THE DOUBLE BIND:
THE POLITICS OF RACIAL & CLASS INEQUALITIES IN THE AMERICAS

Report of the APSA Task Force on Racial and Class Inequalities in the Americas

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This report summarizes the work of the American Political Science Association’s Presidential Task Force on Racial and Class Inequalities in the Americas. The main goal of the task force was to investigate the relationship between race and class in producing material, political, and social inequalities in the nations of the Americas. The task force also examined how the political systems in these countries work to foment and/or ameliorate inequalities that track with ethnic and racial identities and socioeconomic status.

Clearly, enormous diversity exists among the 55 nations of the Americas (see Appendix I). At the same time, a sizable majority of these nations share features that make them ripe for comparative analyses along the dimensions of inquiry suggested here: inequality, particularly as it relates to race and class. All of these nations were founded on a history of European imperialism and settler colonialism that ravaged indigenous populations beginning in the fifteenth century (Jennings 1975; Todorov 1984). The majority of these nations also participated in the transatlantic slave trade that brought upwards of 12 million Africans to the western hemisphere between 1525 and 1866 (Eltis 2000; Eltis and Richardson 2010). Both the early economic growth of these nations and the expansion of their European populations through immigration are traceable to their participation in the transatlantic slave trade and the exploitation of African labor during their colonial eras (Drescher 1977; Eltis 1987; Williams 1944). At some point in their histories, almost all of the nations of the Americas have used ethnic and racial differences and/or socioeconomic status to confer citizenship rights on an unequal basis (Andrews 2004; Telles et al. 2014). By the end of the twentieth century, nearly all of these nations had experienced some form of democratic transition that, in name at least, institutionalized the principle of equal citizenship. At the same time, many nations in the hemisphere had implemented various types of social welfare and poverty-reduction programs, as well as (in some cases) public policies aimed at reducing racial and ethnic disparities. Despite these changes in conferring citizenship status and legal rights, widespread disparities remain on most indicators of socioeconomic wellbeing, service provision, basic safety, and political influence along racial, ethnic, and class lines. The chapters in this report document these gaps and explore the causes of their persistence.

The work of the task force unfolded in a period in which political science has begun to pay greater attention to the causes and consequences of various forms of inequality (Bartels 2009; Chalmers et al. 2003; Gilens 2013; Jacobs and Skocpol 2005). To some extent, political science has lagged behind cognate fields of history, economics, and sociology in terms of scholarly attentiveness to inequality. The recent literature on inequality in political science, however, has focused almost exclusively on rising income inequality and how it affects political representation. The long-standing gaps in the life chances of whites and communities of color in the nations of the Americas have been largely unexplored. At the same time, in Latin America, which had long denied the existence of a relationship between race and ethnicity and class disparities, there has been an explosion in data-gathering on race and ethnicity and in particular on the relationship between race and inequality (see, for example, Telles et al. 2014). The chapters developed by the task force members have explicitly sought to grapple with both the problem of rising socioeconomic inequality and the multifaceted racial gaps that exist throughout the Americas. Moreover, most of the chapters examine the ways in which race and class inequalities are epiphenomena of politics. Thus, the chapters are organized around several core concepts and theoretical insights that animate research programs in political science—e.g., the role of institutions; the mobilizing power of group memberships; party politics; and social movements.

The chapters in this report make several contributions to our understanding of racial and class inequalities in the Americas. First, the contributors share a broad agreement that the class and race inequalities that persist in the Americas are deeply rooted historically. They also agree that racial and class inequalities in the hemisphere are typically mutually constitutive. In other words, the disparities in the socioeconomic indicators that governments and social scientists often use to evaluate the life chances of
individuals—e.g., income, wealth, and access to basic services—tend to map onto racially demarcated group boundaries in the Americas. The contributors also demonstrate that a multiplicity of strategies to combat racial and class inequalities have emerged in the Americas over the past 30 years and achieved varying degrees of success. In short, no regional model for combating race and class inequalities rivals the regional pacts on trade and clean energy that many of these nations began to embrace in the early 2000s. In addition, many of the contributors identify important gaps in the way political science has traditionally approached the study of these questions. In particular, some of the task force contributors suggest that analyses of inequality in political science focus only on certain dimensions of state action (such as political behavior or voting) while ignoring others where the bulk of citizens, particularly communities of color, experience key disparities shaped by race and class, such as the welfare state, the criminal justice system, and the provision of public goods and services. Many of the contributors also raise questions about the type of data that is available on racial and class disparities, which varies significantly across the Americas, and which shapes the kinds of questions scholars are able to answer.

THE STATE, RACIAL CLASSIFICATION, AND SOCIAL WELFARE

The important role played by states in shaping political and economic life in modern nations has come into greater focus within political science since the middle decades of the twentieth century (Geddes 1994; Simon 1965; Evans et al. 1985). For scholars interested in the study of the relationship between politics and the socioeconomic and racial inequalities that exist in the Americas, two dimensions of state action have garnered considerable attention in the literature. First, the role that administrative states play in sorting human beings into categories for the distribution of citizenship rights, governmental benefits, and labor market opportunities is pivotal (Katznelson 2005; Kim 1999; Lieberman 2001; Marx 1998; Omi and Winant 1994; Smith 1997; Williams 2003). The second dimension is the overall design and performance of the welfare programs aimed at reducing inequalities (Esping-Andersen 1990; Hacker 2002; Hacker 2008). The task force members devote serious consideration to both of these issues.

There was broad consensus within the task force that the ethnoracial hierarchies established in the colonial eras of most of these nations—which privileged those of European descent over indigenous populations, African slaves, and nonwhite immigrants—continue to cast a long shadow over the life chances of people of color in the western hemisphere. For example, Guillermo Trejo’s and Melina Altamirano’s chapter, “The Mexican Color Hierarchy: How Race and Skin Tone Still Define Life Chances 200 Years after Independence,” shows that indigenous populations and mestizos with indigenous phenotypical features continue to experience the harshest levels of social and economic discrimination in Mexico. Trejo’s and Altamirano’s findings are sobering because they show that dark-brown Mexicans with indigenous features systematically report to have less access to private and public goods and services than white Mexicans and that these forms of discrimination persist at all levels of education and income. Michael Dawson’s and Megan Francis’s chapter, “Black Blues: The Persistence of Racialized Economic Inequality in Black Communities,” also draws a bright yellow line connecting the socioeconomic inequalities and depredations that African Americans experience in the “Age of Obama” to their historical status as a subordinate group in America’s racial hierarchy. Thus, as scholars of wealth acquisition and educational attainment in economics have highlighted recently (Oliver and Shapiro 2006; Shapiro 2003), intergenerational effects undoubtedly play some role in structuring the inequalities experienced by ethnoracial minorities in the Americas.
Jane Junn and Taeku Lee explore the ways in which Asian Americans continue to suffer from racist constructions of their panethnic and subgroup identities in their chapter, “Asians in the Americas.” They discuss how the social meanings attached to the category “Asian” have shifted in the United States from a designation that foreclosed opportunities for full citizenship to a valorized position of a “model minority” within the racial order. Despite this valorization, Junn and Lee point out that Asian Americans continue to face discrimination and underrepresentation in a number of fields in American life. These empirical realities debunk arguments that portray racial gaps between whites and people of color in the United States as simply epiphenomena of socioeconomic status. Finally, Junn and Lee show how the “model minority” narrative obscures the rampant inequalities that exist between different ethnic subgroups.

Task force members, however, are less certain about the extent to which these modern inequalities are the path-dependent effects of the establishment of racial classifications and hierarchies in the founding moments of the 55 nations. Evidence from the United States—which had the most well-developed and punitive legal regimes governing group position in the Americas—clearly illustrates that race over-determined class status for the groups clustered at the bottom of the social hierarchy until at least the middle of the twentieth century (Allen and Farley 1986; Willie 1978; Willie 1989; Wilson 1978, 1–62). By contrast, racial categorization was more fluid in Latin America, even as racial hierarchies continued to exist (Hernández 2012; Telles 2004; Wade 1997). The literature on Latin America suggests that even during the height of the slave system in nations like Brazil and Colombia, opportunities for class mobility, while extremely difficult, were not completely restricted (Andrews 2004; de la Fuente 2001).

Nonetheless, as Mara Loveman’s chapter, “New Data, New Knowledge, New Politics: Race, Color, and Class Inequality in Latin America,” describes, newly available data reveal clear evidence of racial, ethnic, and color stratification throughout Latin America today. In many countries in the region, the very existence of these data represents a major political development, breaking with decades of official refusals to collect ethnic or racial statistics in national surveys. Social scientists are using these new data to produce a steady stream of research documenting significant inequalities by race and color. The new data are not only producing new knowledge; they are also producing new sites and stakes of political struggle over recognition, rights, and redress.

Mala Htun’s chapter, “Emergence of an Organized Politics of Race in Latin America,” raises concerns about the new politics of race in Latin America. She discusses potential unintended consequences of the push by Afro-descendant and indigenous groups in Brazil and Colombia to force the state to recognize (and affirmatively redress, via targeted policies) the connections between the material inequalities that shape their daily lives in the present, and the ethnoracial hierarchies that were constructed in the colonial and post-independence eras. For both Htun and Loveman, these moves portend the rise of white backlash movements in these countries and threaten important race-neutral efforts to address poverty that have recently swept through Latin America (Hall 2006; Lomeli 2008; Soares et al. 2010). We revisit the question of the extent to which the emergence of a racialized politics in Latin America foments or alleviates inequalities when we discuss Tianna Paschel’s chapter, “Beyond Race or Class: Entangled Inequalities in Latin America,” on the black consciousness movements in Brazil and Colombia in subsequent sections of this report. Given the historical trajectory of welfare states in the western hemisphere, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the rise of white backlash politics in Latin America might lead to retrenchments in the region’s welfare states. After all, scholars of American politics have long pointed to the ways in which white backlash movements have generated incentives for politicians to attack the modern welfare state (Hancock 2004; Neubeck and Cazenave 2001; Quadagno 1994; Soss et al. 2001).

Comparative scholarship on inequality has also highlighted the importance of the overall design and performance of welfare states in their roles as vehicles for reducing poverty (Duncan et al. 1995; Kenworthy 1999; McFate et al. 1995). The concerns that Htun and Loveman express about the rise of efforts to address racial inequality via race-conscious policies in Latin America are derived from the fact that the subregion’s relatively new welfare states have performed very well in their central task of reducing poverty. By contrast, the modern US welfare state has been bifurcated from its inception in the New Deal era, and performed very well at reducing poverty for those classified as white, while leaving behind those excluded by the color-caste system that reigned in the United States until the late twentieth century (Fox 2012; Katznelson 2005; Williams 2003). In the US context, the notion of a race-neutral welfare state is nothing more than a thought experiment. Moreover, one of the fundamental challenges for combatting rising inequality in the United States by expanding welfare provision is the tendency of white voters to ignore the transfers that have flowed to their families for generations, while simultaneously demonizing the state for attempting to equalize access to minorities under the various Great Society programs (Brown et al. 2003; Gilens 1999; Katznelson 2005; Mettler 2010).
In their chapter, “Learning from Ferguson: Welfare, Criminal Justice, and the Political Science of Race and Class,” Soss and Weaver persuasively argue that racist narratives of the US welfare state have stigmatized underserved communities of color—which they term race-class-subjugated (RCS) communities—beyond simply limiting their access to social provision aimed at reducing poverty. For Soss and Weaver, these racialized narratives of welfare provision construct “public understandings” of communities of color being outside of the commonwealth. In their view, these narratives leave RCS communities vulnerable to depredations such as the “poverty-trap,” broken-windows style of policing that the US Department of Justice recently condemned in a report on Ferguson, Missouri. In short, Soss and Weaver assert that the exclusion of RCS communities from the welfare state is the antecedent factor in the denial of equal citizenship rights and fair treatment from other US institutions that exercise state power.

Banting’s and Thompson’s provocative chapter, “The Puzzling Persistence of Racial Inequality in Canada,” provides a cautionary tale to all of Canada’s southern neighbors seeking to use their welfare states to close socioeconomic gaps between ethnoracial groups. In the late twentieth century, Canada achieved global recognition for developing policy regimes to grapple with the nation’s history of abuse and discrimination toward aboriginal peoples, adopting color-blind immigration laws and fostering multicultural tolerance. Despite these advantages, Banting and Thompson highlight a stubborn persistence of socioeconomic gaps between ethnoracial minorities and whites in Canada. Existing disparities were exacerbated by the retrenchment of Canada’s welfare state, which took place primarily in the late 1980s and 1990s. This time was precisely when changes in immigration policies led to record numbers of immigrants of color coming from developing countries, and those immigrants were facing greater problems moving into the labor market, despite having higher educational credentials than previous cohorts of immigrants. In addition, an institutional quagmire in which neither the federal government nor the provinces have taken responsibility for creating effective social policies for Canada’s indigenous peoples has worked to solidify the significant socioeconomic disparities between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians. Banting and Thompson argue that rebuilding universal redistributive programs alongside race-targeted antidiscrimination policies would help remedy these ethnoracial gaps between whites and peoples of color in Canada.

ATTITUDES, GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The study of attitudes about ethnic and racial group differences has been a key component of social science research since the rise of survey and experimental research techniques in the early twentieth century (Allport 1954; Bogardus 1928). Most of the early work in political science focused on the determinants of the racist attitudes whites held toward African Americans in the southern United States during desegregation (Campbell 1971; Matthews and Prothro 1966; Wright 1977). In the wake of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which completed the formal restoration of citizenship rights to African Americans in the South, political scientists shifted their attention to understanding the determinants of white racial attitudes across the nation (Bobo 1988; Giles and Hertz 1994; Schuman et al. 1985). These studies confirm V.O. Key’s (1949) “racial threat” thesis, which holds that whites tend to view African Americans as a threat to their privileged group position and interests within the polity, particularly, the relationship Key elaborated between spatial concentration of African Americans in the environment and the development of white racist attitudes.

Given that labor market outcomes, housing quality, educational opportunities, and welfare state provisions all tracked with racial group membership during the United States’ long history as a Herrenvolk democracy, white Americans’ tendency to see the mere presence of African Americans in their vicinity as a threat caused great consternation among social scientists. Indeed, even before the legislative victories of the Civil Rights Movement were consolidated, social scientists began examining the conditions that might lead whites to soften their negative predispositions toward African Americans (Allport 1954; Deutsch and Collins 1951; Myrdal 1944). The contact thesis—the view that sustained, noncompetitive social interactions with African Americans could moderate white racism—emerged from these early studies as the best hope for the United States to forge a healthy multiracial democracy (Aberbach and Walker 1973; Meer and Freedman 1966; Sigelman and Welch 1993; Wilner et al. 1955).

By the 1980s, support for the contact thesis had declined markedly among social scientists for several reasons. First, there is considerable evidence that whites see race relations through the lens of, what sociologist Herbert Blumer (1958) called, “group position,” rather than their own personal experiences with African Americans. Thus, whites who have positive contacts with African
American cohorts do not tend to translate that affective position to views of the larger group or policies designed to close the persistent racial gaps that differentiate white and black life chances in the United States (Jackman and Crane 1986). Second, given the nature of racial segregation in the United States (Iceland and Weinberg 2002; Massey and Denton 1993), the possibility that racism could be reduced by sustained social interactions between whites and African Americans is highly unlikely. Finally, the most robust findings about attitude change among whites occur when they form sustained relationships with African Americans who have obtained a higher socioeconomic status than theirs (Jackman and Crane 1986). Again, given the persistent racial gaps in income and wealth between whites and African Americans, these are the types of contacts that whites seldom experience.

The twentieth century closed with a bleak assessment from social science research about white racial attitudes. While several studies reported moderation of overtly racist attitudes among whites in the United States (Firebaugh and Davis 1988; Steeh and Schuman 1992; Taylor et al. 1978;), they continue to express widespread skepticism about policies designed to close the racial gaps that are the result of the systemic exclusion of African Americans during the Herrenvolk phase of American history (Bobo et al. 1997; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Kinder and Sears 1981). Recent studies have also shown that whites are increasingly seeing Latinos and Asian Americans through the lens of a “racial threat” to their group position due to the demographic shifts in the United States as a result of immigration (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Hood and Morris 1997; Maddux et al. 2008; Rocha and Espino 2009; Tolbert and Grummel 2003). Finally some evidence exists that president Barack Obama’s historic victory in 2008 has promoted a spike in “old-fashioned racism,” whereby white respondents are more likely to express antipathy toward African Americans in terms that resemble southern opposition to black equality during earlier periods (Tesler 2013).

During the past 20 years, political scientists have made considerable progress modeling the environmental determinants of white racial attitudes in the United States (Branton and Jones 2005; Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989; Oliver and Mendelberg 2000; Oliver and Wong 2003). Socioeconomic class has figured quite prominently in these models. Oliver and Mendelberg (2000), for example, demonstrated that whites living in “low-status contexts” have a greater likelihood of becoming hostile toward racial minorities and policies that target them irrespective of actual interracial competition. In other words, low-status whites are more likely to develop racist attitudes regardless of their level of exposure to minorities.

The finding of connections between low socioeconomic status and white hostility toward racial and ethnic minorities has been replicated in Canada (Blake 2003; Pettigrew 2007). Moreover, Blake (2003) has shown that, like in the American case, low-status social contexts have a potent effect on white racial attitudes regardless of the levels of “realistic competition” that they experience in relation to ethnic and racial minorities. These findings are especially striking given that, in contrast to the United States, Canada lacks the historical legacies of a racial caste system.

As we have seen, most of the nations of Latin America developed ascriptive hierarchies that privileged European-descended populations over other ethnoracial groups at some point. As Trejo and Altamirano have shown in their chapter, these European-descended populations in Mexico continue to receive greater access to basic services, such as clean water and education, than their darker-skinned co-nationals. Moreover, their evidence shows that there is no “whitening” effect—that is, the service gap between whites and dark-brown Mexicans persists at all levels of wealth and income. Similarly, there is evidence of active racial discrimination against nonwhites in labor markets in the region. In Brazil, for example, significant income disparities exist between whites and nonwhites with similar levels of education and experience (do Valle Silva 2000; Lovell 1994; Sanchez and Bryan 2003). Despite these facts, little attention has been given to the role that socioeconomic context plays in the formation of white racial attitudes in Latin America. Perhaps this is because Latin America’s supposedly greater variety of ethnic and racial categories and the often fluid borders between them has made it difficult for many researchers to see whites in Latin America’s as occupying the same hegemonic group position that they do in the United States and Canada (Portes 1984; Wade 1997). As comparative studies of the census have shown, however, the United States has also used multiple racial classifications despite its supposedly binary racial order based on the one-drop rule (Nobles 2000). Recent public opinion studies reveal burgeoning resentment to social policies designed to upgrade the status of indigenous and Afro-descendant populations and that these individuals who identify as white in Latin America have developed a racialized group consciousness and competitive frame.
for viewing race relations (Bailey et al. 2015; Htun 2004). In light of these findings, the environmental determinants of white racial attitudes in Latin America can no longer be ignored.

In the shadow of the Great Recession, which was a global economic crisis (Bagliano and Morana 2012; Llaudes et al. 2010), political scientists need to examine the relationship between socioeconomic class and white racial attitudes in the United States, Canada, and Latin America. In both the United States and Canada, whites will remain the demographic majority for several more decades into this century. As several members of the task force highlight, this means that the beliefs, fears, and attitudes of whites will continue to have a disproportionate impact on political dynamics and social policy in these nations for the foreseeable future.

It is also important that political scientists diversify their approach to conceptualizing socioeconomic standing. As we have seen, most previous research has used the level of educational attainment as a proxy for socioeconomic status in modeling the relationship between low status and racist attitudes among whites. In light of the flattening of incomes outside of the top 1% in the United States, the shrinking welfare state in Canada, and economic slowdowns in Latin America, political scientists should consider how such reversals contribute to the environment in which public opinions about race and class are formed.

Vincent Hutchings’s chapter, “Public Opinion and Inequality in the United States,” works through some of these questions by examining attitudes toward egalitarianism among white, black, and Latino Americans in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008. Using data from the 2012 American National Election Study (ANES), Hutchings finds that whites have the lowest commitment to the general principle of egalitarianism among the three racial groups in the study. Moreover, Hutchings also demonstrates that whites with incomes below the national median are slightly more committed to the principle of egalitarianism than their higher-income counterparts. Given the strong bivariate relationship between education and income (Bailey and Dynarski 2011; Belley and Lochner 2007), this finding suggests that higher educational attainment may no longer moderate white racial resentment, as previous studies had identified.

By bringing African American and Latino attitudes about egalitarianism into the equation, Hutchings builds on a robust research program examining the dynamics of... the more minority groups see themselves as part of a group the more likely they are to support egalitarian policies for everyone.

racial attitude formation among minority groups in the United States in the post-civil rights era (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Dawson 1994; Gay 2004; Gay 2006; Oliver and Wong 2003; Tate 1993). Most of these studies have found that some degree of group consciousness—rooted in past or present experiences of discrimination—is a major factor shaping the racial attitudes of African Americans and Latinos. Hutchings’ main finding is that “linked-fate” is an important factor that affects the relationship between income and attitudes about egalitarianism for Latinos and African Americans. In short, the more minority groups see themselves as part of a group the more likely they are to support egalitarian policies for everyone.

The concept of group consciousness also plays an important role in several other chapters. In their chapter, “Experiencing Inequality but Not Seeing Class: An Examination of Latino Political Attitudes,” Michael Jones-Correa and Sophia Wallace find that racial group consciousness generally trumps class-consciousness for Latinos in the United States. Indeed, their reanalysis of data from the ANES of 2008 and 2012 found that only about one-third of Latinos interviewed in those years viewed themselves as having a class identity. Although they do show that Latinos at higher educational and income levels are more likely than their counterparts to possess a “class consciousness,” Latinos are less likely than whites to see their social position in class terms. As Jones-Correa and Wallace point out, this result is incredibly surprising because several studies have shown that the Great Recession hit the Latino segment of the population incredibly hard (Kochlar et al. 2011; Pew 2014). Jones-Correa and Wallace posit that the stronger attachment that Latinos show to their ethnoracial identity is because of their experiences with racialization in recent debates about immigration policy. For Jones-Correa and Wallace, Latinos’ relatively weak attachment to class-consciousness in the 2008 and 2012 ANES means that it may be harder to mobilize the Latino community to support race-neutral public policies targeting economic inequality.

Jones-Correa and Wallace’s findings about the Latino community dovetail with the broad perspective on social movements developed by Michael Dawson and Megan Francis in their chapter “Black Blues: The Persistence of Racialized Economic Inequality in Black Communities.” That is, the Latino respondents who are the subjects of the Jones-Correa and Wallace chapter seemed to have developed an intersectional analysis of race and class that...
resembles the black experiences of the post-civil rights era that Dawson and Francis analyze. As Dawson and Francis explain, African Americans have long understood that the economic inequalities that they experience in the United States are part of a system of oppression based on racial difference. So, for Dawson and Francis, the Great Recession is best understood as a continuation of an assault on black lives that began in the Jim Crow era. Although they see governmental action—that is, a federal jobs program—as a way to redress this “economic racial violence,” the main solution, in their view, is a social movement based on the same “black radical tradition” that fueled the end of legally encoded racial segregation in the United States in the middle of the twentieth century.

PARTIES, ELECTIONS, AND REPRESENTATION

As we have noted, democratic regimes (albeit with differing degrees of longevity, stability, and effectiveness) currently dominate the landscape of the Americas. Although a variety of constitutional forms, electoral rules, and party systems exist in the western hemisphere, two inescapable facts cut across all of these differences: people of color and the poor are underrepresented in nearly all of these nations (Carnes 2012; Cassellas 2010; Griffin and Newman 2008; Hero and Tolbert 1995; Houtzager et al. 2002; Juenke and Preuhs 2012; Luna and Zechmeister 2005; Wallace 2014). The task force examined these representation gaps across the Americas to glean insights into the factors leading to the exclusion of ethnoracial minorities and low-income citizens, as well as into the possible strategies that could be enacted to ameliorate them.

For many decades, the conventional wisdom within political science has held that individuals with low socioeconomic status participate less often in a variety of political activities than higher status individuals (Cassel and Hill 1981; Eagles 1991; Leighley and Nagler 1992; Pammett 1991; Powell 1982; Verba and Nie 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Political scientists have pointed to the need to expand the participation of lower-income groups to improve their representation within political institutions across the Americas (Burnham 1987; Griffin and Newman 2005; Lijphardt 1997; Piven and Cloward 1988; Verba 2003). This view is best encapsulated by Walter Dean Burnham’s famous quip, “if you don’t vote [in a democracy], you don’t count” (1987, 99).

Zoltan Hajnal and Jessica Trounstine suggest in their chapter, “Race and Class Inequalities in Local Politics,” that expanding voter turnout has the potential to moderate some of the underrepresentation of minorities in urban areas of the United States. At the same time, they point out that racialized dynamics are at work in elections in US cities that will not disappear simply by raising minority turnout rates. Indeed, they find that “race is the primary driver of urban politics across most contexts” in the United States. Although there is a class skew toward high-income residents in the urban electorate, the average racial divides—between whites and African Americans, Asian Americans, and Latinos—in the vote for winning candidates “overshadows other demographic divides.” They also find that despite voting at higher rates than other minorities, and overperforming expectations based on their low-socioeconomic status, African Americans are the biggest losers in urban elections on most measures. Hajnal and Trounstine further argue that African Americans’ losing more often than Asian Americans and Latinos suggests that group competition exists between these minority groups, and that Asian Americans and Latinos have found it easier to form coalitions with whites and each other in urban elections. The consistent political losses of African Americans also pose a long-term problem for the health of US democracy.

Hajnal’s and Trounstine’s finding that there is group competition between African Americans and other minority groups at the local level is consistent with several previous studies (Kim 2003; McClain and Karnig 1990; Meier et al. 2004). For African Americans to win more frequently in urban elections, they need to forge new and more robust coalitions with Asian Americans and Latinos. Determining the barriers to the formation of these coalitions should be a top priority of political scientists. In other words, we need to understand how distinct group interests and or other factors, like anti-black racism, lead other groups to distance themselves from African Americans. The current literature tends to focus exclusively on the determinants of African American attitudes toward coalitions with other minorities. Gay (2004), for example, suggests that raising the socioeconomic status of African Americans could transform their perceptions of other minorities as a threat to their interests.

Examining the incentives for all groups, several recent studies have found that truly meaningful integration moderates intergroup conflict between minorities in US cities (Ha 2010; Oliver and Wong 2003; Rocha 2007; Rudolph and Popp 2010). Previous research has also shown that elite linkages can reduce conflict and facilitate coalitions between ethnoracial groups in urban areas (Bennett 1993; Browning et al. 1984; Henry and Munoz 1991; Sonenshein 1989). Although Trounstine (2010) suggests that political parties hold the potential to draw minority groups into enduring coalitions, she also notes that this potential is limited in the wake of the movement for nonpartisan government that swept US cities in the
left parties in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru won the allegiance for indigenous voters through a combination of direct ethnic appeals and economic populism.

Political parties have also played an important role in shaping the incorporation of ethnoracial minorities in Latin America. In his chapter, “Indigenous Voters and the Rise of the Left in Latin America,” Raul Madrid demonstrates how leftist parties in the Andean region successfully realigned indigenous voters beginning in the late 1990s. Madrid shows that left parties in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru won the allegiance for indigenous voters through a combination of direct ethnic appeals and economic populism. He argues that this realignment was the key factor in the electoral gains that leftist parties made in Andean legislatures and some presidential elections in the late 1990s and early 2000s. According to Madrid, one of the most striking features of the “ethnopopulist” strategies that leftist parties used in the Andean region was that they did not initially alienate nonindigenous voters. On the contrary, Madrid reports that the fusion of messages about ethnoracial and economic inequality helped the leftist parties attract voters outside of indigenous-dominated provinces as well. Finally, he points out that even when these left parties needed to pivot to more centrist messages to broaden their appeal in recent elections, they tended to maintain a focus on the inequalities faced by indigenous peoples in the Andean region. To some degree, this result is because the parties did a thorough job of integrating indigenous leaders into their organizations.

In the United States, political parties have a much more mixed history with regard to promoting the integration of ethnoracial minorities. Beginning in the Third Party System (1854–1890s), the two major political parties began to aggressively compete for the votes of European immigrants streaming into the nation’s rapidly industrializing cities (Bridges 1987; Sundquist 2011). By the rise of the Fourth Party System (1896–1932), both the Democrats and Republicans had perfected “machine politics” in America’s urban areas. These machines were engines for both the acculturation and economic advancement of European immigrants (Dahl 1961; Henderson 1976; Ostrogorski 1902; Schattschneider 1942). For the most part, the large urban machines did not extend the same benefits to people of color during the height of their power (Erie 1990; Grimshaw 1992; Pinderhughes 1987). Moreover, several scholars have demonstrated how in the current party system, the two major parties have often avoided courting voters of color out of deference to the racist attitudes that they believed the median voter held toward these minorities (Frymer 1999; Mendelberg 2001).

Paul Pierson’s chapter, “Race, Partisanship and the Rise of Income Inequality in the United States,” invokes this racial history as a partial explanation for the Republican Party’s radical shift on macroeconomic policy in the post-civil rights era. Drawing on his research with Jacob Hacker (2010), Pierson argues that: “race is likely a major factor in explaining why the GOP has radicalized around economic issues, and has been able to do so in a politically sustainable way.” He claims that the Republican Party’s reliance on the “Southern Strategy” to gain electoral advantage in the middle decades of the twentieth century has inadvertently turned the GOP into a regional party with no incentive to compromise with the Democrats. In Pierson’s view, this dynamic has freed Republican politicians to embrace radically conservative economic policies geared toward further enriching the top 1%. Pierson rightly points out the irony of the fact that the modal voter who patronizes the Republicans at the ballot box is among the most harmed by the party’s unwillingness to compromise on macroeconomic policies. Pierson also observes that people of color, who are disproportionately clustered at the bottom of the income distribution in the United States, are doubly harmed by the rising “top-end inequality” that results from “asymmetric polarization” and the racial appeals that sustain it.

In addition, several of the task force chapters demonstrate that open party systems do not always lead to outcomes that close socioeconomic gaps between ethnoracial groups, nor do they moderate income inequalities. The situation that Banting and Thompson describe in their chapter, “The Puzzling Persistence of Racial Inequality in Canada,” is instructive. According to Banting and Thompson, Canada’s current political parties have embraced the legacies of the “liberal ideologies” that informed the creation of that nation’s expansive welfare
state in the 1960s and its multicultural policies. Indeed, they argue that Canadian political parties normally reject the racialized appeals that are so commonplace in the United States out of fear that they will be punished at the ballot box. The defeat of the Conservative Party in 2015—an election government in which they broke from Canadian tradition by insisting that Muslim women remove their niqabs during citizenship ceremonies and advancing a race-baiting proposal to create a Royal Canadian Mounted Police hotline for Canadians to report “barbaric cultural practices”—lends support to this hypothesis. At the same time, all of the major parties have also rejected economic populism in favor of retrenchment. In this situation, Banting and Thompson argue, the parties lack the vision and/or willingness to develop specific policies aimed at combatting the economic inequalities that track with certain racial identities. Thus, in Canada, it is impossible to fix racial inequality because the political elite has turned away from populist politics.

Paschel’s chapter, “Beyond Race or Class: Entangled Inequalities in Latin America,” highlights two other tensions between the politics of representation and public policies aimed at targeting racial and class inequalities in the Americas. Paschel notes that in both Brazil and Colombia race-conscious public policies have not dramatically improved the living standards of Afro-descendant and indigenous peoples in those nations. She argues that the progressive laws that these two countries have passed to establish group-based rights for ethnoracial minorities sometimes “do not stick” in the implementation phase. In Colombia, for example, she points out that politicians have often used the multicultural policies aimed at establishing black land rights in rural areas to advance their own favored development policies. In other words, they have coopted ethnoracial minorities, who have often lacked the ability to take advantage of these new laws, to serve their own ends. Paschel acknowledges that Brazil has done a better job than most other countries in the region in rapidly reducing their poverty rate through social welfare programs. At the same time, she notes that the “impact of these policies on racial inequality is less clear.” This outcome is because race over-determines socioeconomic status in Brazil in the same way that it does throughout the region. Thus, the 50% reduction in poverty since the initiation of the “Bolsa Família” welfare programs is significant, but those left behind are still disproportionately Afro-descendant. One reason for these continued gaps, Paschel suggests, is that the state and society lack the capacity to fully implement the progressive racial reforms that public opinion polls indicate most Brazilians support.

All of these findings show that ethnoracial minorities, even in countries in which they represent a large percentage of the population and participate actively in elections, are hampered in translating their demographic potential and civic participation into meaningful socioeconomic gains by their low socioeconomic status and the incentives of the party system.

REFERENCES


The importance of social class and of race and ethnicity as powerful forces in political systems is broadly recognized and frequently studied. The structures of each phenomenon, the particular configurations—class patterns and distributions, racial patterns or "orderings"—vary across and within countries (and even within specific groups and regions and in other ways), as well as over time. Their contours and possible or actual interconnections are influenced by internal and external factors—however rapidly or slowly—over time. The particular conditions of both class and race typically are linked to and legacies of social and political histories, racial and economic formations, and political economies, among other phenomena. Based on these assumptions, a major premise of this task force report is that political science research can and should undertake analyses that provide broader and deeper insights warranted by the interaction of racial and class inequalities. Understanding whether, in what ways, how much, why, and with which implications the two sets of social forces are present and interact—including as identified and applied in political science scholarship on these issues—is a central goal and focus of this task force. Moreover, we engage these issues as they occur in “the Americas.” In several respects, then, we sought to advance a new—or at least underdeveloped—research agenda and focus on the social aspect of politics and on countries not often compared and contrasted by political scholars.

We framed the efforts of the task force around a number of questions and asked the contributing scholars to address them. Are race and class generally understood to be linked in actuality in a society, or are they viewed as largely separate, within and across societies? How are race and class understood and socially constructed—separately and/or jointly? How systematically is each examined and examined in relation to the other, in societies, and in political science research on these issues (to the extent that research has been undertaken)? To the extent that they are analyzed separately in political science research, why is that? Is it because the adoption of a particular analytical standpoint (i.e., focusing on race or class) imbeds and emphasizes or implicitly primes that, or are there other reasons? There seem to be numerous examples in the study of US politics and in other countries, where prima facie both race and class appear to be significant social cleavages; however, political science research seems to ignore one or the other with some frequency. Why is that and what are the implications?

To what extent is inequality acknowledged initially as a relatively ongoing, prominent issue and a part of public understanding and discourse in the society? What is, or are, the narratives in public discourse about forms of inequalities? Of course, this is difficult to assess because agreement about appropriate benchmarks, metrics, and how and where in a society inequality is or is not discussed (e.g., “mainstream” or other media) is not easy. How are the sources of inequality perceived—and, if so, how much—as interrelated (i.e., overlapping, derivative, or distinct)? Are the causes and consequences of class status and of racial and ethnic status framed or explained similarly or differently? Is there a discernible difference in emphasis on economic or social structures or on cultural group or individual-level attributes of those of lower status in the class and (or) racial categories?

Recognizing that considering separately each of the two sets of social factors is tremendously complex, a major issue is the form(s) and the extent of each as well as their interrelationships in contemporary societies in the Americas as they exist and as they are (or are not) studied in political science research. These issues are significant across the globe, but their particular structures and implications vary immensely. However, the undertaking of this task force report, already significantly large, is limited (from necessity) to a selection of countries only in North, Central, and South America. Thus, it is confined primarily because attempting a more extensive analysis is infeasible for practical reasons and beyond resource and time constraints. Moreover, the theoretical and conceptual complexity, as well as the substantive findings of the project as designed, demonstrates the formidable challenges faced by scholars and the scholarship on these topics and the polities studied.
Mexico is a country of entrenched poverty and enduring social inequalities. In the past 40 years, approximately 50% of the country’s population has lived below the poverty line. The Gini coefficient of income inequality has remained nearly unchanged at around 0.48, making Mexico one of the most unequal countries in the world. Social inequalities are pervasive. Beyond differences among income groups, wide and persistent inequalities exist across and within subnational regions, cities, neighborhoods, and households.

Poverty and social inequalities in Mexico have persisted under different economic and political regimes and, despite the adoption of different social and economic policies, they have remained nearly unchanged under state-led (1970–1982) and market (1984 to the present) economies; under closed (1940–1984) and open (1984 to the present) economies; and under autocracy (1929–2000) and democracy (2000 to the present).

The prevalence of poverty and social inequalities under different economic and political regimes raises the question of whether these social problems are primarily the result of poor public policies or are related to systemic forms of discrimination based on individual social attributes, such as class, ethnicity, and race. The question is: Beyond traditional economic and political models, are enduring poverty and social inequalities rooted in systemic forms of public discrimination against individuals based on their class status, ethnolinguistic and cultural practices, or their race and phenotypical appearances?

Social scientists and government officials in Mexico have long recognized class-based discrimination: *clasismo*. In this logic, individuals are excluded from economic and social mobility and from political power because of their socioeconomic status—not as a result of the language they speak, their racial profile, or their skin tone. Scholars, international institutions, and Mexican governmental institutions have recognized in recent decades that ethnolinguistic differences can be a major source of social inequalities. For example, in several publications, the World Bank (WB) has identified a significant gap in access to a wide variety of social and public services between households in indigenous and nonindigenous municipalities (Patrinos 2011; Patrinos and Psacharopolous 1994).

Although the scholarly community and Mexican and international institutions have recognized class and ethnicity as important sources of discrimination, they have failed to systematically explore—or even acknowledge—the likely impact of race and skin tone on Mexico’s deep economic and social inequalities. In fact, race has been a most neglected and understudied issue in Mexico’s scholarly research until recently and is still being publicly debated. Racial categories are associated with a colonial caste system that is part of the country’s “shameful past” but that are no longer relevant signifiers in daily social interactions in the present. It is widely believed that *mestizaje*—the cultural process by which indigenous people can become *mestizos* by abandoning their rural community, dropping the use of indigenous languages, and assimilating to the Spanish-speaking urban world—has eroded racial differences. Because the majority of Mexicans recognize themselves as members of the same “cosmic race”—the *mestizo*—

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In recent years, a number of scholars in sociology, economics, and political science have produced path-breaking research showing the remarkable persistence of race and skin tone as driving factors of social inequalities in Mexico.

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...
A BRIEF HISTORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN MEXICO

Mexican colonial society was stratified by ancestry and skin tone. During three centuries of colonial rule (1521–1821), economic and social mobility and political power in the New Spain were tightly linked to place of birth and to individual phenotypical features, particularly skin tone (Knight 1990; Wade 1997). White Spanish-born peninsulares were at the top of the social hierarchy; their American-born children, the criollos, enjoyed positions of privilege but—in this strictly ranked colonial society—the top leadership positions were closed to them. Numerous native indigenous populations from hundreds of different ethnolinguistic groups, along with small enslaved populations of African descent, were at the bottom of the social scale. Between these two extremes, a significant number of colonial subjects belonged to a wide variety of groups that resulted from the mixing of the four core colonial groups (i.e., peninsulares, criollos, indigenous, and African-descended slaves) and were strictly ranked by ancestry and skin tone. Colonial artists portrayed this caste system in a number of iconographies that remain the most important visual evidence of the colonial social-stratification system (Katzev 2005).

The Mexican War of Independence (1810–1821) was a major social uprising against the stratification of society by place of birth and skin tone. A group of criollo leaders, including local administrative authorities, clergy, and members of business and trade guilds, rallied the rural indigenous masses and other members of lower castes against the Spanish peninsulares.

Despite the Independence Movement’s historical promise to eliminate race and skin tone as determinants of economic and political mobility, racial and phenotypical differences continued to have a crucial role in post-Independence Mexican society. The colonial legacy persisted throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries because Mexican governmental elites became obsessed with overcoming the country’s indigenous colonial past (Knight 1990). As a result, every policy adopted to eliminate race and skin tone as markers of social and political interactions reified the color hierarchy: the white European phenotype continued to be associated with power, progress, and modernity, whereas the dark-brown indigenous phenotype continued to be systematically viewed as an anchor to backwardness and a remnant of the colonial past. Since the early days of Independence to the present, Mexican governmental officials and scholars have misleadingly spoken of the “indigenous problem.”

Liberal and conservative elites in nineteenth-century Mexico sought to solve the “indigenous problem” through substitution (i.e., encouraging European immigration), elimination (i.e., massacres of indigenous peoples), and miscegenation (i.e., encouraging the biological mixing of races) (Knight 1990; Martínez Casas et al. 2014). Although state authorities discouraged the public use of the concepts of race and skin tone, their obsession with the “whitening” of the Mexican population pervaded in the public realm: in governmental halls, in economic and marriage markets, and in everyday forms of social interaction.

Postrevolutionary governmental elites in twentieth-century Mexico sought to overcome “the indigenous problem” through a state policy of mestizaje. After the Mexican Revolution (1910–1917)—a bloody civil war in which approximately one million people died—under the leadership of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), Mexican postrevolutionary elites engaged in a major process of state-building nationalism in which a key objective was to “forge” a single national identity under the broad-umbrella mestizo category (Gutiérrez 1999).

Through economic and social subsidies as well as a centralized educational system that was charged with galvanizing the myth of mestizaje, successive PRI governments provided powerful incentives to rural indigenous populations to assimilate to the mainstream Spanish-speaking society and to become part of a mestizo cultural melting pot (Gutiérrez 1999; Martínez Casas et al. 2014; Trejo 2012). Beyond racial mixing, indigenous people could become mestizos if they left their rural villages in the sierras and the jungle, dropped their indigenous languages, educated their children in Spanish, and gave up the use of traditional indigenous clothing (Knight 1990). As part of a process of cultural assimilation rather than racial mixing, indigenous people could become mestizos even if they remained racially indigenous. In the context of a one-party regime, poor and lower-middle-class mestizos were mobilized within corporatist organizations linked to the PRI, as peasants and workers.

During the twentieth century, millions of native indigenous people became mestizos and Mexico became a society in which the majority perceived themselves as mestizos. As figure 1 illustrates, the great “victory” of Mexico’s national building process under the PRI was the invention of the mestizo as the dominant ethnoracial category. According to different estimates, by the turn of the twenty-first century, 65% to 70% of Mexicans self-identified as mestizos, 15% to 20% as whites, and 10% to 15% as indigenous. As figure 1 suggests, Mexico remains a ranked society in which the poor are primarily indigenous and mestizos and the wealthy are predominantly white.

Under the broad umbrella of mestizaje, class, income, and labor status—rather than ethnicity, race, and skin tone—were recognized as major sources of social and economic and political mobility.
economic inequalities and discrimination in Mexico. In the dominant narrative, race and skin tone could not be sources of inequality and discrimination because most Mexicans were Spanish-speaking *mestizos* (Martínez Casas et al. 2014). To the extent that any Mexican experienced any form of discrimination, the root cause was believed to be class differences, not language or physical appearance.

The 1994 neo-Zapatista rebellion of Mayan Indians in the southern state of Chiapas dealt a severe blow to the harmonizing myth of *mestizaje* and triggered “the end of the cosmic race” (Aguilar Rivera 2010). A major rebellion of poor Indian peasants that shook Mexico and the world, the Chiapas uprising led governmental officials and academics to recognize ethnolinguistic and cultural differences as a major source of social inequalities and discrimination and to adopt mild multicultural reforms. These included reforms in the Mexican constitution, acknowledgment of the country’s ethnocultural and linguistic diversity, and adoption of subnational laws that empowered indigenous communities in a few states. Despite these changes, political elites in Mexico failed to recognize that beyond linguistic and cultural differences, race and skin tone could be major sources of discrimination against indigenous populations and *mestizos* with indigenous phenotypical features.

Two centuries after Independence, we must question whether Mexican society has eliminated race and skin tone as key defining features of economic and social mobility, or whether stratification by race and skin color persists despite a century of assimilationist policies of state-building nationalism under the PRI. We first investigate this question using data on subjective individual perceptions of discrimination and then explore the objective realities of economic and political mobility and exclusion.

SUBJECTIVE PERCEPTIONS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

Beyond the public discourse of Mexican state officials and the socially accepted realities of *mestizaje*, a fundamental question is whether Mexicans subjectively perceive that race and skin tone continue to be sources of discrimination, or whether *mestizaje* indeed has eliminated perceptions of exclusion and inequality based on individual physical appearance.

The Mexican survey of the 2010 AmericasBarometer provided important information about personal experiences and social perceptions of discrimination. Based on a nationally representative sample of 1,562 Mexican adults, the survey asked respondents whether they had been targets of discrimination for reasons associated with their physical appearance and skin tone, language, economic status, and gender. The survey also asked respondents if they had witnessed instances of discrimination in any of these four cases.

As summarized in table 1, the number of Mexicans who reported prior personal experiences of discrimination based on their physical appearance (13.9%), language (16%), and gender (8.9%) is small relative to those who reported discrimination based on economic status (29.9%). However, a significantly larger number of respondents reported witnessing instances of discrimination against others based on physical appearance (54%), language (58.3%), economic status (64.7%), and gender (47.7%).

The large gaps between the personal and societal experiences of discrimination based on skin tone, language, and gender suggest that there may be a major problem of

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Table 1: Experiences of Discrimination in Mexico

PERSONALLY FELT DISCRIMINATED AGAINST BECAUSE OF...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>At least a few times</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Skin color</td>
<td>13.91</td>
<td>86.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accent/Language</td>
<td>16.05</td>
<td>83.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic situation</td>
<td>29.97</td>
<td>70.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>8.99</td>
<td>91.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

WITNESSED DISCRIMINATION AGAINST SOMEONE BECAUSE OF...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>At least a few times</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Skin color</td>
<td>54.08</td>
<td>45.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accent/Language</td>
<td>58.34</td>
<td>41.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic situation</td>
<td>64.70</td>
<td>35.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>47.72</td>
<td>52.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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underreporting on these sensitive topics. In the specific case of discrimination by skin tone, the gap suggests that discrimination on the bases of race and skin color is possibly far more widespread and systemic than what Mexican citizens are willing to accept. The fact that neither the state nor Mexican society recognize race and skin tone as “legitimate” sources of discrimination contributes importantly to a process of “false consciousness” by which Mexicans are aware of widespread discrimination but believe that it is based entirely on economic status. They refuse to accept that they could be individual targets of exclusion on the grounds of their physical appearance.

Despite the personal underreporting of discrimination based on individual physical appearance, additional items in the AmericasBarometer survey provided evidence that Mexicans believe that ethnic and racial markers are major sources of discrimination. As the 2010 survey reported, 83% of Mexican adults believe that indigenous people have significantly fewer opportunities in life than white people.11

To explore more meaningfully the impact of race and skin tone on subjective perceptions of discrimination, we conducted a multivariate regression analysis. The dependent variable was the reported individual perceptions of discrimination based on physical appearance and skin tone.

Drawing on the AmericasBarometer survey, we focused on two items to construct different indicators of race and skin tone: (1) the respondents’ subjective ethnoracial identification; and (2) the measure of the respondents’ skin tones as reported by interviewers using a color palette of 11 shades, ranging from 1 (white) to 11 (dark brown). To test for the impact of skin tone on discrimination, we first used the respondents’ skin tone as coded by local interviewers. This was a continuous variable. The mean skin tone for Mexico is level 4, with a standard deviation of 1.5; the maximum reported skin tone is level 9. To test for the persistence of colonial hierarchies, we re-created ethnoracial categories using information on subjective self-identification and skin tone.12 Unpacking mestizaje by skin tone was the crucial innovation in our analysis. We distinguished between “white mestizos” (23.6%), “light-brown mestizos” (26.4%), and “dark-brown mestizos” (31.2%). As illustrated in figure 2, we ranked groups based on subjective ethnoracial identification and skin tone from white (at the top) to indigenous (at the bottom), with the three mestizo categories in the middle.13 Note that dark-brown, Spanish-speaking mestizos are individuals with indigenous phenotypical features; in fact, dark-brown mestizos and indigenous people are racially identical but culturally distinct individuals.14 Finally, to identify the groups that are more common targets of discrimination, we tested for the individual effect of the unranked ethnoracial categories.

In our statistical models, we controlled for various socioeconomic-status indicators, including material wealth (or income, when appropriate), age, gender, education, and place of residence (urban or rural). Because there is important variation in the ethnolinguistic composition of the population across Mexican regions, we also controlled for geographic region (i.e., North is our reference category). We used logit models for testing.

The results, summarized in table 2, unambiguously show that skin tone is a strong predictor of perceived racial discrimination. As Model 1 reveals, Mexicans with darker skin tone tend to perceive greater levels of discrimination in their everyday life. Simulations based on Model 1 suggest that a person with the median skin-tone category (i.e., level 5) is twice as likely to perceive discrimination as someone with the lightest skin tone (i.e., level 1); an individual with the darkest skin tone (i.e., level 9) is three times more likely to experience discrimination. Model 2 shows that experiences of racial discrimination are inversely related to ethnoracial ranking. As in colonial times, every successively darker category below the white elite is more likely to report experiencing discrimination based on individual physical appearance. For example, dark-brown mestizos are 2.5 times more likely to perceive discrimination than whites, and indigenous people are three times more likely. Because the ranking is partly based on skin tone, this result confirms the structural persistence of a color hierarchy in Mexican society.

Our results in Model 3 show that although all individuals with darker skin tone tend to perceive greater discrimination on the basis of their physical appearance, two groups are particularly vulnerable: dark-brown mestizos and indigenous populations.

Figure 2: Unpacking the Mestizo Category by Skin Tone
Whereas the case of indigenous populations is well known and unsurprising, the most novel finding was about dark-brown mestizos. For any observer of Mexican society, however, this is a category that is easy to identify because these people have specific roles in Mexican urban society: the house servants, nannies, construction workers, bus and taxi drivers, waiters and waitresses, cooks, and millions of street venders who populate Mexico’s extensive informal sector and who live in the shadows of the economic system. Dark-brown mestizos with indigenous phenotypical features are socially stigmatized and deceptively called nahuales, raza, chusma, or simply indios.15 These descriptors are used for urban mestizo populations; however, semantically, they have a direct link to indigenous ethnolinguistic groups: for example, Totonacos (nacos) and Nahuati (nahuales).

This finding strongly suggests that despite nearly a century of state-building nationalist policies of cultural mestizaje, dark-brown, indigenous-looking mestizos experience similar levels of perceived discrimination as indigenous people. This is a difficult reality to verbalize for those who may prefer to express that they are discriminated against on the basis of class rather than to accept that the discrimination may be based on their physical appearance. It is a reality that can easily escape researchers who do not unpack mestizaje and accept it as a broad, color-neutral category.16

The results from the control variables surprisingly show that perceptions of discrimination based on physical appearance are not conditioned by class (wealth), education, gender, or place of residence. Other than individual race and skin tone, age is the only control variable associated with perceived racial discrimination, which indicates that younger Mexicans perceive themselves as more vulnerable to discrimination.

Consistent with the important findings reported by Canache et al. (2014), our results show that perceived racial discrimination in Mexico is not simply a question of class. Rather, our findings reveal that skin tone is a powerful predictor of perceived racial discrimination. The statistical results reported in Model 3 suggest that indigenous people are a significant target of discrimination (possibly due to linguistic and cultural differences). However, the fact that both indigenous-looking mestizos and indigenous people experience similar levels of discrimination reveal that skin tone may be the true underlying reason why indigenous people face discrimination in the first place. This means that discrimination is not only a question of ethnocultural differences but also perhaps more fundamentally a question of differences in physical appearance.

The dominant view of Mexican social scientists has been that economic (i.e., class) differences can explain any form of discrimination, including racial exclusion. Because wealth was not statistically significant in our models, our findings directly challenge this reductionist view. However, because this view is so entrenched in Mexican public discourse, we provide additional evidence showing the independent effect of race and skin tone on perceived discrimination. Figure 3 reports predicted probabilities of perceptions of discrimination for white (level 1, the solid line) and dark-brown (level 7, the dashed line) Mexicans at different levels of wealth. The figure indicates that perceptions of discrimination are always greater for dark-brown Mexicans at all levels of wealth. This suggests that wealth does not have a significant “whitening effect” on perceptions of discrimination; that is, poor and wealthy dark-brown, indigenous-looking Mexicans will always perceive greater levels of discrimination than poor and wealthy white people.17

| Table 2: Determinants of Perceived Racial Discrimination |
|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
|                | MODEL 1        | MODEL 2        | MODEL 3        |
| Skin Tone      | 0.184**        | 0.331***       | 1.545***       |
|                | (0.058)        | (0.080)        | (0.423)        |
| Ethnoracial Ranking | 0.587        | 0.746*        | 1.090**        |
|                | (0.369)        | (0.361)        | (0.352)        |
| White Mestizo  | 0.573*         | 1.545***       | 1.423**        |
|                | (0.287)        | (0.423)        | (0.268)        |
| Light-Brown Mestizo | -0.054      | -0.059        | -0.059        |
|                | (0.032)        | (0.032)        | (0.032)        |
| Dark-Brown Mestizo | -0.014*      | -0.014*       | -0.014*       |
|                | (0.008)        | (0.008)        | (0.006)        |
| Indigenous     | 0.267          | 0.202          | 0.210          |
|                | (0.210)        | (0.215)        | (0.218)        |
| Wealth         | -0.139         | -0.126         | -0.475         |
|                | (0.224)        | (0.223)        | (0.267)        |
| Age            | -0.014*        | -0.059        | -0.059        |
|                | (0.008)        | (0.032)        | (0.032)        |
| Female         | 0.006          | 0.003          | 0.003          |
|                | (0.024)        | (0.024)        | (0.024)        |
| Education      | 0.006          | 0.210          | 0.210          |
|                | (0.220)        | (0.215)        | (0.218)        |
| Urban          | 0.267          | 0.202          | 0.210          |
|                | (0.210)        | (0.215)        | (0.218)        |
| Central-Western Region | -0.439    | -0.480         | -0.475         |
|                | (0.267)        | (0.267)        | (0.268)        |
| Central Region | 0.244          | 0.217          | 0.224          |
|                | (0.222)        | (0.223)        | (0.224)        |
| Southern Region| -0.075         | -0.139         | -0.126         |
|                | (0.264)        | (0.266)        | (0.267)        |
| (Intercept)    | -1.963***      | -2.039***      | -1.843***      |
|                | (0.156)        | (0.530)        | (0.546)        |
| McFadden R-sq. | 0.043          | 0.045          | 0.046          |
| N              | 1,330          | 1,330          | 1,330          |

Note: Significant at *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.
Although our findings show that race and skin tone are powerful predictors of perceptions of discrimination in Mexico, it is crucial to move beyond subjective beliefs and to closely assess more objective socioeconomic material realities.

