 22.0%, respectively. Filtered through the heavily biased electoral system, these numbers translated into 355 parliamentary seats for Labour, 197 for the Conservatives, 62 for the Liberal Democrats, and 28 for various other parties. Labour thus remained in office with a much reduced, but working, majority of 66 seats. Speaking after the election results were announced, Prime Minister Blair remarked that he had heard what the voters were saying. How he interprets the message of the 2005 election and what it will mean for government policy over the next four years remains to be seen.
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The Authors
David Sanders (sanders@essex.ac.uk) is a Professor of Government at the University of Essex, where he has taught politics since 1975. He is author of numerous books and articles on various aspects of UK politics. He has been joint editor of the British Journal of Political Science since 1990.
Paul Whiteley (whiteley@essex.ac.uk) is a Professor of Government at the University of Essex and Director of the ESRC Democracy and Participation Programme. He has extensive experience in survey design, most recently involving the ESRC Citizen Audit surveys.
Harold Clarke (hclarke@utdallas.edu) is Ashbel Smith Professor, School of Social Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas, and Adjunct Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex. He has been a principal investigator on several national survey research projects in Canada including Canadian national election studies and the Political Support in Canada studies. In collaboration with David Sanders, Marianne Stewart and Paul Whiteley, he is currently conducting monthly public opinion surveys on public service delivery and the dynamics of party support in Britain. He also is collaborating with Allan Kornberg and Tom Scotto of Duke University on a national study of party support in the 2004 Canadian federal election.
Marianne Stewart (mstewart@utdallas.edu) is Professor at the School of Social Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas. She has participated in several major survey research projects in Canada and Great Britain. Sanders, Clarke and Stewart are also collaborating on a 4-year project, funded by ESRC, to collect monthly survey data on British voters' attitudes towards democracy and their preparedness to engage in various forms of political activity.
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