**RACE AND SOCIOECONOMIC INEQUALITIES**

The historical promise of post-Independence Mexican elites that race and skin tone would no longer have any effect on the material life chances of Mexican citizens has proved to be long on rhetoric and short on hard data. Villarreal’s (2010) pioneering study of stratification by skin color in Mexico was the first extensive statistical analysis to question the country’s alleged color-blind history. Using panel-survey evidence gathered during Mexico’s 2006 presidential election, Villarreal showed that skin tone and ethnocultural identities are strong predictors of income and labor mobility—that is, Mexicans with darker skin tone and indigenous populations have significantly lower incomes and more limited access to high-status jobs than the rest of the population. On the basis of an experimental study of discrimination correspondence, Arceo-Gomez and Campos-Vazquez (2014) provided compelling evidence of the stratification of labor markets by race: given candidates with nearly identical educational and training levels, Mexican private firms are less likely to hire indigenous-looking people than those with light skin tone.

Moving beyond personal income and access to labor markets, this section assesses the impact of ethnicity, race, and skin tone on individual wealth and access to public goods and services. Both measures capture the dynamics of discrimination in private labor markets and in the allocation of public resources.

**Economic Well-Being**

Using the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey, we created an index of economic well-being that includes access to a wide variety of material goods and services and that divides the population into 10 wealth deciles. As in the previous statistical modeling of perceptions of discrimination, we tested for the impact of skin tone and ethnoracial categories (ranked and unranked) on individual wealth, controlling for age, gender, education, and place of residence. The dependent variable is whether the respondent is in the top 30% of wealth distribution. Table 3 summarizes the results of logit models.

As shown in Model 1, controlling for a wide variety of socioeconomic indicators, skin tone had an important negative effect on individual wealth: darker-skin-tone Mexicans had significantly lower levels of material well-being. Holding all other variables at mean values, a statistical simulation shows that in comparison with white Mexicans with the lightest skin tone (i.e., level 1), Mexicans with the darkest skin tone (i.e., level 9) are three times less likely to belong to the richest 30% of the country; those in the median skin-tone category (i.e., level 5) are twice less likely. The results in Model 2 show that material well-being is inversely related to ethnoracial ranking. As in colonial times, there is a significant decline in wealth as individuals move from the top of the social scale (i.e., white) to the bottom (i.e., dark-brown mestizo and indigenous). In addition to the ranked ordering of groups, results from Model 3 unambiguously show that two groups are particularly vulnerable to economic exclusion: dark-brown mestizos and indigenous people.

Because education is a strong predictor of economic well-being across models, we tested for the impact of skin tone on the probability of a person being in the top 30% of the wealth distribution at different levels of education. Figure 4 shows that although education increases material well-being for all Mexicans, a persistent gap exists between white (i.e., level 1, the solid line) and dark-brown (i.e., level 7, the dashed line) individuals at all educational levels. This means that two Mexican adults having the same educational
qualifications but different skin tones—one white, the other one dark brown—will have different material well-being only because of their innate differences in physical appearance: the white person will be between 10% and 25% more likely to be in the top of the wealth distribution than the dark-brown person. Rather than indicating that money or education “whitens,” this result suggests the reverse effect: everything else being equal, a lighter skin tone is an “asset” that yields greater wealth. This observation is consistent with results from labor-market studies (Arceo-Gomez and Campos-Vazquez 2014), which show that in terms of employment opportunities, Mexicans with lighter skin tone have an advantage over equally qualified peers with darker skin tone.

The evidence on racial biases in wealth distribution raises an important question: Is discrimination by race and skin tone a problem that affects only private markets or does it also pervade the distribution of public resources?

Public Goods and Services

We took the analysis one step further and assessed whether these patterns of stratification in wealth distribution by race and skin tone are reproduced in the public arena via the provision of public goods and services. Scholarly and policy discussions about public-goods provision typically focus on poverty and geography (i.e., people living in rural areas and mountainous terrains have less access to public goods) and ethnolinguistic differences (i.e., ethnic fragmentation prevents groups from effectively demanding public goods); race and skin tone are mostly ignored in these analyses. We assessed the impact of race and skin tone on access to two fundamental public goods: clean water and education.

We used the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey, which included questions about access to a wide variety of public goods and services, along with questions about ethnicity, race, and skin tone. Because most studies of public-goods provision use spatially aggregated information at the country, province, or city level, we first tested the reliability of our individual-level data by aggregating individual responses at the country level and comparing them with WB data on public-goods provision. In all cases, the bivariate correlation coefficients between the AmericasBarometer and the WB data range between 0.6 and 0.8.

Our findings, reported in tables 4 and 5, show that access to public goods in Mexico is strongly conditioned by race and skin tone. Model 1 in table 4 shows that—after controlling for wealth, place of residence, and other socioeconomic indicators—skin tone can be a defining factor in an individual’s reported ability to access clean water.
water. The results show that—everything else being equal—Mexicans with darker skin tone are less likely to have access to clean water. Model 2 indicates that access to water is inversely related to ethnoracial ranking. As in colonial times, people with a darker skin tone—placed at the lower scale of ethnoracial ranking—are significantly less likely to have access to potable water. Finally, Model 3 reveals that among people with the darkest skin tone, indigenous populations stand out as the single group more likely to face discrimination in access to clean water. Unlike wealth—in which dark-brown *mestizos* and indigenous people experienced significant levels of exclusion—in the case of water services, indigenous populations bear most of the discrimination.

Because wealth is a strong predictor of access to water, we tested for the impact of skin tone at different levels of wealth. Figure 5 shows that although material wealth increases the probability of having access to clean water for all Mexicans, there is a persistent gap between white (i.e., the solid line) and dark-brown (i.e., the dashed line) individuals at all levels of wealth. This should not be surprising because most indigenous populations—the group facing the most discrimination in access to water—tend to be at the bottom of the wealth scale.

Using the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey, we also tested for the impact of race and skin tone on individual educational attainment in Mexico. Consistent with findings reported by Villarreal (2010), Flores and Telles (2012), and Martínez Casas et al. (2014), the results reported in table 5 show that educational attainment is strongly conditioned by race and skin tone. As Model 1 reveals, controlling for income, age, gender, and place of residence, Mexicans with a darker skin tone report significantly fewer years of education. A statistical simulation shows that in comparison to a Mexican with the lightest skin tone (i.e., level 1), a person in the median skin-tone category (i.e., level 5) has one less full year of education and a person with the darkest skin tone (i.e., level 9) has three fewer years. These gaps are the net result of skin tone.

Model 2 shows that educational attainment is closely related to Mexico’s ethnoracial ranking. As in colonial times, individuals with darker skin tones in the lower social rankings complete, on average, 1.5 fewer years of education. A statistical simulation shows that in comparison to a Mexican with the lightest skin tone (i.e., level 1), a person in the median skin-tone category (i.e., level 5) has one less full year of education and a person with the darkest skin tone (i.e., level 9) has three fewer years. These gaps are the net result of skin tone.

Model 3 identifies two ethnoracial groups that face the most severe educational disadvantages: dark-brown *mestizos* and indigenous populations. Although the coefficient is greater for indigenous populations, dark-brown *mestizos* also

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Table 4: Determinants of Having Access to Water

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MODEL 1</th>
<th>MODEL 2</th>
<th>MODEL 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Skin Tone</strong></td>
<td>-0.260*** (0.069)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnoracial Ranking</strong></td>
<td>-0.253** (0.094)</td>
<td>0.159 (0.414)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Mestizo</td>
<td>0.159 (0.414)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light-Brown Mestizo</td>
<td>0.049 (0.381)</td>
<td>0.049 (0.381)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dark-Brown Mestizo</td>
<td>-0.386 (0.361)</td>
<td>-0.889* (0.430)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous</td>
<td>-0.504 (0.312)</td>
<td>-0.889* (0.430)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wealth</strong></td>
<td>0.262*** (0.043)</td>
<td>0.274*** (0.042)</td>
<td>0.273*** (0.042)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>0.005 (0.007)</td>
<td>0.007 (0.007)</td>
<td>0.007 (0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.021 (0.198)</td>
<td>0.030 (0.195)</td>
<td>0.040 (0.197)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.022 (0.029)</td>
<td>0.032 (0.029)</td>
<td>0.031 (0.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>1.079*** (0.219)</td>
<td>1.175*** (0.213)</td>
<td>1.130*** (0.216)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central-Western Region</td>
<td>-0.154 (0.354)</td>
<td>-0.121 (0.352)</td>
<td>-0.179 (0.354)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Region</td>
<td>-0.487 (0.327)</td>
<td>-0.544 (0.326)</td>
<td>-0.570 (0.327)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Region</td>
<td>-0.430 (0.348)</td>
<td>-0.462 (0.349)</td>
<td>-0.505 (0.351)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(Intercept)</strong></td>
<td>1.324 (0.679)</td>
<td>0.648 (0.651)</td>
<td>0.096 (0.633)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>McFadden R-sq.</strong></td>
<td>0.178</td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td>0.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>1,330</td>
<td>1,331</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Significant at *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.*
face significant educational disadvantages. If we consider educational attainment as an alternative dimension of redistribution, this result confirms that mestizaje does not have an equalizing effect: much like indigenous peoples, indigenous-looking mestizos also face severe levels of discrimination in the accumulation of human capital.21

Because income and wealth are strong predictors of educational attainment, we assessed access to college by skin tone at different levels of material wealth. Figure 6 shows that for all Mexicans, wealth increases the probability of receiving a college education. The figure also reveals, however, a significant color gap: at intermediate and higher wealth levels—where individuals are more likely to have access to a college education—there is a persistent gap between Mexican citizens with a light skin tone (i.e., the solid line) and those with a dark skin tone (i.e., the dashed line). This result reveals that white Mexicans will always have an advantage in the production of human capital: simply because of their skin tone, they will be between 15% and 20% more likely to have a university education than dark-brown Mexicans with identical levels of wealth.

Our results on the determinants of access to clean water and education strongly suggest that individual physical appearance—particularly skin tone—is a defining feature of access to public services in Mexico. Net of wealth, income, age, gender, and place of residence, Mexican governmental institutions seem to have a color bias in favor of those with lighter skin tone and against dark-brown Mexicans with indigenous phenotypical features and members of indigenous communities. Although it is widely recognized that this public bias negatively affects indigenous peoples living in rural areas, we also must recognize that discrimination in the allocation of public resources affects dark-brown mestizos living on the impoverished periphery of Mexico’s largest urban centers.

In addition to the private domain of wealth production, our results unambiguously show that Mexico’s public institutions reproduce rather than deter economic discrimination based on race and skin tone. This suggests that racial discrimination is not simply a private problem but rather a systemic problem that pervades the Mexican state. Because Mexico transitioned to democracy in 2000, it is crucial to explore whether this color bias affects only governmental bureaucracies or whether it also pervades the political–electoral process. To answer this question, we assessed whether political participation in Mexico’s elections is conditioned by race and skin tone.

### Table 5: Determinants of Years of Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MODEL 1</th>
<th>MODEL 2</th>
<th>MODEL 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Skin Tone</td>
<td>-0.325*** (0.069)</td>
<td>-0.357*** (0.091)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnoracial Ranking</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Mestizo</td>
<td>0.028 (0.350)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light-Brown Mestizo</td>
<td>-0.612 (0.343)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dark-Brown Mestizo</td>
<td>-0.853* (0.338)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous</td>
<td>-0.588 (0.419)</td>
<td>-1.448*** (0.494)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.528*** (0.042)</td>
<td>0.544*** (0.042)</td>
<td>0.539*** (0.042)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.114*** (0.006)</td>
<td>-0.114*** (0.007)</td>
<td>-0.113*** (0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.418* (0.199)</td>
<td>-0.393* (0.200)</td>
<td>-0.381 (0.200)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>0.703** (0.252)</td>
<td>0.771** (0.251)</td>
<td>0.742** (0.253)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central-Western Region</td>
<td>0.133 (0.293)</td>
<td>0.132 (0.294)</td>
<td>0.122 (0.296)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Region</td>
<td>1.398*** (0.278)</td>
<td>1.374*** (0.279)</td>
<td>1.386*** (0.280)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southern Region</td>
<td>2.120*** (0.318)</td>
<td>2.097*** (0.321)</td>
<td>2.103*** (0.322)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>11.253*** (0.551)</td>
<td>10.854*** (0.538)</td>
<td>10.308*** (0.529)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.355</td>
<td>0.350</td>
<td>0.351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R-squared</td>
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<td>0.346</td>
<td>0.345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,245</td>
<td>1,246</td>
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</table>

Notes: Significant at *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. We used income instead of wealth because we know from the results in table 3 that education is a predictor of wealth.
RACE AND UNEQUAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

After seven decades of one-party rule, Mexico transitioned to democracy in 2000. For decades, the Left–Right economic dimension and the authoritarian–democratic political dimension dominated Mexican politics. After 2000, however, basic issues related to market liberalization and economic redistribution moved to the political center stage. In the 2006 and 2012 presidential elections, extensive discussions of state-led versus market-oriented strategies to overcome poverty dominated campaign partisan rhetoric. More than a decade earlier, the 1994 neo-Zapatista indigenous rebellion in Chiapas triggered a series of electoral reforms that paved the way for the development of relatively free and fair elections. However, the indigenous quest for ethnic autonomy and self-determination never materialized as a national demand, and ethnicity did not become a major cleavage in Mexican politics (Trejo 2012).

Unlike other Latin American countries—in which the introduction of ethnic autonomy rights turned democracies into multicultural regimes (e.g., Bolivia and Colombia)—in Mexico, ethnic-based institutional arrangements were limited. Unlike other Latin American multicultural regimes—which went a step further and recognized race-based discrimination and introduced color-conscious policy reforms (e.g., Brazil and Colombia)—Mexico’s nascent democracy remained de jure neutral on questions of race and skin tone.

The final question is whether the Mexican political process is indeed race- and color-neutral or whether politicians establish different forms of engagement with voters depending on race and skin tone. To the extent that race and skin tone are crucial determinants of public-goods provision, it is important to explore whether political parties and politicians—two key actors in the allocation of public resources in Mexico—are race- and color-neutral or whether their actions are racially biased in favor of or against Mexican citizens with specific phenotypical features.

Based on novel laboratory experiments, Aguilar Pariente (2009) was the first scholar to question the widespread belief about Mexico’s political system as a race-neutral polity. She showed that Mexican citizens tend to prefer political candidates with lighter skin tone to those who are indigenous phenotypical. Whereas Aguilar Pariente investigated the “demand” side, we explored the “supply” side of Mexican electoral politics.

Using the 2010 AmericasBarometer, we analyzed whether race and skin tone condition the forms of engagement that Mexican politicians establish with citizens. Following Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007), we distinguished two types of linkages that politicians can establish with citizens during electoral campaigns: programmatic and clientelistic. Programmatic linkages refer to campaign strategies by which politicians offer public goods to citizens in exchange for their support. These are not particularistic appeals but rather public appeals based on specific programs that emphasize education, health, pensions, physical infrastructure, and the environment. In contrast, clientelistic linkages refer to campaign strategies through which politicians offer particularistic goods to citizens in exchange for their vote. These are not public appeals but rather private exchanges by which politicians offer handouts, refrigerators, sacks of beans and cement, chickens, or simply a meal in exchange for electoral support. As the literature shows, although clientelism is one mechanism that allows poor voters to imprint economic value onto their vote, clientelistic redistribution is associated with the reproduction of poverty and inequality. In contrast, programmatic linkages tend to be associated with more redistributive policies and higher levels of economic development.

We tested for the impact of race and skin tone on Mexican politicians’ propensity to make clientelistic or programmatic appeals to voters. The AmericasBarometer survey asked respondents whether they received private gifts from any political party or candidate during the most recent election campaign. Because there is a stigma attached to accepting clientelistic exchanges—which are associated with vote buying—asking a simple “naïve” question rather than a battery of questions that include vignettes or other techniques used to elicit sensitive information will underestimate the extent of clientelism in a country. Despite its limitations, this straightforward question allowed a preliminary assessment of the relationship between race and skin tone and citizen–politician linkages in Mexico’s new democracy.

The results, summarized in table 6, reveal that skin tone is a potentially important predictor of how Mexican politicians engage with citizens. Controlling for parents’ occupation, age, gender, and place of residence, our findings revealed that during election campaigns, politicians tend to make clientelistic appeals to citizens with a darker skin tone and programmatic appeals to citizens of a lighter color. Although neither the ethnoracial ranking nor any of the individual ethnoracial categories are statistically significant, the finding showing that skin tone moderately predicts the development of clientelistic linkages suggests that the Mexican democratic political process is not race- or color-neutral. The possibility that Mexican politicians could make differential appeals depending on voters’ skin tone is consistent with findings that citizens prefer representatives with a lighter skin color (Aguilar Pariente 2011). In fact, both results indicate a perverse political equilibrium in...
THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM: WHY MEXICO NEEDS TO RECOGNIZE RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AS A SYSTEMIC SOURCE OF SOCIAL INEQUALITIES

Our findings suggest four important conclusions. First, race and skin tone are major omitted variables in the study of social inequalities and economic redistribution in Mexico. Although race and skin tone do not trump class or ethnicity, our findings suggest that physical appearance can have a net impact on a person’s perception of discrimination and on the objective ability to generate material wealth, access public goods and services, and participate in the democratic political process. Our findings unambiguously show that this impact cannot be subsumed into class or labor status. This means that innate (i.e., random) characteristics that are beyond an individual’s choice (e.g., physical appearance and skin tone) are determining factors in the life chances of Mexicans.

Second, our findings strongly suggest that the persistence of poverty and social inequalities in Mexico is intimately linked to the persistence of discrimination based on race and skin tone. After two centuries of Independence, our findings provide compelling evidence that the colonial caste system, which liberal, conservative, authoritarian, and democratic elites have condemned for centuries, remains very much in place. As in colonial times, the life chances of Mexican citizens are strongly conditioned by their racial and skin tone features, particularly their skin tone. That is, citizens with a light skin tone and white European phenotypical features enjoy a major advantage in private markets and public institutions, whereas citizens with a dark skin tone and indigenous features are at a major disadvantage.

Third, although the language of race and skin tone is socially tabooed in Mexico, the reality is that individual physical appearance drives Mexican social interactions, private economic exchanges, allocation of public resources, and political participation. Although Mexicans do not willingly admit that they can be discriminated against for reasons associated with their physical appearance and skin tone, they are aware that discrimination against those with indigenous phenotypical features is systemic and widespread. In fact, discrimination on the basis of race and skin tone is a giant “elephant in the living room” of Mexican society—the awkward, ancient animal that no one wants to recognize but that conditions all social interactions.

Fourth, our findings suggest that any attempt to overcome Mexico’s deeply entrenched social and economic inequalities must move beyond the typical concerns about class and ethnolinguistic differences and respond to the

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**Table 6: Determinants of Being a Target of Clientelism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MODEL 1</th>
<th>MODEL 2</th>
<th>MODEL 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Skin Tone</td>
<td>0.117*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.072)</td>
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<tr>
<td>White Mestizo</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.225</td>
<td>(0.282)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Light-Brown Mestizo</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>(0.274)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.262)</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
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<td>Urban</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.201)</td>
<td>(0.199)</td>
<td>(0.201)</td>
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<td>Central-Western Region</td>
<td>-0.353</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.247)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central Region</td>
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<td>0.259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.212)</td>
<td>(0.213)</td>
<td>(0.214)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Region</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.245)</td>
<td>(0.246)</td>
<td>(0.248)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-2.623***</td>
<td>-2.532***</td>
<td>-2.187***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.485)</td>
<td>(0.470)</td>
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<td>0.020</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,246</td>
<td>1,247</td>
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Notes: Significant at *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.
We controlled for parental occupation instead of income and wealth because political parties use clientelistic practices among voters with low levels of income and wealth. Given the relatively low economic intergenerational mobility in Mexico, especially in the poorest quintile, parental occupation is a good proxy of respondents’ socioeconomic status (Vélez 2013).

which both citizens and politicians tend to reify—rather than eliminate—race-based inequalities.

Combining our findings about the provision of public goods and the political process suggests that race and skin tone are two important sources of inequalities in the distribution of public resources in Mexico. Although race and skin color are not publicly discussed issues and their relevance often is denied by the Mexican state, the evidence shows that the everyday actions of Mexican citizens, politicians, and public officials result in the systemic racist biases inherent in Mexico’s public institutions.
country's persistent discrimination based on race and skin tone. This is a major step that countries such as Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia have taken; they have engaged in complex public discussions about adopting public policies that recognize and seek to overcome the hard realities of discrimination hiding beneath the myth of *mestizaje* and the rhetoric of race-neutral democracies. Failure to recognize the racial dimension of Mexico's system of overlapping inequalities will continue to hinder the country’s chances for sustained economic and political development. Furthermore, it will continue to restrain the development of competitive and meritocratic labor markets, the construction of a just and fair society, and the realization of individual and collective freedoms.

After two centuries of Independence, our findings provide compelling evidence that the colonial caste system, which liberal, conservative, authoritarian, and democratic elites have condemned for centuries, remains very much in place.

1. Because “white” remains the aspirational category in Mexico, we adjusted cases of individuals who self-identified as white but had skin tones closer to the *mestizo* category. We did not do the same for self-identified indigenous people because indigenous is the socially stigmatized category. We did not include a category of Mexicans of African descent because the survey did not provide enough information about this population group. Because they represent such a small proportion of the population (between 1% and 3%) and because the survey did not oversample this population, we might have reached biased and misleading results by including them in the analysis. The geographic clustering of Mexicans of African descent on the coasts of the states of Guerrero, Oaxaca, and Veracruz might facilitate oversampling in future surveys that focus exclusively on assessing issues related to race and skin tone.

2. Although ethnicity and race are difficult to disentangle, this article associates ethnicity with the cultural characteristics that distinguish a group (particularly language) and race with individual phenotypical features (particularly skin tone). Because linguistic minorities often share phenotypical features in Latin America (e.g., indigenous populations), following common usage, we use the concept of ethnoracial categories. See Telles (2014) and Martínez Casas et al. (2014).

3. For critical assessments of this view, see Gutiérrez (1999) and Trejo (2012).

4. For an insightful discussion of *mestizaje* as a cultural phenomenon, which does not necessarily entail racial mixing, see Knight (1990). Martínez Casas et al. (2014) provided a useful overview of different views of *mestizaje* in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Mexico.

5. During the early decades of colonial rule, members of indigenous nobilities were not necessarily ranked at the bottom of the social scale. During three centuries of colonial rule, however, most indigenous people were relegated to the bottom of colonial society.

6. For recent data, see LAPIOP (2010) and Martínez Casas et al. (2014).

7. As a reference point, historians estimate that in 1800—after nearly three centuries of Spanish colonial rule—18% of the Mexican population was white and 60% was indigenous (Telles 2014). The dominant category was indigenous, not the mixed races.

8. For a classic discussion on the concept of ranked societies, in which ethnicity and class strictly overlap, see Horowitz (1985).

9. Mexicans of African descent are not represented in this stylized figure because they were not part of the nation-building process of *mestizaje* in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. On this omission, see Sue (2013).

10. On the Chiapas rebellion, see Harvey (1998), Jung (2008), and Trejo (2012).

11. See also Martínez Casas et al. (2014, 68–9).

12. We combine in one category how individuals view themselves and how others view them. This captures the relational dimension of identities (Barth 1969).

13. Because “white” remains the aspirational category in Mexico, we adjusted cases of individuals who self-identified as white but had skin tones closer to the *mestizo* category. We did not do the same for self-identified indigenous people because indigenous is the socially stigmatized category. We did not include a category of Mexicans of African descent because the survey did not provide enough information about this population group. Because they represent such a small proportion of the population (between 1% and 3%) and because the survey did not oversample this population, we might have reached biased and misleading results by including them in the analysis. The geographic clustering of Mexicans of African descent on the coasts of the states of Guerrero, Oaxaca, and Veracruz might facilitate oversampling in future surveys that focus exclusively on assessing issues related to race and skin tone.

14. Unpacking *mestizaje* and distinguishing between “white mestizos” and “indigenous-looking mestizos” recognizes the ambiguous borders of the *mestizo* category with the two main polar categories: white and indigenous. See De la Cadena (2000), Martínez Casas et al. (2014), and Telles (2004).

15. This is not an exclusive Mexican phenomenon. In fact, in Andean countries, those indigenous-looking mestizos are called chulos or longos (Roitman 2008).

16. If *mestizos* are not disaggregated by skin tone, indigenous populations appear to be the only group facing strong discrimination. For example, Martínez Casas et al. (2014) reported that perceptions of racial discrimination affect only indigenous populations but not mestizos; Canache et al. (2014) found that mestizos face only mild levels of perceptual discrimination.

17. When a Mexican with a lighter skin tone seeks to undermine an indigenous-looking person who is moving rapidly up the economic scale, he may remind his co-national that money does not have a “whitening” effect by whispering the widespread racist saying: “La mona, aunque se vista de seda, mona se queda.” This translates as “Even if a monkey dresses in silk, it will continue to be a monkey.” Our results suggest that darker-skinned Mexicans perceive this disdain at all levels of wealth.

18. Some of the goods and services included in the index of material well-being include refrigerators, telephones (land lines), cellular phones, personal vehicles, washing machines, microwaves, personal computers, televisions, and access to the Internet. We followed LAPIOP’s procedure to calculate the relative wealth index. We thank Abby Córdova for her advice.

19. For influential works in this literature, see Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999); Baldwin and Huber (2010); and Habyarimana et al. (2007).

20. This finding is consistent with González Rivas’s (2014) results. Controlling for individual- and municipal-level characteristics, her analysis showed that indigenous households are significantly less likely to have access to clean water than the rest of Mexican society.

21. Although access to education leads Mexicans to embrace a *mestizo* identity (Martínez Casas et al. 2014), our results show that educational opportunities are not the same for all *mestizos*—those with a darker skin tone have fewer educational opportunities than those with lighter skin tones.

22. The first postauthoritarian government introduced a national agency to prevent discrimination (i.e., CONAPRED) in 2003. Although CONAPRED initially focused mainly on discrimination based on age, gender, ethnicity, religion, and sexual preferences, in recent years, it has begun to explore discrimination based on race and skin tone (CONAPRED 2010).

**REFERENCES**


We are at a critical moment in the state of race relations in the United States. The years 2013–2015 marked the 50th anniversaries of important milestones in the Civil Rights Movement. In 1963, Martin Luther King, Jr., delivered his stirring “I Have a Dream” speech at the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom. President Lyndon B. Johnson signed into law the most sweeping piece of civil rights legislation in July 1964. In 1965, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act, which explicitly forbade voter-disenfranchisement measures and opened the pathway for a generation of black people to vote for the first time in their lives. These historic events were the culmination of decades of struggle by women and men who risked their lives for freedom and justice. However, even when a process of struggle culminates in transformative events, the reality of everyday life shows that significant social change is complicated and slow.

On August 28, 1963, in the shadow of Abraham Lincoln and amid thousands of onlookers, King stood on the Washington Mall and observed that in the 100 years since the Emancipation Proclamation, “the life of the Negro is still sadly crippled by the manacles of segregation and the chains of discrimination…. America has given the Negro people a bad check, a check which has come back marked ‘insufficient funds.’” Now, 50 years later, it is necessary to ask two important questions: How far has the United States come? And where do we go from here? These questions are especially important given the racist police violence that has rocked the nation and weakened already-fragile black communities. From small suburban cities like Ferguson, Missouri, to big metropolitan cities like New York, black men and women were brutally killed by law enforcement officers who have escaped punishment. In response, citizens took to the streets to protest, many carrying signs that read “Black Lives Matter” as a counter to the seemingly disposability of black lives at the hands of law enforcement. The frustration and rage that many black citizens felt was plastered across the news for weeks on end. It was not the long, hot summer of 1968; it was after 2015, and now the summer of 2016.

Scholars, journalists, and concerned citizens have responded to the crisis in various ways, with different sides blaming each other for the physical loss of life and/or for the material loss of goods. However, much of the work has been uninformed by social science and has not properly interrogated the historical and contemporary racial and class dimensions. For these reasons, we believe that this chapter (and the task force report of which it is a part) is incredibly timely. Our goal is to describe the state of race and class inequalities as it relates to black politics. We cannot encompass everything related to this issue, but we highlight key areas.

The unrest in cities across the United States that has manifested in the burning of businesses, the torching of police cars, and the silent but determined marching of many black citizens was not irrational—and it certainly was not surprising for scholars of black politics. To understand the protection of white law enforcement officers in the aftermath of black killings, the #blacklivesmatter movement, and the rage of many blacks, we must examine the intersection of race and class and how it shapes individual and group identity in the black community. In what follows, we address a number of key questions, including: Do race and class continue to intersect and affect the black political agenda? Does increasing class stratification among blacks weaken their group consciousness? What is the impact of the Great Recession of 2008 on black economic prospects? Which reforms will narrow the racial gap?

MISSED OPPORTUNITIES

To explore the role of race and class in black politics today, we first must take into account how historical decisions have shaped the landscape for blacks. Path dependency in the social sciences suggests that we cannot understand where we are today or the choices that political actors make without contextualizing the present in past decisions, policies, and laws. In other words, current outcomes in the area of black politics are dependent on the sequence of previous outcomes related to black politics. This discussion concurs with social science research that demonstrates the
...the denial of GI Bill educational and training benefits to black soldiers exacerbated the racial gap and set blacks and whites down two different paths. Thus, while whites were improving economically through federal public-assistance programs, African Americans were being left behind.

Economic violence against blacks included the theft of land owned by blacks, the destruction of individual black people and black communities considered too prosperous (the 1921 Tulsa pogrom is an extreme example), and the prevention of labor organizing by blacks (e.g., the 1919 Elaine, Arkansas, massacre). White nightriders often colluded with the state, through both the terrorizing, arrest, incarceration, and murder of black people and the various tax and loan schemes to either seize or defraud blacks of their property. As discussed in this chapter, these schemes also would wreak havoc in black communities in the North.

Well into the twentieth century, federal policies continued to treat black and whites differently. "Jim Crow" was a comprehensive system of oppression designed to create two separate and unequal societies. Jim Crow laws mandated segregation in all public facilities, including schools, workplaces, department stores, courts, and public transportation. The laws were instituted mainly in the South, but the North also organized around entrenched racial discrimination and violence in the forms of restrictive covenants, discriminatory union rules, and firebombing of homes and businesses (Biondi 2006; Muhammad 2010; Sugrue 2008). These state laws emerged in the aftermath of Reconstruction, when Southern political elites began strategizing about returning to the system of white supremacy that had existed under slavery. They subsequently were aided by the 1896 Supreme Court decision in Plessy v. Ferguson (163 U.S. 537), which ruled that the doctrine of "separate but equal" was constitutional.
The most detrimental Jim Crow policies were the discriminatory housing and criminal policies, both of which had a lasting impact on black communities. As numerous scholars have described (Alexander 2010; Forman 2012; Gilmore 2007; Murakawa 2014), the foundation for the profitable prison-industrial apparatus in place today was laid decades ago in response to civil-rights advances of blacks. Finally, it is impossible to understand the current state of class inequality in the black community without considering the historical role that federal housing policies played in discriminating against and profiting from black homeowners.

In 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson commissioned a now-lauded advisory committee after the race riots in the summer of 1967. The committee conducted an in-depth investigation and determined that the frustration of blacks stemmed from inattention to structural conditions that produced inequality and the lack of economic opportunities. The committee issued the famous warning that “We are moving towards two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal” and also pointed to white racism as the central cause for black rioting. The committee issued a set of recommendations designed to decrease the level of racial segregation and urban violence. By 2015, few of those recommendations had been followed and racial violence erupted again. This should not be surprising; solutions that do not address the underlying issues of a problem can serve as only a temporary stopgap. Therefore, we believe that the current crisis should be contextualized in a longer history of race, class, and inequality in the United States.

THE GREAT RECESSION AND BLACK ECONOMIC INEQUALITY

In this contemporary era, the importance of race is perhaps best expressed through an intersectional analysis. Whereas state and private violence against black citizens is one of the most visible forms of continued racial oppression, economic violence against black communities has accelerated in the wake of the Great Recession of 2008. Race and class continue to intersect and, in some ways, this critical intersection has intensified.

The Great Recession (Cooper, Gable, and Austin 2012) shifted the economic status of blacks from dire to devastating across multiple domains. Even in 2016, we cannot discuss the state of black politics without considering the persisting impact of the recession. Black unemployment, the wealth gap, and residential segregation all worsened as a result of the recession; some of these changes were a result of structural damage that will be extraordinarily difficult to reverse. Even in economic sectors that are improving, it is troubling that black economic fortunes continue to decline.

In the current period, when the United States supposedly has entered a postracial era, massive economic disparities still exist between blacks and whites and, to a significant degree, between whites and Latinos as well. Poor and working-class blacks have been hit especially hard. For example, with respect to labor markets, “[there was] a double disadvantage for black public-sector workers.... They are concentrated in a shrinking sector of the economy, and they are substantially more likely than other public-sector workers to be without work” (Cohen 2015). The well-known wealth differences that worsened both during and after the Great Recession directly affect the economic status of African Americans. Black families that did not experience unemployment had dramatically lower levels of median income than white families that did experience unemployment. Black families experienced a 41% higher unemployment rate (Kurtzleben 2013). This harms both economic security and mobility for black families. Public-sector cuts led to a loss of programs including childcare; other programs necessary for sustaining economic survival also were drastically cut with disparate negative impacts on black communities (Cohen 2015).

The manufacturing and the public sectors of the economy, instrumental to the mid-twentieth-century explosive growth in black incomes, have been in a 50-year decline. Dawson (2011, 118) argued, “...changes in the American political economy [were] responsible for continued high rates of black poverty—deindustrialization, spatial mismatch, the shrinking of the government labor forces at all levels, deproletarianization—have played an even more proximate role in sustaining high rates of black unemployment.” Dawson (2011, 132–3) continued by describing this transformation in more detail, using Los Angeles as an exemplar:

The rapidity with which increasing economic devastation hit cities such as Detroit and Los Angeles can be seen in the decline in manufacturing jobs. South Central Los Angeles (the iconic black ghetto of the mid-to-late twentieth-century Los Angeles, now mainly Latino) lost 70,000 high-wage manufacturing jobs just between 1978 and 1982. The 200 firms that left South Central during this period moved either to the predominantly white outer suburbs or over the border to Mexico, where labor could be more easily exploited. The manufacturing jobs were to some degree replaced by low-paid service jobs offering inferior conditions. The employers of these new service firms had a strong preference for immigrant, mainly Latino, labor and an antipathy toward black labor. This transition in the local political economy was a major factor contributing to a 50 percent black male unemployment rate during the early 1990s. This process was repeated in the major
manufacturing centers in The East, Midwest, and West Coast—all areas that had a history of militant labor organizing, including significant participation by black (and other non-white) workers).

The long-term structural changes in the American political economy devastated the black working and, to some degree, middle classes. This devastation was magnified by the ravages of the Great Recession.

The intersection of race and class combined to have a truly horrific impact on the economic health of black communities. According to the US Census in 2009, the median white family had $97,000 in assets, the average black family had $2,900, and the average Latino family had only $1,300. While black unemployment typically runs higher than Latino unemployment, in general blacks and Latinos are mired at the bottom of the US economic ladder and whites in the United States are on top. Between 2010 and 2014 white wealth rose by 2.4%, whereas Latino wealth declined by 14% and black wealth declined by 34%. Although the level of wealth was lower than those percentages before the recession, it is evident that black wealth continues to plummet absolutely and comparatively, despite the “recovery.” Both the absolute and relative economic status of blacks worsened during and after the recession. Median white wealth is approximately 20 times greater than black wealth, black unemployment continues at more than twice that of white unemployment, and black poverty rates are almost three times greater than those of white Americans.

The current black economic inequality was substantially shaped by racist state policies that were then exploited by predatory entrepreneurs. As discussed in our Public Culture article, blacks also were disproportionately affected by the mortgage-loan crisis; predatory mega-banks targeted black and brown communities with criminally discriminatory loan packages (Dawson and Francis 2016). An extraordinary example is in Chicago during the mid-to-late twentieth century. According to historian Andrew Kahrl (2015), Illinois passed legislation that made it easy for unscrupulous lawyers and firms to seize homes for tax delinquencies of as little as $3. When they purchased tax liens to seize (disproportionately) black homes, both unethical and outright illegal practices were sanctioned by the state and used. Indeed, they were used in accord with practices intended to clear black neighborhoods of their residents. The state greatly exacerbated racist policies that deepened black economic inequality from the 1940s to the 1970s by intentionally over-assessing black neighborhoods while under-assessing large corporations and white neighborhoods. This unjustly shifted the property-tax burden to those who could least afford to bear it. In Chicago, this practice was the well-known “Black Tax” (Capps 2015; Kahrl 2015). Even when these practices were fully exposed by the media in the 1970s, white homeowners and corporations continued to support the system from which they benefited.

As in Ferguson, Missouri, the extraction of unfair taxes from black residents was used as a critical revenue stream for governments throughout the country. When California attempted in the late 1970s to actually tax white properties at a justifiable level, the withdrawal of white privilege directly resulted in the tax revolt, which in 1978 produced Proposition 13 (Kahrl 2015). The predatory policies of that era served as a model for others that further devastated black communities during the Great Recession. Reporting on Kahrl’s research, Capps showed that discriminatory housing practices in Chicago extended into this era and were not confined to Chicago but also are used in cities including Baltimore, Washington, DC, and Cleveland. These policies left poor and particularly black communities vulnerable to the predatory lending policies that produced the housing crisis, which paved the way for the Great Recession.

The current debt crisis, as well as the different loan types and lending rates offered to minorities, is a reminder that this type of exploitation does not belong to a bygone era. In 2011, it was revealed that major banks—including SunTrust, Wells Fargo, and Bank of America—used race as a central factor in determining higher fees and interest rates during the housing boom. This discrimination was not isolated to a city or a state but rather was systemic (i.e., more than 200,000 minority borrowers in the Bank of America case and more than 34,000 in the Wells Fargo case). It has been shown that similarly situated blacks and whites received dramatically different treatment, increasing the debt of people in the former group significantly more than the latter. Specifically, the Department of Justice (DOJ) determined that these banks steered minority borrowers into costly and dangerous subprime loans and charged them higher fees. Brokers steered homebuyers into subprime loans even when they qualified for lower-interest prime loans to earn a higher commission. Signed court affidavits from former Wells Fargo loan officers portray a company that preyed on minority housing debt.

“The company put ‘bounties’ on minority borrowers,” Tony Paschal, a former employee, explained. “By this I mean that loan officers received cash incentives to aggressively market subprime loans in minority communities.” The practice was so prevalent in working-class black communities that Wells Fargo loan officers referred to subprime loans as “ghetto loans” and strategized about how to infiltrate African American churches to exploit vulnerable black families who wanted to buy homes.
Illinois passed legislation that made it easy for unscrupulous lawyers and firms to seize homes for tax delinquencies of as little as $3... Both unethical and outright illegal practices were sanctioned by the state and used ... to clear black neighborhoods of their residents.

Even in the twenty-first century, simply looking black or brown can result in a borrower being charged a higher interest rate and incurring more debt. The discrimination was so rampant that the DOJ sued Bank of America and Wells Fargo for their predatory lending practices. In the first and second largest fair-lending settlements in DOJ history, Bank of America and Wells Fargo agreed to pay $335 million and $175 million, respectively. In its investigation, the DOJ found that highly qualified black borrowers were four times as likely and Latino borrowers were three times as likely as whites with similar profiles to receive a subprime loan from Wells Fargo. The racial discrimination was so persistent that Assistant Attorney General Thomas Perez stated that these discriminatory lending practices amounted to a “racial surtax.”

Although history-making, the legal settlements were far too little and came too late for the countless minority borrowers who had already lost their homes. The paltry settlements hardly made a dent in the banks’ year-end profits, banks did not have to admit to wrongdoing, and bank executives were never held criminally liable. Meanwhile, the ramifications of the banks’ actions on borrowers were much more severe: the short-term impact for those who could meet the higher interest rates and fees has been a loss in income and savings. The impact on access to credit for blacks whose home the bank foreclosed on has been devastating; homeownership is the basis of wealth for most Americans. As a result, this “credit crunch” will likely have longer-term consequences on education and future employment opportunities. When the mortgage market collapsed between mid-2007 and 2008, American households lost 22% of their wealth (i.e., $14 trillion) at the same time that 3.3 million jobs disappeared (Panitch and Gindin 2012, 318). These policies led to a foreclosure rate three times as high for black neighborhoods and nearly as high for Latino neighborhoods (Hall, Crowder, and Spring 2015).

The Great Recession had multiple negative effects on black communities, including the direct result of acceleration in residential racial segregation (Hall, Crowder, and Spring 2015). Racially diverse neighborhoods also had very high rates of foreclosure compared to majority-white neighborhoods, resulting in these areas becoming more segregated (Hall, Crowder, and Spring 2015). These effects were magnified in the South and the West, where there were higher rates of foreclosure and more fluid racial patterns of residence in metropolitan areas. Hall, Crowder, and Spring (2015, 19) concluded, “There is strong evidence that the U.S. foreclosure crisis was predicated at least partly on discriminatory lending behaviors and on racially targeted, predatory marketing... Our results indicate that racial stratification not only structured the concentration of foreclosures, but racial inequality in the residential context has been exacerbated as a result of the crisis.”

The combination of neoliberal ideology and the recession has further undercut what had been the most reliable source of black employment in the past several decades: the public sector. Whereas blacks constituted approximately 13% of the state and local government workforce, they “accounted for almost one-fifth (19.8%) of the overall decline in state and local government employment between 2007 and 2011—blacks lost a greater percent of public-sector employment than any other racial group as a result of the Great Recession and its aftermath” (Cooper, Gable, and Austin 2012). However, the public-sector layoffs cannot be simply explained as needing more highly skilled workers. It was also the sector of the economy in which the racial wage gap for comparable levels of skills was the smallest. Black workers in the public sector are highly educated: “For African Americans, the share with at least a bachelor’s degree, at 42.1 percent, is more than double that of the private sector (20.1 percent), [but]...the most rigorous studies have consistently shown that state and local government employees earn less both in wages and total compensation than comparable private-sector workers” (Cooper, Gable, and Austin 2012).

African Americans have not only disproportionately been laid off; they also have had more difficulty than either whites or Latinos in finding private-sector employment after they are laid off by the state. Indeed, blacks represented 20% of those who lost public-sector employment and 27%...
The brutal combination of racist state policies and predatory and racist financial institutions has caused an economic disaster for African American communities—a disaster that is reflected in the rebellions in Ferguson and Baltimore.

of those who were still unemployed in 2011—a much larger proportion than for other racial groups (Cooper, Gable, and Austin 2012). Cooper et al. concluded, “This finding suggests that, unlike other groups who either took jobs in the private sector or exited the labor force since the beginning of the recession, African Americans have faced greater difficulty in finding other work and/or remained more strongly attached to the labor market, leading to their higher share of those still unemployed.” Given the long-term tendency for blacks to be pushed entirely outside of the labor force, it is not speculative to surmise that this large proportion is due to the difficulty in finding work for former black public-sector workers. The impact of neoliberal ideology is revealed in the fact that as the recession is ending, the public sector continues to shrink, despite the growth of the population. The neoliberal attack on the state—specifically, public-sector unionism—has had a particularly deleterious effect on black economic wealth. The neoliberal remaking of the state (i.e., privatization and destruction of the social safety net) has resulted in large sections of what had been an economically vibrant and stable black working and lower-middle class devastated and destitute.

The recession also affected black employment and wealth. It greatly weakened the public sector—and 20% of all African American adults work for the state (Cohen 2015). Unfortunately, whereas the private sector has recovered 2 million jobs since the official “end” of the recession, the state sector continues to lose them—almost 600,000 jobs more than the nearly 750,000 jobs lost during the recession (Cooper, Gable, and Austin 2012). This is especially harmful to the economic status of blacks because black public-sector workers—better educated although compensated less than their private-sector counterparts—suffered less of a racial wage gap than in the private sector. With respect to race, the public sector was far more egalitarian than the private sector. The continued decline of the public sector also means that “African Americans have faced greater difficulty in finding other work...leading to a larger share of those still unemployed” (Cooper, Gable, and Austin 2012, 13–14).

According to a recent Pew Report, the cumulative and other effects of the Great Recession on African American communities has led to an even greater widening of the wealth gap between blacks and whites. Since the recession, white median household wealth is now 13 times greater than black household wealth (Kochhar 2014). Again, these economic losses continue after the official end of the recession. Whereas median white wealth increased by a modest 2.4% between 2010 and 2013, black and Latino wealth decreased by 34% and 14%, respectively (Kochhar 2014). The widening of the wealth gap after the recession can be traced to the ongoing difficulties that blacks face in the “post”-recession labor market, as well as the continuation of predatory mortgage and tax policies that greatly undermine their ability to build wealth as white Americans have through the investment in their homes. The brutal combination of racist state policies and predatory and racist financial institutions has caused an economic disaster for African American communities—a disaster that is reflected in the rebellions in Ferguson and Baltimore.

The assaults on the economic health of poor blacks have had a particularly devastating impact on black women. As reported elsewhere, “Another devastating economic consequence was that involuntary part-time employment nearly doubled between mid-2007 and early 2013. These losses led to great increases in poverty rates for families with involuntary part-year workers. The effect of involuntary part-time work was particularly ruinous for households headed by black or Latina women, since they had poverty rates of over 55 percent. Welfare reform exacerbated all of these trends by transferring the responsibility of providing a social safety net from government agencies to private households and charities” (Lambert, cited in Dawson and Francis 2016).

Neoliberal policies that greatly intensified the financialization of both the US economy and the global economy also have resulted in declining black economic, social, and political outcomes. The mortgage-loan industry using new financial instruments that aided the predatory loans targeting black communities was one mechanism through which financialization led to depressed black communities (Panitch and Gindin 2012). Another mechanism was the use of tax liens to aid the outright theft of black property (Kahl 2015). Another example of the use of financial instruments to oppress minority communities was the use of lease revenue bonds by anti-tax Republicans
to finance the massive growth of the California prison system (Hagan et al. 2015). What is important to understand is that active state involvement was absolutely critical in making available these and other varied financial instruments that, in turn, were used with such disastrous effects on poor and particularly black communities.

Exacerbating and complicating these effects on poor, working-class, and lower-to-middle-middle class African Americans is the steady growth of a black upper-middle class and black bourgeoisie. Neoliberal ideology has had a pernicious effect on black economic inequality that transcends state policy and that targets the heart of black politics. The type of cross-class black united fronts that often marked social movements of the twentieth century is absent in the struggle for black economic justice. A wide cross section of black elites has embraced neoliberal ideology with the effect that they often blame the black poor for their plight—even when that is not the case, they have largely eschewed non-electoral politics as a means of black advancement (Dawson and Francis 2016). While linked fate remains strong across classes of African Americans, it translates even less into black agreement over strategy and tactics than it did during most of the last century. This development complicates black politics because different class segments of the black community have different political agendas—specifically related to economic and fiscal policy.

THE PERSISTING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE

In the age of Obama, two of the most pressing questions often asked are: Is the United States postracial (or at least almost there)? Does race still matter in the way that citizens understand and navigate in the United States? Focusing on the political behavior of African Americans, previous research provided considerable insight about the contours of black group identity and revealed that race continues to have a dominant influence on black political attitudes—more so than economic factors (Dawson 1994). In writing this chapter, we wanted to revisit the second question. Stated differently: To what degree do African Americans still believe that their fate is tied to that of the race as a whole, given the growing chasm between the life experiences of poor and affluent blacks and the hollowing out of the black working class due to the devastation of the manufacturing and public sectors? Surprisingly perhaps, there remain strong levels of linked fate across various socioeconomic stratifications (tables 1 and 2).4

On the one hand, this is understandable, given the current racist climate in the United States and the prominence of both state and individual white racist attacks on individual blacks, groups of blacks (e.g., Charleston), and black institutions—especially the arson attacks on black churches throughout the country. On the other hand, the high level of linked fate is partly deceptive, as explained in Dawson’s (1994) Behind the Mule. Although blacks from different strata and classes may agree that their fates are linked to that of their race, how the linkage is manifested can vary significantly. As demonstrated in Dawson’s (2003) Black Visions, deep class divisions could be manifested on issues such as attitudes toward the police, despite strong levels of linked fate. Context matters. In an environment perceived as deeply racially hostile by blacks across divisions, the strong levels of linked fate will have a more acute role in predicting black opinion on significant but not all ranges of issues. In environments in which the overall racial climate is more in the background, we found linked fate to be less predictive of black opinion—even though there are still high levels.

For blacks, the years since 2012 serve as a contemporary reminder that America is certainly not free from its racial nightmare. We observe increasing evidence to suggest that blacks across a wide range of economic strata perceive the current environment to be hostile. Perhaps no issue has highlighted the durability of racism in the United States like the escalation of violence since 2012 by officers of the state as well as private citizens. The murders of Trayvon Martin, Michael Brown, Walter Scott, Rekia Boyd, Clementa Pickney, and many other unarmed victims occurred because they had black skin in a society that has yet to embrace and protect the humanity of African Americans. These victims came from different class backgrounds, yet all met the same fate at the hands of private citizens or law enforcement officials who perceived

The situation has become so dire that the hashtag #blacklivesmatter was created to focus attention on the fact that “black lives” were under attack, were deprived of human rights, and that they actually mattered.
them to be dangerous. In most cases, no one is held responsible for the taking of black lives.

The situation has become so dire that the hashtag #blacklivesmatter was created to focus attention on the fact that “black lives” were under attack, were deprived of human rights, and that they actually mattered. It was a solemn but necessary reminder that black lives appear to be increasingly disposable compared to other races in the United States. The most accurate reporting on police killings reveals that 1,134 people were killed in 2015 in the United States at the hands of law enforcement officers. The study also revealed that blacks are twice as likely to be killed as whites or Latinos and that blacks killed by police were significantly more likely to have been unarmed. Thus, it is not surprising that racial discrimination remains a paramount concern in 2016 because it is the very basis for the differential treatment that African Americans receive at the hands of law enforcement. To decrease the level of racial inequality that blacks experience, their right to live must be protected.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Race and class inequality in black politics is in a vulnerable state. The recovery of the black workforce after the Great Recession has been slow and is unlikely to fully rebound. Particularly catastrophic were discriminatory housing policies and the foreclosure crisis, which decimated a generation of black wealth and asset accumulation. Most distressing, the killings of black citizens by officers of the state have highlighted the contemporary durability of American racism. Although this chapter arrives at grim conclusions, we nevertheless see many opportunities for improvement; we are particularly hopeful about the #blacklivesmatter organizing and coalition-building around recent racial injustices.

Recommendation 1: Explicitly Address Economic Inequality through Government Programs

Just as the state was responsible for crafting and enabling policies that worsened black oppression, any serious attempt to address black economic inequality will require a new range of state action. State policy, specifically at the federal level, has been required in the past to aid the quest for black racial, social, economic, and political justice. State action will be required to rein in the worst excesses of neoliberal financialization, including many of the local-level policies that resulted in the loss of black property and wealth globally in the Great Recession. Other policies that are more positive will be needed and would include explicit government action to reduce the massive types of current inequality in the United States today.

---

Table 1: Belief in Linked Fate by Income Level (Weighted)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BELIEF IN LINKED FATE</th>
<th>LESS THAN $5,000–12,499</th>
<th>$12,500–29,999</th>
<th>$30,000–49,999</th>
<th>$50,000–84,999</th>
<th>$85,000–175,000 OR MORE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>30%</td>
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<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>334</td>
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<td></td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td>114</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Belief in Linked Fate by Educational Attainment (Weighted)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BELIEF IN LINKED FATE</th>
<th>NO DIPLOMA/GED</th>
<th>DIPLOMA/GED OR SOME COLLEGE</th>
<th>ASSOCIATE DEGREE OR HIGHER</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>NO</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>143</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>30%</td>
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<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>334</td>
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<td></td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>70%</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>477</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Recommendation 2: Raise the Minimum Wage to a Living Wage

Although there has been notable progress in cities including Seattle and Los Angeles in raising the minimum wage to $15 an hour, we must recognize that more work is needed to address this issue. First, there are vast regions of the United States that still have a minimum wage that does not adequately support a family; moreover, in some areas, $15 is not sufficient and, as it exists right now, the minimum wage in many cities is unlivable. A more comprehensive governmental effort to provide a living wage must consider basic costs of living in different US cities and regions.

Recommendation 3: Create Robust Government Jobs Program

Given the high levels of unemployment and continued racial discrimination in labor markets, there also must be a restoration of the safety net for individuals and families who are detached from them. The best income-support program is a vigorous jobs program. The largest increase in black incomes was achieved in the twentieth century as African Americans moved into good urban public- and manufacturing-sector jobs. These jobs need to be replaced and two possibilities that both require state programs are the rebuilding of the country’s infrastructure and programs designed to “green” the cities.

Recommendation 4: End the War on Drugs

The US criminal-justice system has significantly shaped the development of America’s racial order. Discriminatory drug laws and the overpolicing of minorities have led to a dramatic increase in the number of incarcerated Americans: one in every 15 black men and one in every 36 Latino men. Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that one in three black men can expect to go to jail in their lifetimes. As numerous researchers have described, massive racial disparities undergird the War on Drugs in terms of arrests, prosecutions, and time of imprisonment. The War on Drugs has led to the long-term incarceration of nonviolent, low-level drug offenders—a problem that President Obama called “unproductive.” The War on Drugs must end and new drug policies and laws based on science, public health, and human rights must replace it.

Recommendation 5: Curtail Law-Enforcement Discretion

Discretion in the criminal-justice system takes many forms. The recent past has shown the dangerous consequences of police discretion in those stopped on the streets and how an arrest is made (e.g., Freddie Gray in Baltimore). It can take other forms, such as plea bargaining and sentencing. Whether walking to school, returning home, or driving, blacks are more likely to be stopped and questioned. The most recent statistics released by New York City revealed that 87% of those “stopped and frisked” by the NYPD were black or Latino. However, arrests were made in only 6% of the stops and most were for nonviolent offenses. New York City is not the only city in which blacks are disproportionately stopped and searched; this occurs in many cities across the United States.

Recommendation 6: Return to the Tradition of Radical Black Politics

Both the state and other interests that have profited from the subordination of blacks in the United States will resist reform in the areas described in this chapter. All black advancement has come only as a result of the state, civil society, and economic enterprises responding to mass pressure from blacks and their allies. The radical black traditions of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Ida B. Wells, Ella Baker, and others must be revived and adapted to the twenty-first century to guide those working within and outside of the electoral system in gaining racial and economic justice for African Americans. As evidenced by the organizing connected to #blacklivesmatter, race continues to play an important role in the shaping of black freedom movements. However, despite the continuing importance of race for descriptive representation and movement building, blacks are (and should be) increasingly building alliances that cut across race while still acknowledging its significance. The ownership by young people has led to a movement that actively seeks to connect injustices felt by blacks to other struggles for justice, such as LGBTQ and immigration rights. The #blacklivesmatter movement is directly connected to the persecution faced by LGBTQ individuals at the hands of law enforcement and to the harassment faced by undocumented students and workers. We believe the growing economic and racial inequality across a range of different domains is highlighting the need to work together in creating a new radical black politics.
NOTES
3. Some loan officers received anywhere from $600,000 to $1 million in commissions for securing subprime loans. Subprime loan rates can range from only 1-2% to over 10% higher than the cost of a conventional/prime loan, depending upon a lender's rates and the borrower's credit history. See: Affidavit of Elizabeth M. Jacobson at 5, Mayor & City Council of Baltimore. v. Wells Fargo, 631 F. Supp. 2d 702 (D. Md. 2009).
4. Data for tables 1 and 2 are from 2010. The data used in these tables are from the “Election 2008 and Beyond Survey: Waves 1–3 (2008/2009/2010)”; Principal Investigator Cathy J. Cohen and Co-Principal Investigator Michael C. Dawson. Collected in three waves over the course of one year, the “Election 2008 and Beyond Survey” was conducted by Knowledge Networks using an online panel methodology based on a random-digit-dialing household sampling. The first wave was in the field in the weeks leading up to the 2008 election (October 17, 2008 – November 3, 2008); the second wave was fielded six months after the election (May 30, 2009 – July 24, 2009); and the final wave was in the field one year after the election (November 24, 2009 – January 19, 2010). Comprising a rich set of topics related to race, politics, and government, these nationally representative data feature oversamples of blacks, Latinos, Asians, and young people (ages 18–35) and include substantial numbers of foreign-born respondents—approximately a quarter of the total sample. More than 40% of Latino respondents opted to take the survey in Spanish; all other respondents, including Asian respondents, were offered the survey in English. The “Election 2008 and Beyond Survey” was fielded as part of the Mobilization, Change, and Political and Civic Engagement Project, led by Cathy J. Cohen at the University of Chicago and featuring this panel study of political attitudes and behavior in the context of the Obama campaign and presidency. More information is available at www.2008andbeyond.com.
6. Data for table 3 are from the “Black Politics and the Making of Modern American Ideologies” (Dawson & Francis, 2014). Data were collected in 2011 via survey of individuals in 500 communities across all 50 states using a random-digit-dialing household sampling methodology. A total of 9,996 respondents completed the survey, with a margin of error of ±3.1%.

REFERENCES
Asian Americans occupy a defined and by now accepted corner of America’s “ethnoracial pentagon.” Yet ponder “inequality” and “Asian American” is unlikely to come to mind. In fact, kindle what we think we know about Asian Americans and the light shines on their storied heights of educational and socioeconomic achievement, or perhaps the remarkable within-group diversity that calls to question the very coherence of the pan-ethnic category itself. This chapter explores the ways in which Asian Americans are a meaningful, even critical group to consider in thinking about race and inequality in the United States. It discusses in detail the way in which the social meanings attached to the category “Asian” have shifted in the United States from a designation that foreclosed opportunities for full citizenship to a valorized position of a “model minority” within the racial order. Despite this valorization, the chapter points out that Asian Americans continue to face discrimination and underrepresentation in a number of fields in American life. These empirical realities debunk arguments that portray racial gaps between whites and people of color in the United States as epiphenomena of socioeconomic status. Finally, it demonstrates how the “model-minority” narrative obscures the rampant inequalities that exist among different ethnic subgroups.

In contemporary social and political discourse on class inequalities in the United States, discussion of Asian Americans is relatively scarce compared with examinations of the unequal fortunes of other groups of racialized Americans. Nevertheless, Asian Americans have been consistently and throughout the history of the United States separated into distinct categories of race, beginning with the earliest classification of Chinese in 1870 and continuing with the multiplicity of Asian race categories in the 2010 US Census. Although remaining classified as racial minorities, the construction of Asian Americans in the last several decades as a model minority highlights their relatively high levels of educational attainment and economic status while simultaneously ignoring the diversity of the population. This obscures the wide variation in resources among ethnic groups within the broader set of Asian Americans and persistently discounts unequal opportunities and outcomes in the United States.

Indeed, the contemporary characterization of Asian Americans as a model minority coexists with the “forever-foreigner” trope, which emphasizes their purported inability to assimilate while underscoring a long-standing fear of a “yellow peril” (Kim 2000; Takaki 1989; Tuan 1998). Although they have been present in the Americas for centuries, Americans of Asian descent until recently accounted for only a small proportion of the US population. So effective were federal policies of Asian exclusion that there were fewer than a million Asian Americans in the United States when immigration law was reformed by the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act. Since then, record numbers of immigrants from a wide range of Asian countries have arrived in the United States. Comprising a population distinct from pre-1965 cohorts in terms of education and income, Asian Americans in the United States today are characterized by diversity, remain the target of racial discrimination, and continue to struggle to achieve political recognition and representation.

Focusing on Asian Americans in the United States, this chapter elaborates on three key observations from the study of racial and class inequalities when viewed through the perspective of Asian Americans. First, it discusses the perils of aggregation, arguing that the process of combining the diverse groups of immigrants (and their US-born offspring) into the broader category of Asian American obscures important internal diversity and can result in inaccurate conclusions about inequality and race in the United States. Second, the chapter highlights how the political meaning of Asian American is structured by time, context, and institutions, thereby contending that these constructions continue to nurture inegalitarian practices and political outcomes. Third, it provides empirical illustrations of how inequality for Asian Americans is both cumulative and relational, the result of overlapping spheres of exclusion. Taken together, this trio of observations yields a set of recommendations for devising more robust analyses of inequality within the context of a more racially and ethnically diverse environment.

THE CONTEMPORARY DIVERSITY OF ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE PERILS OF AGGREGATION

Immigration from a diverse set of Asian nations has occurred at the same time during which the official government racial taxonomy has undergone substantial
change regarding the classification of who is Asian (Wong et al. 2011). In its enumeration questionnaire beginning in 2000, the US Census Bureau considers Asian to refer to individuals with origins in the Far East, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Subcontinent, in addition to Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islanders in separate categories. A person can be identified racially by country of origin and the categories of Asian Indian, Chinese, Filipino, Korean, Japanese, Vietnamese, and “Other Asian,” including Asians of Burmese, Cambodian, Hmong, Laotian, Pakistani, and Thai origins.

This broad array of countries includes tremendous diversity inside of the larger category of Asian in terms of language, religion, socioeconomic resources, history in the United States, migration trajectory, and geographic location of settlement. Neither do Asian Americans in the United States today share a common language or religion. Languages spoken by Asian Americans include Mandarin and Cantonese, Arabic, Vietnamese, Tagalog, Korean, Samoan, Tongan, Japanese, Thai, Hindi, Cambodian, and Bengali, among other languages and dialects. Unlike other immigrant groups from Latin America, new arrivals from Asian nations do not share a common language (i.e., Spanish) or a dominant religion (e.g., Catholicism). In contrast, Asian Americans today are as likely to adhere to the religious beliefs and practices of Christianity as Islam, Buddhism, or Hinduism.

In addition to the wide swath of languages spoken and religions practiced, Asian Americans have distinctive trajectories of migration to the United States. A heavily immigrant group overall, only about one quarter of adult Asian Americans today are native-born. These citizens by birth in the second generation and beyond are more likely to have origins in the East Asian nations of China and Japan or in the Philippines, given the relatively early settlement by immigrants from these countries to the United States. At the same time, Asian Americans with Chinese and Filipino roots nevertheless as a group are more heavily immigrant as a function of more recent waves of migration from these countries, whereas Japanese Americans comprise the only ethnic-origin group of Asian Americans who are majority native-born.

Another important trait differentiating Asian Americans is their immigration status and the way they came to the United States. Although the largest grouping of immigrants to the United States overall is through reunification with family already in the country, Asian immigrants are more likely than other immigrant groups to have come to the United States on employment visas and with refugee status. Asian Indians are among the more recent Asian immigrant groups, and a relatively large proportion gain entry and lawful permanent residence through employment preferences as skilled workers. In contrast, a greater number of Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Hmong Americans arrived in the United States as refugees from their home countries. As a result of these unique circumstances, settlement patterns in the United States also are distinctive: Hmong Americans settled in locations as diverse as Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Fresno, California, whereas larger groups of Vietnamese Americans reside in New Orleans, Louisiana, and Houston, Texas, and Cambodian Americans live in locations as diverse as Long Beach, California; Lowell, Massachusetts; and Jacksonville, Florida. Refugee resettlement often has occurred in conjunction with the assistance of civic and religious groups located in cities and states atypical of traditional immigrant destinations. In contrast, immigrants who come on employment visas or under family reunification, such as Asian Indians and Koreans, are more likely to settle in urban metropolitan areas with already-existing large populations of Asian Americans, including Los Angeles, the San Francisco Bay area, and the New York metropolitan area.

Despite stereotypes of Asian Americans as a model minority with uniformly high educational and income levels, there is a wide range of socioeconomic resources (Aoki and Takeda 2008). The distribution of income and economic resources for Asian Americans is heavily bi-modal: highly skilled workers and those with commercial connections and business interests are on the right tail of the distribution, whereas other Asian Americans with a relatively lower level of education and occupational skills are on the low end of the resource distribution. In this regard, it is incorrect to characterize the Asian American population as only wealthy or underprivileged. For example,
although median household income for Asian Americans is higher at $66,000, compared with the overall population of $49,800, these averages obscure a much different pattern when disaggregated by national origin among Asian Americans (see www.pewsocialtrends.org/asianamericans-graphics/st_12-06-17_aa_income). Similarly, and as the data in figure 1 attest, although aggregate levels of educational attainment for Asian Americans is higher than the general population, the proportion of those with a college degree within the broader category of Asian Americans varies substantially.

Aggregation thus obscures internal diversity within the category of Asian Americans and can yield inaccurate conclusions about political, economic, and social outcomes. Figure 2 provides data on poverty rates in California, demonstrating that a higher proportion of Asian Pacific Islanders and Asian Americans with national origins in Southeast Asia live in poverty than the average rate among all Californians. Similarly, there is substantial variation in the rate at which groups of Asian Americans are uninsured. Figure 3 documents these patterns.

These data illustrate the phenomenon that aggregation can obscure internal diversity within the broader category of Asian Americans, resulting in inaccurate conclusions about the model-minority status of this racialized group. In this respect, aggregation also can be exploited to valorize one group relative to others, such as African Americans and Latinos, thereby promoting principles of “color-blindness.” Assuming the pan-ethnic grouping of Asian Americans and aggregating various groups therefore can have both empirical and ideological consequences.

![Figure 1: Percentage without a 2- or 4-Year College Degree](http://www.nasurvey.com/resources/Presentations/KR-aapidata-UCCS-jan26.pdf)

![Figure 2: Poverty Rates in California](http://www.advancingjustice.org/publication/community-contrasts-native-hawaiians-and-pacific-islanders-california-2013)

![Figure 3: Percentage without Health Insurance](http://www.advancingjustice.org/publication/community-contrasts-asian-americans-us-2011)
This context of white European dominance of language and the characterization of “who got here first” exerts a powerful framing of political belonging in the Americas.

To my mind it is clear, that the settlement among us of an inferior race is to be discouraged, by every legitimate means. Asia, with her numberless millions, sends to our shores the dregs of her population. Large numbers of this class are already here; and, unless we do something early to check their immigration, the question, which of the two tides of immigration, meeting upon the shores of the Pacific, shall be turned back, will be forced upon our consideration, when far more difficult than now of disposal. There can be no doubt but that the presence of numbers among us of a degraded and distinct people must exercise a deleterious influence upon the superior race, and, to a certain extent, repel desirable immigration. It will afford me great pleasure to concur with the Legislature in any constitutional action, having for its object the repression of the immigration of the Asiatic races. (See http://governors.library.ca.gov/addresses/08-Stanford.html)

With the completion of the transcontinental railroad and new European immigrant workers from the East Coast arriving in San Francisco, politicians across the nation climbed aboard the Asian exclusion bandwagon so clearly articulated by Governor Stanford. Two decades later, with the thinnest margin of a US presidential election within recent memory, the US Congress passed and President Chester Arthur signed into federal law the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. Despite objections to the racially discriminatory intent of the law, neither political party could risk losing California and other swing states in future presidential elections (Tichenor 2002). Once established in federal law, Chinese exclusion was expanded to restrict entry and naturalized citizenship for immigrants from other Asian nations. This culminated in the Immigration Act of 1917, also known as the Asiatic Barred Zone Act.

The century of explicit racial exclusion from entry to the United States in federal law finally came to a close. However, because it was so effective in keeping Asians out of the United States, post-1965 immigrants from Asia entered a national polity that had become unaccustomed to interacting with Asian Americans and unable to consider them as equal members of the political community. Indeed, the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II and subsequent US Supreme Court decisions upholding their imprisonment reinforced the suspect character of Asian Americans (Aoki and Takeda 2008).

Considering Asian American exclusion in time and context provides a historically grounded perspective from which contemporary inequalities in political, social, and economic outcomes can be regarded as both reflections in categorizations associated with group stereotypes and as a source of inequalitarian practices and political outcomes. Thus, the meaning and consequences of being Asian in the Americas is structured by time, context, and institutions. The political construction and dynamism of group categorization as Asian outside of Asia is more distinctive in the United States than it is in Canada, Latin America, and South America. This is a result of historically situated patterns of colonization and migration along with variation...
in political institutions and practices of racial classification in different contexts. The category of Asian-something signifies different things not only in different places but also at specific points in time.

OVERLAPPING SPHERES OF EXCLUSION FOR ASIAN AMERICANS

The two previous sections contend that the aggregation of Asian Americans across all national-origin groups obscures inequality and supports the myth of the model minority and that the exclusion of Asian Americans has been a persistent feature of the US economy, society, and politics. It is only within the last five decades that this exclusion has been relaxed; as such, the chapter argues that inequality for Asian Americans can be characterized today as cumulative and relational, the result of overlapping spheres of exclusion. The practice of aggregation and the persistence of racial-group stereotypes support the maintenance of a racial hierarchy and power structure in the Americas, where the “default category” of white requires no modifier (Masuoka and Junn 2013). It is telling that the phrases “British diaspora” and “Europeans in the Americas” appear much less frequently (if at all) in comparison to characterizations of the “Chinese diaspora” in the scholarly and popular lexicon. This context of white European dominance of language and the characterization of “who got here first” exerts a powerful framing of political belonging in the Americas.

The widespread characterization of Asian Americans as a model minority presents a narrative of overcoming exclusion on the basis of race and excelling economically and socially. The relatively large number of Asian American students attending elite American universities was the prototype for the model-minority trope. Although it is the case that the student population at elite educational institutions is disproportionately Asian American, this demonstration alone masks a different pattern of relatively low success of admissions when considering the size of the group. Figure 4 documents the proportion of Asian American students enrolling in elite US colleges between 1990 and 2011, tracked together with the number of 18–21 year old Asian Americans in the United States over the same years. Whereas the size of the population of college-aged Asian Americans has near doubled over this time period, admissions to all but one school (i.e., California Institute of Technology) has remained roughly constant, if not declined. While it might continue to be true that Asian Americans are overrepresented at elite colleges in comparison to their proportions in the general population, this proportionality is bumping up against a clear “ceiling

Figure 4: Asians Age 18–21 and Elite College Enrollment Trends, 1990–2011

Note: Trends of Asian enrollment at Caltech and the Ivy League universities, compared with growth of Asian college-age population; Asian age cohort population figures are based on Census CPS, and given the small sample size, are subject to considerable yearly statistical fluctuations. Source: www.advancingjustice.org/publication/community-contrasts-native-hawaiians-and-pacific-islanders-california-2013.
effect.” Notably, universities that publicly disavow the use of “legacy” considerations in vetting applicants for college admissions (e.g., California Institute of Technology or the University of California system) do not show such a visible ceiling and have a proportion of Asian American students that roughly parallels their population growth. Importantly, these data on college admissions show that inequality is fundamentally relational; a group that may appear to be doing well (perhaps even outperforming all other groups) nonetheless still faces barriers to the full realization of its capacity.

In the political sphere, Asian Americans also are underrepresented in terms of voter registration and turnout. Asian Americans reside and vote in all of the United States, with the largest concentration in Hawai‘i, Alaska, and the West Coast. At the same time, there are substantial and growing populations of Asian American voters in Texas, Illinois, Virginia, New Jersey, and New York; The South has experienced the highest growth in Asian American populations during the last decade. However, Asian Americans are still less likely to vote in US elections than Americans of other racial and ethnic backgrounds. Figure 5 provides data on voting turnout over time among Asian Americans compared with non-Hispanic whites, African Americans, and Latinos.

Despite relatively high levels of formal-educational attainment, Asian Americans vote at lower rates than all other groups of voters (Wong et al. 2011). Importantly, the gap between the proportion of Asian Americans who are eligible to vote and the proportion that turnout on Election Day has, if anything, grown and not shrunk in the last two decades. The low rates of turnout contribute to a widespread misconception of Asian Americans as “apolitical” and “perpetual foreigners” (Kim 2000, Tuan 1998) and typically relegate Asian Americans to the category of “low propensity voters” that do not merit a candidate, campaign, or political party’s attention. Lost in such misconceptions are the systemic, institutional sources of exclusion from greater civic and political engagement. Figure 6, for instance, provides Current Population Survey data from the 2004, 2008, and 2012 US presidential elections on the proportion of people reporting difficulty in registering due to language barriers by race. The figure makes clear that, while Hispanics may be the most prominent “language minority” in the United States, it is Asian Americans who are most likely to have problems with language access in their efforts to participate in politics.

Another systemic, institutional barrier to Asian American political engagement is the role of political

Figure 5: Turnout as Percentage of Voter Eligible Population

Source: www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting.

Figure 6: Percentage Not Registered Due to “Difficulty with English”

parties. The absence of visible and effective political mobilization by the two major political parties in the United States is another key contributor to the modest voter-turnout rates among Asian Americans (Hajnal and Lee 2011). Figure 7 compares political contact rates before the 2008 US presidential election and shows that Asian Americans and Asian Pacific Islanders had the lowest mobilization rates compared with other Americans grouped by race and ethnicity.

Taken together, more modest levels of registration, mobilization, and voting among Asian Americans overlap with and factor into systematically lower rates of political representation across all levels of government. Despite accounting for more than 5% of the US population, there is only one Asian American US Senator and 10 members of the US House of Representatives in 2016. Other than in Hawai‘i and California, Asian American political representation at state and local levels of government remains modest and lower in proportion compared with the composition of the population of voters (see https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/AAPI-Participation.pdf).

The observation to draw from this discussion is that analysts should resist compartmentalizing the spheres of exclusion as the domain of one group and not others. Instead, analysts can better understand the dynamics of inequality with research designs and analytical strategies that systematically observe inequality in relational terms, across categories, time, and locations. Taken together, this third observation combines with previous arguments suggesting that the perils of aggregation demonstrate that socioeconomic inequality for Asian Americans is paradoxical only if considered in static, aggregate, and absolute terms. The Asian American case demonstrates that the “color-blind” ideology of opportunity is false. In analyzing inequality in the Americas from the vantage point of Asian Americans, it therefore is important to take care with aggregation, thereby both matching the method of categorization to the phenomenon under study and selecting appropriate frames of reference. Viewing the dynamics of inequality from the perspective of Asian American political exclusion encourages analysts to theorize about the role of variation in time, place, and institutional context with an objective of identifying power structures to reveal the dynamics of inequalities and how they are perpetuated.

REFERENCES
In the past 10 to 20 years, Latin America has come to acquire an organized politics of race. By an “organized politics of race,” I mean a situation in which racial categories are simultaneously and explicitly the subjects of state policy, deployed in claims-making by subordinate groups, mobilized as constituencies by political actors, such as social movements and political parties, and used by social scientists to describe and diagnose social inequalities. To be sure, racial identities mattered previously; racism has been widespread, people have used racialized language to describe others, and economic and social hierarchies have paralleled racial differences. However, explicit mobilization around racial categories—by both society and the state—marks a new trend for the region.

This chapter addresses a few related questions. What is the nature of and the implications of the new racialized public policies being adopted in the region? Do they work? Will they raise awareness of discrimination and reduce inequality? The arguments are intended to constitute the basis for an ongoing conversation. The organized politics of race does not look the same everywhere and has proceeded farther in some countries than in others.

The first part of this chapter shows that, because the historical context of the state’s role in race making differs significantly in Latin America from the United States, taken-for-granted racial categories used by states and scholars mean different things on the ground. The second part argues that the emergence of race-based public policies has involved a racial recategorization project launched by elites, a project that does not always resonate with the targeted populations. The third part of the chapter briefly analyzes two major experiences of race-based public policies: university admissions quotas in Brazil and reserved seats for “black communities” in Colombia. These two experiences demonstrate that race-based policies have succeeded in raising awareness and broadening discussions about inequality. However, they mark an imperfect beginning to a longer and much-needed national conversation about race.

Race in Latin America: What Are We Talking About?

Race is not a concept with any inherent meaning. Rather, it has historical meanings crafted by the distinct ways that states, international organizations, and scientific and intellectual discourses classified, categorized, and identified people. As Brubaker, Loveman, and Samatov point out, “Racial,” “ethnic,” or “national” groups do not exist independently of their identification, classification, and demarcation; rather they are created in and through such acts (ibid).

Racial and ethnic “ways of seeing” evolved differently in Latin America than in other areas of the world. Colonial powers in Africa and Asia, particularly the British, invented ethnic identities and then codified ethnic boundaries in laws and public policies (Anderson 1991; Mamdani 1996, 2001; Ranger 1983; Vail 1989). This does not imply that intergroup differences were absent before colonial rule, but they were neither institutionalized and enforced by the power of the modern state, nor known as “ethnic.” State practices of naming, labeling, and classifying—through the census and other instruments—formed part of a technology of rule. They made subject populations legible and facilitated the allocation of jobs and educational opportunities. State classifications also enabled official discrimination, reified social divisions, and laid the groundwork for ethnic conflict and even genocidal violence (Horowitz 1985; Mamdani 2001; Montville 1990; Scott 1998). Official categorizations helped manufacture and maintain inequalities.

Although colonial Latin American states also upheld ethnic and racial classification and used membership to determine rights, these practices were rejected and abandoned by independent states (Cope 1994; Graham, Skidmore, Helg, and Knight 1990; Mörner 1967; Seed 1982). Latin American countries forged models of the nation based not on racial or ethnic pluralism but rather on mixing and miscegenation. Ideologies of mestizaje (mixity), the raza cosmica (the cosmic race), and blanqueamiento (whitening), combined with administrative practices (e.g.,
Latin America’s embrace of race-based public policies has been accompanied by the deployment of new categories by the state, international organizations, and social movements. 

ELITE RACIAL PROJECTS AND TERMINOLOGY

Latin America’s embrace of race-based public policies has been accompanied by the deployment of new categories by the state, international organizations, and social movements. These categories reflect an emerging “way of seeing” on the part of elites. It is less clear that the elite “way of seeing” is embraced by, and resonates with, the broader population, including the intended beneficiaries of new policies.

The term Afrodescendant refers to people who have ancestors from Africa but who were not born nor currently live there. Contemporary use of “Afrodescendant” by scholars, international organizations, and development practitioners originated in the Durban Declaration and Program of Action adopted at the World Conference Against Racism in 2001. The Declaration referred to “peoples of African descent” as those neither born nor living in an African country, but who had ancestors from the region.

The term gained broad purchase in Latin America for its use by the Inter-Agency Consultation on Race (IAC), formed in 2000. Coordinated by the Inter-American Dialogue, the IAC was a network of development organizations with projects intended to combat social exclusion and racism suffered by Afrodescendants. In their official documents, organizations such as the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), and the World Bank similarly use the term Afrodescendant to refer to these groups. (However, the IADB website uses the term African descendants.)

The term Afrodescendant was not common as recently as 10 years ago. Many scholars referred instead to “Afro-Latinos” or, more specifically, “Afro-Colombians,” “Afro-Brazilians,” and “Afro-Cubans,” as well as “blacks” (see, e.g., Andrews 2004; Sawyer 2006; Telles 2004; Wade 1993). Scholarship published since 2010 has used the...
term Afrodiasomant almost exclusively, and usually synonymously with “black” (see, e.g., Loveman 2014; Telles 2014).

“Black” is another complex concept, usually translated today as “negro.” In Brazil, the term was not used in the census or in official state discourse until recently. The census always counted by “color,” and listed pretos, pardos, brancos, and amarelos as the color groups to be counted. Although historically not interpreted to be the same as race, today the concepts of race and color often are used as synonyms or jointly (e.g., as in the common “race/color”). Pardo was specifically intended to denote people who were neither preto (i.e., the word used historically for black) nor branco (i.e., white) (Campos 2013).

In the Statute of Racial Equality adopted in 2010, the Brazilian government declared that pretos and pardos would heretofore form the população negra, or the black population (Government of Brazil 2010). This was an historic move. The government named the black population as the country’s largest group, thereby creating a racial dichotomy in place of the color gradations of the past.

For their implicit rejection of intermediate categories, both “Afrodiasomant” and “black” move Latin America closer to the US-style binary racial system.

By recognizing the category “negro,” the government was responding to black movements and to findings of social scientists. Activists believed that the branco–pardo–preto classification scheme diluted Afro-Brazilian collective identity and facilitated whitening (S. Bailey 2009; Hanchard 1994; Nobles 2000; Telles 2004). Before the 2000 census, some groups mobilized a campaign to convince Afrodescendants of various shades to reject the whitening ideology that had encouraged them to classify as pardo and to instead declare their color as preto (Nobles, 2000). The idea was that promoting a unified, black identity with a clearly demarcated boundary would expose racism, mobilize blacks to combat it, and make society as a whole more aware of inequality.

In addition, decades of social science research on racial inequality in Brazil had revealed that both pretos and pardos lagged whites in terms of basic social indicators (e.g., income and education) and that, statistically speaking, both pretos and pardos were far more similar than either group was to whites (Feres Júnior 2008, 64; Hasenbalg 1979; Henriques 2001; Paixão et al. 2010; L. F. Schwartzman 2009; G. M. Silva and Paixão 2014; N. d. V. Silva 1985; Telles 2004). Whereas an earlier generation of social scientists had written of whites (brancos) and nonwhites (não-brancos), scholars in the 1990s began to write of brancos and negros, in part to ally themselves with the black movement’s project to combat racial inequality (Henriques 2001; L. F. Schwartzman 2009).

Unlike in the United States, being nonwhite in Brazil is not the same as being black, and binary distinctions do not characterize perceptions of inequalities. Stated another way, pardos are not negros. Pardo means “neither white, nor black”—an option between the two racial poles; it is a residual category (Campos 2013; Feres Júnior 2008, 63). For many students (and members of the general public), there is a significant difference between a negro and a light pardo (L. F. Schwartzman 2009).

The genesis of the “indigenous” category also must be considered. Indigenous or Indian was a category invented by Spanish colonizers, an umbrella term applied to people of distinct languages, cultures, and practices who lacked a common identity. According to Knight: “‘Indian,’ as a term either of abuse or praise, was conceived and applied by non-Indians. No common Indian sentiment preceded the Conquest; it was only in the wake of the Conquest that the generic concept of ‘Indian’ could be formulated in negative contradistinction to the dominant Spanish/European. And this generic concept remained part of Spanish rather than Indian usage” (Knight 1990, 75).

There is evidence that particular language and cultural group labels continue to resonate more than the generic “indigenous” category. Table 1 presents information from the Bolivian 2001 censuses and surveys conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The first column reports what many studies claim, which is that according to the 2001 census, 62% of the population self-identifies as indigenous (see, e.g., Assies and Salmon 2005; Lucero 2008; Madrid 2008; Van Cott 2005).

Yet the second and third columns of table 1 show that the generic category “indigenous” has little salience in Bolivia. The widely used 62% census figure refers to the total number of Bolivians self-identifying with a specific group such as Aymara, Quechua, Guarani, Chiquitano, or Mojeño. (Thirty-six different groups are recognized in the 2009 Constitution.) When surveys ask about generic “indigenous” or “originary” identity, the number of people responding is relatively small, between some 16% and 19% of the country. More people self-identify as mestizo. Interestingly, table 1 suggests that Bolivians are comfortable identifying with particular indigenous ethnic groups and simultaneously as mestizo.

IMPLEMENTING RACE-BASED PUBLIC POLICIES

The decades of the 2000s have witnessed an expansion of racialized public policies in Latin America directed at indigenous and Afrodescendant populations. As Paschel’s
chapter in this Report notes, these policies evolved at two distinct moments: the first emphasized multiculturalism, and the second, emphasized racial equality. In light of the region’s historic denial of racial salience, these actions are revolutionary. Have they worked? Will they work?

University Quotas in Brazil

Affirmative action in Brazil focuses on access to higher education rather than political inclusion or support for minority-owned businesses. What explains the focus on higher education? Widely recognized as the principal mechanism of social mobility, educational levels are closely correlated with income, meaningful and stable work, and economic security. Yet enrollment in higher education reflects and magnifies social inequalities. In 2008, 21% of whites ages 18 to 24 were enrolled in postsecondary education, compared to merely 8% of nonwhites (pardos and pretos). Although overall enrollment grew considerably over time for both groups—in 1988, only 8% of whites and 2% of pardos and pretos were enrolled—the gap between whites and nonwhites has persisted (Paixão et al. 2010, 227).

Public higher education is free, and most of the best institutions are public. Demand for admission greatly exceeds supply. Dozens of applicants compete for each slot in the most prestigious fields of study in public university—including medicine, law, dentistry, and engineering. The only criterion for admission to university is the applicant's score on the entrance examination (vestibular). Lower- and middle-income students tend to lose out in this competition, for two reasons. First, the excellent primary and secondary schools that offer the best training for such exams tend to be private, accessible only to the affluent. Most university students come from private schools, but the majority of Brazilians—86%—go to public schools (S. Schwartzman 2008a). Second, success on the entrance exam usually depends on completing preparatory courses, which are expensive and accessible primarily to wealthier students from private schools (S. Schwartzman 2008b, 2009).

As a result, intellectual elites graduating from public universities tend to be the economic elites who can pay for good private secondary schools, a trend that dramatically diminishes the chances for upward mobility for the lower and middle classes. Quotas—whether social or racial—have been advanced by the black movement and politicians as the most efficient mechanism to break this perverse cycle (Guimarães 2008, 184).

Following the pioneering example of the state of Rio de Janeiro—where the legislature adopted a law mandating public school and racial admissions quotas in 2001—the policy “snowballed” across Brazil in the 2000s. By the end of the decade, the majority of public universities had begun to adopt affirmative action programs. Wheras most were introduced by the universities themselves, some programs were the result of state law.

Effectively, quota programs redistribute results of the vestibular so that individuals of certain social groups compete against one another for a subset of the total number of admissions slots (Feres Júnior 2008, 45). Advocates of quotas attribute growth in the numbers of pardos and pretos in higher education in the 1990s and 2000s to the introduction of affirmative action (Paixão et al. 2010, 231).

In August 2012, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff signed a law that established a 50% “social” quota in all federal universities. The social quota required that half of all admissions slots be allocated to students from public schools. Within the social quotas, half of the slots are to be reserved for students whose families earn less than 1.5 of the minimum wage, and half for those with families earning above that level. Within each income band, slots are to be reserved for people self-identifying as preto, pardo, and indigenous, in accordance with their share of

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<th>Table 1: Ethnic identification in Bolivia</th>
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<tr>
<td>Indigenous or Originario (generic term)</td>
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<tr>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mestizo</td>
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<tr>
<td>65%</td>
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<tr>
<td>White</td>
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<tr>
<td>17%</td>
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<td>None or Other</td>
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Source: Adapted from Zavaleta (2008, p. 52).

Note: Blank cells indicate that the survey did not include this category. Since the census, LAPOP, and UNDP studies asked different questions they are not directly comparable.
the population in each state. Two Constitutional Court decisions issued earlier in 2012 had affirmed the legality of race-based affirmative action.

Two aspects of the implementation of quotas are worth considering. The first is the politics of the categories used by the quota policies. Although the 2012 federal law specified pretos and pardos, earlier policies did not in fact, most used the term negro (Feres Júnior 2008).

Rio de Janeiro’s university quota law introduced the term negro under pressure from the black movement, which viewed the implementation of university quotas as a chance to promote the integration of pretos and pardos into a single, “negro,” racial group (Peria & Bailey, 2014). Most policy makers believed that “negro” applied to, and encompassed, people who would normally self-classify under the preto and pardo census categories. They also assumed that beneficiaries would know what negro meant (pardo plus preto) (ibid).

In fact, most of the population self-identified in other ways and had a different understanding of negro than the government and the black movement. Many pardos—who were among the intended beneficiaries of quotas—did not think the “negro” category applied to them. For example, students at the State University of Rio de Janeiro surveyed by Luisa Schwartzman tended to believe that negro referred only to very dark people (L. F. Schwartzman 2009).

The fact that popular understandings of the meaning of negro were at odds with elite intentions thwarted the ability of quotas to achieve their intended aims (L. F. Schwartzman 2008, 2009). In fact, few Brazilians self-identify with the category “negro.” In the 2010 PERLA study, a mere 6% of respondents identified as “negro” in response to an open-ended question about their racial identification (G. M. Silva and Paixão 2014). Critics alleged that, as a result of the policies’ embrace of the term negro, many pardos, who comprise the majority of nonwhites, and have socioeconomic conditions as limited as pretos, are ignored in affirmative-action policies or forced to be classified as negros to qualify (Feres Júnior, 2008).

The second important development is the gradual usurpation of race by class. Although the black movement fought for affirmative action, in the eventual application, addition to racial criteria to preclude affluent blacks from taking advantage of the policies.

During the first decade of the 2000s, the meaning of quotas in Brazil as a tool to promote recognition and combat racism was displaced by an emphasis on promoting redistribution and combatting socioeconomic disadvantage. The inequality posed solely by racial status on its own was inadequate to justify a policy intervention. Only those who suffered from a combination of racial and class subordination were entitled to benefit from quotas for university admission. Yet data continue to show that racial status shapes educational outcomes independently of class (S. Schwartzman 2008b).

The racialized status hierarchy—that is, institutionalized patterns of cultural value that position some groups as superior, good looking, normative, and moral, while casting others as inferior, lacking, ugly, and indecent—is an independent dimension of social justice (Fraser 2000). Brazilian authorities should be wary of assuming that racial differences will be solved by socioeconomic redistribution, even when poor Afrodescendants are specifically targeted. As De la Fuente noted, “Racism is not simply a question of unequal distribution of resources; it is a cultural and ideological complex that needs to be actively and systematically dismantled” (De la Fuente 2007, 140).

Are university quotas a distraction, based on a misdiagnosis of the roots of inequality (cf. Banting and Kymlicka 2006)? Simon Schwartzman, a prominent educational scholar and opponent of quotas, suggested they are. He maintains that the principal cause of inequality in higher education is the poor quality of secondary schools: “The main limitation to access to higher education is not a shortage of admissions slots, nor a lack of funding, and much less any type of discrimination in the selection
The Politics of Racial and Class Inequalities in the Americas

São Paulo state government in 2012 requires public school students entering university via quotas to attend a two-year preparatory college and they are given a monthly stipend. Since Brazil offers roughly as many admissions slots in higher education as there are graduates from secondary schools, it is not necessary to further expand the higher education system. Rather, convincing people to enroll in, and complete, secondary school is the main challenge that the country faces (ibid). Another challenge involves the inadequate training that a public secondary school education provides for students entering university—a problem not addressed by the 2012 federal quota law. Simply placing students in university offers no guarantee that they will be able to gain an education and complete their coursework (S. Schwartzman 2008a). Poor students have difficulty acquiring supplies and supporting themselves while they study—a problem recognized in early debates about quotas in Rio de Janeiro (Htun 2004a). To address some of these concerns, an affirmative action program launched by the São Paulo state government in 2012 requires public school students entering university via quotas to attend a two-year preparatory college and they are given a monthly stipend (Schwartzman 2013).

Admissions quotas provide a fast track for some Brazilian Afrodescendants to gain access to prestigious universities; however, they do not address the underlying structural problems keeping millions of secondary school students away from higher education. In that sense, admissions quotas reflect a broader limitation with the region’s racial equality policies, as pointed out by Paschel in chapter 6. By putting racial inequality on the public agenda, quotas have succeeded in compelling people to recognize and talk about a long-denied problem in Brazilian society.

Colombia’s Reserved Seats for Afrodescendants

Colombia’s reserved seats for Afrodescendants were first enacted in the Constitution of 2005, when the wording of questions about race and ethnicity changed. The census asked people if—according to their culture, pueblo, or physical features—they self-identified or were identified by others as belonging to one of several groups, including the expansive category of “Negro, mulato, afro-colombiano or afrodescendiente.” With this more expansive terminology, 11% of the population self-identified as Afrodescendant (Del Popolo et al. 2009). Other studies suggest, however, that the official categories are not synchronous with self- and other perceptions and that, if other terms had been used, the size of the Afrodescendant population would be even larger. The recent PERLA survey, for example, estimates that Afrodescendants comprise approximately 20% of the population.

The discursive recognition of racial categories reflected in the census was followed by changes in state policy. In 2005, the Constitutional Court ruled against two Cartagena discothèques that had denied entrance to two black sisters (Meertens 2008). In 2007, the government created an Intersectoral Commission for the Advancement of Afrocolombian, Palenquero, and Raizal Populations in the Interior Ministry; a 2009 publication by the group recognized the existence of racism (Wade 2011, 26). Yet the agency did not abandon the ethnic frame: a bill submitted to Congress in 2012—the proposed “Law on Equal Opportunities for Afrocolombian Communities”—was based on “recognition of the fundamental right to ethnic identity” and the idea of Afrodescendants as an ethnic group.

In 2007, the Afrocolombian caucus was launched in Congress, composed of two senators and seven deputies (including both deputies from the reserved seats as well as one white deputy representing the islands of San Andrés and Providencia). Through agreements with the Interior and Justice Ministry, several universities applied small quotas for blacks in admissions and others offered tuition discounts (Ministerio del Interior y de Justicia de la República de Colombia, N.d.). In 2012, the Interior Ministry submitted a bill to Congress that would institute a 10% racial quota in military and police academies, financially reward
Admissions quotas . . . do not address the underlying structural problems keeping millions of secondary school students away from higher education.

or any organizational capacity (e.g., presence in a minimum number of provinces). As a result, numerous groups qualify to, and actually have postulated, candidates in these races. In 2013, the organization *Congreso Visible* attempted to contact all of the organizations that fielded candidates for seats in the 2006 and 2010 elections. Of the 830 organizations registered with the Interior Ministry, most existed only on paper (without a functioning telephone number), were inactive or had ceased to exist, or were merely the vehicle of a single individual (Camacho 2013). The lax ballot-access rules enabled corrupt political interests to manipulate the “black community” seats (Gil 2013; Laurent 2012).

Finally, the structure of the ballot is confusing. Figure 1 is a ballot from the province of Cauca. It is divided into three parts: part A shows the logos of parties seeking the seats to represent the province; part B shows logos of parties contesting the national indigenous seat; and part C, shows the parties and organizations contesting the national “black community” seats. Part C, by far, is the largest part of the ballot, even though only two seats are in dispute. (In Cauca, four seats are in dispute in part A). Ballot structure is the likely reason for numerous blank and null votes cast in the indigenous and Afrodescendant virtual “districts,” which undermined the legitimacy of the seats and made them the subject of ridicule.

The experience of Colombia’s reserved parliamentary seats highlights the difficulties involved in “creating constituencies for new categories,” according to Loveman’s remarks at the task force meetings in Berkeley, California. On their own, mechanisms of political inclusion do not generate the social movement mobilization and other bottom-up processes that enable marginalized groups to authorize and hold accountable their representatives. In Colombia’s case, the weakness of civic mobilization combined with institutional flaws left the seats open to manipulation. To take advantage of opportunities that the seats offered, the black movement would need to consolidate under the banner of a political party (or a small group of parties), which it has been too fragmented to do.

It is also important to remember that the reserved seats as a vehicle for black representation originated in a misdiagnosis. When blacks were perceived as analogous to indigenous peoples, a communal representation mechanism made sense. However, racial formation in Colombia has not produced communal political groupings organized along
the lines of race. Rather, blacks vote for and are elected by parties across the political spectrum. This suggests that a better mechanism to improve access to elected office would be candidate quotas within parties, not reserved parliamentary seats (Htun 2004b).

CONCLUSION

An “organized politics of race” has emerged in Latin America. People speak of inequality and discrimination, racism is condemned, and the need for remedial measures is assumed. International organizations, intellectuals, and government officials describe national realities in terms of race and have introduced racial categories into public policies. The action, however, has been more from the top down than from the bottom up. The categories used by elites do not resonate with the racial identities and practices of the citizenry. Everyday experiences of racism and subordination are not translated into mechanisms of political mobilization, contestation, and representation built around racial categories.

Although the expansion of the welfare state has reduced poverty and promoted greater equality, racial gaps remain in education, income, and access to services. As pointed out by Paschel’s chapter 6, racialized policies such as admissions quotas and parliamentary reserved seats have not made much headway against these structural underpinnings of
racial inequality—at least in the short term.

What, then, is the point of racialized public policies? First, they get race on the public agenda and force people to confront and not deny decades of discrimination. Second, these policies promote awareness of the value of diversity and help to discredit the racialized status hierarchy that valorizes whiteness and denigrates blackness. Third, the policies constitute a focal point for social movement mobilization, and build coalitions that can launch new projects.

Racialized public policies seem to apply US-style, one-drop rule racial categories. They rely on, and have the potential to generalize, binary understandings of race. For this reason, even critics who admit and condemn racism view such policies as patently illegitimate for Latin America (Daher 2008). Can the state combat racism and inequality without entrenching racial categories? Does it matter which categories the state uses, as long as it pushes in the direction of equality and nondiscrimination? Is it possible to simultaneously pursue social justice and the deinstitutionalization of racial identities? These questions are relevant not only for Latin America but also for the struggle for equality everywhere. •

NOTES

1. Much of this chapter draws on Mala Htun, Inclusion Without Representation in Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press 2016).

2. The growing popularity of ethnic idioms in the region, particularly after the 1990s, has shifted this panorama, but not for everyone.

3. It also called specifically on countries of the Americas to recognize the existence of Afrodescendant populations, the racism they suffer, and historically entrenched inequalities in access to health care, education, and housing (United Nations 2001).

4. Member organizations of the Inter-Agency Consultation on Race included the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the British Government’s Department for International Development, the Pan-American Health Organization, the Ford Foundation, the Inter-American Foundation, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

5. Bills to create candidate quotas and reserved seats have been presented in Congress but had not been approved as of 2015.

6. Organizations to offer pre-vestibular training for poor students, including Afrodescendants, were established in Rio de Janeiro beginning in the early 1990s and later spread throughout the country. Groups offering such courses were important advocates of educational quotas.

7. Of the 73 university affirmative action programs studied by Peria and Bailey in 2011, 19 were established by state law, while the remainder were introduced by university decision (2014).

8. Different scholars produced slightly different numbers but they concur on the general trends. Peria and Bailey (2014) analyzed 79 affirmative action programs, of which 39 used racial criteria, and 60 target public school students.

9. The five groups mentioned by the census included indigenous, “rom” (Roma or gypsy), racial (i.e., a native of the Caribbean islands of San Andrés and Providencia), palenquero (someone from the runaway-slave settlement of San Basilio), or Afrodescendant.

10. If the census had included the “moreno” category, the size of the group would almost certainly have increased. Other studies estimated Afrodescendants to comprise approximately 20% of the population (Barbary et al., 2004, 75), with some going as high as 26% (mentioned in Wade 2002). The 2010 LAPOP survey estimated that blacks and mulattos made up 12% of the population; the PERLA study by Telles and collaborators, estimated 19% (Urrea, López, and Vigoya Forthcoming).

REFERENCES


The political landscape and data infrastructure for social scientific research on race, color, and class inequality in Latin America changed dramatically in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. As recently as the 1980s, the majority of Latin American countries lacked any nationally representative survey data that included information about individual racial identification or color. The absence of this data in most of the region obstructed systematic and comparative research on racial inequality in the Americas. By 2015, in contrast, large-scale social surveys that included information about racial identification or color existed in almost every country in the region.

The “datascape” for research and analysis of racial and color and class stratification in Latin American countries has been transformed; this transformation has opened the gates to a flood of new research about racial, color, and class inequalities in Latin America. New data are generating new knowledge about the connections between socioeconomic and ethnoracial inequalities. New data are also fueling political conflicts, as debates about how to count and classify ethnic and racial populations in large-scale social surveys become inextricably tied to broader and long-standing political struggles over rights and redress for historically marginalized populations.

This chapter describes the rapid reconfiguration of the political and data landscape for social scientific research on racial, color, and class inequality in Latin America at the beginning of the twenty-first century. First, it provides an overview of the transformation of available data for research on racial and color inequality in Latin America in recent years. Considered in historical perspective, the very existence of these new data represents a significant political accomplishment. Next, some of the most striking findings about race, color, and class inequality, and the relationships between these axes of stratification, that have emerged from the initial wave of analyses of these data, are explored. The chapter concludes with a preliminary assessment of the implications of both the unprecedented data collection efforts and the flood of new empirical findings for the politics of ethnoracial and class inequality in contemporary Latin America.

**NEW DATA**

The first decades of the twenty-first century witnessed an unprecedented transformation of the data infrastructure for research on racial, ethnic, and color inequalities in Latin America. Most significantly, almost every state in the region modified its national census to collect new data about ethnoracial identification and/or color of citizens. Across Latin America, states that had long refrained from collecting racial statistics reversed course, embracing new questions that capture lines of ethnoracial distinction within their populations.

The rather sudden regional adoption of ethnic and racial data collection on censuses in the first decades of the twenty-first century is summarized in figure 1. The shaded cells in figure 1 indicate that a country took a national census in that decade. A white circle indicates that the census included a question that made indigenous populations statistically visible in some way. A black circle indicates that the census included a question that made black or Afro-descendent populations statistically visible in some way.

As figure 1 clearly shows, indigenous and Afro-descendent Latin Americans have become increasingly visible in official statistics produced by Latin American census agencies. In the 1980s, approximately half of Latin American countries counted indigenous populations on censuses. By 2010, almost all of these countries had done so or planned to do so in the next census. With respect to Afro-descendent populations, in the 1980s, only two countries—Brazil and Cuba—included census questions that differentiated these citizens from others in the population. By 2010, nearly every Latin American country included a census question to count black or Afro-descendent individuals, or planned to include such a question in its next census.
To put these recent changes in perspective, remember that Latin America is a region where states spent much of the twentieth century cultivating the idea that categorical racial distinctions either do not exist in their societies, or that such distinctions are socially irrelevant. Most Latin Americans today have lived their entire lives without ever being asked to fill in a “race” box on an official form. This is of course very different from the United States. Anyone who has grown up in the United States has had many opportunities to report their racial or ethnic group membership.

In contrast, Latin American states have long encouraged their citizens to see ethnoracial differences as a matter of degree rather than categorical difference. Throughout the region, generations of children have been taught that race mixture—and thus the blurriness of ethnoracial boundaries—is what created and defines them as a distinctive people, as a nation among others. In Mexico, for example, children have been taught that the nation was created through the mixture of Spaniards and Indians; to be Mexican is to be mestizo. In Brazil, national myths championed the fusion of Africans, Indians, and Portuguese into a new human type; as Brazilians, children are told, they are racially mixed. In Cuba, the story goes, “a nation for all” was forged through the absorption of differences; Cuban race and nationality are declared to be one and the same. Even in Chile and Argentina, where national ideologies celebrate the supposed racial and cultural sameness of present-day populations, children learn origin myths that credit historic mestizaje for the creation of Chileans or Argentines as distinct national types.

Of course these stories of nation-making through mixture were not ideologically neutral; they usually smuggled in a preference for the white or European component of the mix. This whitening ideal is captured in a famous painting from Brazil, “The Redemption of Ham” or “Redenção de Cã” by Modesto Brocos (see [link](http://mnba.gov.br/portal/component/k2/item/192-reden%C3%A7%C3%A3o-de-C%C3%A3.html)), that depicts mixture as an intergenerational process through which the Brazilian nation formed, and also as a process through which the population is somehow—miraculously—whitened. The painting shows a black grandmother thanking God for her white grandson. The baby, who personifies Brazil’s future, is the progeny of her mulata daughter and white partner, who looks on proudly.

Latin American national mythologies have long championed the idea that distinctive nations were formed through the mixture and thus dissolution of categorical differences. Against this history, the recent embrace of race, ethnicity, and color questions on national censuses appears as a major ideological shift. Instead of insisting on the blending and disappearance of ethnoracial distinctions in their populations, Latin American states are now officially recognizing and institutionalizing clear, categorical divides (Loveman 2014, ch. 6, 7).

The region-wide embrace of ethnic and racial data collection is not limited to national censuses. A growing number of nationally representative annual household surveys as well as other smaller-scale surveys now include measures of color or ethnoracial identity. Together with data from national censuses, publicly and privately funded data collection initiatives are generating nationally representative surveys that measure ethnoracial distinctions in a variety of ways. These surveys include Brazil’s Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílio (PNAD); Guatemala’s Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida (2006); Mexico’s Household Income and Expenditure Survey (ENIGH) for 2002–2010; Peru’s Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENAHO 2004); Bolivia’s Encuesta Continua de Hogares; Ecuador’s Sistema Integrado de Encuestas de Hogares (SIEH 2006); as well as the Project on Race and Ethnicity in Latin America (PERLA) surveys for Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, and AmericasBarometer surveys for most countries in the region. Taken together, new census data and the growing number of other household surveys that include questions

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**Figure 1:** Questions about Race, Color, or Ethnicity in Latin American Censuses, 1980–2010s

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The shaded cells indicate that a country took a national census in that decade. A white circle indicates that the census included a question that made indigenous population statistically visible. A black circle indicates that the census included a question that made black or Afro-descendant populations statistically visible. A white cell with circles indicates that the census agency announced plans to include questions that would make Afro-descendant and/or indigenous populations visible in the next census. Source: Loveman 2014, 253.
about race, color, and/or ethnicity have fundamentally altered the existing datascape for research on ethnoracial and class inequality in the Americas in comparative perspective.

What caused the embrace of racial and ethnic data collection by almost all Latin American states in recent years? Existing explanations point to the instrumental role of mobilization by Afro-descendent and indigenous movements and strategic collaboration with international organizations (de Popolo 2008; Htun 2004; Hooker 2005; Hooker 2009; Loveman 2014; Nobles 2000; Paschel 2010; Paschel 2016). Activists in Colombia and Brazil took the lead in making census questions and categories a pivotal stake in broader political struggles for recognition, rights, and redress for black citizens. In countries where national political elites resisted activists’ calls to introduce racial or ethnic data collection, international activist networks and international organizations played critical roles in pressuring national statistics agencies to introduce reforms.

The pressure on national statistics agencies to add new ethnic or racial questions to censuses took varied forms, ranging from encouragement to voluntarily adopt “best practices” introduced through international conferences and workshops, to more coercive mechanisms such as conditions attached to loans from multilateral lending institutions for funding ongoing census operations.

The politics of census reform differed in each Latin American country, reflecting distinct histories of black and indigenous mobilization, relationships of activists to the political regimes in power at the national level, and the relative status of national governments in the regional and international system of states. Yet by the 2010s, across Latin America—with few exceptions—blacks and indigenous peoples were enumerated as such in national censuses and other national social surveys. For the majority of Latin American countries, the statistical visibility of race, color, and ethnic identity in national surveys departs from decades of de facto and de jure insistence on the absence or inconsequence of ethnic or racial distinctions within national populations. In the first decades of the twenty-first century, a prolonged era of official color-blindness in Latin America ended.

NEW KNOWLEDGE

The availability of nationally representative survey data with information about the racial, color, and ethnic composition of populations across almost all of Latin America is transforming understanding of the significance of ethnoracial and color distinctions for stratification dynamics in the region. Social scientists who research inequality in Latin America are witnessing—and contributing to—a veritable “avalanche” of new statistics pertaining to race and ethnicity in the region.

Three broad lines of inquiry have motivated the initial wave of research using newly available ethnic and racial population data. First, a number of studies aim to describe the size and characteristics of ethnically and racially identifiable subpopulations across the region. For some countries, such as Brazil and Mexico, scholars have had access to large-scale datasets that include either direct identity questions or questions about language use that have enabled estimates of African-descendent or indigenous populations for many years. In these countries, new data sources are allowing deeper and more nuanced analyses of the characteristics of black or indigenous populations, as measured in various ways. For several other countries in the region, however, it has been decades or longer since the state has collected ethnic or racial population data of any kind. The current wave of surveys can establish new empirical baselines for producing basic descriptive facts about the “composition” of Latin American populations.

In practice, producing simple descriptive statistics based on survey results is anything but straightforward. Describing what the data reveal about the composition of Latin American populations is both technically complicated and politically fraught. Indeed, perhaps the most significant discovery from descriptive accounts of survey results to date is how much our understanding of the size and characteristics of ethnically or racially defined populations in the Americas hinges on survey design.

The sensitivity of descriptive statistics on ethnoracial population composition in Latin America to different question formats and categories is a major focus of current research. A few examples of initial descriptive findings from new survey data reveal why research on how survey design affects survey responses is both scientifically important and politically contentious.

Figure 2 shows Sulmont and Callirgos’s (2014,152) analysis of the size of the indigenous population of Peru according to a variety of different questions and response options included in the 2010 PERLA survey. The results show that the indigenous population ranges from less than 5% to more than 35% of Peru’s population depending on how “indigenous” is defined.

A similar phenomenon is evident in descriptive analyses of recent survey results from Brazil. The size of Brazil’s black population varies widely—from less than 10% to nearly 60% of the total population—depending on the criteria analysts used to define blackness. Figure 3 reproduces the findings of Silva and Paixão (2014, 191), based on analysis of the 2010 PERLA survey for Brazil, which shows how different survey questions and criteria
yield different descriptive pictures of the relative size of the black population of Brazil.

As a final example, figure 4 reproduces Villareal’s (2014, 788) findings that show how the size of Mexico’s indigenous population varies dramatically depending on whether it is measured using a self-identification question or a question about indigenous language use.

The tremendous sensitivity of basic descriptive information about the size of Latin America’s indigenous and Afro-descendent populations to the way surveys measure these populations has important scientific and political implications. For social science, these descriptive results confirm theoretical understandings of race and ethnicity as social constructs that are multifaceted and contextually defined. For politics, these results expose how and why the politics of inequality in the region are not only struggles over who gets what, but also, and essentially, struggles over who is what, and crucially, over who gets to decide the criteria for defining who is what.

The choice of measures or indicators of ethnoracial identification, beyond its methodological implications, is an inherently political question. For social scientists, this means that rather than decide by definitional fiat that one measure is superior to others, it is important to investigate the range of variation in survey responses across different measures as a significant line of inquiry in its own right (Loveman, Muniz, and Bailey 2012). These studies illuminate how racial and ethnic boundaries and identities are delineated and defined in different ways in different parts of Latin America. Also, these studies promise to displace overly general, stylized facts about “race in Latin America” with more refined and contextual descriptive knowledge of how social divisions and individual and collective identities are constructed and reinforced along ethnoracial lines in particular parts of the region.

Basic descriptive research on the ethnoracial composition of Latin American populations—and specifically, research that is reflexively sensitive to “instrument effects” on population counts—is critical to advance social scientific understanding of contemporary Latin American societies. With the wave of newly available data, this research promises
to improve our comparative knowledge of the empirical differences and similarities in the social understandings and consequences of ethnoracial distinctions across the region.

A second major line of research using newly available ethnic, racial, and color data for Latin American populations aims to estimate the magnitude of inequalities among subpopulations on a variety of social and economic well-being indicators. A fundamental finding emerging from this research is that inequalities by color are especially pervasive across the region; darker skin tone is a significant liability throughout almost all of Latin America. In several countries, skin color stratification is more severe than stratification across categorical ethnic or racial divides, even as categorical inequalities are themselves severe in much of the region. A growing number of quantitative analyses of nationally representative surveys confirm pervasive racial, ethnic, and color stratification in Latin America. In case there is any lingering doubt: Latin American societies are neither “racial democracies” nor are they color-blind.

Three examples drawn from important recent studies illustrate how newly available data provide analytic leverage for investigating ethnoracial, color, and class inequalities in the Americas in comparative perspective. Figure 5 reproduces the results from a pioneering article by Bailey, Saperstein, and Penner published in *Demographic Research* (2014).

Figure 5 draws on a combination of data from the 2012 General Social Survey in the United States and the 2012 AmericasBarometer surveys in Latin America, to show income inequality by skin tone and categorical race (self-identification) across the Americas. This graph is the first ever to present comparative data on both categorical and skin-tone inequality simultaneously, for 19 countries in the region, including the United States. The graph shows that in most countries a clear hierarchy exists from lighter to darker skin tone, as well as for categorical race. The graph also reveals significant variation in the magnitude of disparities between individuals of different self-identified ethnoracial categories and between individuals with different skin tones. Importantly, the graph also indicates that the hierarchical order by skin tone or racial classification is not the same in every country. This finding opens new directions for more refined comparative research.

Comparative research on ethnic, racial, color, and class inequalities in Latin America has also advanced through analyses of survey data collected by the Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America (PERLA), directed by sociologist Edward Telles. Figure 6 (Telles and Flores, 2014, 228) and figure 7 (Telles and Flores 2014, 225) reproduce summary findings from the PERLA surveys of the Brazilian, Colombian, Mexican, and Peruvian populations with respect to the relationships between skin color, ethnoracial self-identification, and years of education.

The summary findings of disparities in years of education in the four countries surveyed in the PERLA project reveal a consistent pattern of color stratification. Lighter skin tone is associated with more years of education in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. Regarding the association between years of education and categorical ethnoracial identification, however, the findings are less consistent. For example, in Brazil, people who self-identify as “white” are significantly more likely than those who self-identify with other racial labels to have more years of education; this is not the case for those who self-identify as “white” in Colombia, Mexico, or Peru. The inconsistency in stratification dynamics by categorical ethnoracial identification versus skin tone gradation makes clear that these are not socially synonymous markers of distinction. Categorical and gradational social distinctions clearly operate differently, in close but nonsymmetrical relation to each other, in the social production of educational inequalities.

Overall, analyses of new survey data are revealing an ever-clearer picture of Latin American societies that are
systematically stratified by skin color and unequal by self-identified or other-identified ethnoracial status. The key findings from the first wave of research using this recent ethnic and racial survey data in Latin America demonstrate that individuals who have darker skin, and/or who identify as indigenous or of African descent, tend to be worse off, on average, than lighter-skinned, self-identified whites or mestizos on a range of indicators of well-being. These findings hold across most of Latin America and across a growing number of indicators of individual well-being, including income, education, and health (Pereira and Telles 2014).

At the same time, as the three previous examples make clear, patterns gleaned from new survey data establish that advancing social scientific understanding of relationships between ethnoracial, color, and class inequality in the region requires that researchers move beyond treating “Latin America” as a singular case. Even as scholars have documented and quantified pervasive ethnoracial and color inequalities across Latin America, their analyses have raised a host of new questions about the connections between different bases and axes of social stratification within individual countries and in comparative perspective. The emerging research exposes marked variation across countries in the absolute magnitudes of ethnoracial and color inequalities in key indicators of well-being. The research to date also reveals substantial variation across countries in relationships between categorical ethnoracial inequality, color inequality, and class inequality. This variation can and should be leveraged in future comparative research to improve theoretical understanding of the patterned ways that ethnoracial, color, and class distinctions intersect and interact to produce stratification dynamics in the Americas.

A third line of inquiry made possible and necessary by the avalanche of new racial, ethnic, and color data on Latin American populations builds on the key findings from the first two lines of inquiry to investigate how statistical estimates of inequality are affected by the ways that racial, ethnic, and color data are collected, coded, and analyzed. This research seeks to improve the analytic reflexivity of quantitative analyses of ethnoracial inequalities to better understand the underlying social processes that fuel observed statistical disparities. Increased analytic reflexivity would also better inform evolving scientific and political debates about research and policy related to ethnoracial inequality in the region.

How much do statistical estimates of ethnoracial or color inequality depend on the way these concepts are defined and measured in social surveys? When and why do
different measures produce radically different estimates of the severity of ethnoracial disparities? To what extent does the possible nonindependence of ethnoracial identification and social class (the “endogeneity problem”) affect statistical estimates of racial or color inequality in Latin American countries? Can modeling strategies that compare and combine multiple measures of ethnoracial distinction help researchers determine whether (or when or for whom) social status may shape ethnoracial identification, rather than (or in addition to) the reverse? These and related questions confront a growing number of researchers who aim to make use of the wealth of new ethnoracial data on recent population surveys in Latin America to investigate racial, ethnic, color, and class inequalities in the region.

Several recent studies investigate how estimates of ethnoracial inequality vary depending on the measure of race or ethnicity used in the analysis. To cite just a few examples, Villareal (2014) found that statistical evidence of disparities in educational outcomes in Mexico looks much more severe when language is the criteria for defining who is counted as indigenous as opposed to self-identification as indigenous. Bailey, Loveman, and Muniz (2013) found that income inequality along racial lines in Brazil appears more severe when estimated using a skin-tone measure than when using the race categories used in the census. And the country-specific contributions to Telles’ (2014) edited volume, Pigmentocracies, present similar results for outcomes including occupation, education, and perceptions of discrimination in Mexico, Colombia, and Peru.

The discovery of substantial differences in estimates of ethnoracial inequality across different measures is a promising source of analytic leverage to gain insight into underlying mechanisms that influence individuals’ self-identification and statistically observable ethnoracial disparities (Bailey, Loveman, and Muniz 2013). Direct comparison of results across models that use different measures is one potential source of analytic leverage to deepen understanding of underlying social processes that generate aggregate inequality along different axes of distinction. Another source is the development of innovative modeling strategies that use different combinations of measures within a single model or in a “nested” series of models. These strategies may help researchers identify and quantify the extent to which ethnoracial identification and various social status indicators are independent of each other in different contexts or for different subpopulations. In turn, this may help researchers determine whether or when or for whom money—or
education or occupation or wealth or good health—“whitens,” while also estimating how being perceived as “white” shapes the likelihood of individuals having good health, wealth, occupation, or education.

The possibility that mobility across ethnic or racial boundaries may be a more or less regular occurrence, and one that is tied in nonrandom ways to changes in social status or well-being, raises challenges for modeling strategies that are traditionally used to study racial inequality. Typically, these models require the assumption that racial categorization of individuals is both fixed over time and insensitive to changes in other status characteristics (i.e., the models assume that the independent variables are independent of the dependent variable). The wealth of new ethnic, racial, and color data for Latin American populations invites the development of innovative modeling strategies designed for contexts when the assumption of fixed, status-independent ethnoracial identification of individuals cannot be assumed to hold.

In sum: the wealth of new nationally representative survey data with information about ethnicity, race, and color is stimulating important new lines of research on the composition and stratification of Latin American populations. In addition to using new data to generate new knowledge about the region’s populations, researchers are also investigating how the knowledge they produce is strongly shaped by the methods used to collect, code, and analyze individual-level data on ethnoracial distinctions. Recent research in this vein makes clear that to understand the sociological meaning of statistical significance when dealing with ethnic and racial population data, it is essential to understand the social and cultural processes that influence how the raw data are produced.

Looking forward, additional research needs to assess the implications of different approaches to collection and analysis of racial, ethnic, and color data for empirical description and theoretical understanding of stratification dynamics in the Americas. This will inform public policy debates about how best to track and counteract these dynamics.

**NEW POLITICS**

New ethnic and racial population data are not only fueling the creation of new knowledge about ethnoracial inequalities in Latin America; they are also helping to define new sites and stakes of political struggle about recognition, rights, and redress for historically marginalized individuals and communities. The history of ethnoracial domination in Latin America is long, deep, and multifaceted, and so is the history of struggles against it. In several countries in the region, recent initiatives to produce and analyze population data by race, ethnicity, and color have opened new fronts of political contestation within broader, ongoing efforts to right past wrongs and ameliorate contemporary inequalities.

In assessing the political implications of the new racial and ethnic data in Latin America, it is important to underscore that in much of the region the existence of these data represents a significant political accomplishment. In several countries, the inclusion of new questions and categories on national censuses has made indigenous and Afro-descendent individuals statistically “visible” for the first time in decades, or in some contexts, for the first time ever (Loveman 2014). In part, the existence of new ethnoracial population data is politically significant in marking a victory for communities that have long struggled to gain official recognition of enduring ethnoracial distinctions within Latin American populations.

The increased availability of ethnoracial population data in most of Latin America is partly a product of hard-fought political battles to renegotiate relationships between states and citizens in the region. At the same time, new processes of ethnoracial data collection are constitutive of new sites and stakes of politics. For example, struggles about official recognition—which ethnoracial categories and boundaries will be officially sanctioned and which will remain officially invisible—cede easily into struggles about representation—who gets to speak on behalf of whom? These latter struggles have shaped the field of social movement organization and ties between nongovernmental organizations, activists, and political parties in some countries in the region.

The availability of ethnoracial population data has also bolstered activists’ demands for expanded benefits of social citizenship, including demands for ethnoracially targeted social benefits to redress historical marginalization and/or contemporary discrimination. Affirmative action policies for ethnoracially defined groups are already in place in several Latin American countries, and there is pressure on states from both domestic activists and international organizations to introduce more initiatives of this type in the future. These policies focus on targeted delivery of benefits ranging from health services to housing, poverty alleviation, and political representation. Among the most visible and contentious initiatives have been those focused on affirmative action in higher education.

Quantitative studies of ethnoracial inequalities help justify the introduction of affirmative action programs and also provide a means to monitor statistically observable effects of their implementation. At the same time, affirmative action programs tend to be politically controversial. The introduction of ethnoracially targeted
public policies inevitably raises difficult questions about who qualifies for these programs, who decides who qualifies, and on what basis such determinations are made. In Latin America, these questions are often especially fraught. Against the legacy of nationalist cultural projects that emphasized the blurriness and mixed-ness of Latin American peoples, policies that demand classification of individuals as “black” or “indigenous” raise a host of difficult questions concerning the legitimate criteria and authority to decide among potential beneficiaries.

It remains an open question whether or how the accumulation of quantitative studies documenting pervasive ethnoracial disparities in indicators of income, health, and education will translate into successful political claims for targeted public policies in many countries in the region. In Brazil, the proliferation of these studies in the late 1980s and 1990s supported claims made by the black movement for targeted policy interventions; Brazil became a leader in introducing affirmative action in government employment and university admissions. More recently, however, Brazil has also become a leading example of organized backlash. As ethnoracially targeted social programs spread, controversies about why and how states classify citizens by race or ethnicity will likely escalate. As in the United States, growing opposition to the idea that states might use ethnoracial criteria to differentiate among citizens at all will be seen.

Social policies that explicitly aim to address ethnoracial inequalities through interventions that target ethnoracially defined beneficiaries often draw attention to the political processes that inform the production of ethnoracial data in the first place. Thus, political battles fueled partly by the statistical documentation of ethnoracial inequalities tend to circle back to political battles about the production of ethnoracial statistics per se.

The early twenty-first-century boom in the production of ethnic, racial, and color data on Latin America populations is a major political and social scientific accomplishment, but it is also a politically contentious accomplishment that could well be short-lived. New data have generated new knowledge about ethnic, racial, and color inequalities in Latin American societies; this new knowledge, in turn, has stoked new political battles that have both advanced the claims of ethnoracially defined individuals and communities and given rise to organized opposition to these efforts. Thus, as social scientists continue to analyze the wealth of new population data to advance understanding of the nexus among ethnoracial, color, and class inequalities in Latin America, they must keep the politics of the production of this data within their analytic frame.

NOTES
1. An extended analysis of the recent shift in state practices of ethnic and racial classification of citizens in Latin America can be found in Loveman 2014. This chapter draws in part from sections of Chapters 6 and 7.
3. Of course, even as some ethnoracially defined identities and communities have achieved official recognition, many others—such as those that would demarcate individuals of Asian, Lebanese, or Turkish descent—remain statistically invisible in much of the region.
4. For example, see Paschel (2016).

REFERENCES
Beyond Race or Class
Entangled Inequalities in Latin America

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Latin America is infamous for its deeply entrenched and extreme inequalities. Speaking of the specific case of Brazil, economic historian William Summerhill often states that the country is more unequal than ancient Egypt was under the Pharaohs. In fact, as Gasparini and Lustig (2011) noted, Latin America houses 10 of the 15 most unequal countries in the world. In this sense, Latin America historically has been a region of both extreme poverty and extreme wealth. This was particularly true in the 1980s and 1990s, when inequality continued to rise as a result of economic crises and structural-adjustment policies imposed by international institutions including the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank as a condition of their loans. This led most countries in the region by the 1990s to have a Gini Index of more than 50—in which a score of 0 means that every person in the society has the exact same income and a score of 1 means that one person has all of the income of the society. To put this in perspective, in the same period, the United States—a country also known for its extreme disparities—had a lower Gini Index of 45.

These patterns began to change by the end of the 1990s decade as Latin American states adopted economic reforms—including a broadening of social-welfare policies—that began to chip away at deep-seated socioeconomic disparities (López-Calva and Lustig 2010). This period also marked profound changes in citizenship regimes as states throughout the region adopted new constitutions recognizing ethno-racial rights for indigenous and black populations (Van Cott 2000). The reforms included symbolic concessions such as the naming of these countries as “multicultural” and “pluriethnic” nations; the change in public educational curricula to include the history of black and indigenous peoples; and the naming of national ethnic holidays such as the Day of Black Consciousness in Brazil (November 20) and the Month of Black Heritage in Panama. In addition to important symbolic concessions, states granted these communities the right to highly sought-after material resources, including large swaths of national territory in the form of collective ethnic titles and the right to natural resources.

This coincidence of reforms raises several questions: What is the relationship between these ethno-racial policies and the social-welfare reforms that so greatly reduced inequality in Latin American countries in the last decade? Taken together, are these policies sufficient to address the deep-seated ethno-racial inequalities these countries continue to experience today? What are the politics of their implementation? This chapter examines these questions using the specific cases of Colombia and Brazil, particularly policies designated for black populations, for several reasons. First, these two countries adopted the most robust legislation for black populations in Latin America and were among the first to do so. As a result, they have become models of ethno-racial policy in the region. Second, and perhaps more important, ethno-racial policies in Colombia and Brazil emerged amid radically different political contexts. This chapter shows how these differences shape the nature of the policies as well as the extent of their implementation. It is these similarities and differences that provide much needed leverage for thinking through the relationship between race and class inequality in Latin America as well as which type of approach is needed to address them.

The following discussion first explores the ways in which race and class are heavily imbricated in these cases and in Latin America more generally. Second, it provides an overview of the ethno-racial policies that the Colombian and Brazilian states began to adopt in the late 1980s, including an explanation of how they came about, the nature of the policies, and the politics of their implementation. Third, ethno-racial policy is situated within broader social-policy agendas of the Colombian and Brazilian states during the last decade to further analyze the relationship between class- and race-based policies. This discussion highlights the ways in which the logic of policies for black populations complements broader policy reforms in Brazil but also how they have violently clashed with the development strategy of the Colombian government. Fourth, the chapter then moves toward a series of recommendations for effectively addressing systemic ethno-racial inequalities in both countries—with two caveats. First, it is recognized that there can be no simple policy solution to what is fundamentally a problem of economic and political power. Second, as it is clear in the Colombian case, it is important to unsettle the assumption that “equality” is necessarily what marginalized ethno-racial groups want, make claims to, or may actually need. This is discussed in more detail throughout the chapter.
ENTANGLEMENTS OF RACE AND CLASS

The Brazilian term *favelado* translates literally to a person who lives in and/or is from one of the country’s numerous and massive slums; however, the term functions more as a marginalized social category defined primarily through ideas of spatialized class at the same time that the idea is deeply racialized. Although some poor white Brazilians live in *favelas*, the *favelado*—as it exists in popular imaginary—is a poor black body often pathologized as criminal (Sheriff 2001). Although the social meanings ascribed to places such as Brazil’s *favelas* are highly pejorative, the equating of blackness with poverty in Brazil and elsewhere in Latin America reflects a social reality in which black people are disproportionately found among the poor and extremely poor in these countries (Telles 2007). This also reflects the fact that the relationship between race and class is highly entangled with space. This occurs in terms of both the spatial inequality that occurs within urban centers in Colombia and Brazil as well as through the great disparities among regions. Indeed, this material pattern of uneven wealth distribution has given way, in part, to a symbolic order that also links class with race and space.

In the specific case of Brazil, nonwhites are overrepresented in the poorest and most underdeveloped region of the Northeast, whereas whites are overrepresented in the more urbanized and industrialized Southeast and Southern regions. In a similar way, Colombia’s department or state that is infamous for having the highest percentage of people living in extreme poverty (i.e., more than 40% in 2012) also has 74% of its population identifying as Afro-descendant (Departamento de Estadistica National Estadual 2012). It is also important to note that in both countries, indigenous people also are more likely to live in regions that are extremely underserved in terms of basic infrastructure and public services (Hall and Patrinos 2012).

Figures 1 and 2 show the proportion of each state that identifies as black or brown in Colombia and Brazil, respectively. In both figures, the darker the map, the higher is the percentage of those who identify as black, brown, *mulato*, or *pardo*. The maps also highlight the more industrialized and wealthier regions of both countries in a red circle to convey that in both cases whites are concentrated in the wealthier regions and nonwhites in the poorer regions of each of these countries.

This coincidence of racial and regional and spatial inequalities has led some scholars to argue that blacks and indigenous people are not poor because they are black or indigenous but rather because they simply live in regions that are poorer. Although there may be some truth to such a statement, it requires us to naturalize—rather than analyze and historicize—regional disparities. Indeed, as historians have convincingly shown, Latin American states’ investment in specific regions—especially in the decades following independence—was a highly racialized project (Andrews 2004; Helg 1990; Sanders 2004; Skidmore 1993). In this period, elites throughout the region made strategic racial calculations about how to ensure the entrance of black
and indigenous people into modernity. This meant investing in particular areas such as Brazil’s Southern region, as well as adopting a range of “whitening” policies, including offering subsidies to European immigrants (Skidmore 1993).

However, to state that racial disparities are, in part, a function of regional disparities is not to deny that race has also driven some of the very unevenness of regional development. The most useful way to think about the relationships among race, class, and space is as necessarily entangled, both materially and symbolically (Wade 1993). More than the material reality that underlies these spaces, regions can be said to be highly racialized as well as highly classed. Conversely, race and class can be said to be deeply spatialized insofar as certain regions are understood as synonymous with particular ethno-racial groups and, therefore, read as inherently poor and “backward.”

Because of the way that race operates in these two countries, this imbrication also means that lighter-skinned people from regions that are understood in the national imaginary as black regions also can experience racial inferiorization. This is clear in the negative treatment of nordestinos (i.e., people from Brazil’s Northeast region) who in recent decades have migrated in increasingly larger numbers to the wealthier, whiter Southeast region of the country to work in the service sector and informal economy. Although not all of these migrants are black or even brown, they still are subject to racialized ideas of
Much like in the United States—where there is a myth that everyone is middle class—in many Latin American countries, there is a powerful idea that everyone is equally mixed.

Among other factors, these scholars have showed convincingly that race is not reducible to class. In fact, when they controlled for parental education and income, for example, they found that blacks and indigenous people still have less education and lower returns to education. The work on discrimination that Colombia’s and Brazil’s small black middle class faces in the labor and the dating and marriage markets is particularly telling in this respect (Figueiredo 2004; Viveros 2014). Ultimately, then, being black can be said to negatively affect a person’s life chances for three reasons. First, being black makes one more likely to be poor. Second, whether or not one is actually poor, being black in Latin American countries is equated so significantly with poverty that a black person will be assumed to be poor. This, in turn, means that blacks are more likely to experience class-based discrimination, even if they are actually middle or upper class. Third, there is what Wade (1993) called a “relative autonomy of race” from class such that blackness itself is a “container” for a plethora of negative attributes distinct from class or materiality, strictly defined (e.g., ugliness, criminality, ignorance, and corruption).

Nevertheless, the study of class and urban space has largely been separated from the study of race, which has come at the expense of systematic examinations of the relationship between race and class. Stated differently, scholars on both sides often operated within a set of debates that pitted race against class. The question was whether race or class structured Latin American societies. Of course, this was a false dichotomy and it came at the expense of asking more interesting questions. For instance, whereas scholars of race typically highlight the ways in which black and indigenous populations are disproportionately poor, they typically do not ask questions about how this relates to the broader (and changing) features of the economy, including factors such as the structure of the labor market, fiscal policy, reach and quality of the educational system, and social-welfare policy. The types of social movements that have emerged in recent decades also seek a more intersectional analysis. Indeed, race and class often are linked organically in the political practices that emerge from those who are doubly marginalized as black and slum dwellers.
ETHNO-RACIAL POLICY TRANSFORMATIONS IN COLOMBIA AND BRAZIL

Beginning in the late 1980s, almost every country in Latin America adopted some type of ethno-racial policies. This represented a serious break with nearly a century of state policies based on an emphasis on “race mixture,” both “biological” and cultural. Previously, the model of Latin American nationhood was built on the idea that the strength of a nation was in its unique mixture of Europeans, indigenous people, and Africans. Although on the surface, mestizaje was about the equal valorization of each ancestral root, in almost all cases, it reproduced hierarchies. As many scholars argued, if mestizaje valued mixture on the one hand, it celebrated European culture and “blood” above indigeneity and blackness on the other.

The adoption of ethno-racial policies in Latin America beginning in the late 1980s also overturned a long-standing tradition throughout the region whereby political elites denied the existence of racial inequality and racism. How could there be cultural genocide or racism if everyone was culturally and biologically mixed? In this sense, recent policy changes signaled that the taboo on speaking of racial inequality and heterogeneity has been broken, in great part due to pressure from black and indigenous movements in the region.6

Yet, whereas most recent scholarly accounts characterize this as a singular “multicultural turn,” I argue that it may be more useful to view these changes as constituting two distinct moments.7 The first, I suggest, began to unfold in the late 1980s with the shift to what Van Cott (2000) termed “multicultural constitutionalism.” In this period, Latin American states reformed their constitutions in ways that recognized the “pluriethnic” and “multicultural” character of the political community while also extending specific rights to indigenous peoples (see column 1) and approximately half also recognized specific sectors within the black population, typically rural and geographically concentrated.

However, in a few Latin American countries, these multicultural reforms also were followed by a subsequent wave of ethnoracial policies in the 2000s and 2010s aimed at promoting racial equality and typified in affirmative-action policies. Combating systemic racial discrimination was the goal of these policies and blacks were their presumed subjects. If these temporal and substantive distinctions are taken seriously, Colombia and Brazil emerge as especially important cases for their similarities as well as their differences. They were the only countries to first include black populations in multicultural reforms and then to expand the policies. Elsewhere I argue that these policies occurred as the result of interplay between changes in domestic politics and consolidation of a field of international actors interested in questions about multiculturalism and racial justice (Paschel 2016).

More important, however, are the types of reforms that the Colombian and Brazilian states underwent. Although mestizaje began to lose ground as a state project throughout Latin America beginning in the 1980s, there was still significant variation in ethno-racial policies in the region. First, countries differed with regard to who was either included or excluded from ethno-racial reforms (Hooker 2005). Table 1 outlines these important differences. Of the 19 Latin American countries, all recognized the rights of indigenous peoples (see column 1) and approximately half also recognized specific sectors within the black population, typically rural and geographically concentrated.

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The Politics of Racial and Class Inequalities in the Americas 61
communities such as those on the Atlantic Coast of Central America and the Pacific Coast of Colombia and Ecuador (see column 2). After this initial round of multicultural reforms, Colombia and Brazil became the only two countries to expand the definition of blackness beyond rural populations by passing legislation that focused on achieving racial equality in terms of socioeconomic status.

Fifteen years after the signing of a new constitution, the Brazilian state began to adopt affirmative-action policies unparalleled in Latin America. During this period, the government also began to proactively address racism and racial inequality across a number of policy areas, including health and education. Similarly, in the same period, the Colombian government broadened the conception of the black political subject through a number of constitutional court rulings, the 2005 census, and several policies aimed at achieving “equal opportunity” for “Afro-Colombians.” In addition, the Colombian and Brazilian states created the most robust ethno-racial state apparatuses in Latin America to guarantee these rights and to coordinate the implementation of ethno-racial policies. As a result, these two countries often serve as models for other governments in this region in designing their own approach to ethnic rights.

Although both countries experienced these two moments of policy shifts, the types of policies that stuck in each case were different. Whereas discourses of ethnic difference have come to dominate discussions of black rights and policies in Colombia, racial equality is the dominant frame in which to discuss policies targeting Brazil’s black population. This is important because these different types of policies have radically different implications for racial inequality. They also have given way to distinct forms of contestation around implementation.

### Laws that Stick, Laws that Don’t Stick

Those familiar with Latin America know that simply because laws exist on paper does not mean that they exist in any real material way. A popular adage in Colombia (i.e., “there are more laws than Colombians”) and Brazil’s expression (i.e., “there are laws that stick and laws that don’t stick”) seek to capture this conundrum. Those interested in understanding ethno-racial inequality and politics in this region must look beyond formal law as signs of change or, at the very least, examine when and under what conditions states have kept their promises.

Law 70 has five substantive chapters, each focusing on a specific area including land, natural resources, ethnic education, mining, and social and economic development. Each chapter was to be implemented through separate pieces of legislation. However, despite 20 years of promises by Colombian presidents, ministers, and directors of the Office on Black Communities, the chapters on ethno-education and territory were the only two implemented. Even in those two areas, there were serious limitations, including the fact that less than 10% of Colombia’s public schools have adopted the legally mandated curriculum on Afro-Colombian history and culture.

In contrast, Colombia’s record on land titling of black rural communities is impressive. This is especially true when comparing it to Honduras and Brazil, where efforts to recognize collective titles have been crippled. In the mid-1990s, Colombia began to aggressively title indigenous and black communities through its Natural Resource Management Program. The original amount committed to Colombia’s titling of black communities was $39 million; however, the final project cost was $65 million. The impact was substantial: as one World Bank publication reported, the funding benefited 497 black communities on the Pacific Coast and 2.36 million hectares of collective land titles (Sánchez and García 2006, 27). In the same period, the Inter-American Development Bank also supported land titling in Colombia through its Land Titling and Registry Modernization. Thereafter, the Colombian state continued to demarcate and title collective territories for black communities. Indeed, according to the Colombian Institute for Rural Development, the state had titled 5.4 million hectares involving 185 black community councils by 2014. These figures are particularly striking if we consider that they represent 66% of the Pacific Coast’s 8.3 million hectares of territory.

The institutionalization of black political participation was intended to ensure full implementation of Law 70. Given the contestation over land and natural resources that initially catalyzed black rural mobilization, throughout the 2000s, Black Communities’ Movement pressured the Colombian state to ensure not only participation as defined under Law 70 but also the right to consulta previa. Embodying International Labor Organization Convention 169 and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, “prior consultation” mandates that governments must protect the right to free, prior, and informed consent on all state and private projects that affect the lives of people in indigenous and, increasingly, black rural communities. However, in the case of Colombia, consulta previa may have been largely a performative exercise. State officials would meet with leaders, commit to next steps, organize and fund regional and national conferences, and transport black activists around the country to sign on to development plans that were never implemented. In some cases, state officials used the mere presence of black leaders in meetings as proof that they had been legally consulted.
In contrast to Colombia, the Brazilian state seems to have been expanding ethno-racial policy in recent decades. In addition to affirmative-action policies— which were becoming increasingly commonplace throughout the country—in 2003, President Lula signed Law 10.639, which required all public and private elementary schools to teach African and Afro-Brazilian history and culture. Moreover, under the Workers’ Party administration, the Brazilian state also attempted to mainstream racial equality across other policy areas, including antipoverty programs, health, and education more broadly. However, this characterization of expanding ethno-racial policy holds only if we ignore the fact that long before there were quotas in Brazilian universities, the state had recognized territorial rights for quilombo communities.

Considering the host of policies targeting Brazil’s black population, we find that whereas certain policies have “stuck,” others have not. The main failure of Brazil’s ethno-racial policies is the titling of quilombo land. To date, only 1 million hectares of land have been titled to quilombo communities. To put this in perspective, it is only one fifth of the land that the Colombian state has given to black communities despite Brazil’s much larger size, greater number of officially recognized quilombos, and greater state capacity. After little movement on the issue of quilombo titling, in 2003, President Lula signed a decree that was supposed to identify, recognize, delimit, demarcate, and title quilombo territories in accordance with the country’s 1988 constitution. Lula also launched the Brazil Quilombo Program, an initiative that was to title quilombo communities as well as build infrastructure; implement local development projects; and work on issues of citizenship, rights, and participation. Housed in the Special Secretariat for the Promotion of Racial Equality (SEPPIR), Brazil Quilombo was supposed to involve coordination among the Ministry of Agrarian Development, the Ministry of Social Development and Hunger Alleviation, and other relevant ministries. However, the lack of a real budget and commitment on the part of the substantive ministries curtailed the program’s effectiveness.

At the 25th anniversary of quilombo rights, Brazil’s National Institute for Settlement and Agrarian Reform had recognized 1,360 quilombos. Of those, only 193 had received collective titles, representing only slightly less than 1 million hectares of land (Bailey 2009). As in Colombia, the Brazilian state’s procrastination on quilombo land titling is deeply tied to underlying economic interests.

However, if the titling of quilombos was an uphill battle, affirmative-action policies proved to be the opposite. By the early 2010s, dozens of Brazil’s most prestigious public universities had adopted some form of affirmative action, based on either race, class, or both (Racusen 2009). At that time, 10.5% of the country’s highly coveted university slots were reserved under affirmative action, amounting to slightly less than 35,000 students (Paixão, Rossetto, and Carvano 2010). As a result, the number of black and brown students at universities in Brazil had increased substantially. This was remarkable, given that affirmative-action policies had been adopted in a decentralized manner through decisions made by individual university councils and state legislatures rather than federal mandate. The Statute of Racial Equality sought to further institutionalize racial-equality policy, including affirmative action in a more durable way at the national level.

In the decade leading up to affirmative action, the majority of Brazilians already believed that racism was a problem in the country (Bailey 2009). This does not necessarily mean that they, in turn, supported policies such as affirmative action; however, in the late 2000s, there was increasing evidence that they did. In 2006, for example, Datafolha found that 65% of Brazilians were in favor of race-based affirmative action and 87% were in favor of class-based quotas. Similarly, seven years later, as Brazil’s Supreme Court considered a landmark affirmative-action case, the Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion and Statistics (IBOPE) released results from another nationally representative survey showing that 64% of Brazilians were in favor of race-based affirmative action. This ideological change culminated in April 2012 when Brazil’s Supreme Court voted unanimously that affirmative-action policies were constitutional.

The Supreme Court decision came at a time when the federal government also was shifting toward a more aggressive stance on racial policy under president Dilma Rousseff and SEPPIR Minister Luiza Bairros. In addition to being more vocal about racism, there were substantive
changes in racial policy under this new Workers’ Party administration. Most notably, in August 2012, Rousseff signed the Law of Quotas that had been delayed in Congress for more than a decade. This was a major feat considering that professors at Brazil’s prestigious federal universities had been among the most vehement opponents to affirmative action. The Law of Quotas required all of the country’s 59 federal universities and 38 technical institutes to reserve 50% of their seats for poor and working-class students. The law also mandated that these same universities guarantee that the racial composition of those reserved seats match that of the state in which a university is located. Although federal universities had until 2016 to comply, most had already done so by the end of 2012.21

Yet while affirmative-action policies have undeniably transformed state and popular discourse around the question of race in Brazil, it is not yet clear how transformative they have been in material terms. Whereas in 1988, 12.4% of whites had some college, only 3.6% of blacks and browns did. This gap actually widened slightly in 2008 when the percentage of whites that had some college increased to 35% whereas that of blacks and browns increased only to 16.4% (Paixão, Rossetto, and Carvano 2010). In this sense, the Law of Quotas could radically transform not only the federal university system but also the broader patterns of social mobility and racial inequality in ways that more decentralized affirmative-action policies had yet to do.

The dynamics of these two cases are distinct in important ways. Even so, the Colombian and Brazilian states’ uneven records on implementing ethno-racial reforms can both be said to have derived from two sources. The first factor is the emergence of various reactionary movements against affirmative action in Brazil as well as ethnic land rights in both countries. The second factor, which has resulted in the uneven implementation of these policies, is related to the depoliticization and cooptation of black activists vis-à-vis the creation of racial-policy institutions within the Colombian and Brazilian states. Although Afro-Brazilian activists such as the Minister of Racial Equality, Luiza Bairros, have been able to push for policies from within the state apparatus, their power is extremely constrained. The failure of the government to consider the issue of police killings of black and brown youth, as well as the recent subordination of race-based affirmative action to class-based policies, speak to these limitations. Furthermore, because many of the recent policy gains are not sufficiently institutionalized (i.e., almost all of them occurred through presidential decrees rather than congress), there is reason to believe that they are fleeting. This is especially the case if we consider the record-low approval ratings of Dilma Rousseff and the Worker’s Party more generally, as well as the historic and politicized impeachment process underway in the country.

The situation in Colombia is even more precarious due in great part to the nature of the incorporation of Afro-Colombian activists in the state. Beyond paying off leaders, the state created hundreds of spaces for black participation that are devoid of power and that facilitate state retrenchment. In this, a few activists who represent themselves through “paper organizations” have colonized most spaces that were initially created to ensure the elaboration and implementation of legislation related to black communities. Given these dynamics, even those Afro-Colombian activists who engage with the state for more sincere reasons—whether or not knowingly—participate in ritualized participation that facilitates state retrenchment.

ETHNO-RACIAL POLICY AND THE BROADER DEVELOPMENT AGENDA

The recent ethno-racial reforms that the Colombian and Brazilian states have undertaken are embedded in a larger political field, which can have a profound impact on those very policies. Moreover, if we care about racial disparities, we also must consider that given the high concentration of black people among the poor and extremely poor in both countries, class-based programs have the potential to remedy racial inequality. This section situates the ethno-racial policies outlined previously within the larger context of the Colombian and Brazilian states’ approach to development and inequality in the last two decades.

Racial-equality policies in Brazil occurred within the context of a broader expansion of social policy in Brazil. Although much of this is to the credit of the Workers’ Party—which took national office with the election of Luis Inacio da Silva in 2002—secondary enrollment already had increased dramatically under the previous president, Fernando Henrique Cardoso (López-Calva and Lustig 2010). As a result, the impact of affirmative-action policies must be situated in these decades-long attempts to reduce class inequality. Indeed, at a time when nations throughout the Global North and South were shrinking the welfare state, Brazil was expanding it. This included several robust national-level programs such as Fome Zero, a large-scale antihunger campaign; Bolsa Familia, a cash-transfer program that rewards poor families for immunizing their children and keeping them in school; and Saúde para Todos, which substantially expanded access to health care.

Additionally, several reforms to higher education, including unprecedented government investment and the creation of programs such as Programa Universidade Para Todos (PROUNI)—which offer tax breaks to private
Brazil witnessed the percentage of those living in extreme poverty decrease from 25% to 4% between 1990 and 2012.  

...
Southwestern region. The government sought to make Colombia the main exporter of palm oil—a goal that it eventually realized. However, in 2008, a highly contagious disease befell many of the crops in the region.

In addition to the problem of the African palm was the much deeper clash between the Colombian state’s development agenda and the guarantee of basic human rights, including the ethnic rights won in the constitutional-reform process. Although these major development schemes ostensibly were designed to generate income for Afro-Colombian communities as well as revenue for the Colombian government, instead they have led to illegal mining, forced cultivation, and increased violence throughout the country (AFRODES 2009). Furthermore, offering titles to mining companies, many of them transnational, has resulted in the violation of many rights guaranteed under Law 70.

In this sense, the logic of development operating in Colombia is fundamentally in tension with the type of multicultural project for which many indigenous peoples and rural black communities fought. The rights-based project was conceived as one that would allow for more autonomy in making decisions about what type of development was wanted and would have guaranteed their collective territorial rights. Of course, this has not been the case. Furthermore, even if communities desired this kind of development, these were often designed to benefit large, mechanized agricultural and mining practice, and as such would benefit large corporations rather than mitigate Colombia’s extreme racial inequalities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Brazilian and Colombian cases raise many questions about how we think about the relationship between race and class. They also provide insight about what types of policies would address most effectively the different types of inequality that derive from race and class.

1. Beyond Race or Class

First is the fundamental question about the terms of the debate. Several myths pervade political and scholarly debate in Latin America (as in the United States) about the relationship between race and class, which undermine real efforts to jointly address race and class inequality. Perhaps most obvious, the case of black rights in Colombia underscores the need to move beyond debates that pit race and class as fundamentally irreconcilable approaches to addressing inequality. In such a formulation, policies would either be race-based or class-based. This problematic binary is based on several assumptions that must be problematized before the discussion about the relationship between race and class can begin. First is the idea that identities, movements, and policies based on race inherently undermine class struggle. We know from recent work that this also has little basis—at least in terms of policy outcomes. In fact, the same states that adopted multicultural reforms in the 1980s and 1990s also were likely to adopt social-welfare policies (Banting and Kymlicka 2006). In countries such as Brazil, Venezuela, and Bolivia, the adoption of specific policies for black and indigenous peoples occurred alongside an unprecedented expansion of universal social-welfare policies. Banting and Kymlicka (2006) found that countries with more robust multicultural policies also were more likely to have more robust social-welfare programs. Second, such binaries between race and class rely on the assumption that racial claims are inherently not material in nature. This is a difficult argument to uphold when we consider the diversity of claims that black movements in Latin America have launched at the state, including access to basic infrastructure, education at every level, and natural resources.

A less cynical view is that given the imbrication of race and class discussed previously, class-based policies—in and of themselves—would dramatically reduce racial inequality. The experience of Latin America gives us pause (Buvinić, Mazza, and Deutsch 2004). Although blacks and indigenous people are overrepresented among the poor, antipoverty programs historically have not lessened ethno-racial inequality. As policy analysts also aptly noted, this is in part because black and indigenous people tend to be overrepresented among the extreme poor when compared to their white and mestizo counterparts. They also are more likely to live in regions where the basic infrastructure is precarious. Moreover, class-based programs and policies are not designed to address racism, structural or otherwise. The Cuban case is especially telling on this point. Despite adopting a blend of universal class-equalizing policies and a symbolic commitment to antiracism in the wake of the country’s 1959 revolution, racial hierarchies continued to pervade Cuban society, inside of and beyond the reach of the state (Sawyer 2005). In this sense, racial logics continued to infiltrate society and the state—if they ever were exterminated. Cuba makes the strongest case that formal equality and class-based solutions can go only so far in remedying racial inequality.

Ultimately, then, the conversation should not be about race or class but rather both. Former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso made a speech that set the ball rolling on affirmative action in Brazil after decades of denial of the country’s racial inequality. A sociologist who had
conducted extensive research on racial inequality in Brazil before becoming president, Cordosa—commenting at the Third World Conference against Racism—stated:

We, in Durban, what we saw was the need to reaffirm that societies need to become more and more just and based on equality and solidarity. It’s for this reason that the Brazilian state recognizes the painful consequences that slavery caused in Brazil. And it will continue with the task of repairing such damage, through policies that promote an equality of opportunities. There is an eternal debate about if policies should be universal or specific. They should be both...  

In the same way that class policies alone are insufficient for addressing the entanglements of race and class inequalities, so too are racial policies. No matter how robust, race policies cannot address dramatic structural inequalities in areas such as uneven access to health care and quality of education or the precarious nature of work—particularly given the size of Latin America’s labor market. These structural issues are a central factor in explaining the reproduction of racial inequality in this region. Again, the example of Colombia is useful. The few policies aimed at addressing racial inequality in Colombia have not been part of a broader set of reforms in the same way that they have in countries such as Brazil, Bolivia, and Venezuela. In those cases, the Left has “colonized” the state—so to speak—and, as such, ethno-racial policies have emerged as a broader package of reforms.

What is needed are social policies that not only address the overlap and imbrication of race and class but also recognize how race can function autonomously from class to produce systemic disadvantages for blacks, independent of their class position. It is worth noting that in contexts such as Colombia—where black and indigenous populations are concentrated in specific areas—policies that target particular regions also may jointly address class and racial inequality. For example, a program that targeted the state of the Chocó—which is more than 80% black—might be perceived as simultaneously addressing both race and class inequality. Of course, it does not follow that such an approach will necessarily address racism in any meaningful way.

2. Beyond Universal Measurements

Even if we agree that race- and class-based approaches are not inherently about conflict, we still must recognize that it does not mean that they are in complete harmony either. This is especially clear in the Colombian case. Assuming that the goal of class-based or universal welfare policies is to bring about class mobility, the multicultural policies passed in Colombia and throughout Latin America unsettle the very premise that such class mobility should be the end goal. If Law 70 was completely implemented, it would not necessarily translate to more equality—at least not measured through macro socioeconomic indicators such as income, wealth, and education. As discussed previously, black and indigenous movements in the 1980s and 1990s fought to be incorporated under fundamentally different terms than they had been historically. Rather than be incorporated through the logic of assimilation and modernization, they demanded recognition of their cultural differences and right to chart different paths to the future that did not involve industrialization, marketization of land, and large-scale extraction. As a result, many of the ethno-racial reforms adopted by Latin American states fundamentally challenge the idea of a singular horizon toward social mobility and development.

Ultimately, both multicultural and racial-equality policies are simultaneously about recognition and redistribution, about symbolic and material inclusion. However, they do imply different types of state projects of inclusion, which has implications for how inequality and exclusion are measured. Indeed, whereas the impact of racial-equality policies can be measured concretely in indicators such as educational attainment, income, wealth, and returns to education, multiculturalism cannot be quantified in similarly discrete ways. More important, mainstream indicators of well-being may be in serious tension with the livelihood projects that have been institutionalized in multicultural reforms. Stated differently, the right to difference and the policies aimed at granting indigenous and rural black communities the right to collective territory, political autonomy, natural resources, alternative development, and even multicultural education are not easy to capture in traditional measures of inequality and development. It was precisely the construction of certain people and places as “poor” and “subjects of development” that led to the many integrationist policies against which they fought in the first place (Escobar 2008). In fact, what may appear on a graph as unemployment in black or indigenous communities with a collective land title actually may be precisely what they demanded from the state beginning in the 1980s: that is, the right to stay on their land and continue to practice sustainable farming and mining.

At the same time, it is difficult to ignore the fact of glaring differences in basic infrastructure and access by race in Colombia. To cite only a few examples, in their audit study, Rodriguez Garavito et al. found that there was systematic racial discrimination in employment in cities throughout the country. Moreover, according to 2005 census data, the black infant-mortality rate was...
The looming question that remains is: What would that other world look like? In the context of deep-seated race and class inequalities in Latin America, there is no doubt that it would mean more access to education, health care, dignified housing, justice, and higher incomes for blacks who historically and systematically have not enjoyed them. However, we also must recognize that this “other world” may be entirely different: something that shows up as extreme poverty and unemployment, instead of self-sustainable living, on our graphs. Ultimately, people want to live a better life. This is as true for Afro-Colombian farmers living in remote villages on the rivers of the Chocó as it is for their counterparts in urban slums such as the Agua Blanca district of Cali. This desire is perhaps universal; even so, we must take seriously the fact that these different groups may have distinct definitions of the good life. We must also grapple with the fact that social mobility and incorporation into markets may run counter to these life projects and political claims. The multiplicity of claims—which often have mapped directly onto differences in the material conditions and trajectories of politicization of urban and rural black populations—may require moving away from measuring “inequality” and toward developing more nuanced definitions of “el buen vivir” (“the good life”).

3. Beyond Policy, Toward Politics

In Tanya Murray Li’s (2007) work on development policy in Indonesia, she argued that a main reason that policies that attempt to improve the lives of people fail is that they “render technical” what actually are political problems. If we take her warning seriously, we must not only examine how to get policies “right” but, more important, we also must analyze the deeper political and economic constraints to implementing greater equality in Latin America—and, indeed, in the world. In the cases of Colombia and Brazil, this exercise must involve rethinking how we characterize ethno-racial legislation passed in the last 20 years. Rather than fetishize these laws or fixate on the dramatic shift from formal “colorblindness” to ethno-racial policies (which, admittedly, I have done), we must think seriously about what actually was won and how institutionalized the gains
are. In other words, what will happen if the Left is forced to leave power (a likely scenario in several Latin American countries)? Moreover, what are the actual impediments to full realization of ethno-racial rights and policies? What accounts for their expansion in some cases?

This chapter is not a call to cease all analyses of the impressive armory of legislation accumulated in the last 20 years in this region. This was a major outcome of mobilization by the Left and by black and indigenous movements. Instead, it is a call to think more systematically about the dynamics of implementation, including the politics of backlash. This has manifested in the media-backed movements of mostly white upper-class Brazilians, who have launched a frontal attack on affirmative action and, more recently, against social-welfare policies. However, reactionary movements also have emerged to undermine ethnic land rights in Colombia, Brazil, and elsewhere in Latin America, through both legal and extralegal means. The difference between this and the backlash against affirmative action in Brazil is the extreme violence, dispossession, and displacement that it often entails.

The consolidation of the reactionary movements, as well as the precarious state of black rights and participation within many state apparatuses in Latin America, signal (perhaps more now than ever) the need for a more organized and autonomous movement that is against both class and racial inequality. Nevertheless, mobilizing the grassroots around ethno-racial issues has always been difficult for black movements in this region. The fact that they were successful in pressuring states to include specific subsets of black populations in the constitutional reform processes of the 1990s, and later in affirmative-action policies, does not mean that they overcame this problem. Instead, their effectiveness was in their lobbying of governments in the context of constitutional-reform processes and international norms. This was an important strategy that allowed these movements to take advantage of a political opening without massive grassroots backing; however, it may not be sufficient to hold states accountable for implementing or expanding policies.

Ultimately, then, the study of stratification is inherently the study of politics; it also is necessarily about the study of both formal and contentious policies. In Colombia and in Latin America more generally, how much the state complies with specific laws for black populations depends heavily on activists’ ability to exert pressure from outside official channels, typically with transnational leverage. Indeed, many of the advances in terms of policy implementation in Colombia occur in the face of international pressure from human-rights organizations and other US allies to indigenous and black movements. Given that the issue of policy implementation is inevitably one of politics, any amelioration of racial inequality in Colombia and Brazil must be just that: a question of politics, not policy.

**NOTES**

2. That is, of the countries included in the World Income Inequality Database (2007); the other five are on the African continent.
3. Afro-descendant includes those who identify as black as well as those who identify as pardo (in Brazil) and mulato (in Colombia). Both categories refer to people who are considered a mix of African and European ancestry. Increasingly, though, scholars have argued that pardo is not always associated with blackness in Brazil.
4. There are some important exceptions here including Twine (1998).
6. Elsewhere I argue that rather than massive movements, it was the mobilization of small black movements in the context of an alignment of both domestic and international political openings.
7. See Greene (2007), Hooker (2005), Loveman (2014) and , Rahier (2012), and for accounts that outline a singular shift to multicultural, multiethnic state policies.
9. The Ministry for the Promotion of Racial Equality in Brazil, for example, consulted with governments throughout South America on institutional design. In addition, the inclusion of black rights in Colombia’s 1991 constitution and later the Law of Black Communities (1993) served as a template for the inclusion of blacks in Ecuador’s multicultural constitution some years later.
11. A number of scholars have addressed these differences including Hooker (2005), Ng’weno (2007) and Ascher (2009).
16. The educational system was not only the main vehicle through which race and class stratification was perpetuated in Brazil, but also was arguably the most central arm of the state in the production and diffusion of racial democracy ideologies. As such, textbooks typically highlighted racial mixture as the strength of the nation, while also marginalizing Afro-Brazilians from history (Munanga 2005). There have been many impediments to implementation including intense debates within the Ministry of Education between those who support the legislation and others who believe it effectively introduced racism into Brazilian schools (Moura, Santana Braga and Soares 2009, Silva Souza and Souza Pereira 2013, Gomes and de Jesus 2013).
10. It is important to note that this number did not include the many communities still fighting for official recognition as quilombos.
18. It is important that the debate about affirmative action may have been particularly polarizing because rather than a point system, the majority of policies were based on a quota system that reserved a specific number of seats for students based on race or class or both. See the Grupo de Estudos Multidisciplinares da Ação

19. They asked respondents their opinion on affirmative action based on color, attending public school, and income. Much like the 2006 Datafolha survey, the support for class-based affirmative action was higher (77%). Only 16% of Brazilians, overall, were against all forms of quotas, however, this percentage increased substantially when specifically considering wealthy Brazilians. Results are available at http://www.ibope.com.br/pt-br/noticias/Paginas/62-dos-brasileiros-sao-favoraveis-as-cotas-tem-universidades-publicas.aspx. Accessed October 28, 2014.

20. Luiza was the first black movement activist in that position. Previous ministers had been leaders within the Workers Party, rather than the black movement, which made them particularly vulnerable to critiques from the movement.


23. Ibid.

24. Study by the Center for the Study of Labor Relations and Inequality.

25. I state this with one caveat. In 2005 a number of leftist organizations consolidated to create the Alternative Democratic Pole (POLO). Although the party has had more electoral success than any other leftist party in Colombian history, it has been more successful at taking local office. In the 2014–2018 session they held only 5% of seats in the Senate and less than 2% of those in the House of Representatives.

26. Speech by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, on December 19, 2001

27. To see Mala Huf’s analysis in this report for a deeper discussion of this relationship, and particularly the subordination of race to class in federal affirmative action policy in Brazil.

28. This debate is not entirely unfamiliar in the US context either. At its core it is the type of debate that played out among African American leaders in the 1960s and 1970s about integration versus autonomy and self-reliance. However, to be fair, movements for black power and self-determination did not necessarily critique the idea of economic development. More at stake was whether black communities should rely on the white-dominated economic institutions and market to bring about that mobility, or create their own.

29. Sociologist and lawyer Cesar Rodríguez Garavito is currently finishing a study with findings along these lines.

30. Examples include Ley Florestal in Colombia, the proposed revision of the mining code, and the land law recently proposed in Honduras.

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In 2015, Americans learned from the US Department of Justice (DOJ) that public authorities had imposed a “predatory system of government” on poor black citizens in Ferguson, Missouri (Chait 2014). The extensiveness of police repression and harassment, deployed to extract revenues for the municipality, looked eerily similar to the practices of authoritarian regimes. The government of a small inner-ring suburb of St. Louis, we learned, had designed an aggressive system of “poverty traps” for the citizens. Ferguson residents, primarily poor and black, were targeted, arrested, and summoned on civil-ordinance violations; they were assessed prohibitive fines and fees and subjected to jail if they failed to pay (US Department of Justice 2015). Many discovered it was almost impossible to escape the resulting cycle of perpetual debt, which often drew them into further entanglements with police and courts. It soon became clear that whereas Ferguson officials may have been masterful in their repression and pilfering—generating an average of three arrest warrants per household and fees sufficient to sustain a municipal government—they were hardly alone. Local governments around the country, which also approached their poor black and Latino residents as suspect populations, were actively pursuing similar projects of governance (Harris 2016).

As a popular uprising emerged, journalists quickly set to work, adding to the damning evidence in the DOJ report and constructing varied interpretations of the newly visible municipal repression and collusion between the municipality’s budgetary arm and its police forces. The same dramatic events, however, appeared to catch off guard many in our field of political science, in unfamiliar empirical territory and lacking a conceptual language to describe what unfolded. Indeed, the vital journalism that emerged thrust into the spotlight governmental practices that had rarely been discussed or measured by the field’s mainstream scholars—practices that were deeply at odds with democratic ideals and prevailing models of US politics and citizenship.

Scholars from our subfield had important things to say about Ferguson, of course. In op-eds and prominent political science blogs (e.g., The Washington Post’s Monkey Cage), they explained how off-year elections and nonpartisan ballots work in US politics to diminish voter knowledge and turnout, much to the advantage of powerful organized interests. They discussed how electoral rules and procedures produced a Ferguson city council far whiter than its majority-black population. They reflected on the cavernous racial divide in public attitudes toward the criminal justice system and offered thoughtful commentaries on the protesters’ use of social media to solve collective action problems. As community protests grew, scholars offered sharp insights into whether the “Ferguson moment” might generate a movement and challenges of leadership and organization (see, e.g., Schaffner et al. 2014; Tucker 2014).

As important as these contributions were, their focus was a telling indicator of our subfield’s preoccupations (for contrasts, see e.g., Allen and Cohen 2015; Harris 2014). In recent decades, mainstream scholarship on US politics has largely retained its long-standing center of gravity, anchored in electoral-representative processes, citizen opinion and participation, politics within and among branches of national government, and policy struggles among organized interest groups. In most of this work, citizen involvement with government appears to resemble an unalloyed good; more is better than less. Those who are more engaged with electoral-representative institutions, for example, enjoy greater political voice, at the expense of those with weaker connections. Policy influence leans toward the “repeat players,” who have intimate ties with governance, and away from those who are ignored by oficialdom. Those who are more fully incorporated into the welfare...
We focus on the state’s welfare and criminal justice systems . . . because the institutions and agents of these systems play pivotal roles in the operations of state power, governance, citizenship, and politics in RCS communities.

state enjoy investments, benefits, supports, and opportunities denied to those who are excluded and ignored.

In most of the subfield, American government is conceived and US politics is evaluated on terms that closely resemble the liberal-democratic model advanced by T. H. Marshall (1964). In this view, state institutions express, secure, and implement a complex of civil rights (to free speech, property, and impartial justice), political rights (to participate in or check the exercise of power), and social rights (ranging from “the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in society”) (Marshall 1964, 78). This liberal-democratic starting point frames civic and political inequalities in terms of how subordinate groups are excluded, ignored, and ultimately deprived—complemented at times by attention to how such groups overcome these exclusions by drawing on group consciousness, coalition partners, and other resources. This perspective offers a valuable foundation for analysis and critique, as is evident in the many powerful studies of inequality that students of American politics have produced in recent decades—studies that deserve to be applauded.

Viewed against the backdrop of Ferguson and the Black Lives Matter movement, however, these studies appear to be decidedly one-sided. In their focus on what we might call the liberal-democratic “face” of the state, mainstream research on US politics has given surprisingly little attention to a second face of the American state that is just as significant—or more so—in the political lives of communities like Ferguson: the activities of governing institutions and officials that exercise social control and encompass various modes of coercion, containment, repression, surveillance, regulation, predation, discipline, and violence. Few citizens desire more attention from this second face of the state and, once its repressive operations are brought into fuller view, exclusion-centered frameworks begin to appear inadequate as ways to think about political positioning and governance at the bottom of the American political order.

The marginalization of what we call race–class subjugated (RCS) communities in American power relations reflects more than merely governmental inattention or a lack of political voice through resources, organized advocates, and coalition partners. It is actively produced through modes of governance that stigmatize, repress, and ultimately turn government into an invasive, surveillant authority to be avoided (Brayne 2014). The inferior political positions of RCS communities flow not only from insufficient governmental attention but also from too much governmental oversight, interference, and predation. As Cathy Cohen (2010, 151) observed, many youth in RCS communities today believe “that the system is not only closed to them but out to get them.” “People suffer,” Dorothy Roberts (2012, 1479) rightly argued, “not only because the government has abandoned them but also because punitive policies make their lives more difficult.”

The one-sided emphasis of our subfield’s mainstream is striking, in part, because it is such an aberration within the broader study of politics and society. In sociology, we find a vibrant tradition of research on social control and repressive, regulatory state practices—a tradition that stretches back to the field’s origins in the works of W. E. B. Du Bois and has remained central to the discipline through scholars such as Patricia Hill Collins, Frances Fox Piven, and Loïc Wacquant. The second face of the American state has been equally prominent in works by leading scholars in fields such as law (e.g., Dorothy Roberts, Kimberle Crenshaw, and Jonathan Simon) and history (e.g., Barbara Fields, Kahlil Gibran Muhammad, and Walter Johnson). Closer to home, we find serious, ongoing attention to the state’s second face in major subfields of political science including international relations, comparative politics, and political theory. Indeed, within the subfield of US politics, a wide range of feminist scholars and critical race theorists have placed the state’s active construction and control of subordinated groups at the center of their analyses of American governance (e.g., Claire Kim, Cathy Cohen, Ange-Marie Hancock, and Clarissa Hayward, to name only a few). Yet, the mainstream of the subfield—its intellectual “center of gravity,” the “canon” taught to PhD students, its most celebrated and discussed studies—has continued to frame most of its inquiries around the liberal-democratic face of American politics.
Thus, as protests emerged in Ferguson in 2014 and spread to West Baltimore, Charleston, Staten Island, and Cleveland, questions about unequal voting rates fit the subfield’s research agenda far better than questions about the state–citizen encounters that residents in these communities had actually been experiencing in their dealings with police, schools, jails, bail offices, and the gamut of local institutions that encircle the poor. Biased representation on the city council fell right into our wheelhouse, but we had less to draw on when asked about how state power operates in communities like Ferguson and why people there found it so difficult to resist the control and exploitation of public authorities. If asked about relevant dynamics of public opinion or why there was not more responsiveness to the “median voter,” we could easily describe a conventional subfield view. However, when asked about police power and state repression in local communities of color, or asked about mass resistance to governmental predation, what could we in the American politics subfield offer as a well-considered, empirically warranted prevailing view? It is telling that when The Monkey Cage did turn to the latter issues (in an excellent essay by Henry Farrell), it bypassed the American politics subfield and drew instead on insights from sociologist Charles Tilly’s analysis of European history to explain why “Ferguson’s government was run like a racket” (Farrell 2015).

In communities like Ferguson, the state was actively deployed against its citizens and residents; it was a persistent threat and a force of domination and exploitation in their lives. To focus, then, on how these residents were insufficiently incorporated into governmental processes (e.g., through electoral and representative institutions) is to frame political analysis at the outset in a way that is deeply at odds with their political experience. To be blunt: the mainstream of our subfield has been intellectually uncurious about such political experiences because they do not fit neatly into the electoral-representative dynamics that have become the taken-for-granted object of our attention. Few have asked how governance is practiced in communities at the bottom of America’s ethnoracial and class orders or paused to consider that electoral-representative frameworks may result in a blinkered perspective that actually distorts critically important political dynamics in local communities. The powerful political questions raised by protesters and the DOJ report were difficult for our subfield to answer because, for the most part, they fell outside of our chosen field of view.

In this chapter, we encourage our colleagues to expand this field of view. Toward that end, we explore several underlying sources of the disconnect between our subfield’s mainstream and the political lives of RCS communities. We focus on the state’s welfare and criminal justice systems—not only because they stand at the center of our own work as political scientists, but also because the institutions and agents of these systems play pivotal roles in the operations of state power, governance, citizenship, and politics in RCS communities. The latter observation should not be mysterious. More than a century ago, W. E. B. Du Bois said of his Philadelphia neighborhood that “police were our government and philanthropy dropped in with periodic advice” (Du Bois 1968, 195). A half-century ago, the Kerner Commission singled out “police practices” and the conditions of “welfare programs” as two of the top grievances leading RCS communities to rise up in the streets (United States 1968). In 2015, attorney general Loretta Lynch observed that in communities like Ferguson, police often represent the “only face of government that [residents] see” (Lynch 2016).

We begin first with the subfield’s prevailing approaches to race and class, clarifying how they obscure key dynamics of subjugation that are fundamental to the political lives of RCS communities. Second, we discuss subfield assumptions about where politics happens, whose politics merits our attention, and which types of political activities matter for the quality of American democracy. Third, we take a closer look at the study of welfare and criminal justice systems in the subfield of US politics, clarifying how and why prevailing approaches have focused so little on their social control functions and governmental uses. Fourth, we return to race and class, urging our subfield to give greater attention to how these and other axes of differentiation and inequality emerge and change as political outcomes produced, in part, through governing practices such as those carried out by welfare and carceral institutions. In what follows, we hope to convince students of US politics that the important research our subfield pursues on the first face of the American state should be complemented by more sustained, careful attention to its second face. In fact, we suggest that understanding of the former will remain distorted in important ways as long as it is not connected to a more thorough understanding of the latter. Marginalization in electoral-representative politics both reflects and enables the practices of subjugation and repression that we describe as the American state’s “second face.” Or, we might as easily say that the latter reflects and produces the former. Scholars distort understandings of both faces of the American state when we pay attention to only one—or imagine that the two are connected by a one-way causal relationship running from representation to governance. The two, in fact, are deeply entwined, with changes in one reverberating through the other. Thus, whereas effective political change may emerge from the greater incorporation of RCS communities into electoral-
representative processes, it also may emerge through direct efforts to disrupt, resist, and overturn the modes of governance that constitute the state’s second face.

PERSPECTIVES ON RACE, CLASS, AND US POLITICS

To make sense of the mismatch between the Ferguson moment and our subfield’s dominant lens, we begin with race and class: first, as they operate in RCS communities, and second, as political scientists typically address them in the study of US politics. Our goal is not to adjudicate longstanding debates about how best to conceptualize race and class (see, e.g., Back and Solomos 2009; Wright 2005) or to argue for a “best” model. Rather, we aim to unsettle the subfield’s prevailing approach by showing how it clashes with experiences of governance in RCS communities and approaches in fields that have given greater attention to them.

Many scholars working in critical theory, history, and sociology take it as axiomatic that we must ask how racial hierarchies enable and structure class relations, how class relations constitute and organize race in America, and how the two together intersect with other axes of differentiation and power (e.g., gender). From this perspective, scholars are drawn to ask how race and class relations are interwoven in the lives of RCS communities and how best to conceptualize the terms of their interplay (see, e.g., Gordon 2008; Gowen 2010; Hayward 2013; Kim 2000; Sharkey 2013; Sugrue 1996; Wilson 1997). These questions have been a guiding concern for sociology, for example, ever since the dawn of the twentieth century, when W. E. B. Du Bois and Max Weber identified the interplay of race and class system as foundational (see, e.g., Morris 2015). By contrast, in the American politics subfield, race and class typically are conceptualized as alternative explanations, hailed into empirical analysis in the form of separate independent variables.

It is perhaps for this reason that in our own studies of citizens’ welfare and criminal justice encounters—based on in-depth interviews conducted approximately 15 years apart—we are struck by how experiences in RCS communities disrupt the tidy analytic opposition of race and class variables (Lerman and Weaver 2014; Soss 2000). Many of our study participants declined to impose separate frames of class or race as a lens for interpreting what Evelyn Nakano Glenn (2011) called experiences of “substantive citizenship.” Class was central to the lived reality of race for poor black and Latino informants, just as racial subordination wove its way through their understanding of being lower class. Many avoided these categories altogether and hedged when asked about one versus the other. Instead, they spoke of an overarching sense of being minor and marginal—a sense that, as poor people of color, they were subjects targeted by state power more than citizens in a system of democratic governance. They often spoke not of predefined categories to which they belonged (e.g., black, Latino, Asian, poor, or wealthy) but rather of their experiences with the state and how these experiences were broadly shared across their communities. Consider the following (Soss 1999, 368):

They [state authorities] make decisions that influence or govern the smaller people in the world, people who don’t have any say-so or nothing..... I’m what you call the “little man.” I’ll always be the small man. I don’t have any power. I don’t have any say-so..... Power is...I don’t know what word I’m looking for. It’s a dominating type of thing. You can move people around like puppets just by making laws and having the police enforce those laws. If you do something that the people with power don’t like, they’ll have you arrested, and there’s nothing you can do about it.

The little people are like us, people that live in houses like these, you know transitional housing, I’m talking about men and women alike.
If you don’t have a job and you getting things from the government or such as welfare or whatever, you’re part of the little people. But if you actually going out there and getting a job or actually have a job and you know and pay, you know. If you not paying into the system, you’re looked over.1,2

In recent decades, a growing number of scholars have engaged the co-constitutive relationship between race and class via the concept of intersectionality (see, e.g., Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall 2013; Crenshaw 1991). Framed in this manner, race, class, gender, and other dimensions of social differentiation do not produce disadvantages in “additive” ways (e.g., disadvantages of race added to those of class) but rather through a conjunctural logic that constitutes distinctive positions in relations of power and oppression (e.g., the position of a lower-class Asian American woman). In recent decades, intersectionality scholarship has flourished in fields such as critical race theory and gender studies and become prominent in disciplines such as sociology, law, and history. It has attracted a growing number of political scientists yet has largely failed to penetrate the discipline’s mainstream. Indeed, although political scientists have produced a number of acclaimed works in this vein (e.g., Cohen 1999; Hancock 2004; Strolovitch 2007), it is noteworthy that in the 15 years from 2000 to 2014, the American Political Science Review published only three articles that contained the word “intersectionality.”4
Explicit use of the intersectionality concept, of course, is not required for careful attention to the interweaving of race and class in the lives of poor Americans of color. Indeed, many historians who make no use of the concept trace the origins of American racial categories to the brutally coercive labor system of slavery (Wood 2003), and they emphasize how exploitative class relations have shaped and conditioned American ideologies of racial subordination over time (Fields 1982). Discourses and practices of racial subjugation, in turn, have played a pivotal role in constructing the American “working class” as a social and political category rooted in whiteness and “free labor” (Roediger 1999). Historically and today, RCS communities have confronted labor markets structured by race and experienced race differently depending on the structure of those labor markets. Indeed, as Cybelle Fox (2012) shows in *Three Worlds of Relief*, profound differences in welfare provision across regions of the United States in the early twentieth century can be traced directly to distinctive configurations of racialized labor relations. To explain how RCS communities experienced the welfare state in that era, we must understand how different labor systems intersected with the particular racial constructions of poor blacks, Mexicans, and Southern and Eastern European immigrants. *Neither race nor class operated in a manner independent of the other.* Blacks in the South and Mexicans in the Southwest were both subjected to domination, exploitation, prejudice, and discrimination, for example. However, migratory labor systems in the Southwest produced a racial order that differed markedly from racial subjugation in the Jim Crow South, where more residentially rooted systems of labor extraction prevailed (Fox 2012).

For RCS communities today, positioned at the intersection of race and class systems, the two dimensions of power relations remain thoroughly entwined in experiences of civic ostracism, economic marginalization, and state-led governance. Race and class blend together in denigrating discourses that construe their neighborhoods as repositories for a disordered “underclass” filled with women deemed “welfare queens” and men deemed criminal “superpredators” (Beres and Griffith 2001; Hancock 2004; Reed 1999). Experiences of labor markets remain strongly conditioned by race (Pager 2007), even as rising class inequalities have intersected with immigration and other recent developments to reconfigure the meanings and implications of racial classifications (Hoschschild, Weaver, and Burch 2012). Interminority conflict in cities continues to be shaped by the twinned experiences of race and class subordination (Kim 1999).

Indeed, when students of politics focus on RCS communities, they often part ways with the disciplinary mainstream’s tendency to address race and class separately, stressing instead the importance of class politics within racially subordinated groups (or, sometimes, racial conflicts in the context of class subordination). This perspective has proven essential for illuminating the contributions that disruptive poor and working-class blacks have made to the struggle against white supremacy (Kelley 1994). It has played a key role in efforts to explain the suppression of issue agendas through “secondary marginalization” (Cohen 1999), the vexed terrain of “respectability politics” (Harris 2012), and the construction or destruction of cross-class racial solidarities around the interests and concerns of black elites (Reed 1999; Thompson 2006).

Yet, in most scholarship in the subfield of US politics, these interplays of race and class relations remain marginal concerns. Here, the starting point for analysis typically is far from the experiences of RCS communities, in ongoing debates about government institutions, party and interest-group systems, public opinion and citizen participation, and so on. Focused in this manner and framed by the field’s heavy reliance on multivariate analysis, political scientists typically treat race and class as distinct societal variables used to test alternative causal explanations for political outcomes. In the process, efforts to study race and class as intersecting social structures and productive social forces—efforts to specify the terms of their interplay and the ways they shape, condition, and produce changes in one another—are almost wholly displaced by narrower projects of classification and coding designed to meet the needs of variable-based analysis. Thus, race typically is deployed to specify categories of subjective identity or (assigned) group membership that differentiate political actors, policy targets, and objects of public attitudes. Class typically is equated with (and reduced to) categories of socioeconomic status, measurable on the basis of possessions (e.g., education and income) or on the basis of subjective class identifications.

In treating race and class as values possessed on discrete variables, most political scientists today operate at a distance from contemporary innovations in theories of race and class. Across the social sciences, many scholars have turned toward more constructivist and relational theories of race; for example, those that emphasize how socially recognized racial “groups” are constructed over time through material and symbolic practices that establish boundaries between “social kinds” and how these racial boundaries operate as powerful social structures organizing the terms of political, economic, and social relations (see, e.g., Bonilla-Silva 1997; Brubaker 2004; Desmond and Emirbayer 2009; Fox and Guglielmo 2012; Kim 1999; Loury 2003; Loveman 1999; Wimmer 2008). Many such theories emphasize the need to analyze race “as a political construct that was created and has been deployed in order to pursue
power and maintain control” (Frymer, Strolovich, and Warren 2006, 41). From this perspective, racial classifications and ideologies must be understood as emerging through, servicing, and shifting to accommodate historical configurations of domination, exploitation, and control (e.g., slavery and Jim Crow) and thus appear, in the first instance, in concert with the evolving terms of capitalism and class.

When class and race are conceptualized in these ways, questions of social control—and the productive and repressive mechanisms of what we call the state’s second face—are built into the race–class analysis in the first instance. Race and class are conceived in terms of power and political relations organized in part by the state rather than as mere classifications of possessed traits. By contrast, most empirical research in our subfield—and, within it, a large share of work in race, ethnicity, and politics (REP)—continues to rely heavily on theoretical frameworks that reduce race and class to discrete variables and focus narrowly on dominant-group attitudes and behaviors, including racial threat (Blalock 1967), racial contact (Allport 1954), and racial resentment (Kinder and Sanders 1996). As Lowndes, Novkov, and Warren (2008, 13) rightly argued in a recent critique of the subfield, “Much work on racial attitudes and political behavior proceeds as if in a historical, contextual, and institutional vacuum devoid of either a causal, constitutive, or discursive narrative about racialized politics or racialized development.”

A key result of these tendencies has been to occlude the fundamental role of gender in producing and structuring relations of race and class. In reducing race to a discrete reference point for identities and attitudes, shorn of historically specific power relations, the subfield of US politics has largely banished inquiries into “the ways gender is racialized and race is gendered” (Glenn 1999, 4). Uses of gender politics to ward off threats to the racial order—for example, through alarmed calls for white male solidarity to protect white women from mythical threats of violent sexual predation at the hands of black men—fall beyond the scope of political analysis (e.g., Kantrowitz 2000). The gender specificity of the male breadwinner in capitalist class relations is placed under erasure, severed from its historical dependence on women’s domestic labor and the gendered modes of social reproduction that have enabled it (Fineman 2005). Race and class are analyzed as if their operation, historically and today, could be neatly separated from gender and assumed to have equivalent consequences for men and women.

The divisions of race from class (and both from gender) that arise from theory and method in the study of US politics tend to be reinforced in political science by the structure of subfields and strong pressures toward issue specialization. Thus, in some areas of study, race is taken to be an obvious and essential element of analysis whereas class is virtually ignored; in other areas, the reverse pattern obtains. Consider, for example, the politics of poverty and inequality. Poverty and inequality, of course, are closely related outcomes, and many governmental actions that matter for one also affect the other. Accordingly, we might expect to find a high level of “cross-fertilization” and continuity across the two political-science literatures. Yet, in our subfield’s literature on US poverty politics, racial factors take center stage, largely unaccompanied by significant scrutiny of class relations (e.g., Gilens 1999; Neubeck and Cazenave 2001). Conversely, in the scholarship on economic inequality in the United States, class power and class biases stand at the forefront of analysis whereas racial politics are largely unmentioned (e.g., Bartels 2008).

The contrast is not simply a matter of different researchers having different concerns; it is constitutive of the intellectual discourse in each subspecialty of American political science. In each literature, a deviating group (i.e., the richest or the poorest) is singled out and contrasted with the “ordinary citizens” of the American polity. Thus, on one side, the racialized poor are analyzed in relation to the American “mainstream,” with hardly a mention of the super-rich, class power, or relations of production. On the
other side, we find analyses framed by the rich pulling away from the rest, as if a common trajectory had been shared by the American middle classes and RCS communities in the lowest reaches of the social order.

Thus, in his landmark intervention in the study of poverty politics, *Why Americans Hate Welfare*, Martin Gilens (1999) wrote little about class relations, wealth accumulation, and the power of class-based interests. His analysis focused instead on racial biases in media stories on poverty and the ways that white Americans’ stereotypes of black Americans shape their attitudes toward welfare programs. By contrast, when Gilens (2012) engaged subfield debates on inequality and democracy in America in his equally acclaimed *Affluence and Influence*, class politics define the terms of analysis whereas race largely disappears from view. Equally important, the study of race in welfare politics proceeds as if the real barrier is attitudes that stymie shared preferences for redistribution across racial groups, whereas the study of inequality politics focuses on the organized power of the wealthiest Americans with hardly a mention of race. Indeed, in the indexes of three of the most influential recent political science books on the politics of inequality, references to race, racism, and racial politics are found on only a few pages (i.e., Bartels 2008, one page; Gilens 2012, six pages; Hacker and Pierson 2010, zero pages).

A similar contrast is seen in the literatures on descriptive representation in government, on one side, and governmental responsiveness to mass publics on the other. In the first literature, we find steady streams of research on racially representative bureaucracies (e.g., Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard 1999; Rocha and Hawes 2009) and the racial compositions of legislatures (e.g., Gay 2002; Pantoja and Segura 2003). By contrast, studies of class biases among elected representatives are quite rare (see Carnes 2013), as are studies that combine race and class in an intersectional analysis of representation in governance (Watkins-Hayes 2011). In the second literature, questions of class bias predominate in studies of governmental responsiveness, regardless of whether these studies correlate policy actions with public preferences (e.g., Bartels 2008; Gilens 2012) or trace them to power imbalances in the “organized combat” of interest groups (Hacker and Pierson 2010; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012). Responsiveness studies that foreground racial bias remain unusual in the subfield (e.g., Frymer 1999), and studies that foreground the interplay of race and class in political representation remain rarer still (e.g., Thompson 2006).

In many cases, separate analyses of race or class in the study of US politics can be traced to the underlying structure of disciplinary sections and subfields. In the discipline of sociology, for example, the prominent field of social stratification has encouraged theoretical and empirical dialogue across studies of race, class, gender, and other hierarchical social structures. In political science, by contrast, scholarship of this type has been organized into separate communities of inquiry. REP has largely developed as a distinct area, set off from the largest research areas of US politics and organized as its own American Political Science Association (APSA) Organized Section (founded in 1995). REP research started from the position of being a marginal player in the larger subfield (and polity), which regularly diminished the importance of black political actors, discourses, and indigenous institutions. Because of this, it understandably proceeded from the argument that black politics should be viewed primarily through the lens of race and research strategies that emphasized its distinctive ideological traditions and indigenous political sites and information sources. Adolph Reed (2004) explained the contextual imperatives at work; black politics emerged from a potent ideology of racial uplift and interest collectivity, grounded in the idea that race was “an undifferentiated, corporate entity”:

> ...consolidation of a white supremacist order...altered the context of black public debate.... The result was a default mode of politics in which individual “leaders” could determine and pursue agendas purportedly on the race's behalf without constraint by either prior processes of popular deliberation or subsequent accountability. Securing patronage appointments for elite blacks appeared as generic gains for the race partly because of the premise that elevating the best men advanced the group as a whole, as well as because the power of scientific racism in broader American political rhetoric raised the significance of any black achievement, by any individual, as a challenge to the ideological foundations of white supremacy. The potential for felicitous pursuit of a politics that took class interest as synecdochic for race interest was overwhelming. (Reed 2004, 111; italics added)

Although discussions of class and gender did surface in REP research, many studies assumed an invariant experience of race across the class spectrum, preferring models that presumed interests, goals, and ideas that cohered along racial lines. As a result, even if unintentional, other forms of difference were treated as secondary or even superficial—a distraction to the primary status of racial difference. As Reed (2004) explained, the tendency to naturalize race-based interests and treat as unimportant (or disruptive) internal differences within the group (or interests and ideas that transcended race) was overwhelming (c.f. Hochschild 1995). The study of black politics entailed “a forgetting,” whereas the practice of black politics entailed a “silencing” of some groups that posed a threat to the pursuit of a positive public image (Cohen 1999). Despite the force of Reed's critique and the...
boldness of Cohen’s intervention to embrace black politics’ “struggle with difference,” it is indeed striking how few works within the REP field took it to heart.

Works in sociology, by contrast, were keenly attentive to intersections and differences within a racial group—for example, how racial identity formation of young West Indians was mediated by their gender and class position (Waters 1999). Black politics and, later, Latino politics were less eager to embrace this, often showing that the strength of racial identity even at the top of the income distribution was not disrupted by class (Dawson 1994). Rarely in the REP area do we find work that treats class or immigration status as important (i.e., there is more work on the interplay of race and gender); research strategies proceeded from the starting point of racial groupness. If sociological discourse was fastened to the idea of the “underclass”—that is, lower-class blacks with pronounced experiences of incarceration, joblessness, and concentrated poverty—REP was neglectful of the positioning, consciousness, and political lives of lower-class blacks even as intraracial class inequality grew and class was becoming a part of urban black and Latino politics (Fortner 2015; Hochschild and Weaver 2014; Thompson 2006). Although our REP surveys rarely try to measure class attachment and identity, one showed an interesting result: more affluent blacks saw their identities as more related to other blacks than other upper-income people. This result was unsurprising given Dawson’s (1994) *Behind the Mule;* however, lower-income blacks identified more with other poor people than with others in their racial group (Harris and Langer 2008).

By comparison, the study of class advantage in US politics has held a more central position in American political science. Although the APSA’s formal section on class and inequality was founded only recently (2014), its subject matter has long been an important topic of inquiry for leading scholars in the field (for a review, see Jacobs and Soss 2010). Although class-based analysis is less common in studies of government institutions (e.g., the internal workings of the US Congress and the presidency), it is a mainstay of political-science research on efforts to influence government. Regardless of whether political scientists focused on the “unheavenly chorus” of organized interest groups (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012) or individual-level patterns of citizen voice and participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), they conventionally treated class bias as a primary subject of analysis when studying political influence and responsiveness in American politics. Yet, as the report of the APSA’s Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy amply demonstrated, the profession today continues to speak to questions of class inequality in a way that pushes serious analysis of race and ethnicity to the margins. For example, in an article that is excellent in other respects, Howard Rosenthal dispatched racial politics as a competing explanation for trends in economic inequality that are better explained by class politics (Rosenthal 2004). The explanatory role for race must be minor, he concluded, because racial prejudices and hostilities did not rise in tandem with inequality trends: “It is hard to see racism as hardening in the last quarter of the twentieth century when inequality increased. Racism and racial tension seem to have been at least as rife when inequality fell” (ibid., 868). Here, we see a further peculiarity, characteristic of the field: scholars tend to conceptualize race in terms of irrational attitudes (mainly of whites) or episodic social tensions that are eventually overcome rather than as a fundamental, durable, and evolving social structure that organizes the polity (Frymer, Strolovitch, and Warren 2006). Thus, for Rosenthal and others, if racist attitudes did not trend upward, racial politics could not have contributed to expanding inequality. No consideration is given to changes in the structure of racial relations that emerged as within-race inequalities rose sharply. No mention is made of the ways that key features of American political life—from the party system to voting habits to support for policies—became reorganized around racial cleavages after the 1960s, during the very decades that produced an ascendant conservative coalition, sharp political polarization, and spiraling economic inequalities. From these perspectives, race became *more* powerful as a political force during this time, not less—even though biological racism was on the wane and some indicators of explicit racial prejudice improved.

In other cases, leading scholars wrote race out of the political picture in a more fundamental way by simply restricting their analysis to whites. Consider, for example, the following passage from *Unequal Democracy,* in which Larry Bartels (2008) defended this analytic move (and the distortions it produces) as both conventional and expedient:
Throughout this chapter I follow the lead of Stonecash, Brooks, and many other writers in this domain by limiting my analysis to whites. Doing so obviously produces a distorted picture of the contemporary party system, and those distortions are especially significant for an analysis of class-related cleavages, given the strong and persistent correlation between race and economic status in American society. Nevertheless, the distinctiveness of white political behavior over the past half-century and the overwhelming focus on whites in the existing scholarly literature and popular literature make this limitation expedient for my purposes here. (2008, 68)

Against this backdrop, we can see more clearly how political science scholarship on the welfare state (and, more recently, the carceral state) reflects common practice in the study of US politics as a whole. In historical efforts to explain the comparative weakness of the US welfare state, for example, factors related to race and class typically are counter-posed on a roster of explanations that includes other (allegedly separate) factors (e.g., institutional design, historical path dependency, and political culture) (e.g., Hacker 2002; Huber and Stephens 2001; Skocpol 1992; Steinmo and Watts 1995; Wilensky 1975). Political analyses of welfare programs for the poor tend to emphasize racial factors (e.g., Gilens 1999; Neubeck and Cazenave 2001; Pfefley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman 1997), whereas those that focus on social-insurance programs for “ordinary Americans” tend to emphasize class politics (e.g., Hacker 2006; Mettler 2011). In these analyses, race and class seem to belong to separate domains of analysis or to define opposing explanations for a given political outcome. Severed from their roots in historical relations of subjugation and exploitation, race and class become abstract variables suitable for correlation—but highly unsuitable for (1) illuminating the second face of the state as a complex of institutions and agents pursuing agendas of social control, and (2) understanding and combating the oppressive conditions of governance that plague RCS communities in America today.

THE PLACES OF POLITICS: WELFARE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AND THE SITES OF CITIZENSHIP

A second barrier to addressing the second face of the state in RCS communities arises from the way scholars in our subfield have conceived and studied “political” experiences in the citizenry. Drawing heavily on theories of representative democracy, students of US politics typically reserve the label “political” for citizen activities that “aim at influencing the government, either by affecting the choice of government personnel or by affecting the choices made by government personnel” (Verba and Nie 1972, 2). In practice, this perspective has limited the inquiry to a narrow subset of Americans’ interactions with government: mostly actions that address electoral or legislative institutions and, within this set, mostly those directed at the national level. Consequently, much of what the field says about citizens’ political lives focuses on the ways that individuals think and behave as constituents operating in electoral and legislative arenas.

Thus, political scientists produce numerous studies that analyze how citizens, as electoral constituents, vary in their political preferences and levels of engagement. The field is especially attentive to citizens when they act as legislative constituents: organizing as interest groups, contacting their elected representatives, and using lobbying and other tactics to sway legislative actions. As political scientists, we should study these types of roles and activities. Our over-reliance on this citizen-as-constituent model, however, has distorted our understanding of the lived experience of political citizenship for many Americans today. When representatives in government are treated as the defining reference point for politics, day-to-day experiences of politics—personal experiences of power, authority, membership, injustice, rights, rules, standing, political agency, and so on—apparently become less important than citizens’ preferences about political candidates who they have never met and the policy choices of distant legislative bodies and the registering of their opinions in infrequent elections. The quality of American democracy appears to hinge on how closely public officials resemble the citizenry (i.e., descriptive representation), how well officials’ policy choices align with citizens’ preferences (i.e., substantive representation), and how often the people involve themselves in the electoral process. The political lives of different groups in the polity are compared by asking who got a seat at the policy-making table, a role in selecting governing officials, a voice in the formal debate, and a chance to determine legislative outcomes.

These are all critical questions, and the American politics subfield has made great strides in studying barriers to electoral and legislative influence in all of its forms (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). We now can state with confidence that many people simply do not have the time or resources needed to vote for, campaign for, and lobby lawmakers; that only a biased subset of Americans runs for office and manages to get elected; that civic associations and organized interest groups today primarily represent the most advantaged; and that elected officials tend to ignore the policy preferences of all but the wealthiest citizens (see, e.g., Bartels 2008; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Butler 2014; Carnes 2013;
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Gilens 2012; Strolovitch 2007; Skocpol 2003). This portrait of political life encourages scholars to identify the major threats to democracy in predictable ways: unequal political voice and biases in participation and responsiveness, a frayed social fabric producing disconnected and disengaged citizen-constituents, polarized political elites acting at a distance from voters, the “irrationality” of citizens who appear to vote against their own material interests, and so on.

The assumption that frames this account, rarely noted by political scientists, is that politics (and, thus, political agency) occurs in citizens’ lives when they take action as constituents. Political citizenship most often is enacted at the voting booth but may happen through contacts with elected officials; it happens indirectly when citizens support interest groups that speak for them or work on behalf of political parties and campaigns. Other activities in citizens’ lives also may hold political significance but mainly insofar as they act as influences on these more primary political roles. Thus, political scientists may take an interest in citizens’ experiences in schools or bowling leagues, or inquire about their families and social networks, but they do so primarily to figure out how citizens gain the types of knowledge and other resources needed to engage in more truly “political” endeavors. The implication (usually left unsaid) is that the lives we lead outside of these spaces and activities are not our political lives and, therefore, not relevant to the quality of our citizenship or democracy.

Even when political scientists push back against the preeminent focus on electoral politics in the American politics subfield, they tend to leave this preoccupation with representative government undisturbed. Thus, Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson (2010), like Robert Dahl (1973) and E. E. Schattschneider (1935) before them, emphasized the need to move beyond the analysis of “politics as electoral spectacle” and focused more intently on the “organized combat” of pressure groups intent on shaping legislative decisions regarding policy. Hacker and Pierson (2010) rightly criticized American politics research for its emphasis on election inputs and outputs—as if the real prizes in political life are electoral victory and a seat in government. Instead, they called for political scientists to attend more closely to organized struggles over “what the government actually does for and to its citizens” (2010, 108). The most important political actors, they suggested, seek to control public policy because, in the end, it is the ability to use policy for preferred ends that is the real “prize” in political life.

We would go further still. By focusing political analysis on “coalitions of intense policy demanders” who repeatedly duel it out in the halls of power, Hacker and Pierson (2010) actually reinforced the field’s tendency to see the “real stuff” of politics as something that happens in locales far removed from RCS communities. There is much to applaud in their call to decenter elections in the study of US politics and to pay close attention to the most powerful interests in American political life. In heeding this call to shift emphasis toward the powerful and organized, however, political scientists risk replicating—or even deepening—a major drawback of the field’s conventional focus on “politics as electoral spectacle.” The narrow focus on citizens as constituents is tightened further still, as scholars come to equate the truly important essence of politics with interactions between policy-making elites and powerful “repeat players” who vie for policy control. The political actors who are able to win disproportionate benefits from government, in this view, also seem to deserve disproportionate attention from political scientists. Thus, Hacker and Pierson’s (2010) call to focus on “what the government does for and to its citizens” turns out to be an agenda that, once again, focuses political analysis on actors distant from RCS communities—and on governing activities far removed from those that drew Ferguson protesters into the streets.

Within the REP subfield, several scholars have provided valuable correctives to this focus on electoral and legislative incorporation. Their studies yielded rich portrayals of political life and political agency as they transpire in barbershops and churches (Harris 2001; Harris-Lacewell 2004); in political struggles for change in black city neighborhoods (Hunter 2013); in the “infrapolitics” of working-class blacks of the Jim Crow South (Kelley 1994); in the informal networks that underpin Latina “survival politics” (Hardy-Fanta 1993); in the insurgent, extraintitutional politics of protest (Gillion 2013); and in arenas of popular culture such as rap music (Bonnette 2015; Iton 2008). Even in the REP subfield, however, the leading journals and most prominent debates continue to be framed by representation in electoral and legislative processes. Access and influence vis-à-vis these institutions continue to provide the major measurement for assessing variations in power, citizenship, and governance across racial and ethnic groups. Here, as in the rest of the discipline, significant empirical research demonstrates how deeply people in RCS communities are marginalized in electoral and legislative processes (Griffin and Newman 2008; Guinier 1994; Tate 2003).

These observations about US politics are critically important, of course. However, taken alone (as they have been in political science for decades), they yield a political understanding of RCS communities strongly biased toward themes of absence, passivity, and exclusion. In study after empirical study, political scientists shine a light on what RCS communities lack—their underrepresentation in office,
Mainstream scholarship offers little about why, when, and how various actions by state authorities construct race–class positions or how organized governmental practices of social control are guided and rationalized through the coordinates of race and class.

they have direct, personal experiences with state officials who have the authority to alter their lives in profoundly damaging or beneficial ways. They are stopped and frisked walking down the street or perhaps publicly subjected to violence at the hands of state authorities. They claim and receive public resources that allow them to feed their children or perhaps have this lifeline severed when they are deemed to have violated government rules. In RCS communities, these types of events are central to the lived experience of citizenship. They raise fundamental questions of governmental responsiveness and state power, and they are frequently at the heart of grievances that generate political demands and protests. Yet, most scholars in our subfield continue to treat these realities as if they had little relevance for citizenship and democracy in America.

To understand why politics of this type remains obscure in political science, it is important to see how the field has gravitated over time toward an overwhelming focus on national political institutions, modes of political competition, and patterns of citizen opinion and behavior. Students of US politics today frequently note the institutional importance of federalism and, with some regularity, take methodological advantage of the repeated observations provided by state-level variations in political and policy outcomes. In the main, however, serious studies of state and local politics—for example, studies of the type that anchored debates about community power a half-century ago—have largely fallen out of favor. This shift in analytic focus has produced, among other things, a variety of biases in the mix of substantive political relations and issues that draw attention from political scientists.

Governance of poverty and criminality—and, more broadly, practices of social control related to race, class, and gender—consists primarily of state and local functions in the American polity. As Theodore Lowi (1998) rightly reminded the subfield:

There is a wise old saying in America, that “all politics is local”; there is a still wiser corollary, that all social control is local. All of the fundamental policies that regulate the conduct of American citizens
and corporate persons have been and still are made by the state legislatures. State [and local] government in the U.S. is a regulatory state, and as a regulatory state it specializes in setting rules of conduct and backing those rules by sanctions. (Lowi 1998; Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011)

Thus, like its narrow focus on electoral and representative institutions, our subfield’s strong emphasis on the national level of US politics pushes to the margins a variety of active and repressive modes of governance that are distinctively critical to the political lives of RCS communities. What appears to be a neutral methodological choice to focus analysis at the national level turns out to be a substantive political decision that privileges the first face of the state over critical inquiries into the second.

Political inequality in the United States, then, lies not only in what the advantaged have and the RCS communities lack but also in distinctive state and local modes of governance that are pervasive in RCS communities yet largely unknown outside of their boundaries. It is a mistake to imagine that all citizens engage the same government, with some capable of being more effective than others. The American state, famously fragmented and decentralized, also is variegated: it presents different citizens with different modes of governance and positions them unequally in relation to its varied institutions. Our distinction between the “first” and “second” faces of the state is far too crude to do justice to this multiplicity. However, although this distinction is not sufficient on its own, we suggest that it provides an essential building block for efforts to construct more theoretically rich and empirically defensible accounts of American politics that are capable of making the political lives of RCS communities recognizable.

If we look to the streets of Ferguson and Baltimore, we find citizens who are outraged for reasons that are not, in any simple sense, about whether policy makers are responsive to the median voter. To be sure, many in RCS communities feel ignored by policy makers; indeed, they are poorly represented in government; and these political dynamics demand both political analysis and political action. Their immediate grievances and their dramatic embrace of political agency, however, have not focused on electoral and legislative outcomes. They have been rooted in people’s direct experiences of state authority and the ways in which they are governed as subjects of the polity. Political scientists’ favored remedies for such grievances—and, more generally, for the ills of American democracy—focus on deepening the electoral incorporation and legislative representation of marginalized groups. Yet, the relationship between the two realms of politics is far from straightforward.

After all, most Americans today feel poorly represented by government, and empirical research lends credence to this view (e.g., Gilens 2012). Yet, outside of RCS communities, weak political representation clearly does not produce comparable practices of repressive and predatory governance. Conversely, when representatives supported by RCS communities gain office and seek to represent them in “substantive” ways, it is far from clear that their efforts translate into dramatic changes in governance on the ground. Baltimore is a clear example of this dynamic, an exemplar of what Philip Thompson (2006) called “deep pluralism” under mayors and city elites that rode into office by mobilizing the minority poor and building their civic capacity. It was also a city where empowerment and representation did not lead to better treatment by local governing authorities such as the police. Indeed, decades of scholarly research underscore the gaps between legislative outcomes and street-level bureaucratic practices and the potential for significant changes in the former to be followed by continuity in the latter (Brodkin 2012; Edelman 1964; Handler 1986, 1995; Lipsky 1980).

These observations do not cast doubt on the political importance of electoral influence and legislative representation (which we take as a given). Rather, they call into question the widespread tendency in our subfield to treat electoral and legislative incorporation as the obvious and singular remedy for all grievances and negative experiences of government. Admonitions to vote and lobby and gain representation on the city council seem trite against the backdrop of experiences in Ferguson and Baltimore: routine violence and abuses of police authority, predatory uses of fines and fees to fund municipal budgets, and so on (US Department of Justice 2015). Whatever its value for democracy may be, a tighter correlation between public preferences and policy making has a loose relationship to efforts to set right these distortions of democratic citizenship. Indeed, under conditions that are easy to envision, greater responsiveness to majoritarian preferences in US politics might be quite consistent with a regime that practices violent subjugation in RCS communities. Thus, as political scientists continue to lament the thin ties connecting RCS communities to “the political process,” urging greater incorporation, members of RCS communities take to the streets to protest the thick injustices of state authority in their lives. If history is any guide, their insurgent actions may play an important role in wringing policy concessions from elected officials who otherwise would have ignored them (Fording 1997, 2000; Piven 2006; Piven and Cloward 1977).

Our point is simply that important forms of politics transpire outside of the formal institutions of representative government and cannot be reduced to mere outcomes of
representative government. Dissenting voices, of course, repeatedly call the profession to account. Since Michael Lipsky’s (1980) landmark work, students of street-level bureaucracy have consistently called for greater attention to “the frontlines” of governance as critical sites of political citizenship. Yet, as the US welfare state grew during the twentieth century, and as America’s massive carceral state emerged at century’s end, political scientists rarely acknowledged their growing importance as domains of political life in their own right—a subject to which we now turn.

GOVERNING RACE, CLASS, AND CITIZENSHIP

Welfare and carceral practices are central to the state’s second face, as it is experienced in RCS communities; yet, political scientists typically treat them as if, somehow, they fall outside of the significant forces of political life. Such modes of governance often are treated as if they affect only a marginal subset of the population (and those who have behaved in certain ways) and operate merely as technical endeavors, carrying out necessary but apolitical administrative functions. Public-assistance programs for the poor are tools for meeting social needs, in this view, easily contrasted with “political” government institutions that organize competition and bargaining among political interests and register citizen preferences. Police and prisons secure public safety, carrying out necessary state functions through administrative procedures and the actions of trained bureaucrats, not political actors. These state activities are, in short, politically uninteresting. Indeed, among those of us who study them, many share the experience of being told at one time or another that our topic is “not really political science.”

We do not need to read far into the discipline to see evidence of this orientation. Within the first few weeks of a typical political science doctoral program, students of American politics can easily discern this facet of the subfield’s boundaries and absorb its scope and bias. In *The Future of Political Science*, a compilation of 100 essays billed as the “most exciting ideas now percolating among political scientists” (King, Schlozman, and Nie 2009), about one fourth of the contributions focus specifically on electoral and legislative dimensions of the polity, with many addressing the implications of growing economic inequality for American politics. Yet, only one contribution (i.e., by Traci Burch) addresses the political importance of criminal justice institutions, and not a single essay focuses on the political significance of welfare institutions.

When *Perspectives on Politics*, one of the APSA’s two flagship journals, devoted an entire special issue to “the American politics of policing and incarceration” in September 2015, it staged a pointed intervention, illuminating the subfield’s long-standing blind spot (see the editor’s introduction, Isaac 2015). Indeed, decades had passed since scholars like James Q. Wilson (1975) and Stuart Scheingold (1992) penned their important volumes on the politics of crime and punishment. Calling out the field for its inattention to a remarkable transformation of the American state, Marie Gottschalk (2008) bluntly described this neglect in the title of her *Annual Review of Political Science* essay: “Hiding in Plain Sight: American Politics and the Carceral State.”

Relative to the carceral state, research on the welfare state has a larger footprint in political science, particularly in the study of American political development. Yet, it typically is characterized by an important asymmetry, focusing mostly on the benefits allocated by welfare policies but discussing little about the state’s second face as it operates in RCS communities. People engaged by government welfare programs are generally described and conceived as beneficiaries of state action, with key political questions pivoting on their real or perceived “deservingness” for this desirable role (see, e.g., Gilens 1999). Political scientists typically present the US welfare state as less generous than its counterparts in other Western democracies, giving little attention to the comparatively large role that US welfare programs—with their rich histories of “man-in-the-house” rules, midnight raids, and agendas to promote “Americanization,” work, sexual restraint, and marriage—have played in the social control of RCS communities (on the first, see e.g., Huber and Stephens 2001; Skocpol 1995; on the second, see Gordon 1994; Katz 1996; Piven and Cloward 1993; Smith 2007).

Influenced particularly by the writings of Marshall (1964), scholars have actively debated political explanations for the US welfare state’s historical emergence and evolution—including the roles that race, class, and gender played in shaping its categorical architecture, limited scope, and unusually heavy reliance on “submerged” modes of provision (see, e.g., Hacker 2002; Katznelson 2005; Lieberman 1998; Mettler 1998; Noble 1997; Skocpol 1992). Students of political behavior routinely analyze welfare policies as objects of public attitudes and beliefs (see, e.g., Cook and Barrett 1992; Feldman and Steenbergen 2001; Feldman and Zaller 1992; Gilens 1999; Goren 2001; Jacoby 2000; Shapiro and Young 1989). The scope and structure of the welfare state, in these literatures, are important political outcomes to be explained and objects of political contestation. Rarely are the political character and practices of these institutions contemplated. Welfare
is seldom analyzed as an instrument of governance, a structural basis for political subjugation, a site where citizens exercise important forms of political agency, or an arena for direct political experiences with modes of social control that have lasting consequences for political consciousness and action.

The root of this bias can be traced, in part, to a distributive paradigm for contemplating the US welfare state, in which politics determines “who gets what, when, and how” (Lasswell 1936). Why, we typically ask, have some social groups been excluded from social protections or given inferior benefits, whereas others have received greater benefits and protections from risk? This focus on the allocation of desirable civic and social goods—Marshallian rights and resources—emphasizes the channeling of poor Americans (more often, women and people of color) into inferior public assistance programs that offer inferior benefits under more variable, conditional, discretionary arrangements. These questions are vitally important, to be sure (Liberman 1998; Mettler 1998; Noble 1997). Furthermore, by engaging them, scholars in our subfield have generated keen insights into the political forces that made white Americans the primary beneficiaries of social insurance, housing assistance, and veterans’ benefits throughout the twentieth century (Katznelson 1997). In focusing so consistently on the exclusion of RCS communities from social provision, however, the subfield has tethered its understanding of marginalization to a tale of deficits and neglect. As Stephen Pimpare (2007, 314) rightly noted: “Even in analyses specifically focused on the history of race and welfare...it is exclusion that is the focus: African Americans are characters in someone else’s story, bit players in a sub-plot, not protagonists.”

―Stephen Pimpare

“Even in analyses specifically focused on the history of race and welfare . . . it is exclusion that is the focus: African Americans are characters in someone else’s story, bit players in a sub-plot, not protagonists.”

Joe Soss and Vesla Weaver

The Politics of Racial and Class Inequalities in the Americas

the welfare state has grown, welfare claiming has become an essential tactic in “the action repertoire of modern political citizenship”—central to the quality and character of citizenship experienced by poor women, and particularly poor women who are racially subordinated (Nelson 1984). The reconstruction of political relations within the welfare state, scholars such as Kathleen Jones (1990) contended, should be seen as nothing less than central to the pursuit of gender justice in the polity as a whole.

Serious attention to the carceral state emerged much later in the American politics subfield, and it remains more limited. Its incorporation surely would have encountered fewer hurdles if welfare scholarship had attended to the social-control functions of social programs—and its visible connection to policing and penal practices—all along. Conversely, because the subfield has traditionally neglected the state’s policing and penal activities, recent theoretical and empirical interventions have been able to start with a cleaner slate, less beholden to intellectual grooves cut in the middle of the twentieth century.

Here, scholars have not had to contest a well-established distributive paradigm, and they have been under less pressure to make their studies speak to existing debates about political competition and state neglect. Thus, recent work powerfully emphasizes the political consequences of the carceral state, with its sprawling apparatuses of policing and imprisonment. Scholars such as Marie Gottschalk (2012, 364) argued that correctional growth has begun to “fundamentally alter how key social and political institutions operate and pervert what it means to be a citizen in the United States.” Contemplating how the American state now “governs through crime,” Jonathan Simon (2007) concluded that criminalization and criminal justice logics have fundamentally “transformed American democracy.” To explain the centrality of punishment in
the lives of RCS communities, scholars including Lisa Miller (2008), Nicola Lacey (2008), and Vanessa Barker (2009) developed political–institutional explanations for why the US government invested so heavily in governance through punitive laws and institutions (i.e., Barker looked across states; Miller across local, state, and federal levels; and Lacey across nation-states). Our own studies, along with many others, explored the consequences of welfare and criminal justice systems for civic and political life in RCS communities, emphasizing how experiences with the state’s second face actively produce civic inequality, political marginalization, and conceptions of citizenship and government (Burch 2013; Cohen 2010; Fortner 2015; Justice and Meares 2014; Lerman 2013; Lerman and Weaver 2014; Miller 2008; Murakawa 2014; Owens 2008; Soss 2000; Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011; Weaver and Lerman 2010).

Within our subfield, studies of the state’s second face can be invigorated by recognizing several key insights. Most important, encounters with welfare and criminal justice systems are political experiences, both prevalent and profoundly consequential in RCS communities. Indeed, criminal justice and social welfare apparatuses (e.g., police, courts, parole agencies, and prisons; welfare agencies, schools, hospitals, public housing, and disability services) are among the most prominent and influential state-led institutions in RCS communities (Fernández-Kelly 2015). That they do not fit neatly into an electoral-representative model of politics is not sufficient reason to ignore them. In separate studies of political citizenship, our interviewees placed great emphasis not on City Hall, Congress, or political parties but rather on their direct and frequent experiences with welfare offices, police, jails, courts, reentry agencies, and prisons as they tried to explain how government works, what political life is like for them, how they understand their own citizenship and political identities (Lerman and Weaver 2014; Soss 2000). “That’s the only government I know,” one interviewee said, after remarking on his interactions with criminal justice authorities (Lerman and Weaver 2014). In RCS communities, criminal custody has become a normal mode of interaction with government and an expected experience of the state (Lerman and Weaver 2014; Roberts 2004; Western 2006). Yet, despite their documented (and, for residents, obvious) political significance, our subfield’s primary surveys of American citizens (i.e., the American National Election Study and the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey) and the best surveys of black and Latino(a) Americans do not include even a single recurring question that seeks to provide insights into citizens’ encounters with criminal justice and welfare systems. Cathy Cohen’s Black Youth and Culture Survey remains the sole political science survey to focus substantially on criminal justice experiences (see Cohen 2010).

Criminal justice and welfare institutions also must be addressed as primary sites of political agency and demand making in RCS communities. As welfare and criminal justice agencies operate as sites of state power vis-à-vis citizens, actively pursuing agendas of surveillance and social control, they equally serve as targets for the political claims of community members who routinely direct demands at them on an individual basis (Gordon 1988; Soss 2000) and, in more turbulent times, engage them as contentious collectives (Piven and Cloward 1977, 1993). Indeed, a closer examination of recent protests revealed a dual logic from which our subfield can learn: contestations of state failures to provide security from violence and deprivation, as Miller (2016) emphasized, and contestations of repressive and disciplinary state projects that work more affirmatively to sustain subjugation, as Keenga-Yamahtta Taylor (2016) stressed. In more quotidian and ongoing ways, people in RCS communities routinely call on police and welfare officials, seeking to make these state apparatuses responsive to their specific problems, needs, and interests. “Experiences in these [interactions] bring practical meaning to abstract political concepts such as rights and obligations, power and authority, voice and civic standing” (Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011, 284). Such encounters play a critical role in the political subordination and control of RCS communities (Clear 2007; Roberts 2004), but they also are sites where people with few conventional political resources make effective claims on government, resist state power, and “mobilize the state” against threats to their autonomy (Butler 1995; Cohen 2004; Soss 2000, 26–59).

Against a backdrop of spiraling incarceration and renewed protests of police violence, criminal justice has begun to surface—albeit haltingly—within American politics research. For RCS communities, however, the rise of mass incarceration since the 1970s is a relatively recent chapter in a long-standing experience of governance by police and penal authorities. Not only in the Jim Crow South but also throughout the country, police—alongside public and private social-welfare agencies—have long been central to the lived realities of citizenship in RCS communities (Muhammad 2010). Indeed, deep insights into the state’s second face weave their way through the writings of many leading black intellectuals of the twentieth century. In The Philadelphia Negro (1899), W. E. B. Du Bois described his neighborhood in the Seventh Ward by recalling, “Police were our government, and philanthropy dropped in with periodic advice.” In 1966, writing four decades before “stop-question-and-frisk” came under attack and at the very moment mainstream intellectuals roundly celebrated the end of the prison, James Baldwin...
wrote of how his Harlem community was “forbidden the very air,” as blacks were kept indoors through police stops after the *Terry* ruling and Nixon’s “no-knock” policy. The civic consequences of these experiences were highlighted by one early black sociologist, writing after Du Bois but before Baldwin, who noted: “Too often the policeman’s club is the only instrument of the law with which the Negro comes into contact. This engenders in him a distrust and resentful attitude toward all public authorities and law officers” (quoted in Muhammad 2010, 251).

Intellectuals coming out of more radical traditions of black political thought were also keenly attuned to police authority in shaping the politics, resentments, and relationships to authority in the “dark ghettos.” Malcolm X, for example, described the view from RCS communities: “Our people in this particular society live in a police state. A black man in America lives in a police state. He doesn’t live in any democracy. He lives in a police state. That’s what it is, that’s what Harlem is” (X and Breitman 1965). It is no accident, from this perspective, that the prison emerged as a pivotal location for the black freedom struggle and antiracist movements in the century’s middle decades (Berger 2014).

In making these arguments, leading black intellectuals also highlighted a second theme that largely escaped analysis in the American politics subfield: the entwinement of the state’s carceral and welfare apparatuses.

In RSC communities, police, courts, and welfare agencies historically have worked alongside one another as interconnected authorities and instruments of governance. Exclusions from welfare benefits have always been part of a broader political experience in RSC communities that encompasses the welfare state’s second face: the midnight raids and moral uplifting of welfare caseworkers, paternalist social services demanding various forms of behavioral compliance, extensive policing of private as well as public spaces, discretionary uses and abuses of legal authority, and so on.

Analytic distinctions between welfare and carceral apparatuses are necessary if scholars are to understand their differences and specify their relationship. (For example, we should not lose sight of the fact that welfare caseworkers—however much they may pursue surveillance and punishment—are not police officers who walk the streets with discretionary authority over the use of deadly force.) The problem lies in our discipline’s limited efforts to understand how these two systems interact and, together, serve as mechanisms of *social control*. Both parts of this formulation are important. For example, when scholars note how a felony record limits access to welfare benefits, they address the first blind spot (i.e., the interaction of the systems) but remain within a framework that ignores these systems’ collaboration in co-producing social control. The prevailing logic of welfare exclusion is retained, framing a storyline that pits the punishing hand of the carceral state against the beneficent distributions of the welfare state.

As historians and sociologists often stress, the broader story is not so straightforward. The densely woven fabric of social control in RCS communities encompasses a host of “collaborative practices and shared information systems between welfare offices and various branches of the criminal justice system” (Gustafson 2011, 2). Today, core functions of social provision—such as housing, employment, physical and mental health, and education—are carried out on a large scale by agencies of the carceral state (Stuart 2014; Wacquant 2009). (In fact, prisons are now the largest public providers of mental-health services in the United States.) In agencies such as Child Protective Services, the pursuit of child-welfare goals blends seamlessly into...
the policing and prosecution of criminal negligence and abuse (Roberts 2012). In traditional means-tested welfare programs, officials employ criminal logics of “penalty for violation” to discipline clients and aggressively investigate and prosecute them for potentially felonious cases of welfare fraud (Gustafson 2011). Prisoners, meanwhile, are classified as “voluntarily unemployed,” thereby owing thousands of dollars in child-support debt on release—a fact that quickly sweeps them into various mechanisms of welfare supervision (Katzenstein and Waller 2015). Indeed, some argue that broader debts related to incarceration now constitute a deeply predatory component of the welfare state in its own right, through which the state can seize the resources of the poor families attached to incarcerated men and women (Katzenstein and Waller 2015). Symbolic migrations between the two arenas are just as observable: repeat users of public assistance are now commonly called welfare “recidivists”; some welfare recipients are made to work in prison garb (Kohler-Hausmann 2008), and some politicians have proposed that they be housed in prison dorms.

When we ignore such material and symbolic interconnections, we misspecify the structure and functioning of the American state and—equally important—occlude how low-income minority citizens experience surveillance, monitoring, coercion, work extraction, and confinement across the range of institutions that encircle their communities. The official missions of these agencies may differ—to protect children from mistreatment, to ensure public safety and crime control, to educate youth, to provide housing, to provide income support and job training, and so on—yet, in practice, they also collaborate in a shared, multifaceted project of oversight and transformation oriented toward changing behaviors of populations considered deviant. Scholars, mostly outside political science, recently began to highlight these connections across different sites of state action, describing how the “punitive arm of the state” has “percolated itself into traditionally nurturing institutions like the family and the community center” as well as social-service spaces throughout government (Rios 2006, 49; see also Beckett and Herbert 2009; Fernandez-Kelly 2015; Gustafson 2011; Roberts 2012; Simon 2007; Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011; Stuart 2014; Wacquant 2009).

These interconnections, in fact, have deep historical roots. The welfare and carceral capacities of the American state developed alongside one another and have always been entwined. Throughout the twentieth century, for example, labor regulation strategies designed to ensure work compliance in RCS communities operated through a division of labor between welfare and criminal justice authorities. In the Jim Crow South, welfare officials facilitated the exploitation of black agricultural workers by offering a bare subsistence level of support only when the fields lay idle. When hands were needed for planting or picking, local officials moved the poor off relief by applying vague eligibility rules, inspecting homes for moral violations, or simply shuttering the welfare office (Piven and Cloward 1971/1993). Welfare officials promoted work among poor black women through “employable mothers” rules, implemented mostly “in areas where seasonal employment was almost exclusively performed by nonwhite families” (Bell 1965, 46). Working through different means, police secured compliance with the sharecropping system by using vagrancy laws to arrest blacks deemed to be “in idleness.” They frequently channeled them into the exploitative labor arrangements of the penal system, in which chain gangs and convict-leasing programs were widespread (Mancini 1996).

These social control functions were hardly restricted to the South or to the sphere of work. Because welfare programs operated as tools of labor regulation in RCS communities (Piven and Cloward 1993), they also were deployed to impose dominant groups’ preferred models of domesticity, monitor sexual and reproductive practices, place parenting under surveillance, and regulate gender and race relations (Gordon 1994; Mink 1995). In many of these activities, welfare agencies functioned in RCS communities as entities separate from police and immigration bureaus (in formal terms) but also as full collaborators in the policing of citizen behavior. In a recent discussion of poverty governance in urban “main stem” districts, for example, sociologist Forrest Stuart (2014) emphasized how social reformers from the 1880s to the 1930s developed “two-pronged tactics” of social control, deploying assistance and rehabilitation on one side and penal incapacitation on the other. Noting “the nineteenth-century police role developed via a symbiotic relationship with private welfare organizations” (Marquis 1992), Stuart (2014, 4–6) highlighted several key dimensions of integrated practice, as follows:

Police were either formally charged with or quickly assumed the burden of not only controlling crime, but also overseeing a plethora of social welfare services (Monkkonen 1981, 1982). This included taking censuses, regulating health standards, providing ambulances, and giving overnight lodging in police stations; functions that provided broad and amorphous powers to deeply intervene into the daily lives of the urban poor… [Social welfare] organizations used their political influence at the state and city levels to draft ordinances prohibiting vagrancy, loitering, begging, and drunkenness...[and then] demanded that police departments behave much like surrogate organization employees. Most notably, the COS [Charity Organization Society] enlisted the police to investigate the homes of anyone receiving
relief, draw up central registers of the poor, and report back to COS officials as to whether or not a recipient should continue receiving aid.... They enlisted the police to discover child abuse and neglect, as well as assist in locating and returning lost children.... This coupling was unmistakable for its targets. Managers and customers of the Main Stem’s vaudeville theaters quickly learned to keep “a weather eye open for the social worker, with policeman in tow, out to preserve the integrity of the American home (McLean 1965, 86–7).”

Calling for an expanded historical conception of the welfare state itself, which would include penal institutions, Steven Pimpare (2007, 315–16) offered the following insightful critique:

Slavery, its successors (sharecropping, tenancy, convict labor), and the prison have been as important throughout American history in the lives of (poor) African Americans as have, say, Social Security, homeless shelters, or Medicaid. By excluding them because they are malign in intent, we make all but inevitable a distorted view of the history of the American welfare state.

Now, as in the past, welfare and criminal justice function as distinct systems with separate missions that, nevertheless, are deeply entwined as components of the state’s second face. The contemporary system of mass incarceration in America grew directly out of the collapse of mental health institutions in the mid-twentieth century (Harcourt 2007), and many scholars suggest that the comparatively weak US welfare state has played a foundational role in this country’s development of an outsized carceral state (Gottschalk 2014; Lacey 2008). In the United States today, stigmatizing political discourses frequently assimilate race- and class-identified “welfare queens,” “gangbangers,” “thugs,” and “superpredators” in threatening narratives of underclass pathology (Beres and Griffith 2001; Hancock 2004; Reed 1999). Public attitudes toward means-tested welfare and criminal justice policies exhibit remarkably similar dynamics (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman 1997). Budgets for welfare and carceral systems tend to be strongly correlated (Guetzkow and Western 2007) and governing logics and practices routinely migrate from one system to the other (Gustafson 2011; Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011).

The deep interplay of welfare and carceral systems, and their shift in tandem over recent decades, equally reflects a division of labor that is sharply gendered. Soss, Fording, and Schram (2011, 48) summarized a growing literature that has emerged mostly beyond political science when they wrote the following:

[In recent decades], the penal and welfare systems have converged as symbiotic elements of a “double regulation of the poor” (Wacquant 2009). This convergence can be understood as gendered in four senses. First, its institutions have been built, politically, around gender-specific cultural images of poor racial minorities: the lawless, violent male of the underclass ghetto and the lazy and licentious welfare queen. Second, the system operates through gender-segregated institutions, with women making up roughly 90 percent of adult welfare recipients and men making up roughly 90 percent of prisoners (Haney 2004). Third, the direction of change on both sides has been toward a “masculinizing of the state” as a paternalist, behavior-enforcing custodian (Wacquant 2009, 15). The “nanny state” of welfare protections and prison rehabilitation programs has been supplanted by a “daddy state” emphasizing direction, supervision, and discipline (Starobin 1998). Fourth, historically masculine images of the worker-citizen have been elevated and universalized as a behavioral norm (Collins and Mayer 2010; Korteweg 2003). For former welfare recipients and prisoners, the sine qua non of civic reinstatement is the same: formal employment and wage-based support of one’s children.

That political scientists so rarely study these two systems together is particularly telling given that, in RCS communities today, their interactions, their gendered foci, and their shared logics are so readily observed. The relationship between school suspensions and later experiences of incarceration, for instance, is but one example of a common pattern in which sites of social-policy implementation—child protective services, foster care, Trespass Affidavit programs, and so on—introduce young people to the penal system and channel them toward its machinery. When residents experience crises related to drug addiction, domestic violence, or a host of other social problems, they turn to social welfare workers and police—who often communicate and collaborate, regardless of which one served as the point of first contact. Involvements with both systems are common for families in RCS communities and, regardless of whether “mandatory reporting” rules apply, residents tend to assume that information yielded in one system will be available to authorities in the other.

In a recent book exploring criminal justice effects on RCS communities (Lerman and Weaver 2014), Weaver was struck by how often and easily people shifted between the two systems as they discussed the role of government in their lives. A man named Marcus, for example, explained a welfare caseworker’s disregard for him by pointing to stigmas related to both domains: “Cause it’s, I believe it’s my caseworker, cause of the fact that I have a felony, she wanna overlook me but wanna scold me from time to time: ‘You’re not looking for a job and this, that and the third.’” Later, when recalling a criminal court judge, he brought the two together again: “In 2001, I got some tickets which weren’t mine, they were my brother’s but I didn’t wanna tell on him so I took the blame for it and like I’m paying for them...
now and trying to pay them off... The amount of the fines is no biggie but it’s the principal, and the judge going to say, cause I told her I was on GA [general assistance], ‘GET A JOB!’ [That’s what the judge said?] Yeah. That’s another person, don’t have the data in front of them, just figured that I’m on GA all my life.” Lerman and Weaver (2014) began their study mainly interested in the racial and civic consequences of the criminal justice system; yet, for Marcus and many others, the welfare state was never far from their experiences of discipline and control. When asked which was more stigmatizing, having a conviction or being on GA, Marcus responded: “A little of all of it.”

TRANSFORMING RACE, CLASS, AND CITIZENSHIP

Having come this far in arguing for greater attention to welfare and carceral institutions as active forces of governance in RCS communities, we are now in a position to return to where we began: our subfield’s leading approaches to race and class. Previously, we noted how the subfield typically deploys race and class as independent variables, alternative explanations, axes of social classification, bases of subjective identification, and objects of political attitudes. In all these guises, students of US politics ask how race and class operate as causal factors that influence various outcomes. Rarely does our subfield address the question of how to understand the production of race and class as historically specific political outcomes (Hayward 2013; Omi and Winant 2014). In this final section, we briefly extend our discussion to how welfare and carceral practices in RCS communities make and remake these fundamental axes of social differentiation and inequality in America.

Beyond their uses as methods for managing poverty and crime—indeed, beyond their functions as tools of surveillance, repression, and social control—welfare and criminal justice institutions also must be understood as productive forces. As police, courts, prisons, and social-welfare interventions are deployed to govern RCS communities, they reconstruct categories of race and class, transform their meanings, and redefine their operations as social structures.

The material and symbolic boundaries of race, class, and nationality citizenship are not natural givens or exogenous forces in political life. They are shaped and reshaped over time as political actors use institutions to divide populations in various ways, define the terms of their relations, and subject them to different modes of governance (Brubaker 2004; Loveman 2014; Somers 2008). Thus, RCS neighborhoods in places such as Ferguson and Baltimore do not exist simply as sites where political action may take place. They are politically constructed spaces built over time, in part by raced and classed governmental policies, such as the housing, education, and public-assistance programs of the welfare state and the surveillance and punishment practices of the carceral state (Hayward 2013; Massey and Denton 1993). These policies segregate and stigmatize, constructing understandings of groups and “their places” that come to seem normal, natural, and even legitimate. Thus, many RCS neighborhoods become understood as “bad places” that “ordinary Americans” should avoid going to or living in—shrouded in images of danger and degradation that cannot be explained by their objective conditions alone (Sampson 2012). The governing practices that saturate these places (e.g., police frisk, arrest, and search) display for the public the suspiciousness of their targets in ways that fuel, reinforce, and sometimes transform long-standing racial and class ideologies.

Through its activities of penal control and poverty management—under the guise of responding to crime and poverty—the state constructs RCS communities in various ways. Carceral and welfare practices shape the boundaries of racial categories and membership (Wacquant 2009); reproduce the material conditions of RCS communities and create durable “classification[s] of social status” (Pager 2013, 267; Western 2006); restrict and channel the flow of people across space (Beckett and Herbert 2010; Capers 2009); confer standing, legitimate exclusions from societal institutions, and authorize private discrimination (Pager 2013); assert blackness, communicate race- and class-inflected knowledge about groups, and regulate the meaning and salience of race and class differences; single out RCS groups as needing oversight, contrasting them against citizens who “play by the rules” and need protection from RCS communities; resuscitate racial ideologies and shore up their invidious presumptions when they are challenged by new norms (Muhammad 2010); engage RCS communities in constructive projects of identity-making, social valuation, internal labeling of “decent” and “law-breaking” (i.e., deserving and undeserving) (Anderson 1999; Lerman and Weaver 2014); socialize RCS communities into and out of political life (Lerman and Weaver 2014); and insinuate themselves into prevailing patterns of collective consciousness. In short, criminal justice and welfare governance “invest [race] with meaning” (Capers 2009, 33) and function together as class-specific, spatially targeted race-making institutions (Hayward 2013; James 1994; Lipsitz 1998; Omi and Winant 2014).

Whereas our subfield has focused mainly on questions including how racial stereotypes influence support for welfare and criminal justice policies, scholars in other fields have given more attention to how these systems
function as powerful forces in the first-order projects of manufacturing racial differences and configuring their intersections with class relations (Capers 2009; Carbado 2005; Muhammad 2010; Rios 2011; Roberts 2004; Wacquant 2005). Criminal justice punishments and punitive welfare sanctions produce, as Glenn Loury (2012) termed it, a “violence of ideas”: gradually, the act of punishing itself comes to “seem natural, inevitable, necessary, and just” as an institutional practice, and the raced-classed targeting of punishment (as well as surveillance, programs of behavior modification, and so on) comes to be viewed as normal and right. Active governmental efforts to impress work, marriage, and sexual responsibility on welfare recipients convey to the broader public that specific groups—widely understood in race–class terms—would not work, marry, or behave in a sexually responsible manner unless compelled or taught to do so (Soss and Schram 2007). These ideas gain momentum and, whether or not consciously intended, become lodged in media constructions of poverty and criminality, exploited in electoral campaign strategies, embedded in policy rationales, reflected in employer hiring decisions, and—most broadly—internalized as taken-for-granted assumptions and implicit biases both in the citizenry and among their political representatives (Entman and Rojecki 2001; Gilliam and Iyengar 2000; Mendelberg 2001; Peffley and Hurwitz 2010).

Criminal justice and welfare interventions construct what we might term the public reputation of RCS groups: communicating powerful stories and images about who is suspicious, who can be trusted with freedoms, and who deserves the benefits that governments provide for citizens in full standing. Through these encounters, citizens are swept into a process of the “state assigning worth” (Capers 2011, 28). Furthermore, as governments engage in processes of “symbolic branding”—that is, labeling individuals by the processes of arrest, conviction, and imprisonment—they mark individuals as occupants of a social status that defines and limits access to other social, political, and economic goods (Pager 2007; Wacquant 2009). Thus, race-making through state activities of surveillance and punishment actually provides a foundation for race-making and racial subjugation in private domains—for example, employers making use of the state’s criminal labels to distinguish the hirable from the nonhireable.

As police, courts, prisons, and social-welfare interventions are deployed to govern RCS communities, they reconstruct categories of race and class, transform their meanings, and redefine their operations as social structures. As the constructed public understandings of RCS communities, these governing practices also shape patterns of thought and behavior within them. They demand that RCS communities regularly perform or, as Capers termed it, “negotiate the script” to avoid aggravating the police contact. Such performance is “a full-time endeavor” that asks its subjects to engage in citizenship-limiting practices, such as consenting to unlawful searches and limiting their travel through white neighborhoods (Capers 2011; see also Capers 2009). This work on the part of RCS communities becomes “analogous to a trial” where, in effect, they must “take the stand” to describe their law-abidingness before ever going to court. In performing against the script—for example, by not asserting rights of due process or by not letting the search proceed—the suspect is actually “assuming the position of a second-class citizen, or three-fifths of a citizen, or a denizen, or an at-will citizen allowed autonomy only at the discretion of the law officer” (Capers 2011, 28). Furthermore, as governments engage in processes of “symbolic branding”—that is, labeling individuals by the processes of arrest, conviction, and imprisonment—they mark individuals as occupants of a social status that defines and limits access to other social, political, and economic goods (Pager 2007; Wacquant 2009). Thus, race-making through state activities of surveillance and punishment actually provides a foundation for race-making and racial subjugation in private domains—for example, employers making use of the state’s criminal labels to distinguish the hirable from the nonhireable.

This race-making evokes and draws power from the past as it molds the polity in the present, working through the legacies of earlier (and, in some cases, now-discredited) instruments that designated and segregated RCS communities as a suspect group. The criminalization of blackness, as Muhammad’s impressive account reminds us, stretches far beyond Dilulio’s (1995) thrill-seeking invocation in the 1990s crime wars of “superpredator”
juveniles roaming the streets. Rather, it goes as far back as
the postslavery era when practices of racial subjugation,
violence, isolation, and neglect developed in tandem with
ideas about black criminality—heuristics that became
central to the nation’s racial imagination and expansive
notions of what constituted blackness (Muhammad 2010).
As David Garland (2005, 817) wrote, “The penal excess of
the lynching spectacle said things that a modernized legal
process could not.... It reestablished the correlative status
of the troublesome black man, which was as nothing, with
no rights, no protectors, no personal dignity, and no human
worth.”

Today, instruments of punishment continue to mark the
black body as criminal and project this view both outward
to “law-abiding” society and inward to RCS communities—
constructing a status that some political theorists describe
as a type of social and civic death and banishment from
the public square (Cacho 2012; Dilts 2014). In fact, this
racialized death is explicit in the Constitution, which
prohibits slavery except in one condition: “as punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.”
The prison system and practices of the carceral state not
only shape broader discourses around race- and class-
subjugated “criminals,” they also ripple outward to “cast
a shadow of criminality across the black population.”

Criminal stigma becomes a wellspring of racial stigma as
race and racialized residence come to “signify” criminality
(Eberhardt et al. 2004; Kang 2005), enveloping whole
groups and labeling them as “potential criminals” regardless
of their transgressions or adherence to rules. So extensive
is this idea—or ideology—that blacks are “saddled with
a provisional status” until their law-abidingness can be
proved, whereas white membership “denotes civility, law-
abidingness, and trustworthiness” (Anderson 2012, 80).
Just as it was during the time of which Muhammad wrote,
societal narratives and ideas about crime—whether in the
media, social interactions, or employer decisions—are often
ideas about RCS communities. This two-way arrow—that
blackness is suspicious and criminality is raced—begins
to blur the boundaries. Thus, scholars identified
the deeply embraced ideas of dangerous populations in
“shooter” games of individuals deciding quickly who is
wielding a weapon and who to take out (Kang 2005); they
have found that once a young person has been arrested,
survey interviewers perceive his race differently than at
a prior time (Saperstein and Penner 2010); and that our
memory tends to fail or it takes us much longer to process
when confronted with information that goes against the
black-cum-predator stereotype.

Race-making is witnessed not only in processes of
symbolic branding and stigmatizing ideas about “others”
but also in the habits, narratives and norms, and modes
of resistance found in the RCS communities. Criminal
justice configures the internal politics, processes of
identity formation, and community dynamics of the RCS
groups. Indeed, whereas most REP scholarship has rightly
focused on distinct levels of trust, processes of opinion
formation, and the pivotal role of racial identity and group
consciousness in shaping policy preferences and voting
behaviors among RCS communities, it is indeed curious
that the heft and coercive treatment that criminal justice
regularly exerts on RCS communities until recently
has not been considered as a critical force in the black
“counterpublic” (Cohen 2010 is an exception). In a pattern
that is now familiar to readers, scholars in sociology and law
have been keenly attuned to these dynamics. Victor Rios, an
urban ethnographer, described the ways that RCS youth in
the juvenile system in Oakland developed identity through
the criminalization they experienced in schools, detention
centers, police encounters, and even the neighborhood
community center. By being imagined and treated as thugs
and deviants, youth “developed identities that they often
wished they could renounce”—embracing being “hard” as
a failed type of resistance to authority figures (Rios 2006,
how these encounters offer a “hidden curriculum” to RCS
communities that counters the mainstream conception of
criminal justice as egalitarian, procedurally fair, and just.

The emotional force of minority youths’ first
experiences of the police baptizes them, in a way, giving
a significant and lasting memory of the state exerting
power over them and of their position as suspects. These
experiences, far from being neutral, eventually shape an
individual’s interpretations of events, how one moves
through the world, and what one comes to believe (Capers
2011; Hagan, Shedd, and Payne 2005; Peffley and Hurwitz
2010). The legal scholar Devon Carbado (2005), drawing
on his own experience, called it a “racial naturalization.”
Experiences with police and being arrested or jailed not
only were important (and, often, early) in communicating
“ideas about who should be where, how they should
look and act, and what constitutes ‘suspicious behavior’”
(Lerman and Weaver 2014, 157). They also contributed to
an involuntary and broad race–class socialization, building
on and consolidating ideas about racial equality, the
position of their group, the salience of their identity, and
their connection to the group (Lerman and Weaver 2014).
Lerman and Weaver (2014) found that these interactions
strengthened racial learning; specifically, they diminished
faith in the American Dream, reduced individuals’
senses of their equal worth, exacerbated perceptions of
discrimination against themselves and their group, and
cultivated “serious misgivings about the extent of equality.”
Because criminal justice interventions and welfare encounters cultivate habits of consciousness and behavior through direct personal experiences, they work as well to construct the stories and social structures that enclose RCS communities (Hayward 2013). Policing, for example, plays a critical role in the segregation of social and physical space through “racial-incongruity” stops, a practice that treats people who are racially “out of place” as suspicious (Capers 2009). These interventions become “the seedbed for historical consciousness—a kind of socially and politically charged remembering through which people transform experiences of pain into collective narratives” (Ralph 2013, 112). Personal experiences with police and welfare officials are retold and become elements of collective memory. They become building blocks for communal narratives of suffering and resistance that instruct new generations about what it means to be a member of an RCS community (Davis 1988).

CONCLUSION

Our subfield has long revolved around images of the American polity as a representative democracy, in which citizen–state interactions tend to be voluntary and normatively desirable. “Contacts” with state officials and other forms of “participation” contribute positively to responsive governance; therefore, it is cause for concern that disadvantaged social groups have so much less of these civic and political goods. Inequality, in this view, results from the best off having stronger ties to political representatives and converting their greater access and influence into policies that advance their interests and preferences.

This broad electoral-representative framework guides our subfield to valuable political insights and animates some of its best theoretical and empirical work. Yet, it is deeply incomplete. Taken alone, it operates to systematically distort our understanding of the American polity as a whole and, like Ralph Ellison’s (1952) “invisible man,” render the political lives of RCS communities unrecognizable. This framing of US politics is rooted in a partial and highly salutary view of the American state, a view that places its active contributions to repression, subjugation, and social control under erasure. Working within such a framework, we argue, scholars inevitably will be hobbled in our efforts to understand the political lives of RCS communities. Greater attention to what we call the state’s “second face” is essential for our subfield to develop more analytically and politically powerful accounts of political inequality and marginalization in RCS communities—and equally essential if we are to comprehend the wellsprings of political agency, resistance, and solidarity that emerge in response. We cannot measure political marginalization and inequality solely in terms of deficiencies such as inferior levels of participation, organization, and government responsiveness or inferior access to generous citizen-enhancing social provision. For too long in our subfield, “politically disadvantaged groups” have been conceptualized in terms of an inability to enlist government effectively to one’s aid. In 2014, Ferguson made the limits of such a view readily apparent and efforts to address it politically urgent.

Ferguson posed important and troubling questions to our subfield, as Katrina, Watts, and similar flashpoints of racialized inequality had previously done many times. We focus here on the question of whether American politics can be adequately understood by a scholarly field that bounds its inquiries according to a representative-democratic frame and a Marshallian, rights-centered conception of state action. Building on the insights of many scholars before us, we argue that our subfield should expand its analysis of American politics to include greater attention to the state’s second face and must work to build a less distorted account of American politics that reflects—as more than an anomaly or unfortunate exception—the political lives of RCS communities. The second face of state-led governance actively produces citizenship, social inequalities, and the structured patterns of the political order through its practices of social control. In an era of mass incarceration, paternalist welfare, and “broken-windows” policing, when “the power of the US government to regulate, study, order, and punish its citizens...has never been greater” (Novak 2008, 760), it is unacceptable for the mainstream of our subfield to continue excluding these dimensions of politics and government. By expanding our field of vision in the ways we describe, scholars can generate significant new insights into the American state and US politics in the twenty-first century.
NOTES

1. From Lerman and Weaver’s interview transcripts for their 2014 book; this quote did not appear in the book.

2. In addition to the concept of the “little” person, we can also see here a theme that we will return to later in the chapter: the integration of welfare and criminal justice institutions. In an interview focused on experiences with the welfare system, the first individual describes his “small” status by talking about police and arrests (Soss 2000). Conversely, in an interview focused on criminal-justice encounters, the second individual uses welfare programs as a way to explain the meaning of “little people” (Lerman and Weaver 2014).

3. Search conducted on May 22, 2015, via University of Minnesota Library JSTOR archives.

4. For feminist critiques of needs versus interests as a basis for locating the political, see, e.g., Fraser 1987; Jonasdottir 1988.

5. In the case of criminal justice, political scientists have generally failed to consider even such an ancillary role. Indeed, based on the field’s leading publications, it is unclear that many scholars of American politics consider policing and the penal systems to be a significant component of government or governance at all. Like the military (and, in some respects, welfare institutions), police and prisons have been acknowledged as state apparatuses but, curiously, omitted when political scientists have asked what government is, how it works, and what it does—and, thus, what citizenship means in the United States and how it is practiced.

6. “But the police are afraid of everything in Harlem and they are especially afraid of the roofs, which they consider to be guerilla outposts. This means that the citizens of Harlem who, as we have seen, can come to grief at any hour in the streets, and who are not safe at their windows, are forbidden the very air. They are safe only in their houses—or were, until the city passed the No Knock, Stop and Frisk laws, which permit a policeman to enter one’s home without knocking and to stop anyone on the streets, at will, at any hour, and search him. Harlem believes, and I certainly agree, that these laws are directed against Negroes. They certainly are not directed against anybody else” (Baldwin 1998, 735).

7. The equally vast Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State, which has a broader cross-national reach, includes no index entries for any of these terms (Castles et al. 2010).

8. Laurence Ralph argued that police torture and the experience of racially-selective infliction of pain “are crucial centers for creating forms of historical consciousness—or communal ‘remembering’” (Ralph 2013, 105). The torture has a legacy, “frequently invoked” in a small community of Chicago where the infamous Jon Burge tortured over more than a hundred blacks, leading the community to understand the meaning of “my son was Burge’d.”


10. “When race is used as a proxy for criminality, the presumption [of innocence] fails and the burden of proof shifts” (Capers 2011, 22).

11. “By marking large numbers of young men with an official record of criminality,” Devah Pager (2013, 258) argued, “the criminal justice system thus serves to formalize and legitimate long-standing assumptions about blackness and crime.”

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The Puzzling Persistence of Racial Inequality in Canada

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Debra Thompson, Northwestern University

This chapter examines the puzzling persistence of racial economic disparities in Canada, which continue despite a social safety net and a model of diversity governance that many assume are far more robust, redistributive, and egalitarian than those that exist south of the 49th parallel. Many racial minorities remain disadvantaged compared to white Canadians, and the picture is even more troubling for Aboriginal peoples, who face incredible disparities in terms of almost every socioeconomic indicator. Why did not the transformative policy regimes introduced during the postwar decades in welfare, immigration, equality rights, multiculturalism, and Aboriginal policy have greater success in alleviating racial economic inequality?

We argue that these policy regimes largely failed to eliminate racial inequality in Canada because, simply stated, that was not their original purpose. The policies were put in place during an era when Canada was not as racially diverse as it is now. In 1961, more than 96% of Canadians traced their ancestry to Europe, and Aboriginal people, who represented less than 2% of the population, were not politically mobilized. As a result, the postwar policy regimes were shaped primarily by the concerns of a white European population divided primarily by ethnicity, language, and culture rather than race. Canadian society and politics became more racially complex in the 1980s and 1990s as a result of changing immigration flows and the political mobilization of the Aboriginal peoples. However, established ways of thinking about difference and growing constraints on state activism ensured that the inherited policy architecture was not retooled explicitly to address racial economic inequality. The welfare state underwent major retrenchment with disproportionate—although not purposeful—effects on racial minorities. Problems of immigrant economic integration were defined as failures of the immigration system rather than racial discrimination. Legal innovations such as the Charter of Rights and Freedoms have never been interpreted as guaranteeing economic rights or redistributive benefits, and multicultural policies have been instruments of cultural equality rather than mechanisms for addressing racial or economic inequality. Finally, the Aboriginal peoples define themselves as autonomous nations rather than racial minorities, and the resulting policy struggles—which focus on self-governance and territorial rights—so far have done little to alleviate socioeconomic gaps between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians.

The prospects for the near future suggest continuing policy drift. The decentralization of the federation makes less likely a concerted national campaign against racial inequality. The party system in Canada has never been class-based, which accounts for the weakening of the redistributive role of the state and a general Right-ward shift among political parties, both of which limit the potential for political challenges to racial inequality. Finally, Canadian policies are shaped by liberal ideologies, which often work to foreclose more radical, redistributive, and antiracist politics. The chapter concludes by offering preliminary strategies for enhancing racial equality in the Canadian context, including reinvigorating policy tools designed to reduce economic inequality among the general populace; developing explicit policy tools to problematize, target, and alleviate racial inequality; and acknowledging the urgency of Aboriginal poverty by taking concrete steps to improve program delivery.

THE PUZZLE

Canada presents a puzzle in the context of racial inequality. The country often is perceived as having a robust social model and as being an international leader in the development of multiculturalism policies and the nurturing of cultural tolerance. Yet, these policies, which together should work to enhance equality and social solidarity, coexist with significant levels of racial economic inequality—smaller perhaps than in the United States but significant nevertheless.

In our opinion, the fact of Canadian inequality is far less interesting than the persistence of inequality. In the two
Since the postwar era, Canada has become one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the OECD. In addition, the policy regimes built in the postwar era have morphed into new shapes, reflecting changing economic and social realities. These changes included the adoption of several laws that prohibit explicit discrimination on the basis of race. However, the policy regimes under study were not retooled to directly address racial economic inequality. Furthermore, given the prevailing political and ideological climate of the country, such a strategic change in direction seems unlikely.

To anticipate our arguments about the key policy fields, we first examine the welfare state, which emerged in an era when Canada was still a predominantly white society. By the time Canada became more racially complex in the 1980s and 1990s, important components of the welfare state underwent major retrenchment with disproportionate—although not purposeful—effects on racial minorities. Second, changes to Canadian immigration policy in the late 1960s catalyzed a dramatic shift in the country’s racial demographics, but new immigrants soon began to experience problems in economic integration. These problems have intensely preoccupied successive governments, but they were always defined as failures of the immigration system, not as evidence of racial discrimination. As a result, policy responses did not address race as such. Rather, they focused first on training and credential recognition and then increasingly on new immigration policies that intended to change who is admitted to the country, with as-yet uncertain implications for the racial composition of the inflow.

Third, although state-sponsored multiculturalism policy has a revered place in the national psyche, multiculturalism has been an instrument of cultural equality rather than economic or racial inequality. The legal institutions designed to protect individual rights—such as the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the federal and provincial human rights commissions—have been more important in addressing explicitly racial and religious discrimination. The Charter, however, has never been interpreted as guaranteeing economic equality and redistributive benefits.

Fourth, Aboriginal policy in Canada has been substantially shaped by nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century laws and policies designed to eradicate indigenous cultures, traditions, and languages. Since 1973, the focus has been on jurisprudence, governance, and territorial
rights. So far, however, this focus has done little to alleviate the socioeconomic disparities between Aboriginals and non-Aboriginal Canadians, which are further exacerbated by an institutional quagmire in which neither the federal nor the provincial and territorial governments have taken comprehensive responsibility for creating effective social policies.

In short, racial inequality—especially racial economic inequality—has never been a major, explicit policy target in Canada. Members of racial minorities undoubtedly have benefited from welfare policies, integration programs, and multicultural policies. However, these policies were set in place before Canada was as racially diverse as it is today. They were not designed with racial economic inequality as a distinct, central preoccupation and, in the main, they have not been retooled to directly address the problem.

Moreover, the evolution of major policy drivers in the country suggests that such a retooling is unlikely in the future. The decentralization of the federation, coupled with growing asymmetries of power between Quebec and the other provinces, makes a concerted national campaign against racial inequality more difficult. The party system has never been class-based and electoral politics are now defined by political parties that are comfortable with immigration and diversity. Unlike the United States, all parties recognize that any platform featuring anti-immigrant or antiminority overtones would be a form of political suicide. However, the weakness of class politics also accounts for the weakening of the redistributive role of the state and a general Right-ward shift in the party system, both of which limit prospects for an assault on all forms of inequality, including racial inequality. Finally, Canadian policies continue to be shaped by liberal ideologies, which often work to foreshadow more radical, redistributive, and antiracist politics that, perhaps, would more explicitly address the scope and persistence of racial inequality.

Ultimately, the prospects are for continuing policy drift. Underlying these proximate factors are elemental political realities. From Canada’s founding as a federal state in 1867, politics have been defined primarily by cultural and linguistic cleavages, especially the division between English- and French-speaking communities. This historic divide continues to create political sensitivities, with Quebec almost voting for separation in 1995. In addition, the large waves of immigration that filled out the country in the early decades of the twentieth century came mostly from Europe, generating a more ethnically but not racially diverse country; that was to emerge much later. As a result, the politics of ethnicity, culture, language, and identity dominated Canadian politics, and racial minorities—even those that are now second and third-plus generations—tend to be incorporated into these embedded understandings of difference. Racial-minority immigrants have been incorporated into multicultural approaches to integration, and the Aboriginal peoples have come to define themselves less as separate races and more as separate nations with distinctive identities, cultures, languages, and goals of self-determination.

We advance this argument in four sections. The first section is a brief overview of trends in economic inequality and racial inequality. The next section examines the major developments and attributes of each of four key policy areas: the welfare state, immigration policy, rights and multiculturalism, and Aboriginal policy. The third section assesses the prospects for change by examining the evolution of three political drivers of policy change in Canada: federalism, political parties, and dominant ideologies. The final section pulls the threads of the argument together.

Aboriginal peoples have come to define themselves less as separate races and more as separate nations with distinctive identities, cultures, languages, and goals of self-determination.
that the tax-transfer system completely offset the rise in market inequality until the mid-1990s. Until that point, the welfare state was accomplishing its purpose and there was little change in final-income inequality. In the mid-1990s, in part because of cuts to unemployment benefits and social assistance, the tax-transfer system could no longer keep up with rising inequality in market incomes. The result was a sharp rise in inequality in post-tax/transfer incomes, and the Gini Index for disposable incomes rose from about 0.29 to 0.32 by the end of the decade. Since then, inequality as measured by the Gini Index has remained essentially flat.

However, this view of inequality obscures what has been happening at the extremes of the income distribution. Figure 2 focuses on the top 1% of tax filers, whose share of total income rose from approximately 7% in the mid-1980s; peaked at 12% in 2006–2007, approaching levels reached in the Gilded Age of the 1920s and the Great Depression of the 1930s; before falling back to 10.6% in 2010 following the financial crisis of 2008–2009 (Banting and Myles 2013; Banting and Myles 2016; Fortin et al. 2012).

It is interesting that growing inequality does not appear at the other end of the income distribution, in the form of growing poverty. Using the standard international benchmark for poverty (i.e., percentage of the population with incomes less than 50% of the median), the poverty rate has remained more or less stable for more than three decades (Banting and Myles 2013). This does not mean that Canada does not have a poverty problem; the poverty rate is one of the highest in the OECD. The stability in the poverty rate means that incomes in the bottom and the middle of the distribution have largely been moving in tandem. Growing inequality has been a matter of the top half of the income distribution pulling away from the middle, not the bottom falling away from the middle. In other words, the rich have been getting richer but the poor have not been getting poorer.
To put the Canadian case in perspective, table 1 provides comparative indicators of poverty and inequality rates for comparable affluent democracies.

### Racial Inequality

Canada has become more racially diverse since the postwar era. According to the 2011 National Household Survey, Aboriginal peoples represent approximately 4% of the total population (Statistics Canada 2011b). Categorized by identity group, registered Indians represent 50% of the overall Aboriginal population, whereas non-status Indians represent approximately 15% and Métis and Inuit represent 30% and 4%, respectively (ibid.). About half of First Nations people and Métis live in urban areas; many others live in rural non-reserve areas; and only about a quarter live on reserves. They also have a much larger presence in the western part of the country and comprise the largest minority group in many prairie cities.

To these percentages, immigration has added a more complex pattern of racial diversity. According to the 2006 Census, immigrant-origin racial minorities represented 16% of the population, a third of which were born in the country (Statistics Canada 2010). These immigrants traditionally have been attracted to major portal cities—Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal—but are increasingly settling in smaller communities as well.

Canadians have long considered their country a mosaic of ethnic and racial hues. However, as Porter (1965) pointed out a half-century ago, this is a vertical mosaic, with British-origin Canadians at the apex of an ethnorracial hierarchy. Much has changed in the ensuing years. The income differences between English- and French-speaking Canada have almost totally disappeared and other white ethnic groups earn more, on average, than British-origin workers. However, racial minorities remain at a disadvantage—some groups significantly so—and Aboriginal peoples are significantly disadvantaged. Moreover, after minimal improvement in the 1970s and relative stability in the 1980s, the economic position of racial minorities weakened noticeably during the 1990s (Pendakur and Pendakur 2002). This suggests that minorities were affected more negatively by the growth in market inequality and the decline in redistribution by the state. Since then, the level of racial inequality apparently has stabilized—at least until 2006, the last date for which reliable data are available (Pendakur and Pendakur 2011).²

We first consider racial-minority immigrant groups. The first generation—immigrants themselves—face distinctive problems of language and credential recognition, which are discussed in more detail later in this chapter. We therefore focus on the second-plus generations—that is, Canadian-born members of racial minorities. As a composite group, racial minorities face a comparatively small economic gap. Indeed, Canadian governments celebrate the successes of second-generation members of racial minorities, pointing especially to educational outcomes that exceed those of the white population and stand out in international terms (OECD 2006). However, as shown in table 2, educational success does not translate directly into comparable economic success, especially for men. Compared to white workers, racial-minority men...

### Table 1: Poverty, Inequality and Redistribution: Select OECD Countries, 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Poverty Rate (%)</th>
<th>Inequality (GINI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Market Income</td>
<td>After Tax-Transfer Market Income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Poverty line is based on 50% of median income. Source: OECD (2008).

### Table 2: Racial Minorities in Canada: Education and Earnings by Generation, Ages 25–34

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MEN</th>
<th>WOMEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White</td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIVERSITY DEGREE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Generation</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third+ Generations</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEAN EARNINGS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Generation</td>
<td>39,800</td>
<td>44,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third+ Generations</td>
<td>37,600</td>
<td>40,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data include members of racial-minority immigrant communities, referred to by Statistics Canada as “visible minorities.” Data do not include Aboriginal peoples. Source: Statistics Canada (2011a).
face an earnings gap of approximately 10%; racial-minority women experience smaller gaps. Table 3 compares racial-minority workers with British-origin workers over time, controlling for personal characteristics such as age and education; these gaps are more significant. However, averages obscure more than they reveal because there are major differences across minority groups. Some minority groups do well; for example, Chinese and Japanese Canadians outperform white workers (Baker and Benjamin 1997; Reitz, Zhang, and Hawkins 2009). There are significant negative gaps for other groups, however, especially for male workers. In 2005, the gaps for men in the larger immigrant groups were South Asian (-0.19), Caribbean (-0.24), and Southeast Asian (-0.30).3 There also are dramatic differences across cities, with the largest gaps in Montreal and the smallest in Vancouver (Pendakur and Pendakur 2011). Racial minorities are more likely to be unemployed or underemployed in positions with job insecurity, low wages, and few social benefits (Galabuzi 2006). A 2008 study comparing the economic status of black and white populations in Canada and the United States found that after controlling for the relative sizes of the first, second, and third-plus generations of immigrant groups, racial income and wage gaps in the two countries are strikingly similar (Attewell, Kasinitz, and Dunn 2010). In summary, poverty is increasingly racialized.

The situation is even more troubling for Aboriginal peoples. According to the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, these communities endure conditions “normally associated with impoverished developing countries” (Canada 1996). Educational levels are low and unemployment rates are high. Despite rapid increases in educational attainment in the past decade, outcomes are still well below the national average. In 2011, nearly 29% of Aboriginal peoples aged 25 to 64 had “no certificate, diploma or degree”—more than double the proportion in the non-Aboriginal population (Statistics Canada 2011a). In 2012, the average unemployment rate for the working-age Aboriginal population was more than twice the rate for other Canadians (i.e., 13% compared to 6%) and was significantly higher for status Indians (i.e., 17%), especially those living on-reserve (i.e., 22%) (Canada: Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada 2013). There also is a persistent employment-income gap between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people across every region of Canada. According to a 2010 report from the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, the median income for Aboriginal peoples in 2006 was approximately 30% lower than for the rest of the Canadian population (Wilson and MacDonald 2010). In fact, in 2006, median incomes for Aboriginal peoples still fell short of the level non-Aboriginal Canadians reached a decade earlier in 1996. Even more troubling, these findings persist regardless of residence on-reserve or in urban areas (ibid., 3–8).4

Table 3 presents another view of the earnings gaps, calculated in this case with the previous methodology used for racial-minority immigrant groups. Controlling for age and education levels, the earnings gap for Aboriginals compared to British-ancestry workers is enormous, reaching almost 60% for men in 1995 and “improved” to slightly more than 40% in 2005. Again, there is considerable variation across cities. The 2005 gap for men declined to 20% when job characteristics are taken into account as well, suggesting that Aboriginal men are categorized into less favorable jobs (Pendakur and Pendakur 2011, table 2). These economic deficits translate into complex social problems. According to the 2011 National Household Survey, approximately one third of Aboriginal children lived in a single-parent family, and almost half of all children younger than 14 in foster care were Aboriginal (Statistics Canada 2011b). Approximately four in 10 Aboriginal children live in poverty and, in status First Nations communities—where the federal government has primary responsibility for providing income support and community services—a full 50% of children live in poverty (Campaign 2000, 2014). Suicide rates and substance abuse also are much higher than national averages (Noël and Larocque 2009; White, Maxim, and Beavon 2003), and the incarceration rate for Aboriginal adults is estimated to be 10 times higher than for non-Aboriginal adults. The overrepresentation of Aboriginal women is particularly disconcerting; in 2010–2011, approximately 41% of women in sentenced custody (i.e., provincially, territorially, and federally) were Aboriginal (Canada: Office of the Correctional Investigator 2013).

| Table 3: Earnings Gap: Second-Plus Generations Racial Minorities and Aboriginals, Compared to British-Origin Workers, 2005 |
|---|---|---|---|
| GROUP | SEX | 1995 | 2000 | 2005 |
| Racial Minority | Female | -0.04 | -0.07 | -0.03 |
| | Male | -0.14 | -0.17 | -0.18 |
| Aboriginal People | Female | -0.13 | -0.22 | -0.07 |
| | Male | -0.59 | -0.52 | -0.42 |

Note: Data depict the earnings gap, controlling for personal characteristics of workers (e.g., age and education) but not characteristics of their jobs. Source: Pendakur and Pendakur (2011, Table 2).
Clearly, Canada is a long way from being an egalitarian society. The next section discusses the impact of the primary policy instruments that normally are seen as enhancing equality.

THE POLICY TOOLS

During the middle decades of the twentieth century, the Canadian state developed a complex set of tools designed to respond to different forms of inequality: a liberal welfare state; a new approach to immigration policy; multiculturalism policies; and a new approach to Aboriginal issues. But none of these policies were designed explicitly to tackle to issue of racial economic inequality.

The Welfare State and Racial Inequality

What is the relationship between the welfare state and racial inequality? As discussed previously, Canada built its version of the welfare state during the postwar decades when it was still predominantly a white society and racial inequality was not a significant dimension in social politics. Important components of the welfare state were restructured in the 1990s and early 2000s, by which time Canada had become racially complex. The politics of race was not a major factor driving those changes, but racial minorities were undoubtedly disproportionately affected.

BUILDING THE WELFARE STATE

The postwar social programs clearly made Canada a fairer, less unequal place, and some Canadians likened their system to the social-democratic model found in Europe. In reality, however, the Canadian welfare state was always comparatively modest. In his typology of welfare states, Esping-Andersen (1990) classified Canada—along with the United States and other English-speaking democracies—as a “liberal” welfare state, in contrast to the more expansive corporatist or Christian-democratic welfare states of Continental Europe and the social-democratic welfare states of Scandinavia.

This Canadian outcome was driven by a distinctive combination of class and territorial politics (Banting and Myles 2013). Power-resource theory suggests that countries with strong Left parties and powerful trade unions were more likely to develop expansive welfare states; countries where parties of the Right and the Center dominated and trade unions were weak developed more modest systems (Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi 1983; Stephens 1979). Canadian experience fits the latter pattern. Class-based voting is limited and labor unions have been weaker than in Europe. The Left party—the New Democratic Party—has always been a minor party. More than in most countries, class divisions in Canada are crosscut by linguistic and regional divisions at the national level, and the politics of equality have centered as much on regional as on class inequalities. The territorial politics that flow from this political geography generated a distinctively Canadian dynamic of expansion in social policy in the postwar period. National social programs were perceived as an instrument of territorial integration (Banting 1995; Jenson 2013). Over time, many Canadians—particularly in English-speaking Canada—came to see national social programs, especially universal health care, as part of the Canadian identity, distinguishing them from their powerful neighbor to the south and part of the social glue holding their vast country together (Boychuk 2008; Johnston et al. 2010). The social model that emerged from this distinctive combination of class and territorial politics is best characterized as a hybrid version of the liberal welfare state (Tuohy 1993).

Income-security programs were a thoroughly liberal component of the social architecture. Social insurance and universal programs (e.g., family allowances, unemployment insurance, and pensions) provided modest benefits, and those in need continued to rely heavily on means-tested programs (e.g., social assistance). The major exception is health care, which assumed a more social-democratic configuration, with universal coverage for core services and funded from general tax revenues with no co-payments or user fees. However, the limits of the Canadian model become clearer when attention shifts to questions of income inequality and poverty. As described previously, the tax-transfer system reduces inequality and poverty more than in the United States. However, compared to European countries, the Canadian welfare state was not powerfully redistributive in design or effect.

RESTRUCTURING THE WELFARE STATE

Canadian social policy was restructured in the final years of the twentieth century and the early years of the twenty-first century. As elsewhere, the primary forces at work were rooted in globalization and neoliberalism (Mahon and McBride 2008; McBride 1992). In addition, however, many of the domestic political champions of the postwar welfare state have weakened: organized labor has been sidelined, equality-seeking social movements have declined, and progressive advisory bodies and think tanks have been crippled by the withdrawal of public funding (Phillips 2013). The role of territorial politics also matters less because decentralization in the federal system has reduced the role of the federal government. In the field of social policy, Canada is now one of the most decentralized federations in the OECD (Obinger, Leibfried, and Castles...
2005, table 1.6) and national social programs are perceived much less as instruments for strengthening territorial integration.

Restructuring reduced the equalizing impact of the welfare state (Banting and Myles 2013). Universal programs relied on by the middle class (e.g., pensions and health care) are sustained by major injections of new resources. However, programs for unemployed working-age people, including unemployment benefits and social assistance, were cut significantly (Battle 2001; Kneebone and White 2008). As table 4 indicates, by 2012, public social expenditures as a proportion of GDP were lower in Canada than in the United States. Tax levels also have been reduced, as well as the progressivity of the tax system (Boadway and Cuff 2013). An OECD study concluded that from 1995 to 2005, redistribution had weakened more in Canada than in other member countries (OECD 2011).

Was the growing racial diversity of Canada also a factor eroding redistributive politics? In the United States and Europe, many commentators argue that ethnic and racial diversity erodes a sense of community, weakens feelings of trust in fellow citizens, and fragments the historic coalitions that built the welfare state. They fear that members of the majority public might withdraw support from social programs that give money to “outsiders” who are not part of “us” (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Gilens 1999). So far, such corrosive politics have been limited in Canada in the case of immigrant racial minorities. Analyses of the relationship between racial diversity and support for redistribution found little evidence of majorities turning away because some of the beneficiaries are racial-minority immigrants or “strangers” (Soroka, Johnston, and Banting 2006). Moreover, in contrast to findings elsewhere, nationalism is a positive force in this context. Strong identification with Canada increases tolerance for immigrants and support for the welfare state, especially among the affluent (Johnston et al. 2010).

However, there is a darker side to Canadian attitudes. Respondents who believe Aboriginal peoples are heavily dependent on welfare tend to reduce their support not only for social assistance but also for the redistributive state as a whole, an effect that is strongest in the western part of the country, where the Aboriginal population is larger (Banting, Soroka, and Koning 2013). Even there, however, the power of the politics of race should not be overstated. The impact is relatively modest, and less than the impact of stereotypes about blacks in American welfare politics.

Although the politics of race may not have been a major component in the politics of retrenchment, restructuring has had a significant impact on all marginal groups in Canada, including racial minorities. In addition to the impact of retrenchment in general programs such as social assistance, racial minorities have faced more targeted forms of retrenchment. Because the federal government does not control social-assistance programs, the Conservative government in Ottawa could only urge provinces to restrict benefits for immigrants (Smith-Carrier and Mitchell 2015). Its 2014 budget eliminated a condition attached to federal fiscal transfer to provinces that proscribed provincial residency tests for social assistance, in the hope that provinces would use this greater freedom to delay benefits for newcomers (Canada: Department of Finance 2014). So far, none of the provinces has done so. In addition, the federal government made cuts to the one social program that it does control—the Federal Interim Health Program—reducing the range of health benefits provided to refugee claimants and others not yet eligible for the regular provincial health insurance. The complaint was that the program provided more comprehensive services than what are available to the population as a whole (Canada: Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2012). In addition, as discussed in the next section, the federal government tightened immigration regulations to limit further the admission of sponsored immigrants who are more likely to need social benefits.

Retrenchment of income support for Aboriginal peoples tracked the wider pattern. Aboriginal peoples living in urban areas rely on provincial health and social programs and suffered from cuts to those programs, especially in the case of social assistance. Aboriginal peoples living on reserves rely on the federal Income Assistance Program for First Nations and are six times more likely to receive income assistance than the Canadian average (Papillon 2015). However, the federal program is designed to mirror the social-assistance program in each province; the federal government essentially imported the significant benefit reductions and eligibility restrictions imposed by provinces on their programs in the 1990s. Until recently, however, it failed to introduce many of the activation and training programs designed to enhance

| Table 4: Total Public Social Expenditures as Percentage of GDP |
|---------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
|              | 1990   | 2000   | 2010   | 2014   |
| Sweden       | 28.5   | 28.2   | 27.9   | 28.1   |
| France       | 24.9   | 28.4   | 31.7   | 31.9   |
| Germany      | 21.4   | 26.2   | 26.8   | 25.8   |
| Canada       | 17.6   | 15.8   | 17.9   | 17.0   |
| United States| 13.1   | 14.2   | 19.3   | 19.2   |

Note: Includes public expenditures on health care and income transfers. Source: OECD 2016.
self-sufficiency, which provinces mounted as part of retrenchment (Papillon 2015).

In summary, the politics of race may not have been a major driver of retrenchment, but racial minorities—who are more likely to be poor—were negatively affected disproportionately. Of course, racial minorities are also likely to be among the primary beneficiaries of a subsequent strengthening of redistribution. One of the first acts of the Liberal government that came to power in late 2015 was to significantly expand child benefits, which help low-income families most. It is worth noting that however, during the election campaign, the Liberals presented the child benefits proposal as part of a larger policy package designed to help “middle-class families” (Banting and Myles 2016). Strikingly for our purposes, there was no mention of race and racial minorities during the election debates over the proposal.

**Immigration Policy and Racial Inequality**

What is the relationship between immigration policy and racial inequality? Canada is a classic “settler society” and maintains one of the largest immigration flows, relative to its population, of any OECD country. First-generation immigrants represent 20% of the population—a level almost twice that of the United States. Moreover, changes in immigration policy in the late 1960s clearly altered the traditional flows, opening the door to non-European source countries and contributing to the emergence of a more racially diverse Canada.

The architecture of Canadian immigration policy is designed to attract immigrants who are likely to become economically successful, thereby limiting their potential reliance on social benefits (Banting 2010). The 1967 points system gave priority to newcomers with the education and training required to move reasonably quickly into employment and self-sufficiency. In addition, immigrants who want to sponsor family members to come to Canada must sign a formal undertaking to support them for a period ranging from three to 10 years, during which family members are ineligible for social assistance (Côté, Kérist, and Côté 2001). Because policies target economic immigrants and limit the ways that other migrants (e.g., refugee claimants or temporary foreign workers) may access public support, immigrants in Canada traditionally use social assistance and unemployment benefits less than native-born Canadians (Akbari 1989; Baker and Benjamin 1995a, 1995b; Baker, Benjamin, and Fan 2009; De Silva 1996; DeVoretz and Piven 2004; Picot, Lu, and Hou 2009; Sweetman 2001).

The economic integration of immigrants is a constant preoccupation of the country. Traditionally, immigrants to Canada moved relatively quickly into the economic mainstream, with poverty rates among newcomers typically falling below the rate for the population as a whole within about a decade. However, this economic-integration machine began to falter when Canada was becoming more racially diverse. The incomes of recent cohorts of immigrants have declined relative to earlier cohorts—a decline experienced most strongly by men from nontraditional source countries. The Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants found that only 40% of skilled principal applicants who arrived in 2000–2001 were working in the occupation or profession for which they were trained; many immigrants with university degrees were working in jobs that typically require only a high school diploma or less (Banting, Courchene, and Seidle 2007, 658). As indicated in table 5, the poverty rate among immigrants has been increasing at the same time that it has been decreasing among the Canadian-born population.

Canadian governments focused intensely on these problems. However, they overwhelmingly framed the problem as immigrant integration rather than racial inequality. To be sure, part of the explanation is in global economic trends. Larger numbers of racial minorities began to enter the labor market in the 1980s and 1990s, just as economic growth in Canada and other OECD countries began to slow, increasing unemployment rates. All new entrants to the labor market—including not only immigrants but also young white Canadians—bore the brunt of these pressures. This situation was further compounded by issues regarding the language competence of newcomers and the difficulties that employers had in evaluating foreign credentials and experience (Alboim and Cohl 2012). However, a part of the problem also undoubtedly reflected racial discrimination in the labor market. Studies using résumé experiments revealed patterns similar to those found in other countries. For example, one study found that English-speaking employers in Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver—the major magnets for immigrants—were about 40% more likely to choose to
interview a job applicant with an English-sounding name than someone with a minority-sounding name, even if both candidates had identical education, skills, and work histories (Oreopoulos 2011). This dimension of the problem seldom framed the policy debates.

As a result, policy responses initially focused on integration programming. Both federal and provincial levels of government launched programs to assist employers to assess foreign credentials; they expanded basic language training and introduced professional-level language programs; and they tried bridge-training projects involving work placements to acquire Canadian work experience (Alboim and Cohl 2012). To the surprise of many observers, the Conservative government—otherwise fixated on reducing public expenditures—dramatically increased federal spending on immigrant-integration programs (Seidle 2010).

In time, however, it became clear that fixing problems inside the country would require major state intervention in labor markets and even larger public spending on integration. Rather than taking that approach, the federal government increasingly shifted from integration to immigration policy, transforming the admissions process through a long, tortuous series of incremental steps. Language-testing became more stringent; the family reunification stream was narrowed further; and the minimum income that immigrants need to be eligible as a sponsor was raised. As one commentator observed, “These changes are intended to reduce immigrant welfare access and, ultimately, will allow only wealthier immigrants to benefit from the family reunification program” (Smith-Carrier and Mitchell 2015). Most important, however, a preexisting offer of employment has become increasingly important for admission. The Temporary Workers Program, which depends on a preexisting job offer, expanded dramatically. Furthermore, changes to the points system for permanent entry significantly increased the value of a preexisting offer of employment. It is premature to assess the impact of the most important of these changes, Express Entry, which commenced on January 1, 2015. However, two points are clear. First, changes in immigration policy have already altered the balance of source countries; for example, more stringent language standards seem to be contributing to a decline in Chinese immigrants (Canada: Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2015). Second, given the evidence of discrimination in studies of employers’ selection of people to interview from among those inside the country, commentators fear that a similar preference for people with English- and French-sounding names will determine who enters the country.

Immigration policy represents a case in which the state took serious action in response to growing inequality experienced by racial minorities. However, governments never framed the problem as one of racial inequality.

**Multiculturalism Policy and Racial Inequality**

What is the relationship between Canadian multiculturalism and racial inequality? Canada is widely recognized as the first state to implement an official multiculturalism policy, and Canadians—especially in the Anglophone parts of the country—have embraced multiculturalism as a revered national value integral to Canadian identity. As a policy area, multiculturalism has evolved from its initial formulation of providing government assistance for cultural groups to retain their ethnic identities to its contemporary focus as an instrument of immigrant integration and social cohesion. Moreover, multiculturalism policy has consistently focused far more on issues of identity and the equality of cultures—as Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor (1994) suggested, a “politics of recognition”—rather than racial or economic equality.

**ORIGINS**

In 1963, in response to rising Francophone discontent in Quebec, Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson established a Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism with a mandate “to inquire into and report upon the existing state of bilingualism and biculturalism in Canada and to recommend what steps should be taken to develop the Canadian confederation on the basis of an equal partnership between the two founding races...” (Canada 1969). Commissioners also were instructed to consider the cultural contributions of other ethnic groups outside the English–French cultural and linguistic binary. The fourth volume of the 1969 final report did precisely this, recommending that ethnic minorities (largely defined by language) be given greater recognition and support in preserving their cultural traditions. In response, Liberal Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau announced the implementation of a federal policy of “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework.” In his speech before the House of Commons on October 8, 1971, Trudeau outlined his vision for achieving national unity through multiculturalism, stating that “A policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework commends itself to the government as the most suitable means of assuring the cultural freedom of Canadians....National unity, if it is to mean anything in the deeply personal sense, must be founded on the confidence in one’s own individual identity; out of this can grow respect for that of others and a willingness to share ideas, attitudes, and assumptions.”
Trudeau’s conceptualization of multiculturalism was premised on a liberal primacy of individual rights and freedoms as well as a multicultural policy designed to help individuals celebrate their cultural affiliations—what Kunz and Sykes (2007) termed “ethnicity multiculturalism.” In part, the adoption of multiculturalism was a response to political lobbying by other ethnic groups, especially Ukrainian Canadians, and a means of reducing the formidable opposition to bilingualism in English-speaking Canada, especially in the western provinces. However, according to some scholars, multiculturalism also was an effort to enhance national unity through the negation of biculturalism. They argued that in context of rising separatist sentiment in Quebec, Trudeau strategically introduced multiculturalism to counter the “compact thesis” of Quebec nationalists, which states that Canada is a compact between two founding peoples. Whatever the mix of motives behind Trudeau’s initial policy, Quebec nationalists rejected the new multicultural vision from the outset. They argued that in advancing a conception of the country that Anglophone Canada found highly appealing, the policy encouraged the rest of Canada to think of Quebec as simply one more minority group and to become increasingly unsympathetic toward Quebec’s claims to be a distinct society (Isajiw 1983; McRoberts 1997).

MULTICULTURALISM AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS PROTECTIONS
Although antidiscrimination provisions often are considered an integral element of the multiculturalism-policy regime, they offer little protection for social or economic rights and no guarantees of racial and class equality in economic terms. The increase in the arrival of more racial-minority immigrants in the late 1970s and 1980s shifted the focus of multiculturalism policy from social adaptation in largely linguistic or cultural terms to providing clearer laws and policies that could address racial discrimination in employment, housing, and education.

In 1982, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was entrenched in the constitution of the country. Section 15(1) of the Charter provides constitutional protection to equality rights before and under the law and the right to “equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination, and in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age, or mental or physical disability.” Steps also were taken to ensure that the Charter did not become a barrier to affirmative action. Section 15(2) states that the protections in Section 15(1) do not preclude the establishment of laws, programs, or activities that use positive action to ameliorate conditions of racial and other forms of disadvantage. In addition, Section 27 states that “This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.” There is no question that, armed with the Charter, the courts have provided redress against a number of discriminatory policies, especially against religious minorities (Eliadis 2014). However, the courts have dismissed efforts to find support for social rights in the Charter.

In 1984, the Special Parliamentary Committee on the Status of Visible Minorities in Canadian Society published its report, “Equality Now,” which acknowledged that racial minorities faced obstacles limiting their full participation in Canadian economic, social, and cultural life. It presented 80 recommendations to address persistent inequalities in the areas of social integration, employment, public policy, legal and justice issues, media, and education (Canada: Parliament 1984). Shortly thereafter, the Royal Commission on Equality in Employment was tasked with ascertaining the “most efficient, effective, and equitable means of promoting employment opportunities for and eliminating systemic discrimination against four designated groups: women, native people, disabled persons, and visible minorities” (Canada 1984). The Commission’s report became the foundation of the Employment Equity Act of 1986, which confirmed that “employment equity means more than treating persons in the same way but also requires special measures and the accommodation of differences.” The Conservative government under Brian Mulroney also introduced a Multiculturalism Act in 1988, which combined the initial approach to multiculturalism as the preservation of culture and languages with the newer mandate of reducing racial discrimination.

Together, these federal initiatives were important symbols, especially in promoting multiculturalism as a social ideal and a national value. Yet, in practice, these laws and policies did little to alleviate the growing economic inequality between racial minorities and white Canadians. For example, as federal legislation, the Employment Equity Act applies only to federally regulated industries (e.g.,
banks, Crown corporations, and the public service), which combined employ a relatively small percentage of the Canadian workforce. In an effort to avoid the controversy associated with American affirmative-action programs, the legislation did not establish quotas or mandate the hiring or promotion of people from the four designated groups. The only enforcement mechanism in the 1986 Act was a $50,000 fine that could be levied against employers who failed to submit annual reports to the federal government detailing the representation of women, persons with disabilities, visible minorities, and Aboriginal peoples in their workforce (Grundy and Smith 2011). The revised 1995 Act improved compliance provisions by giving the Canadian Human Rights Commission the authority to conduct audits and by creating a tribunal to enforce compliance. With this new power to review employers’ employment-equity goals, the Canadian Human Rights Commission found in 1999 that many employers set goals that were lower than the labor-force availability of the designated groups (Agocs 2002, 264). Whereas the employment gap between men and women has greatly dissipated in the past three decades, employment equity has largely failed to rectify the underrepresentation of visible minorities, Aboriginal peoples, and persons with disabilities—even within the federal public service (Weiner 2014).

MULTICULTURALISM AS INTEGRATION

Beyond the promotion of multiculturalism as a laudable but largely symbolic social ideal, there has been a shift away from this antiracist orientation of Canadian multiculturalism policy toward a more explicit focus on integration (Abu-Laban 1998; Kymlicka 1998). This goal became clearer in the early 1990s as Canada faced yet another national-identity crisis and the danger of Quebec separation following the failure of the Meech Lake Accord in 1988. The 1991 Citizen’s Forum on Canada’s Future (i.e., Spicer Commission) called for a more civically oriented refocusing of official multiculturalism that favored immigrant integration, the reduction of racial discrimination, and the promotion of equality, with the key goal of multiculturalism being “to welcome all Canadians to an evolving mainstream—and thus encourage real respect for diversity.” Critics suggested that this “Canadian mainstream” was envisioned as far more of a homogenizing than a pluralizing force that ultimately gives primacy to retaining national symbols and culture rooted in British heritage (Abu-Laban and Stasiulis 1992, 370–1). In Quebec, the multicultural regime is explicitly intercultural, meaning that newcomers are encouraged to develop a sense of belonging to Quebec’s specific political and cultural community through policies that define French as the language of public life in the province (Salée 2007).

In cultural terms, immigrant integration has been a successful endeavor in the Canadian context (Banting 2010); ethnic enclaves exist but are limited (Myles and Hou 2004); children of immigrants “do better” than their parents even when there are controls for skills, education, and income (OECD 2006); and multiculturalism has nurtured a more inclusive sense of Canadian identity, helping to “normalize” diversity, particularly for younger generations (Harel 2009). In addition, as Bloemraad’s (2006) comparative study of immigrant political integration in the United States and Canada demonstrated, multiculturalism programs encourage the active participation of immigrants in Canadian political institutions. Broadly speaking, social integration or social cohesion, defined as an immigrant’s sense of belonging in the country, is relatively strong and tends to increase over time (Soroka, Johnston, and Banting 2007). In an era when many Western governments have declared multiculturalism to be a “failed experiment” and scholars argue that there is a global “retreat from multiculturalism” (Brubaker 2001; Joppke 2004), Canadian multiculturalism policy remains intact and is heralded as a (somewhat sui generis) success story (Banting and Kymlicka 2010; Kymlicka 2012).

However, there also is substantial evidence that despite multiculturalism policy, the experiences of the white and racial-minority populations of Canada are very different. Reitz and Banerjee (2007) demonstrated that second-generation racial minorities are less integrated than their first-generation parents, particularly in terms of key determinants of belonging (e.g., perceived discrimination, sense of vulnerability, and propensity to vote). There is an even sharper decline in the sense of belonging to Canada among second-generation racial minorities in Quebec (Banting and Soroka 2012). In a recent devastating article in Toronto Life magazine, journalist Desmond Cole described the consistent police harassment and scrutiny he faced as a young black man living in Kingston and Toronto (Cole 2015). Racial minorities also remain underrepresented in most formal institutions of government. For example, in April 2012, the Globe and Mail reported that of the 100 federal judges appointed between 2009 and 2012, an astonishing 98 were white.

In Quebec, where multiculturalism has always had less traction, the 2008 public debate surrounding the boundaries of “reasonable accommodation” for racial, cultural, and religious minorities—the final report of the provincial commission confirmed—was partially based on distorted perceptions about the threats posed by those who are culturally different in French Canada—especially Muslims (Bouchard and Taylor 2008). Identity politics continue to swirl in the province and, in 2014, resulted in the introduction of a legislative proposal for a Quebec Charter
of Values, which would have forbidden public servants—including employees of schools, universities, and hospitals—from wearing religious symbols such as the hijab. The government was defeated before the Charter was adopted, but the issue continues to foment.

Given these mixed results, it is not surprising that multiculturalism has its critics, who argue that the policy is akin to a neoliberal diversion tactic that has worked to stabilize the hegemony of white-settler power relations, ultimately foreclosing a more serious and sustained discourse about the reality of racial domination and inequality in Canada (Abu-Laban and Gabriel 2002; Bannerji 2000; Haque 2012; Mackey 2002; Thobani 2007; Thompson 2008; Vickers and Isaac 2012). Defenders of the multicultural approach counter that there is no reason to assume that the scope of the political agenda is inelastic and that a focus on cultural equality inevitably squeezes out attention to racial equality. Indeed, a focus on one dimension of inequality might well prepare the ground for a broader egalitarian agenda, which apparently happened in the 1980s when the multiculturalism program concentrated on race relations and the breaking down of racial barriers to integration (Kymlicka 2015). This debate continues.

Multiculturalism is a revered social ideal that lies at the foundation of Canadian national identity in the twenty-first century. As noted previously, it reflects the centrality of the politics of ethnicity, culture, and identity in Canadian life. As a result, the policy was clearly aimed at greater cultural equality and was not designed to address—at least directly—economic or racial inequality.

**Aboriginal Policy and Racial Inequality**

What is the relationship between policy related to Aboriginal affairs and racial inequality? As discussed previously, Aboriginal peoples measure among the poorest in Canada. This racial stratification is morally troubling and economically inefficient on its own terms, but it also stands in stark contrast to Canadian values. Yet, so far, Canadian policies have had limited success in remedying the entrenched socioeconomic inequalities between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal populations. As Salée argued, it is important to recognize the political nature of Aboriginal poverty—that is, the ways that broader political and institutional arrangements have shaped and reproduced positions of privilege and disadvantage over time (Salée 2006; Smith 2009).

From its inception, Aboriginal policy has never been primarily about alleviating the socioeconomic disadvantage affecting Aboriginal communities. For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, these policies were overtly and explicitly racist, designed to segregate, dominate, and assimilate Aboriginal peoples by eradicating indigenous cultures, traditions, and languages; appropriating Aboriginal lands; and removing Indian status (Lawrence 2005). The Indian Act, originally passed by Parliament in 1876, was central to these endeavors. The legislation and its many amendments over the decades defined Aboriginal peoples as wards of the state, incapable of managing their own affairs. The ultimate goal of the Indian Act was the assimilation of First Peoples into Canadian society—thereby eliminating any claim to underlying Aboriginal title and minimizing the fiduciary obligations of the Crown. However, the act also provided wide-ranging powers to the federal government to manage the lives of Aboriginal peoples and communities. Under the provisions of the Indian Act, status Indians could not access the same civil and political rights as most other Canadians, including the right to vote, the ability to retain legal counsel, and mobility rights, as well as prohibitions against public meetings to discuss indigenous affairs, cultural ceremonies (e.g., the Potlatch and Sun Dance), and alcohol consumption on-reserve (Coates 2008). Also, approximately 150,000 Aboriginal children were removed from their communities—at times forcibly—and placed in government-funded, church-run residential schools in which students often were subjected to mental, physical, and sexual abuse and forbidden from speaking their traditional language or practicing their culture. Driven by a changed normative environment in which explicit racial discrimination was no longer politically palatable, Trudeau’s Liberal government introduced the 1969 White Paper, which proposed to eliminate Indian status and the Indian Act, dissolve the Department of Indian Affairs within five years, convert reserve land to private property, and transfer responsibility for Indian affairs to the provinces, gradually integrating these provisions with other provincial social services (Canada: Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development 1969). This proposal inadvertently catalyzed the Red Power activism of the late...
Aboriginal peoples measure among the poorest in Canada. This racial stratification is morally troubling and economically inefficient on its own terms, but it also stands in stark contrast to Canadian values.

found more gravitas after the reform of the Canadian constitution in 1982. A new Section 35 recognizes and affirms the “existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada,” including Aboriginal title (Canada 1982). This embedding of Aboriginal rights in the constitution led to substantial legal action against the Crown: a large body of jurisprudence now exists on issues ranging from hunting and fishing rights to commercial fishing rights, Aboriginal title, and the Crown’s duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples before making important decisions that affect them (Asch 1997, 2014; Borrows 2002, 2016; Macklem 2001; Macklem and Sanderson 2015). In 1995, the Canadian government adopted the position that Section 35 includes an “inherent right to self-government” that “may be enforceable through the courts” and attempted to dissuade Aboriginal peoples from that course of action because “litigation over the inherent right would be lengthy, costly, and would tend to foster conflict” (Canada: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 1995). However, a long-standing issue among Aboriginal communities that choose to enter into self-government and/or comprehensive claims negotiations concerns the federal government’s requirement that Aboriginal groups surrender any claims to Aboriginal rights and title to lands and resources. Although several committees of the United Nations have called on Canada to abandon or amend this practice, the government’s consistent position considers the extinguishment of Aboriginal rights as necessary to achieve “legal certainty” (Alcantara and Whitfield 2010; Belanger 2008; McNeil 2004). Moreover, self-government agreements exist within the bounds of Canadian federalism and presuppose the sovereignty of the Canadian state. As Papillon (2011, 315) noted, “[s]elf-government agreements...
and other form of governance arrangements are not the expression of Indigenous residual sovereignty, despite Indigenous claims to that affect.” Progress has been painfully slow: to date, the Canadian government has signed only 22 self-government agreements, of which 18 are part of comprehensive land-claim agreements.

So far, these initiatives have done little to change the socioeconomic inequalities between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians. First, although comprehensive claims have been heralded as a new type of “treaty federalism” (Hueglin 2013; White 2002), relatively few self-government agreements have been signed and the economic-development provisions of final agreements have yet to substantially improve the situation on reserves. For the majority of First Nations not covered under self-government agreements, the economic-development programs of the federal Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development also have fallen short. Meanwhile, there have been few significant efforts to directly address Aboriginal poverty. The only major effort was the Kelowna Accord of 2005, proposed by Paul Martin’s Liberal government, which promised to dedicate $5.1 billion over five years to improve access to education, health services, housing, and economic opportunities through an unprecedented collaborative of federal, provincial, and territorial governments, as well as all of the major Aboriginal organizations (Noël and Larocque 2009). However, after the Liberal government was defeated a few months later, the new Conservative government considered itself neither bound by the terms of the Accord nor committed to spending government money to address what it viewed as an area of social policy under provincial jurisdiction. The Conservatives refused to inject much-needed additional funding into Aboriginal education on reserves unless the Aboriginal leaders agree to accountability measures, which leads directly back to disputes over governance. The new Liberal government, however, has promised to flow the educational funding.

Second, the policy drift is exacerbated by an intergovernmental quagmire of service delivery, in which neither the federal nor provincial and territorial governments have taken comprehensive responsibility for concrete policy direction. The situation is the result of Canadian federalism (Vickers and Isaac 2012, chap. 4). The constitution grants the provinces control over most areas of social policy (e.g., health care and education), but it stipulates that “Indians and lands reserved for Indians” remain under federal authority. As such, most provinces largely consider Aboriginal affairs—including economic development and poverty reduction—to be a federal problem. Problematically, the federal government has long interpreted its constitutional obligations as pertaining only to Indians on lands reserved for Indians, leaving authority for the Inuit, Métis, and Indians that live off-reserve unspecified and resulting in these populations being largely underserved (Hanselmann and Gibbins 2003). As discussed previously, more than half of Aboriginal peoples now reside in several urban areas, with concentrations in Winnipeg, Regina, and Saskatoon.

This liminal intergovernmental position of Aboriginal peoples means that they access social-welfare programming through a “somewhat modified version” of the Canadian welfare state, as noted previously. Noël and Larocque (2009, 16) provided more detail: “[l]abor market and economic development programs are provided by the federal government to all Aboriginal peoples, as they are for all Canadians, since they are within the bounds of federal jurisdiction. Child welfare, education, health and housing programs, on the other hand, follow the bifurcated social assistance pattern [of provinces determining the scope of the program and the federal government providing the funds to Indians on-reserve] because they constitute primarily provincial jurisdiction. On these matters, Ottawa more or less takes the role of the provinces for Indians on-reserve, and provinces respond to the needs of other Aboriginal peoples.” They stated further, however, that there are numerous administrative anomalies that make the division of federal and provincial roles “ridiculously” complex. For example, their analysis of recent poverty-reduction strategies demonstrates wide variation among provinces in terms of how they understand their obligation to reduce Aboriginal poverty, ranging from neglect and the expectation of federal leadership in the Atlantic provinces; to a politics of engagement through bilateral, sometimes “nation-to-nation” agreements in Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia; and to a politics of avoidance throughout the prairie provinces and by the federal government. Although poverty, and specifically Aboriginal poverty, seems to garner more attention now than in previous decades, this patchwork of policies and overlapping jurisdiction simply enables a situation in which the most vulnerable segments of Canadian society continue to fall through the gaping holes of the social safety net.

**PATH DEPENDENCY AND POLICY DRIVERS: INSTITUTIONS, PARTY POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGIES**

The broad patterns described here largely reflect the type of gradual, incremental institutional change normally associated with the concept of policy drift, which refers to situations in which institutional rules remain the same, but their impact changes because of shifts in external
conditions (Hacker 2005). In circumstances of drift, actors either choose not to respond to environmental changes or are purposefully obstructed from doing so. As Canada became a more diverse society and racial minorities began to experience socioeconomic inequality, the policy architecture was either not substantively retooled to address new forms of diversity and inequality (the welfare state, multiculturalism) or particular framings of policy problems prevented the policy tools from addressing racial economic inequality directly (immigration policy, Aboriginal policy). In essence, this policy drift demonstrates the extent to which inaction is a powerful form of political action.

Each of these policy sectors has distinctive features, inherent in the political interests at stake and the nature of the policy instruments being deployed. Nevertheless, several common political factors have shaped all of these domains and would shape any concerted effort to address racial inequality in the future. The consistency in Canadian formations of political institutions, political parties, and political ideologies suggests that the dominant story of the foreseeable future is one of path dependency, whereby the opportunities for new directions in these policy areas are constrained by the developmental pathways that have long been institutionalized.

**Political Institutions**

Canadian political institutions combine a parliamentary system, which concentrates power *within* governments, and a federal system, which divides power *between* governments. The decentralized nature of the federation has had powerful implications for social justice in Canada, and authority in each of the four domains is divided among levels of government in complex ways. In the welfare state, federalism largely divides major tax-transfer programs, in which the federal government is still predominant, from social assistance and major services such as health and education, in which provinces rule. In the immigration sector, federalism carves out a separate zone for Quebec; in the remainder of the country, it separates authority over immigration policy from authority over many of the policy instruments that shape immigrant integration in the long term. In the case of rights of individuals, those relative to the state are highly centralized through a constitutionalized Charter; however, nondiscrimination in the private sector falls to provincial bodies. Similarly, multiculturalism initiatives are divided between the two levels, and Aboriginal policy is a jurisdictional quagmire.

Canadians actively debate whether federalism obstructs social justice.

For some, the division of authority weakens the state and inhibits the pursuit of social justice. For others, the capacity for action at the regional level opens new pathways for innovation and reform. Undoubtedly, both are true. However, on balance, the continued decentralization and the increasingly asymmetrical position of Quebec seem to make concerted egalitarian projects less likely in the future. In the case of the welfare state, for example, Quebec has made use of the additional provincial policy space it has achieved to chart a more egalitarian policy trajectory, one that offsets growth in economic inequality (Noël 2013). Despite the greater effort in Quebec, however, redistribution across the country as a whole has weakened more at the provincial level than at the federal level in recent decades (Fortin et al. 2012). Federalism makes a concerted, countrywide assault on racial inequality highly unlikely.

**Party Politics**

Canada has never had a class-based party system. Indeed, in a study of the Anglo-American democracies published a half-century ago, Alford (1963, x–xi) described Canada as a case of “pure non-class voting.” Although subsequent studies have marginally qualified the observation, the central conclusion remains accurate: the Canadian electorate is much less likely than electorates in many other democracies to vote along class lines, whether measured by income, education, or occupation. Instead, to a level unusual among Western democracies, Canadian electoral cleavages are rooted in language, ethnicity, religion, and region. This party configuration explains why Canada never developed a powerfully redistributive welfare state on the European model. What are its implications for a future agenda of racial equality? Here, the prospects are more complex. The importance of ethnicity, language, and culture in electoral politics explains why the country is more comfortable with ethnic diversity, immigration, and multiculturalism policies. Since the beginning, the
The Politics of Racial and Class Inequalities in the Americas

The Puzzling Persistence of Racial Inequality in Canada

presence of Quebec removed a monocultural definition of the country from the political table. Given the facts of cultural demography, a Canadian national identity must accommodate and celebrate diversity. In addition, the size of the Quebec and immigrant communities in the electorate ensures that no political party can hope to win power at the national level by running against minorities. During the twentieth century, national politics was dominated by a party of the center, the Liberal Party, which was successful in capturing minority voters in both French-speaking Quebec and immigrant communities.

Conservative political forces have now come to accept this basic reality. In 1993, the Reform Party, a populist radical-Right party, broke through in Western Canada, propelled in part by attacks on Quebec, immigration, and multiculturalism. Its breakthrough decimated the traditional center-Right Progressive Conservative Party and divided conservative forces, ensuring the dominance of the Liberals for the next decade. The Reform Party soon realized that it could not win nationally with an antidiversity strategy; in the next election, its platform advocated increased immigration levels and muted previous criticism of Quebec and multiculturalism programs. Through a tortuous series of steps in several elections, the political Right reconsolidated in the form of the current Conservative Party and has successfully courted racial-minority votes. Its success consolidated its hold on power in Ottawa after 2006. More recently, the party seems to have paid a price for reverting to cultural wedge politics. The Conservative leadership’s insistence on banning the niqab during citizenship ceremonies and its proposal to create a RCMP hotline for citizens to report “barbaric cultural practices” during the 2015 federal election seem to have contributed to the defeat of the Conservative government.

Although these dynamics make the party system more responsive to immigration and diversity, proposals for a robust agenda of racial equality run against the current ideological orientation among the parties. The 2000s witnessed a greater ideological polarization of the federal party system, and during the 2015 federal election political parties responded to growing public anxiety about economic inequality. But none of the diverse policy proposals on offer was framed around an agenda of racial equality.

Political Ideologies

Canada is a liberal state and the limitations of many of its social-justice policies reflect the limits of liberalism. The country built a liberal welfare state, with a limited redistributive impact. Its immigration policies have always been dominated by economic objectives, with humanitarian impulses playing an important but secondary role. Canada’s constitutional protections of the rights of individuals from state action are stronger than its machinery for limiting discrimination in the private sector, and its multiculturalism policies represent a liberal multiculturalism, compatible with liberal conceptions of social justice (Kymlicka 1995). Its approach to Aboriginal communities for much of the twentieth century reflected an individualist conception of their future, anticipating their assimilation into the cultural mainstream. Only the political mobilization of Aboriginal peoples in the 1960s diverted the path to a more collectivist conception of relations between indigenous peoples and the state.

There are, of course, multiple conceptions of liberalism. The Canadian variant has been traditionally a more social version of liberalism (Mahon 2008) and its dominance in policy debates has been challenged and qualified by social-democratic themes articulated by a minority party of the Left. Canadian liberalism shared the emphasis on the market economy and negative rights inherent in more classical forms of liberalism. However, it also accepted a legitimate role for government to advance equality of opportunity, including elements of social-citizenship rights such as health care. However, an attack on racial inequality would require deeper intervention in labor markets—among other actions—running against the commitment to the market economy. Moreover, the social dimension of traditional liberalism has been challenged by neoconservative voices. Neoconservatism has never had a “free ride” in the country, and social liberalism (now sometimes called “inclusive liberalism”) remains part of the discourse. However, the ideological balance clearly shifted against state activism in the late 1990s and 2000s. Although there are tentative signs of growing support for redistribution, as noted previously, there are no serious signs of support for state activism premised on an agenda of racial equality.

CONCLUSIONS

We began with a puzzle. Why has the Canadian panoply of social policies not made more definitive progress in ending racial inequality? Undoubtedly, racial inequality would be even greater if these policies did not exist. Moreover, on several dimensions, the Canadian record on the integration of racial-minority immigrant communities is impressive in comparison with other countries. However, it cannot be denied that the Canadian record regarding Aboriginal peoples and several large racial-minority immigrant groups is embarrassingly weak.
Our answer to the puzzle is, at first glance, quite simple. The core social instruments of the Canadian state were never designed to directly address racial inequality. The major planks of the policy scaffolding were put in place when Canada was much less racially diverse and social divisions defined in linguistic and regional terms loomed larger. The large racial-minority immigration flow had yet to begin and the Aboriginal population was small and had not yet mobilized politically. More complicated is the question of why Canadian policy instruments have not been reengineered to respond better to the racial inequalities that have now emerged. Some new instruments were adopted, such as a constitutionalized Charter of Rights and Freedoms; multiculturalism policy went through a phase of addressing racial discrimination more explicitly; and Aboriginal policies moved onto a new track emphasizing territorial rights. However, these initiatives were not designed—at least in the first instance—to address the economic dimensions of racial inequality. A frontal assault on racial economic inequality as such was never debated, much less adopted.

In part, this is a story of path dependency and policy drift. In part, it is a story of long-term policy cycles. Canada became more racially diverse just as economic prosperity was fading, unemployment was rising, and social supports were eroding. The constraints on action were tightening just as the problems were becoming more apparent. Furthermore, as emphasized at the outset, this is in part a story rooted in constitutive elements of Canadian society, which nurture a politics of ethnicity, culture, identity, and peoplehood. Together, these factors have worked in some instances to obscure the realities of racial economic inequality. In other instances, it has deflected attention from a problem definition and concrete action using this framework toward more familiar approaches to diversity.

The evolution of key political drivers in recent decades does not inspire confidence in the prospects for a concerted campaign on racial economic inequality in the near future. What would be the best way to alleviate racial inequality in the Canadian context? Given the impressive set of policy tools already in place, what is missing? In part, the best strategy would be to reinvigorate policy tools designed to reduce economic inequality among Canadians in general. The jockeying among political parties during the run-up to the election in the fall of 2015 reflected pervasive public anxiety about the growth of inequality. The explicit political focus was overwhelmingly on the plight of the middle class, but some—although not all—of the policies proposed also would benefit low-income groups, including many racial minorities. As we have seen, the expansion of child benefits by the new Liberal government does have significant redistributive effect, suggesting that proposals framed in terms of helping Canadian families have a far greater chance than those framed explicitly in the language of race.

However, a general strategy of reducing inequality among all Canadians, on its own, may not be sufficient to address the dynamics sustaining racial economic inequality. Policy tools specifically designed to problematize, target, and alleviate racial economic inequality could also be an effective approach. For example, a more uniform model of human-rights laws could harmonize the 14 distinct human-rights systems (i.e., commission and tribunals), thereby ensuring that all Canadians are equal before the law (Eliadis 2014, 259–61). Similarly, given that the current model of employment equity is limited to public-sphere reporting mechanisms, a more aggressive and accountable approach toward “positive action” might be more effective. However, any explicitly race-based strategies in Canada must first traverse a political terrain full of pitfalls for reasons already alluded to: ethnicity, culture, language, and identity, not race, have been the dominant understandings of difference, and as a result, Canadians have been uncomfortable with the language of race. This does not suggest that abandoning multiculturalism as an ideal necessarily would generate support for combating racism. Progress is likely to come not by subordinating ethnicity to race as an organizing principle but rather by finding political strategies that combine them in pursuit of stronger action.

Finally, neither a reinvigoration of redistributive social policies nor more effective race-based strategies will be sufficient to address the urgent circumstances of Aboriginal poverty. The mobilization of Aboriginal communities during the “Idle No More” movement in 2012 and 2013, repeated calls for a national inquiry into missing and murdered Aboriginal women, and the 2015 report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada declaring that residential schools were an instrument of cultural genocide are all part of recent sustained public attention to Aboriginal conditions in Canada. These efforts have yet to elicit a response from the federal government. It is clear, however, that at a minimum, the federal government should be delivering programming on-reserve, especially in education, that is at least as robust as what is provided by the provinces.

Since the federal election of 2015, Canada has been experiencing something of a ‘Yes we can’ moment. It remains to be seen how much the altered political climate will change inherited ways of thinking about and responding to difference. But at some point, in the future if not now, political parties and governments will have to address issues of racial economic inequality openly and directly. The disconnect between our politics and our lived reality is growing too large to be ignored.
1. Many racial minority immigrants also define themselves in these terms. Consider the experience of one young man: “Growing up as a Somali–Canadian in Winnipeg and Toronto, the concept of ‘black’ was largely absent from my life. The first-generation Somalis around me rejected the concept entirely; they would say, ‘I’m not black, I’m Somali.’ There was no subtext to this declaration. They tended to think of themselves through the lens of culture and nationality” (Issa 2015).

2. Unfortunately, the decision of the federal government to make the detailed version of the census form voluntary in the 2011 census means that this source of consistent data over time ends in 2006. This is a serious gap because there are reasons to believe that the recession that began in 2008 had a significant impact on immigrant communities. In addition, evidence about the situation of First Nations populations on reserve is especially limited. These data limitations are one manifestation of the tendency in Canadian debates to think of “difference” in terms other than race. The standard definition of “vulnerable populations” employed by labour economists and income statisticians includes recent immigrants, Aboriginals, single parents, disabled persons, and unattached individuals aged 45–65. (For a recent example, see Fang and Gunderson 2016.) Racial minorities (or “visible minorities”) are analyzed much less often.

3. The gaps are even larger for several small groups. For example, the gap for African black males in 2005 was 0.32.

4. There is one exception to this trend: Aboriginal peoples who have earned a bachelor’s degree reduced their overall income gap from $3,382 in 1996 to only $648 by 2006. However, there still remains a significant gap in the number of Aboriginal people who have earned a bachelor’s degree (8%) and other Canadians who have earned a bachelor’s degree or higher (22%), as well as enduring disparities in educational attainment at the K–12 level (Wilson and MacDonald 2010, 15–19).

5. For an earlier case of restricting family reunification explicitly in the name of limiting welfare costs, see Banting (2010).


7. For a useful survey of studies exploring these issues, see the various contributions to Kanji, Bilodeau, and Scott (2012).

8. See Thompson (2016, especially chapter 5).

REFERENCES


In this chapter, the task force focuses on the beliefs and opinions that Americans have about inequality. Specifically, we examine the commitment to egalitarianism as a norm and how this commitment varies across groups defined by race, class, ideology, and political party. Additionally, we examine support for governmental efforts to reduce income inequality across racial groups, and the extent to which attitudes about equality in the abstract are shaped by attitudes about equality for different class and racial groups. Lastly, we focus on levels of racial group identity, how this concept can be measured, and whether it varies over time and across different groups.

How are Americans' values and views of inequality shaped by understandings of economic inequality and of racial inequality?

Since 1984, the American National Election Studies (ANES) has sought to measure support for the value of egalitarianism. The battery, originally designed by Stanley Feldman, consists of six items incorporating the concepts of equal opportunity, concerns about the pace of equal rights, whether the failure to provide equal opportunity is a big problem, whether equality should be a societal goal, and whether the pursuit of equality would lead to fewer problems in this country. One of the virtues of this scale is that it is not designed to capture egalitarianism on any specific dimension, such as gender, sexual orientation, class, race, or ethnicity. Instead, it refers to equality more broadly, and hence ostensibly measures egalitarianism as an abstract value. The Cronbach’s alpha on this six-item scale approaches or exceeds conventional thresholds for coherent attitudinal scales. For example, the alpha on the egalitarianism scale was .78 in the 2012 ANES survey, which had 5,914 respondents (2,054 in the face-to-face component of the study and 3,860 in the Internet component). This statistic varied considerably across the two survey modes, with an alpha of .82 in the Internet survey but an alpha of only .68 in the face-to-face survey. It is not clear why this discrepancy appears but the answer may partly lie in the fact that the two samples are not equivalent, with the face-to-face sample having a higher response rate (38% versus 2%) and fewer, but a more representative number of, college graduates.

More troubling than the different alphas across survey modes is the different alphas across racial, ethnic, and class groups. For example, focusing on the face-to-face study, the alpha on the egalitarian scale is .70 for whites, .54 for African Americans, and .62 for Latinos. In the case of class, respondents in the face-to-face study who graduated from college report an alpha of .79 on the egalitarianism scale compared to noncollege graduates who report a score of only .64. Overall, this suggests that the egalitarianism scale is less than optimal especially for African Americans, Latinos, and respondents who have not graduated from college. Yet, although the scale is less than ideal for disadvantaged groups the measure appears sufficiently coherent—especially when analyzing the weighted data—that we can, at a minimum, draw some preliminary conclusions.

Regarding this task force’s discussions, if we accept that the ANES measure is an imperfect, but adequate, construct of the value of egalitarianism, how is it related to attitudes about economic inequality and racial inequality? One way to assess this relationship is to regress the egalitarianism scale on measures assessing support for class and racial equality, controlling for standing demographic and political variables. These results are shown in table 1.

In the first column (Model 1) of table 1, the association between attitudes on income inequality and support for the egalitarianism scale is determined. These analyses control for standard demographic variables such as age, race, ethnicity, and education as well as political predispositions such as partisanship and ideology. The most noteworthy result in the Model 1 is that attitudes on income inequality are significantly related to the broader egalitarian scale. The magnitude of the association is of moderate size: moving from low to high on the income inequality measure results in a 12-percentage point increase in support for egalitarianism in the abstract. Interestingly, none of the
class-oriented demographic measures (e.g., education and income) are statistically significantly related to the egalitarian scale. However, the effects of race and ethnicity are significant although in the case of Latinos negative and somewhat counterintuitive. Finally, and not surprisingly, ideology and party identification are also correlated with the egalitarianism scale.

The second column of table 1 (Model 2) shows similar analyses, except that the measure of income inequality is replaced with a question assessing levels of support for governmental efforts to assist African Americans. Again, we find that this more focused measure is significantly associated with the broader egalitarianism scale. The effect size is roughly equivalent to that of attitudes on income inequality. With the exception of Latino ethnicity, none of the demographic control variables meet conventional levels of statistical significance.

In Model 3, we substitute attitudes on immigration for the aid to blacks question. Having previously assessed the association between attitudes about class or race and egalitarianism, we now turn to nativist-oriented expressions of equality. The relevant measure in Model 3 assesses respondents’ preferred level of immigration into the United States. Predictably, we find a significant, and negative, association between attitudes about immigration and the egalitarianism scale. The magnitude of this effect, however, is noticeably weaker relative to income and racial inequality. This finding suggests that the broader egalitarianism scale is more likely to reflect class and racial sentiments rather than nativist considerations.

Table 1: The Impact of Attitudes on Class, Race, and Ethnic Equality on Egalitarianism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MODEL 1 (EGALITARIANISM)</th>
<th>MODEL 2 (EGALITARIANISM)</th>
<th>MODEL 3 (EGALITARIANISM)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REDUCE INCOME DIFFERENCES</td>
<td>.12*** (02)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AID TO BLACKS</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>.14*** (02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPPOSITION TO IMMIGRATION</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARTY IDENTIFICATION</td>
<td>.13*** (02)</td>
<td>.15*** (02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDEOLOGY</td>
<td>.14*** (03)</td>
<td>.15* (07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMALE</td>
<td>.00 (01)</td>
<td>.01 (01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td>-.01 (02)</td>
<td>-.03 (02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCOME</td>
<td>-.03 (02)</td>
<td>-.03 (02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATION</td>
<td>.04 (02)</td>
<td>.01 (02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLACK</td>
<td>.05** (02)</td>
<td>.04 (02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LATINO</td>
<td>-.03* (01)</td>
<td>-.03* (02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERCEPT</td>
<td>.43*** (03)</td>
<td>.42*** (03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R SQUARED</td>
<td>.27 (03)</td>
<td>.30 (03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL NUMBER OF CASES</td>
<td>1598</td>
<td>1394</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 for two-tailed test. All variables coded 0-1; higher values of partisanship indicate the Democratic end of the scale.

Do minorities and whites have a different conceptualization of the relationship between egalitarianism, and class and racial equality? If so, how?

The analyses presented in table 1 were also separately run for whites, African Americans, and Latinos (results not shown). These findings did not differ substantially across groups in the case of attitudes on reducing income inequality (Model 1). The relevant coefficients for whites and Latinos were .12 and .15, respectively. In both cases the results were highly significant. Among blacks, the results were somewhat weaker (.07), but still statistically significant. Thus, the impact of class considerations on egalitarianism is roughly equivalent across racial and ethnic groups.

Larger differences emerge when examining the association between racial considerations and egalitarianism across groups. The results in Model 2, with respect to the aid to blacks question, are largely driven by whites and Latinos. Specifically, the relevant coefficient for whites (.18) and Latinos (.13) are large and highly significant, whereas the effect among blacks (.08) is much weaker and falls short of statistical significance. Race—or at least attitudes about African Americans—is clearly implicated in views about egalitarianism among whites and Latinos, but not among blacks.

Group differences are even sharper when examining the relationship between immigration attitudes and egalitarianism. In summary, attitudes about immigration
are linked to egalitarian values only among whites. When replicating the analysis in Model 3 for white respondents only, the relevant coefficient is moderately strong and highly significant (.10; p = .001). Among blacks (.03) and Latinos (-.04); however, the results are considerably smaller and fall well short of statistical significance. The obvious conclusion here is that anti-immigrant sentiments play some role in reducing support for egalitarianism—but only among white Americans.

Does the public have a stance on whether class inequalities are caused by racial inequalities or vice-versa? What is the relationship between white’s attitudes about economic inequality and their views of minorities?

This first question alludes to perceptions of the origins of class inequality. The ANES did not ask any questions on this subject in 2012. Other high-quality surveys likely did contain some items gauging these opinions (e.g., the General Social Survey), but unfortunately that data is not evaluated in this chapter. The second question involves the relationship between attitudes about racial inequality and attitudes about class inequality. This matter is addressed by regressing attitudes on reducing income inequality on the aid to blacks or immigration questions, controlling for standard demographic and political variables. These results are presented in table 2. In the first column (Model 1), we focus on attitudes about government efforts to address the unique challenges of African Americans. Among whites in the 2012 ANES, attitudes regarding this issue are strongly associated with attitudes on reducing income inequality. The coefficient on this variable is statistically significant and rivals that of partisanship in its magnitude.

The results for the immigration question (see table 2, Model 2) are much less powerful. Here opposition to immigration is not significantly associated with attitudes on reducing income inequality. We remain cautious in interpreting this result, however, as it does not necessarily mean that white attitudes about Latinos are unrelated to attitudes on income inequality. Additional analyses show that, for example, perceptions that Latinos possess too much influence in American society are significantly associated with white opposition to government efforts to reduce income inequality.9 Thus, opposition to immigration per se appears to be unrelated to anti-egalitarianism; this is not necessarily the case for negative attitudes about Latinos.

Are minorities more concerned about economic inequality than whites?

Another question raised by the task force involves racial and ethnic differences regarding levels of concern about economic inequality. The 2012 ANES asked a few questions about this issue with generally consistent results across the different indicators. The most straightforward question yields the sharpest group differences (see endnote #5), as shown in figure 1.10 As with previous analyses, these results are coded onto a 0–1 scale. Higher values indicate greater support for governmental efforts to reduce income differences. Clearly, both blacks and Latinos are considerably more positive about these efforts than are whites. These differences are both substantively and statistically significant.11

Table 2: The Impact of Support for Aid to Blacks and Immigration Attitudes on Support for Reducing Income Inequality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(White Respondents)</th>
<th>MODEL 1 (INCOME INEQUALITY)</th>
<th>MODEL 2 (INCOME INEQUALITY)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AID TO BLACKS</td>
<td>.17** (0.05)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPPOSITION TO IMMIGRATION</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>.05 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARTY IDENTIFICATION</td>
<td>.19*** (0.06)</td>
<td>.23*** (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDEOLOGY</td>
<td>.24*** (0.07)</td>
<td>.23*** (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMALE</td>
<td>.04 (0.02)</td>
<td>.02 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td>-.17*** (0.05)</td>
<td>-.18*** (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCOME</td>
<td>-.08 (0.04)</td>
<td>-.10* (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATION</td>
<td>-.12** (0.02)</td>
<td>-.10* (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERCEPT</td>
<td>.25*** (0.05)</td>
<td>.27*** (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R SQUARED</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL NUMBER OF CASES</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>709</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 for two-tailed test. All variables coded 0–1; higher values of partisanship indicate the Democratic end of the scale.
Is there any evidence to support recent claims that Americans are shedding their commitments to racial and ethnic identities?

This last question asks about overtime change in Americans’ commitment to their racial and ethnic identity. Unfortunately, this information has not been collected for all racial groups over an extended period of time. Much of the early literature on racial identity focused on African Americans, and here we do have some information going back to the 1980s. Specifically, respondents are asked “Do you think that what happens generally to black people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?” If the respondent answers in the affirmative, they are then asked whether this will affect them a lot, some, or not very much. The ANES has asked this question of black respondents since 2004, with the 2008 and 2012 time series being especially useful because of the minority oversamples. The question was initially asked in the 1984 National Black Election Study (NBES). Results for this question drawn from 1984 NBES, and the 2008, and 2012 ANES are presented in figure 2.

By this metric, at least, it would seem that levels of racial identity among blacks has declined since 1984. Indeed, if the 2008 respondents are only compared to 2012 respondents, there would appear to be a noticeable decline. It is unclear how to assess these results, but it is appropriate to resist over interpreting them. This is primarily because 1984 and 2008 were unusual years—both featured a dramatic run for the presidency by an African American candidate (Jesse Jackson and Barack Obama, respectively). Of course, this is also true of 2012, but President Obama was running as an incumbent in this election cycle and we could argue that the movement-like atmosphere was far more muted relative to the other times examined in figure 2. Fortunately, additional measures of racial and ethnic group identity are included in the 2012 ANES, and these measures were asked of all respondents (see figure 3). Specifically respondents were asked, “How important is [RESPONDENT RACIAL/ETHNIC GROUP] to your identity? Is it extremely important, very important, moderately important, a little important, or not at all important to you?”
important.” Although we have no overtime data for this item, it seems clear that Americans continue to place some value on this identity, albeit with important differences across groups. For example, the modal response (61%) for African Americans to this question was “extremely important.” Less than 10% provided a response of “a little important” or “not at all important.” Identity importance was far weaker among whites, although it is worth emphasizing that a nontrivial fraction of these respondents also valued their racial identity. For example, the modal response among whites (25%) was “moderately important,” with another 20% indicating that it is “very important” and 14% indicating that it is “extremely important.” Lastly, among Latinos the modal response (31%) was “very important,” with less than 20% indicating that this identity was of little or no importance to them.

NOTES

1. All of these questions use an agree-disagree answer format. Each of the six items is presented as follows: “Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed.” “We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.” “One of the big problems in this country is that we don’t give everyone an equal chance.” “This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are.” “It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others.” And, finally, “If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems.”

2. Even an alpha of .68 borders on acceptable as most researchers consider anything at or above .7 to be more than sufficient.

3. Racial differences are much smaller on the Internet, with whites reporting an alpha of .82 on the egalitarianism scale, and African Americans and Latinos reporting scores of .75 and .73, respectively.

4. Because of the greater confidence we have in the face-to-face interviews, only results from this mode will be presented in this chapter. All variables are coded onto a 0–1 scale.

5. This question was asked in an agree-disagree format with respondents addressing the following prompt: “The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels.” The variable is recoded such that higher values indicate greater support for government efforts to reduce income inequality.

6. This question is asked as follows: “Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks. (Suppose these people are at one end of the scale at point 1.) Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help blacks because they should help themselves. (Suppose these people are at the other end of the scale at point 7.) And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between at points 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.” This variable is recorded onto a 0–1 scale such that higher values indicate greater support for governmental efforts to assist African Americans.

7. In this question respondents are asked, “Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to the United States to live should be increased a lot, increased a little, left the same as it is now, decreased a little, or decreased a lot” [the order of response options were randomized across respondents]. Results are coded such that higher values indicate greater opposition to immigration.

8. Both blacks and Latinos were oversampled in the 2012 ANES. Unfortunately, there were insufficient numbers of Asian Americans or Native Americans to analyze results for these groups separately.

9. The relevant coefficient here is .08 (p = .05). Similar analyses among African Americans fail to find any relationship between attitudes about Latino influence and support for efforts to address income inequality.

10. Three additional questions were also asked on this subject. One asked whether income differences between the rich and the poor have increased over the last 20 years. A second question asked whether changes in income inequality are a good thing or bad thing. And the final question asked whether the respondent favored government efforts to make this difference smaller. Somewhat surprisingly, on average whites (.72) were more likely than Latinos (.66) and blacks (.62) to regard increasing inequality as “bad.” It is possible that many respondents were confused by all the information (a chart was provided depicting over time changes in income inequality) accompanying this question and this might account for the counterintuitive results. On the question of government efforts to address income inequality, differences among white (.47), Latino (.62), and African Americans (.57) were more consistent with results shown in figure 1.

11. Some of the white opposition to reducing income differences is due to the role that government might play in this endeavor. However, even when controlling for attitudes on the role of government—which reduces racial differences by about half—white support for reducing income differences is significantly lower relative to minorities.

12. Data on linked fate attitudes among blacks in 1984 is drawn from the National Black Election Study (Jackson, Gurin, and Hatchett 1984).

REFERENCES

The American National Election Studies (ANES; www.electionstudies.org), The ANES 2012 Time Series Study [dataset], Stanford University and the University of Michigan [producers].

Since the 1970s, inequality in the United States has increased dramatically, with income and wealth gaps widening and reaching their highest levels since the Great Depression (Atkinson, Picketty, and Saez 2011; Congressional Budget Office 2011; Kopczuk and Saez 2004; Picketty and Saez 2003; Pierson 2016). The findings in this research clearly indicate significant disparities among racial and ethnic groups. Furthermore, within given racial and ethnic groups, there can be substantial differences in inequality, for example, among Asian Americans (Junn and Lee 2016). This chapter focuses on Latinos in the United States, who at 17% of the national population comprise the largest racial and ethnic minority group (US Census 2015). As this population continues to grow, Latinos are already or soon will be the majority ethnic group in some states. Levels of inequality between Latinos and other groups, particularly whites, are considerable, with Latinos the racial or ethnic group most negatively affected by the Great Recession of 2008 (Pew Research Center 2014). Thus, while the widening gap in wealth and income is apparent across all groups, since 2007 has increased disproportionately between Latinos and other Americans. Given this group’s relative size, the potential consequences of this continued inequality for broader US society are substantial.

While Latinos and inequality has not gone unstudied, it has received little attention in political science. Studies exist examining Latinos’ unequal access to health care and its consequences (Sanchez and Medeiros 2012; Sanchez, Medeiros, and Sanchez-Youngmann 2012) and their uneven political representation (Casellas 2010; Hero and Preuhs 2014; Rouse 2013; Wallace 2014) but there are remarkably few about the effects of economic inequality and its political consequences for Latinos. We argue that it is critical to more comprehensively examine Latino inequality given its depth and breadth across many dimensions of social, political, and economic life for this group, including wealth and class, health, the criminal justice system, education, and political representation.

This chapter begins by mapping out the multiple dimensions of inequality for Latinos. It then turns its focus on economic measures of inequality, analyzing survey data from the 2006 Latino National Survey (LNS) and the 2008 and 2012 American National Election Survey (ANES), both of which oversampled Latino respondents. This analysis has two foci: first, it seeks to tease apart the conceptual difference between class and class-consciousness and to investigate the relationship between respondents’ self-reported income levels, their perceptions of their own social class (or the absence of any self-identified class status), and the income gap. In particular, we assess the degree to which there is disjuncture between respondents’ class as measured by income and their self-perception of their class. Second, we explore changes over time, in particular the role of temporal events such as the economic recession of 2008 and the disparate impact on Latinos and their political attitudes during and after the recession. The next section focuses on the degree to which class-consciousness (or its absence) plays a significant role in Latino public attitudes and its salience as a major cleavage. We also investigate how income and perceptions of class influence Latinos’ attitudes about the economy more generally. We argue that self-perceived class shapes policy attitudes and that the absence of class identification among underrepresented minorities, such as Latinos and African Americans, may help explain the lack of traction of group-based economic arguments among these actors. Finally, we suggest possible avenues of future research on Latino inequality.

MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS OF LATINO INEQUALITY

Measuring inequality is complicated in part because of different approaches to its definition and measurement.
When defining inequality, scholars most often emphasize forms of economic inequality or class, commonly conceptualized as income. However, income is, at best, an incomplete measure of class inequality and may be a particularly poor measurement of class for marginalized racial and ethnic groups because it does not capture the full dimension of inequality in the historical context of structural racism. Economic inequality may also include, for example, measures not only of household income and relative income but also indicators of homeownership, home value, wealth, and savings. Broader interpretations of inequality may also include measures of political access and representation, health outcomes and access to health care, and the differential treatment in the criminal justice system. Latinos suffer from inequality across all of these dimensions.

On the purely economic dimension, a variety of measures indicate that Latinos have significantly lower wages, household income, wealth, and homeownership compared to whites. According to a Working Poor Families Project (WPFP) report, which draws on 2013 US Census Bureau data, the disparities between whites and racial and ethnic minorities are significant and paint a grim picture of inequality across groups. Povich, Roberts, and Mather (2015) found that 10.6 million of 32.6 million US working families have incomes under 200% of the official poverty level. Among Latino and black families, over a third fell into this bracket, earning less than $32,000 a year. WPFP estimates that of “the 24 million children that live in poverty, 3 out of 4 or 14 million are children of color” (Povich, Roberts, and Mather 2015). Moreover, Povich, Roberts, and Mather found that over 50% of Latino low-income working families have a parent without a high school degree or GED, compared with 16% of whites. The gap in poverty between racial and ethnic minorities and whites measured in this study was 25 percentage points, a measure that increased substantially in the aftermath of the 2007–2009 recession.

Indicators such as homeownership, income, education, and inheritance more broadly capture gaps in wealth (Shapiro, Machede, and Osoro 2013). Recent data from the Pew Research Center indicates that whites have 18 times the wealth of Latinos, independent of their educational attainment (Kochlar, Fry, and Taylor et al. 2011). The factors, which led to declining overall net worth for Latinos over this period, included losses on the value of houses and dramatic increases in unemployment rates. For example, after 2007, 33% of Latinos owed more on their mortgage than their homes were worth, compared to 15% of blacks and 13% of whites. Latinos were also disproportionally affected by foreclosures: 8% of Latino homeowners lost their home between 2007 and 2009, and another 21.4%

![Figure 1: Median Wealth by Race and Education (2013)](image)
were at imminent risk of foreclosure (Kochlar, Fry, and Taylor 2011). Unemployment among Latinos increased dramatically after 2007, from 5.9% to 12.6% in 2009. Overall, reflected across a variety of economic measures, Latinos continue to struggle economically in absolute terms in addition to substantial relative disparities between Latinos and other racial and ethnic groups.

Broader measures of inequality beyond economics paint a similarly dismal picture. As scholars examining political representation have often demonstrated, Latinos are significantly underrepresented in legislatures (Casellas 2010; Hero and Tollbert 1995; Rouse 2013; Wallace 2014), and legislators are not as responsive to Latinos compared to whites (Butler 2014; Gonzalez Juenke and Preuhs 2012). In the arena of health care, prior to the implementation of the Affordable Care Act of 2010, Latinos suffered from a larger proportion of uninsured or underinsured compared to any other racial or ethnic group (Medeiros 2012).

According to the Office of Minority Health (2012), in 2010, 30.7% of the Latino population lacked health insurance coverage, compared to 11.7% of the US white population. Turning towards the criminal justice system, Latinos are incarcerated at a rate twice that of whites (Sentencing Project Report 2003). Although Latinos constituted 13% of the US population in 2004, they comprised 31% of the prison population (Walker et al. 2004). Morín (2008) demonstrates that not only are Latinos incarcerated at a higher rate than whites, the Latino prison population is also increasing dramatically. Studies examining the role of prosecutorial and judicial discretion also have shown that Latinos and African Americans are more likely to be sentenced harshly for their crimes (Spohn 2007).

In short, across the dimensions of political representation, health, and criminal justice, in addition to economics, Latinos face unequal access and poorer outcomes relative to whites and in some categories other racial and ethnic minority groups in the United States.

LATINO ECONOMIC ATTITUDES AND PUBLIC-OPINION DATA

The starting presumption in much of the discussion about income inequality and class is that objective measures of inequality—the unequal access and outcomes highlighted previously—should translate into how people feel about class. That is, if individuals experience higher poverty rates, lower rates of wealth accumulation, or inequality across similar measures, then this should be reflected in their class identities. We examine public attitudes about economic inequality to probe how groups may feel differently about class, the economy, and class-consciousness.

We utilize three surveys: the 2006 LNS and the 2008 and 2012 ANES. The LNS was fielded in 2005 and 2006 and had 8,644 Latino respondents. The ANES is fielded immediately before and after every November presidential election since 1952. This analysis uses both the 2008 and the 2012 ANES. The studies had 2,322 and 2,054 pre-election respondents, respectively, in the face-to-face format. We use these three surveys because of the relatively large samples of Latino respondents and, in the case of the ANES, a sample that allows for comparison across racial and ethnic groups. Whereas the LNS is composed of only Latino respondents, the ANES in 2008 and 2012 has non-Hispanic white samples and oversamples of Latino and black respondents. The LNS asks a few questions about income and perceptions of the state of the economy. The ANES contains several batteries of questions addressing finances, wealth, and perceptions of class and inequality. Together, these instruments offer a variety of questions that directly tap into class and economic inequality.

We use the LNS data as a baseline for Latino attitudes before the economic crash and recession began in 2008, since it was fielded in 2006. As noted previously, Latinos were disparately impacted by the crash beginning in late 2007, thus we anticipate significant effects on political attitudes and perceptions of inequality and class. We utilize the 2008 ANES similarly, that is, the survey was fielded in October and November as the recession was underway. During this early period of the economic downturn, the recession’s impact may not have yet been fully apparent to respondents. However, its effects were already substantial given the large numbers of people who were unemployed, in a lower paying job than before the crash, and/or had lost their home. By 2012, the economic recession had largely subsided and the worst effects were declining. The 2012 ANES provides a sense of attitudes about class, income gap, and inequality as the recession came to a close. Accordingly, we contend that drawing on a combination of surveys rather than a single snapshot is necessary for a complete picture of how economic events influence Latino attitudes about class and the economy.

On the 2006 LNS, there are a limited number of questions that ask respondents about their views on the economy in general as well as their personal financial situation. Even in 2006, Latino respondents’ attitudes about the economy were already pessimistic. When asked if the economy of the country as a whole has gotten worse, stayed the same, or gotten better, the largest share of respondents (i.e., fully 48%) expressed that it had gotten worse; only 17.3% believed that it had stayed the same.

If we disaggregate this question by national origin group, 47% of Mexican respondents and 52% of Puerto Ricans said the economy was getting worse, but only 36.3% of Cuban
In essence, the difference between class and class-consciousness is not only theoretically important but also methodologically distinguishable.

Class-consciousness, thinking of oneself as a member of a class, is a kind of social group identity such as race and ethnicity. Like race or ethnicity it is one that can be or become highly political. Individuals who identify strongly with a class have attachments to their class and view their life outcomes as connected to their class as well as to others sharing the same class position. This kind of class-consciousness would operate in a similar fashion to the notion of linked fate within racial groups described by Dawson (1993). We posit that class-consciousness may be more likely to influence public attitudes and participation than simple raw economic metrics of class, if it is a salient identity. Historically however, in the US context, class-consciousness has been considerably weaker than in other countries (Lipset and Marks 2001).

For the objective indicators of class to translate into attitudes and ideology, then, people have to choose class as a social identity. It remains unclear, however, whether Latinos make this choice, and how salient class is for Latinos. Although there is considerable data on Latino inequality, there is remarkably little research on Latino class-consciousness. In particular, unlike Dawson’s 1993 seminal work assessing the relationship between class and African American identity, no comparable work examines the intersectionality of class and ethnicities among Latinos. Our approach here is to utilize the small amount of existing survey work—specifically, the ANES—that has both sufficiently large numbers of Latino and other respondents and includes items specifically about class and class-consciousness.

The ANES includes a standard question asking whether people think of themselves as members of a class, and then follow-up questions asking people to place themselves into specific class groupings. The existing analysis of class focuses on these follow-up questions, which sort people into, for example, as working, lower, middle and upper class segments. However, examining responses to the ANES item that asks respondents whether they think of themselves in class terms reveals that a significant number of Latino and other respondents, in fact, do not. In the 2008 and 2012 ANES, respectively, 37% and 34% of Latino respondents did not think of themselves as belonging to a class at all.

Why do some people self-identify by class and others do not? The ANES data allow us to examine what might shape class identification. We use the same question that asks individuals in the 2008 and 2012 ANES whether respondents answered this way. By party, Republican respondents were evenly split across the three choices, whereas Democrats were more likely to state that the economy had gotten worse. It is worth noting that one potential explanation for this result may be that at the time, there was a Republican president, George W. Bush, and this may have positively biased Republican respondents’ evaluations, while Democrats may have in turn responded more negatively than they would otherwise. When reflecting on their own financial situation that year compared to the previous year, approximately 50% of the respondents indicated that it had remained about the same, 25% indicated worse, and 25% indicated better. Answers were fairly consistent across national-origin groups and Democrats. Republican respondents were more likely to indicate that their financial status had improved.

Overall, the LNS data indicate a considerable number of Latinos perceived in 2006 that the general state of economic affairs was worse than before. The 2008 and 2012 ANES allow a direct comparison of the same questions and a wider scope of questions. For example, the ANES includes a host of questions that ask whether respondents think unemployment is worse, compared to the prior year, in addition to a series of income- and wealth-related questions. We turn now to an examination of the ANES data with a specific emphasis on class identification and perceptions of inequality.

LATINOS AND CONCEPTUALIZING CLASS

If there has been a persistent puzzle to thinking about Latinos and class, and about class in the United States more generally, it is why, when the objective measures of inequality point to persistent class differences, these differences are not reflected in political choices of ideology, party, or policy (Devine 1997; Jackman and Jackman 1983; Lipset and Marks 2001). The experience of class inequality is not the same as identification with a class. When exploring class, we argue it is critical to distinguish between raw measures of class (e.g., income) and how individuals actually think about being part of a class (i.e., class-consciousness). In essence, the difference between class and class-consciousness is not only theoretically important but also methodologically distinguishable.
they think of themselves as belonging to a class as the dependent variable, thereby creating a dichotomous variable with those answering “yes” and “no” coded as 0 and 1, respectively. In our models, we control for race and ethnicity of respondents with dummy variables for black and Latino respondents. We also include income as measured on a 7-point scale, with lower values indicating lower incomes, and education recoded on a 5-point scale, with lower values indicating lower levels. The model incorporates a dummy variable for those who identify as either a Democrat or an independent and Republicans represent the baseline excluded group. The logit models with results for the 2008 and 2012 ANES analyzed separately are reported in table 1.

The models for both the 2008 and 2012 ANES data have similar results. As one might expect, both income and education are positively and significantly correlated with class identification: the higher one’s income and education, the more likely one is to think of oneself in class terms. This finding implies, however, that class has an upward bias—that is, those with lower incomes and less education are less likely to identify in class terms and so are less likely to identify with working or lower class identities. Race and ethnicity have effects separate from income and education: blacks and Latinos are significantly less likely to identify with working or lower class identities. Race and ethnicity of respondents with dummy variables for black and Latino respondents. We also include income as a continuous variable with those answering “yes” and “no” coded as 0 and 1, respectively. In our models, we control for race and ethnicity with results for the 2008 and 2012 ANES analyzed separately are reported in table 1.

The substantive effects of these variables were calculated for each racial group of respondents. Figures 2a, 2b, and 2c display the results using 2008 and 2012 ANES data and figures 3a, 3b, and 3c display the results using the 2012 ANES. The values represent first differences for the effect of each variable on the probability that a respondent will answer the highest value on a survey item if the value of a given variable is changed from its minimum to its maximum value. Dichotomous variables are set to zero and continuous variables are set to their median values. For continuous variables, the estimate shows the first difference as a result of moving from the minimum to maximum value for each variable. For dichotomous variables, the first difference represents a change from 0 to 1. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are indicated by the lines and in brackets.1 The substantive effects of the variables on the predicted probability of identifying with a class are reported in figures 2a, 2b, and 2c.

The substantive effects figures demonstrate that some factors play a considerable role in influencing class identification and the strength of those factors varies over time. For example, in 2008, being a Democrat has a significant and strong effect on Latino and black respondents, resulting in a 16-point and a 22-point change in the likelihood of identifying with a class. However, in 2012, these effects were not observed for Latino and black respondents. In 2012 the dominant factors on shaping Latino and black respondent’s attachment to class are education and income. For Latinos, the moving from the lowest to the highest education level is associated with a 13-point change in the likelihood of identifying with a class. This effect is considerably stronger for black respondents, resulting in a 40-point change. Moving from the lowest income group to the highest group results in a 30-point change.

### Table 1: Identification with Class, Logit Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>2008 ANES</th>
<th>2012 ANES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>(1)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLACK</td>
<td>-0.592**</td>
<td>-0.524**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.125)</td>
<td>(0.0855)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LATINO</td>
<td>-0.212*</td>
<td>-0.205*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
<td>(0.0829)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATION</td>
<td>0.117*</td>
<td>0.258**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0505)</td>
<td>(0.0297)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCOME</td>
<td>0.0972**</td>
<td>0.148**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0354)</td>
<td>(0.0192)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDEPENDENT</td>
<td>-0.548**</td>
<td>-0.417**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.165)</td>
<td>(0.0952)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMOCRAT</td>
<td>0.0901</td>
<td>0.132+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.124)</td>
<td>(0.0740)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSTANT</td>
<td>0.502**</td>
<td>-0.199+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.176)</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBSERVATIONS</td>
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<td>5523</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.0518</td>
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<td>LOG-LIKELIHOOD</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHI-SQUARE</td>
<td>78.77</td>
<td>351.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
Republican represents the excluded party category.
change for both Latino and black respondents. For people of color, education, income, and Democratic partisanship are important factors in forming political attitudes.

Turning towards white respondents, a consistent and strong effect on class identification is income. White respondents with higher incomes levels are considerably more likely to identify with class; and this effect holds across 2008 and 2012, resulting in 11- and 14-point changes, respectively. In 2012, the effect of moving from the lowest level of education to the highest education level results in a 15-point increase in the likelihood of identifying with a class. For white respondents, being an independent in terms of political party identification is also associated with a decrease in the likelihood of identifying with a class. In 2008, it decreased the likelihood of identifying with a class by 15 points and in 2008 was associated with an 8-point decrease. The results reveal that higher levels of education and income substantially increase class identification, whereas racial and ethnic identities and lack of political party identification are associated with decreases in class identification.

In addition to the models that calculate the substantive effects for each racial and ethnic group separately, we also calculated the first differences on the entire model presented in table 1 to calculate the effects of being Latino or black on an individual’s likelihood of class identification. The effects of race and ethnicity are also key in shaping class identification. Black and Latino respondents are less likely to identify with class compared to whites. The effect of being black ranges from an 11-point decrease in class identification in 2008 and a 9-point decrease in 2012. The effect of being Latino is constant on both the 2008 and 2012 ANES surveys, resulting in a more modest 4-point decrease in the probability of identifying with a class.

When examining respondents who did identify as belonging to a class and were asked to situate themselves in a particular class, approximately 35% of Latinos identified as working class and between 27% and 30% identified as middle class. Interestingly, self-identified class does not necessarily correlate closely with actual income. Very few respondents, for instance, chose the lower class or poor options, with less than 1% of the Latino sample on each
survey identifying themselves as lower class or poor. To help put these self-reported class memberships in perspective, on the 2008 ANES, 22.4% of Latino respondents indicated their household income was less than $20,000. Similarly, on the 2012 ANES, 26.5% of Latinos reported household incomes below this same earnings level. The threshold for 100% of the federal poverty level in 2014 for households with two people was $15,730 and for three people, it was $19,790. Thus, a significant number of Latino respondents do not self-identify themselves as poor or lower class despite the fact that their reported income level would indicate this is the most accurate classification of their class.

The fact is that while many Latinos are objectively members of a class, particularly of what we might call the “working” or “lower” classes, a third or more opt out of identifying in class terms entirely. Individuals identifying as Latino or black are significantly less likely to identify in class terms. Why would this be the case? As suggested above, it may well be that with race and ethnic categories made politically and socially salient in the United States, identification in class terms is eclipsed by race. In the American discourse, class does not exhibit a comparable salience to that of race.

TEMPORAL COMPARISONS

We explicitly analyze the role of temporality in questions that examine the overall state of the economy and unemployment in the following section. One reason to engage survey data from the different periods of 2006, 2008, and 2012, is due to the economic downturn that began in 2007. It is worth examining potential temporal differences in responses due to the disparate impact of the recession on Latinos and variation in-group perceptions over time. While we are unable to directly compare all of the questions across the instruments, there is some continuity in questions in the ANES, particularly the class identification question for 2008 and 2012. Figure 4 displays the difference in the percentage of respondents identifying with a class by race. This data is also presented with side-by-side bars for each racial group to show data from the 2008 and 2012 ANES. Overall, the data indicates that whites have the strongest attachment to class identification, with over 75% of the group identify with a class. Black and Latino respondents demonstrate lower levels of attachment, with 40% and 35% expressing no class identification. Temporally, there are small shifts between 2008 and 2012, where white and black identification with class slightly increase and Latino identification slightly decreases. The key point to take away from this figure is that a sizeable portion of minority respondents does not identify with a class and this non-class identifier component of each group is relatively consistent over time.

We are also able to compare Latino perceptions of the economy and their own financial situations in 2006, 2008, and 2012. Overall across the periods examined, Latinos seem relatively negative about the state of the economy. For example, in the 2008 ANES, 68.4% of Latinos reported that the economy had gotten much worse in the last year, and an additional 19% indicated it had gotten somewhat worse. This is a marked increase over the 2006 LNS data where 48% of respondents said the economy had gotten worse. In contrast, in the 2012 ANES, Latino respondents expressed more neutral and less negative positions. Combining responses for “much worse” and “somewhat worse,” only 28.1% of Latinos felt the economy was worse than a year ago. When examining whites and black respondents over the same periods, there is also a significant increase in the amount of positive feelings expressed in 2012 compared to 2008. However, among these three racial groups, blacks and Latinos are the most optimistic in economic terms by 2012 compared to whites, more than a third still evaluate the economy as worse than before.

In the 2006 LNS, approximately 25% of respondents indicated that their financial situation was worse, however, on the 2008 ANES, 45.8% of Latino respondents indicated it was worse. This is once again a considerable increase in the negative economic outlook that likely reflects the effects of the recession among Latinos. By 2012, Latino
respondents were feeling more positive about their financial situation and only 38.3% reported a worse personal financial situation than the year before. Similar to the prior question, black respondents also expressed significantly more optimism about their finances in 2012 compared to 2008. Whites also become more positive, however, over 50% still evaluate their financial situation as worse than the year before. In both the economy and financial situation questions, it is worth noting that people of color are considerably more optimistic about the general economic climate, as well as their own personal financial situation, compared to whites. These results are perplexing in part because of documented inequalities between whites and people of color, in particular the economic inequality that minority communities face.

Perceptions of inequality likely have a temporal dimension to them—how people respond reflects their economic situation and their evaluation of the overall economy. However, the 2012 data indicate that controlling for partisan affiliation, blacks and Latinos are more likely to perceive worsening inequality over time, even though both groups also are less likely to identify in class terms.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Economic inequality and class identification is a fundamentally important area of research in the study of race, ethnicity, and politics. Currently, there is a dearth of literature in Latino politics that examines this topic. Building on the empirical results presented in this chapter, here we outline a few broad areas that deserve further exploration, along with some methodological concerns and a plea for better data.

Our initial findings suggest that self-identification in class terms varies across racial and ethnic groups, with groups, such as Latinos, that have some of lowest median incomes also including surprisingly large percentages of individuals who do not report any identification with class labels. What explains variation in class identification across groups? Under what conditions is class salient? Would an increased salience of class identification among blacks and Latinos influence the types of issues highlighted and coalitions developed amongst these and other groups? Does racial framing enable or limit the types of coalitions that can be formed amongst disadvantaged segments of society? In short, we need further research on the salience of class identity among Latinos and other racial and ethnic groups in the United States.

None of this is to suggest that race and ethnicity are somehow irrelevant, obscuring the “real” issues of class. Framing issues around class might offer coalitions greater breadth by including people from more diverse groups, but there remain issues specific to people of color that are independent of class. Issues around racism and discrimination cannot simply be subsumed under class issues. In the United States race taps into individuals’ group identities in ways that class has generally not done, and may not be able to do, in the US context. Perhaps as a result, the findings presented above suggest that for many blacks and Latinos, class terms carry little meaning or have scant resonance for them. For better and for worse, the language of race that has developed over time in the United States is not translatable into the language of class. For all intents and purposes, this means that Latino inequality will likely continue to be addressed through racial and ethnic identities rather than ones centered on class.

Research has demonstrated that ethnic identities can become heightened and more salient in response to mobilizing events (Massey and Sanchez 2010; Ramirez 2013; Zepeda-Millán 2011), as well as in response to racialized language surrounding immigration and related contentious issues (Jiménez 2011; Pérez 2015). In addition, racialized identity among Latinos can also be heightened through mass protests (Zepeda-Millán and Wallace 2013). Given these effects on the racial and ethnic identities among Latinos, under what circumstances could we imagine mobilizing events having a similar impact on class identification, attachment, and consciousness?

When Latino inequality has been studied, the analyses often compare Latinos to other racial and ethnic groups, particularly whites. This is important, but we argue that it also serves to obscure differences among Latinos (the preliminary findings we have presented here are guilty of this too). This approach is in large part a response to existing data that often has insufficiently large Latino samples, much less one sufficiently varied enough to meaningfully examine differences across different Latino sub-groups. When studies do examine in-group variation, they primarily focus on differences between national origin groups, gender, legal status, and immigrant generations. There is evidence, however, that greater attention should be paid...
to both class identification and inequality among Latinos, and between Latinos and other groups. The data suggest that both experiences and measures of inequality vary among Latinos. For example, while wealth increases across successive generations among certain Latino immigrants, some national origin groups tend to have greater levels of education, income, and wealth. Additionally, survey work that includes questions about inequality and class often does not include corresponding measures of attachment to class or the extent of class-consciousness. In order to obtain a more complete picture of Latino inequality and the role of class-consciousness in Latino public opinion and identity, researchers must strive to collect and incorporate a varied and sizeable Latino sample, with a broad range of questions examining inequality, in addition to gathering data at different time points.

NOTES
1. All simulations were performed using Clarify software (King et al. 2000).

REFERENCES
Race and Class Inequality in Local Politics

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This chapter assesses the effect of race and class divisions on the urban political arena in the United States. It presents an array of data from our previous research outlining the roles that race and class play in shaping both individual political choice and overall political representation in urban politics. We found that both factors significantly shape political behavior and outcomes but that race is the primary driver of urban politics across most contexts. The centrality of race and, to a lesser extent, class in shaping the vote has widespread consequences for representation at the local level. Across an array of different indicators, racial and ethnic minorities and other disadvantaged groups are poorly represented in the local arena. Minorities are more apt than whites to end up on the losing side of the vote, they are grossly underrepresented in elected offices, and—ultimately—they are less satisfied with city government than whites. Local democracy, by almost all accounts, is more likely to represent the interests of whites and the wealthy than those of minorities and the poor.

There are, however, potential solutions. Turnout is a linchpin for several forms of minority achievement. Expanded turnout is associated with more minorities in office and more minority-friendly policies—which, in turn, are linked with greater minority satisfaction with local government. In addition to turnout, this chapter highlights a range of other documented solutions, including local policy change and institutional reform.

The discussion first provides evidence of unevenness in participation and explores racial divides in vote choice. This is followed by an assessment of representation in local politics, determining which voters elect their favored candidates, which candidates win election to office, and which residents are most satisfied with the governance of those local officials. Finally, potential solutions to underrepresentation are examined and emerging questions for the future of our diverse communities are discussed.

PATTERNS IN THE VOTE

Voting may be the bedrock on which democracy rests but, at the local level, one of the most consistent findings is that relatively few people vote. Whereas about half of all adults participate in national contests, data from the most recent nationwide survey of city clerks—local officials who record and report participation rates—indicate that, nationally, only about 27% of voting-age adults participate in city-council elections. Data from recent California elections suggest that turnout for mayoral elections is no better. Moreover, these data likely represent the high end of the spectrum. Anecdotal evidence from other types of local elections—from school boards to county supervisors—suggests that voter apathy is much greater in other types of local contests. At the local level, where policies are most likely to be implemented and where a majority of the nation’s civic leaders are elected, important public-policy decisions are being made without input from most of the affected residents.

Problematically and not coincidentally, there is a severe skew to those who turn out in local contests. Figure 1, the self-reported local voting rates for voting-age adults, reveals dramatic differences in participation across race and class. In terms of race, whites report voting almost twice as regularly as Latinos and Asian Americans: fully 63% of whites report voting in local elections, compared to only 39% for Latinos and 36% for Asian Americans. African Americans are in the middle of the range, with a reported voting rate 8 percentage points less than whites.

The class skew also is severe. The relatively upper-status groups—the well educated, those with higher incomes, and the employed—report voting in local elections at rates that are as much as three times higher than members of lower-status groups. The largest gap in turnout is a significant 39 percentage points between full-time workers and the unemployed. These patterns are mirrored in our own analysis of the General Social Survey and in data from a wide range of exit polls. Those who turn out to vote are quite different from those who do not.
The patterns shown in figure 1 also are mirrored in the national electorate (Verba and Nie 1972; Wollinger and Rosenstone 1980). Yet, the local skew in turnout appears to be even more severe than that for national contests. For example, a comparison of exit polls for local and national contests found that whites are 40% better represented among local voters than the local population but only 7% better represented among national voters. Similarly, residents with a college degree were 2.6 times better represented at the local level but only 1.9 times better represented among national voters.

In summary, by every measure, there is a severe skew to the local electorate. However, turnout differentials are unlikely to have meaningful political consequences if demographic groups share preferences for political outcomes. That is, if whites and nonwhites, wealthy and poor, old and young, and more- and less-educated individuals tend to support the same candidates and policies, then the skew in participation may not matter. By analyzing local voting patterns, the next section discusses whether this is the case. We found deep divides across demographic groups—with race as the most prominent division.

Divides in the Vote

To some observers, local politics appears largely apolitical, with bureaucratic needs and economic constraints driving decision making, thereby making differences in local political participation an unimportant problem (Oliver et al. 2012; Peterson 1981). Others argue that the urban electorate, in fact, is divided. Which dimensions matter most? Is local politics largely a struggle among racial groups to control local decision making, as a number of studies suggest (Barreto 2007; Collet 2005; Hajnal 2007; Kaufman 2004; Liu and Vanderleeuw 2007)? Or is it principally a class-based conflict between haves and have-nots (Bridges 1997; Trounstine 2008). Alternatively, does local electoral politics mirror national-level politics, in which ideological battles between liberals and conservatives and partisan contests between Democrats and Republicans dominate (Abrajano and Alvarez 2005)? Or are the contenders defined more by religion and morality, gender, and age (Bailey 1999; DeLeon and Naff 2004; Sharp 2002)?

To answer these questions, we assessed voting patterns across a wide range of local elections. For each election in the dataset, we measured the divide in support for the winning candidate across each of the major demographic and political factors that previous research suggested represents important dividing lines in local politics. Table 1 presents average divides across all of the contests.

Perhaps the most striking feature of table 1 is the degree to which the racial divide overshadows other demographic divides. Across all of the elections in this exit-poll dataset, the average maximum racial divide was a massive 38.3 percentage points. The following example more clearly illustrates that number. A 38.3-percentage-point gap between racial groups translates to overwhelming support for one candidate by one racial group (e.g., 75% support) and clear opposition to that candidate by a second racial group (e.g., only 36.7% support). In other words, a 38.3-percentage-point gap means that the typical urban election pits two racial groups against one another.

Some scholars maintain that class continues to be the main driving force in politics; however, in these elections, class divides typically are much smaller than racial divides. The average income gap in the vote is 19.6 percentage points—sizeable but only about half of the typical racial divide. T-tests indicate that class divides are significantly smaller than racial divides in these contests; educational divides also are generally half as small as racial divides.
Moreover, other than class, few major demographic divides emerge. Differences in gender, employment status, marital status, union membership, and parental status are all dwarfed by racial divides. It is interesting that some of the largest demographic divides other than race are between different religious affiliations, across different age groups, and between gay and straight voters. The largest religious divide in these contests averages 29.9 percentage points, making religion the second-most important demographic variable. Age also significantly factored into these contests: the average maximum age gap that was generally between the oldest and youngest voters was 21.4 percentage points. Finally, in the few exit polls that asked about sexuality, there was a reasonably significant 14.9-percentage-point divide between gay and straight voters.

Importantly, table 1 also indicates that racial divisions significantly surpass partisan and ideological divides. The 38-percentage-point racial gap in urban elections exceeds the average 27.4-percentage-point gap between liberal and conservative voters and the average 33-percentage-point gap between Democratic and Republic voters. Moreover, the partisan or ideological divide is greater than the racial divide in less than a third of the elections. This is perhaps the starkest evidence yet that race continues to be a central driving force in urban politics. Party and ideology shape the mayoral vote, but race is the more dominant factor.

Approximately the same pattern emerged when we shifted to a multivariate model in which the independent effect of each variable was assessed after controlling for the range of other factors. Race remained the most robust factor in the urban electoral arena, but political dimensions such as party and ideology also strongly shaped the vote. Importantly, conclusions about the centrality of race held when we focused exclusively on contests involving two candidates with the same racial identity. Even in contests in which voters cannot choose on the basis of a candidate’s race, its average effect remains far more important than other demographic characteristics and is on a par with party and ideology.

Given the prominence of racial divisions in the urban vote, we further explored the data to determine exactly which racial and ethnic groups differed most in their preferences from one another and which most often favored the same candidates. Table 2 presents figures for the average divide between each racial and ethnic group across the entire set of local elections. Specifically, the table shows the average absolute difference in the percentage of each group favoring the winning candidate.

As shown in table 2, there is considerable variation in the size of racial and ethnic divisions across different pairs of groups. As previous research might lead us to expect, the black–white gap is the largest. In a typical case, the percentage of black voters who supported the winning candidate differed by 31.6 percentage points from that of white voters who supported the same candidate. In one election, the gap increased to 84 percentage points, and in only 25% of the cases was it less than 10 percentage points. In summary, it was unusual when black and white voters...
favored the same candidates at the local level.

Another interesting set of patterns that emerged is related to the major divides between racial and ethnic minorities. The growth of the minority community has not paved the way, as some had hoped, for an interminority coalition that is challenging white control. Instead, blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans appear to be regularly competing for the often-meager political and economic rewards available in the local political arena. Blacks and Latinos—the two groups that often are perceived as having common economic and racial interests and as potential coalition partners—seldom support the same candidates. The black–Latino divide, in fact, is the largest divide within the minority population. In a typical case, the percentage of blacks who supported the winning candidate differed by 24.1 percentage points from that of Latino voters who supported the same candidate. From these results, it is apparent that Latinos and African Americans may perceive themselves as competitors more often than as partners. This lends credence to accounts that highlight conflict between these two groups (Meier and Stewart 1991; Oliver and Johnson 1984; Vaca 2004). Other intraminority divisions also were stark. In particular, black voters differed sharply from Asian American voters; the average divide was 20.8 percentage points. In this set of cities, these three groups have not worked together consistently to elect candidates.

Combined, all of these patterns highlight the distinctiveness of the African American community. The black vote differs sharply not only from the white vote but also from the Latino and the Asian American votes. In many contests, the black community is competing against the white community and also challenging the Latino and Asian American communities.

There are few indications of a close, enduring coalition in table 2 but, of all the groups, whites and Asian Americans appear to have the closest preferences in the urban electoral arena. The average divide between white and Asian American voters is 15 percentage points and it exceeds 20 percentage points in less than half of the cases.

**CONSEQUENCES: UNEVEN REPRESENTATION IN LOCAL POLITICS**

Uneven voter participation and sharp racial divisions raise serious concerns about the fate of minorities and other disadvantaged groups in local democracy. In a democracy defined by majority rule and dominated numerically by a white majority, the concern is that policies will be biased, outcomes will be unfair, the local democracy ultimately will represent the interests of whites and the privileged few, and minorities and other less-advantaged groups will lose. This section assesses several different forms of representation (i.e., from winning the vote to gaining office and overall satisfaction with government) to determine which groups are relatively well represented in the local arena and which groups are more likely to be ignored.

### Winning and Losing the Vote

One of the most straightforward ways to assess winners and losers in the local electoral arena is to simply count how many voters from each demographic group vote for a candidate who wins and, conversely, how many support a candidate who loses. We calculated that count using an array of mayoral-election exit polls across the largest 25 cities between 1982 and 2002 (table 3).

This simple count of winners and losers reveals that concerns about a dominant white majority always winning at the expense of the minority are unfounded. No group—black or otherwise—is totally barred from local elections. Nevertheless, there are real gaps. Across the range of contests, white residents are relatively successful, winning 60% of the time that they vote. By contrast, African American voters lose most of the time. Overall, only 47% of black voters ultimately support the winning candidate. Latino and Asian American voters are in the middle of the range.

These results largely mirror patterns found at the national level. In recent decades and across a range of national contests, there is no group of voters that always loses. However, black voters lose more than they win—and

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<th>Table 3: Who Wins the Local Vote</th>
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<td><strong>PERCENTAGE WINNING</strong></td>
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<td>African Americans</td>
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<td>Whites</td>
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the rate at which they lose surpasses that of any other group defined by income, education, age, gender, religion, and sexual orientation (Hajnal 2009).

Which Candidates Win Office

Winning the vote is an important measure of incorporation into local politics, but it is far from the only one. More typically, when scholars attempt to measure minority representation, they focus on descriptive representation: How many minorities do or do not win office? Do elected officials look like the constituents of the cities over which they preside?

The data are clear. Racial and ethnic minorities are grossly underrepresented in the local electoral arena. African Americans represent approximately 12% of the urban population; however, nationwide, 2011 International City/County Management Association (ICMA) figures indicated that blacks hold only 5.2% of all city-council seats.16 Latinos are even worse off; they account for 19% of the urban population but only 2.7% of city-council seats. Asian Americans fare no better in being elected: only about 1/2% of all city-council members are Asian American despite the fact that they comprise 5.4% of the urban population. The underrepresentation of racial minorities is reflected in the overrepresentation of whites, who comprise 60% of the population yet hold 90% of all city-council seats (see table 4).

The situation in mayoral representation is no different. The mayoral data are not as up to date, but the most recent figures suggest that of all of the nation’s mayors, only about 2% are black, less than 1% are Latino, and a small fraction are Asian American (Asian Pacific American Legal Center 2007; Joint Center for Political Studies 2003; MacManus and Bullock 1993; National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials 2008). Political decisions at the local level continue to be made overwhelmingly by whites.17

Perceived Responsiveness

Ultimately, the best arbiters of whether minorities are well represented in local politics are the minorities themselves.

City residents do not always have complete information about local government (Lowery and Lyons 1989; Teske et al. 1993) and their views can be shaped by factors beyond city control (Arnold and Carnes 2012). However, an examination of residents’ satisfaction with government is a critical component of any evaluation of representation. Ultimately, are minorities satisfied with city government and its actions, or are they much less likely than their white counterparts to be satisfied with local democracy?

To answer this question, we used a unique survey that included large samples from 26 different communities across the nation.18 Approximately 35,000 respondents were asked to evaluate four different local services (i.e., police departments, fire departments, schools, and libraries) and to provide an overall assessment of their city or town government. Figure 2 presents basic data on differences in overall government satisfaction and perceived responsiveness across four areas of government activity. The figure displays satisfaction divides by race, class, ideology, and other demographic characteristics. For each group, we calculated the proportion of respondents who stated that the government is doing a good or excellent job to represent the group’s satisfaction. We then used the difference in approval between pairs of groups to calculate the statistical significance in the difference of these proportions.

Figure 2 clearly demonstrates that satisfaction with local government is substantially divided along several dimensions. Again, racial differences clearly comprise the largest dimension. Compared to white respondents, blacks are significantly less likely to be satisfied with the performance of the police department, fire department, local schools, and local libraries and they are significantly less likely to approve of their local government overall. In each case, the difference is substantial, ranging from about 5 to more than 21 percentage points. For instance, when asked how well the police served their community, 82% of white respondents stated that they believed they were doing a good or excellent job, compared to only 60% of blacks who felt the same. This means that 40% of blacks stated that the police were doing only a poor or fair job. Latinos feel almost as underserved by local government services— the gap with whites ranges from about 2 to more than 9 percentage points. Similar to blacks, almost 30% of Latinos believed that the police were doing only a poor or fair job serving their community. Latinos, however, do not rate local government as a whole any worse than whites. Asian Americans are near the middle of the range, rating some services worse than whites but providing an overall grade for local government higher than whites.

Similar to the black–white and Latino–white divides, those on the lower end of the

<p>| Table 4: City Council Representation |</p>
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<th>POPULATION PERCENTAGE</th>
<th>COUNCIL REPRESENTATION</th>
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<td>AFRICAN AMERICANS</td>
<td>11.9</td>
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<td>LATINOS</td>
<td>19.0</td>
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<td>ASIAN AMERICANS</td>
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<td>WHITES</td>
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socioeconomic spectrum feel underserved by local government. Respondents who are income-stressed, those who have not graduated from high school, and those who do not own their home are more likely to rate government services poorly and are less likely to approve of government compared to their more well-off counterparts. However, these gaps are generally smaller than the racial gaps.

Finally, although there are good reasons to assume that ideology will not play a role in local politics, we found substantial differences on this dimension. Liberals are generally more apt to believe that local government services are not sufficient and they are significantly less likely to approve of local government overall.

To analyze these gaps in satisfaction more rigorously and to control for the interrelationships between race, income, and other measures of status, we regressed overall government approval and service evaluations on the range of individual-level factors. The results revealed patterns that are similar to those shown in figure 2. More-privileged members of society rate local government and its services well, whereas those at or near the lower socioeconomic level feel underserved. Of all of the demographic inequalities, race is by far the most severe—even after controlling for other individual characteristics. All else being equal, blacks feel substantially less well served by city government than whites. Black, Latino, and Asian American respondents also are significantly less likely than white respondents to be satisfied with city services. This suggests that perceived differences in responsiveness by race cannot be explained by the lower socioeconomic status of blacks and Latinos or by the left-leaning nature of these groups. According to these respondents, the performance of city government is uneven and decidedly favors white Americans. Class effects again are smaller and less consistent than racial effects.

In summary, there is a clear perceived bias to local democracy with race—more than any other factor—shaping those perceptions. It also is important that racial differences appear to be based on realistic evaluations of what is occurring in these localities. When we controlled for local conditions, both race and class differences disappeared (Hajnal and Trounstine 2013b).

**SOLUTIONS**

The overall picture is discouraging. Racial and ethnic minorities, relatively speaking, are not well represented in the urban political arena. Minority voters lose more regularly than whites, minority candidates win office much less often than whites, and minority residents are much less satisfied with city government than whites. This limited success can be explained easily: racial minorities tend to vote less than whites and they tend to favor different candidates than whites. Can this be addressed in any practical way? Are there solutions to the problem of minority underrepresentation?

This section discusses several sets of reforms that our research and that of others indicates could greatly affect minority representation at the local level. No single change will address all of the underrepresentation of the minority community and none of these reforms will be easy to
enact, but several are both feasible and impactful. There are reasonable, concrete steps that can be taken to make local democracy fairer and more equitable.

**Expanded Turnout as a Solution**

The discussion begins by focusing on voter turnout. Low and sharply uneven participation is clearly a problem and therefore a likely target for policy makers interested in affecting representation. Through the vote, citizens convey information about their needs and preferences, they make important decisions about whom to elect, and they hold leaders accountable for their actions by either voting or not voting to return them to office. If local voter turnout could be expanded, could we then reduce minority underrepresentation?

To determine whether turnout matters in the local context, we focused on the relationship between voter turnout and two core aspects of local democracy: (1) which candidates win, and (2) local government policy.21 In both sets of analyses, we focused on city-council elections because they arguably are the most central election in most cities.22

First, to assess the ability of turnout to change who wins office, we explored whether cities with higher and presumably less skewed turnout elect more minorities, all else being equal. Data on voter turnout and minority representation are from the ICMA survey. We repeated the analysis with more recent data from a Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC) survey of California cities and obtained the same pattern of results. In the regression analysis, we controlled for a range of factors that could affect minority representation, including the institutional structure of local elections; racial and ethnic demographics; and age, education, and income of the local population (Hajnal 2010). Figure 3 illustrates the predicted effects of turnout on the over/underrepresentation of each group (i.e., the percentage of a given racial or ethnic group on the council minus the percentage of that group in the city’s voting-age population) for each of the four racial and ethnic groups.

It is clear from figure 3 that expanded turnout could have a major impact on minority representation. In our model, increased turnout does not bring Latinos, Asian Americans, or African Americans to equity in representation on city councils. However, for Latinos and Asian Americans, it has the potential to considerably reduce underrepresentation. For Latinos in a typical city, moving from an election in which 10% of registered voters turn out (i.e., the 10th percentile) to an election in which 69% turn out (i.e., the 90th percentile) is associated with a decrease in Latino underrepresentation on the city council by 4.2 percentage points, which eliminates approximately 25% of the 13-percentage-point average underrepresentation of Latinos. A similar increase in turnout could reduce Asian American underrepresentation in a typical city by 2.8 percentage points, which accounts for approximately one third of the 9-percentage-point average underrepresentation of Asian Americans. For whites, a similarly large increase in turnout might eliminate approximately 25% of white overrepresentation in a typical city-council election.

In some ways, the effects in figure 3 understate the importance of turnout. In alternate tests, we examined whether turnout mattered more when the racial group in question comprised a larger proportion of the local population. These interactions were positive and significant for all minority groups except African Americans, which indicates that the effects of turnout on representation increase significantly as a group’s proportion of the city population increases. In other words, when minorities are numerous enough and they vote enough, they tend to win.

In another set of tests, we examined whether an even turnout across the four racial and ethnic groups would alter the outcome of mayoral elections. To obtain these results, we used exit polls to gather the vote by race in each election and then calculated the shift in the vote outcome if turnout had been even across racial groups. Several important assumptions are built into these simulations (Hajnal and Trounstine 2005). However, it is interesting to learn that between 15% and 30% of these big-city elections would have had a different winner if all racial and ethnic groups had voted at the same rate and racial preferences had remained constant. The big winners in these simulations are Latinos. If minority participation in local contests were expanded, Latinos appear to gain on two fronts. Importantly, Latino voters would have been more likely to be on the winning side of the vote and Latino candidates would have fared better under conditions of an even turnout. Almost half of the reversals resulted in a Latino candidate emerging victorious. Blacks and Asian Americans often came out ahead in the simulations, but their gains were neither as consistent nor as large as the gains made by Latinos. The clear losers were whites.

What a government does rather than who is in office is perhaps the most unambiguous measure of whether minority preferences are being represented. Thus, in a second test of how turnout affects minority representation, we examined whether the spending priorities of cities matched the expressed policy preferences of most members of the minority community more regularly in cities with higher turnout than in those with lower turnout. We focused on spending patterns because changes in how cities raise and spend money are arguably the most important way that local governments can affect policy. Unless a
local government actually commits substantial economic resources to a policy, that policy is likely to have a marginal effect on the well-being of different respondents. Thus, the more that spending patterns follow the public opinion of minority constituents, the more often minorities can be seen as being well represented.

Because we were particularly interested in how turnout affects the interests of racial and ethnic minorities and other disadvantaged groups, we categorized government spending and fiscal policy in three different spending areas that are more or less popular among those groups: (1) redistributive, (2) developmental, and (3) allocational. City financial data are from the year after the turnout data (Census of Governments 1987). We obtained a similar pattern of results when we analyzed more recent data from a California city survey (Hajnal 2010).

As shown in figure 4, turnout clearly matters for local-government spending. The figure shows the net effect of turnout on local-government spending priorities after controlling for a range of other factors that could impact spending, including the political leaning of the city, local economic conditions, city spending capacity, poverty needs, local demographics, local institutional structure, state spending, and state mandates (Hajnal 2010). The flat line in each case represents mean spending on each category. The sloped line shows expected spending at different levels of turnout, all else being equal.

Increasing the proportion of registered voters who turned out from 19% (i.e., one standard deviation below the mean) to 59% (i.e., one standard deviation above the mean) is associated with a 1.8-percentage-point increase in the proportion of city-government spending on redistributive programs. This may not appear to be a substantial shift. However, given that the average city spends only 7.8% of its budget on redistributive programs, expanded turnout could increase the amount of redistributive spending by 1.8 percentage points.
25%. As figure 4 shows, the effect of a boost in turnout on allocational spending is equally significant. There is no clear link between turnout and developmental spending.

In other words, when few voters turnout, spending is concentrated in functional areas that favor privileged interests. When more voters turnout, spending on lower-class or minority-preferred programs, such as welfare, public housing, health services, and education, expands.

Additional tests also indicated that voter turnout matters for more fundamental government policy decisions about debt and taxes. According to these models, greater turnout translates into substantially higher taxes and higher per-capita debt. When a larger and more diverse set of residents turns out to vote, governments appear to comply with this increased demand by raising taxes and increasing local debt. Higher voter turnout could dramatically reshape who wins and who loses in urban politics.

**Policy and Satisfaction**

What we have seen is that turnout can have consequences for whom is elected and the policies they pursue. However, does this ultimately affect the minority community in meaningful ways? Can local governments do enough to change their lives to make them believe that they are truly well represented by local democracy?

We cannot easily or directly assess the impact of politics on the well-being of racial and ethnic minorities. However, we can determine whether reasonably attainable policy changes affect the degree to which racial and ethnic minorities believe that local government serves their interests and needs. Figure 2 reveals that the gap in local-government satisfaction is largest between whites and African Americans. Therefore, we asked whether African American residents are more satisfied with local government relative to whites when policy choices more closely reflect the preferences of the black community. We focused on two regularly highlighted aspects of pro-black policy: (1) affirmative action in hiring, and (2) spending on redistributive programs.

First, we examined whether government approval increases among black respondents when local governments hire a greater share of blacks for the public work force. Then we analyzed the effect of local-government spending on government approval among black respondents. We examined whether perceived responsiveness among blacks increased with greater local spending on social services (measured as the proportion of city expenditures on welfare, health, and housing) and reductions in developmental spending (measured as highway, parking, and general-construction spending). The analyses controlled for other city-level factors that could affect black perceptions of local governments’ responsiveness and that may be correlated with spending and employment patterns (e.g., local institutions, political leaning of the local population, level of political competition in the city, and local participation rates) (Hajnal and Trounstine 2013a).

The dependent variable was the respondent’s approval of government. Figure 5 shows the difference in average predicted government approval for black versus white respondents for each of the independent variables (e.g.,
the marginal effect of respondents’ race on government approval at different fixed values of each policy variable).

We observed that blacks think more often than whites that local government is more responsive when they favor the black community and vice versa. Local-government hiring practices have a clear and substantial impact on government approval. The more often that local governments hired African Americans, the more responsive government was perceived to be by blacks and the less responsive by whites. Increasing the proportion of public employees who are black from the minimum to the maximum value (i.e., 0.007 to 0.466) decreased white approval of government by about 9 percentage points and increased black approval by about 14 percentage points.

Similarly, local-government spending patterns apparently influence views. Localities that spend more on redistribution and less on development were viewed more positively by blacks and more negatively by whites. The pattern in figure 5 is clear: at the lowest levels of social-service spending, whites are more supportive of government than blacks. This relationship reversed as social spending increased; in cities that spend a large share of the budget on programs such as welfare, health, and housing, blacks were more supportive of city government than whites. Blacks perceived greater responsiveness when governments began to favor blacks, and whites perceived less responsiveness when resources shifted to the black community.

These results imply that what a government does matters. When local governments spend money on the policy areas that blacks tend to favor and when they shift resources to the black community, black residents begin to feel better served. Moreover, we identified two specific policies that overcome racial disparities in perceived responsiveness: (1) redistributive spending, and (2) affirmative action. To reduce perceived racial bias, these two policies are a good place for reformers to start.

Solutions to Low Voter Turnout

We suggest that (1) more even turnout among racial groups and higher levels of turnout overall could significantly affect electoral and policy outcomes; and (2) changes in policy have the potential to alter minority perceptions of government responsiveness. Given that turnout is the linchpin for many of these changes, it is important to ask whether solutions exist for increasing turnout.

The short answer is yes. Numerous clear, documented mechanisms expand turnout. Research convincingly demonstrates that individuals are more likely to participate in politics when they are asked to do so; that is, when they are mobilized by candidates, parties, and other social groups (Green and Gerber 2000; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). The most successful mobilization efforts are those that contain personal messages (e.g., door-to-door canvassing or personal telephone calls rather than mass e-mails or robotic calls). Recent experimental research has shown that these results are equally if not more powerful for minority voters, particularly when the personal message is conducted in the respondent’s own language (Garcia-Bedolla and Michelson 2012; Ramirez and Wong 2006). Thus, we have strong evidence that participation among minority voters can be increased, perhaps dramatically, when interested parties invite them to engage in the political process.
However, minorities have been less-often mobilized than whites. Other than a few organizations, those who mobilize in American politics seek a particular political outcome and use mobilization as a means to their preferred end. As a result, some members of the population are more likely to be targeted than others. This mobilization bias has profound implications for the distribution of political participation. Figure 6 shows the share of each racial and ethnic group that was contacted by parties or candidates in the 2012 election, according to the Cooperative Congressional Election Study. Whereas 66% of white Americans reported being contacted, only 56% of African Americans, 45% of Latinos, and 34% of Asian Americans reported receiving a message from a candidate or a party. The discrepancy was even larger when we focused on personal contacts (i.e., in person or telephone calls). Figure 6 indicates that there is tremendous opportunity for increasing participation among minority voters through simple mobilization efforts.

Additionally, reforms related to institutional structures could have an even more powerful effect. By simply changing the timing of local elections, we could substantially alter who votes, who wins office, the types of policies that local governments pursue, and—ultimately—the dissatisfaction that many minorities feel with their local governments. Our research showed that moving from standalone local elections to on-cycle elections that occur on the same date as statewide and national contests has the potential to dramatically increase the number and the representativeness of the local voting population. By moving the dates of local elections to coincide with statewide primaries or general elections, it becomes almost costless for voters who participate in higher-turnout statewide elections to also vote in local elections—they need only choose candidates further down the ballot.

The data are unequivocal. Across the nation, turnout in cities with on-cycle elections is dramatically higher than those with off-cycle elections (Anzia 2014; Hajnal 2010). Combining local council elections with a presidential election leads to a 29-percentage-point increase in registered voter turnout, all else being equal. Given that, on average, only 39% of registered voters turn out in a typical contest, that gain represents close to a doubling of turnout. Scheduling local elections with midterm elections is not as effective but still leads to a boost in turnout by about 13 percentage points. With one simple step, we could move from local elections with a small and generally unrepresentative electorate to those with broad and significantly more representative participation.

Because the majority of cities currently hold off-cycle elections, the potential to expand participation is enormous. Nationwide, only 6.7% of all municipalities held local elections that coincided with presidential contests. Even fewer cities (i.e., 3.5%) held elections concurrently with midterm congressional elections. This leaves almost 90% of all cities with the ability to greatly increase turnout by shifting election dates.

Moreover, in most cities, a simple municipal ordinance would suffice to change the timing of local elections. In fact, cities often change their electoral timing: more than 40% of city clerks responding to a 2001 California survey indicated that their city had made a change in the timing of municipal elections in recent years; the majority of those switched from standalone elections to elections concurrent with statewide contests (Hajnal 2010).

What makes timing even more appealing as a policy lever is that there are strong incentives—other than increasing participation and minority representation—to change to on-cycle elections. Indeed, the primary motivation typically is the cost savings. In most states,
... the establishment of district elections and the move to on-cycle elections—could significantly expand black representation on city councils nationwide.

municipalities pay the entire administrative costs of standalone elections but only a fraction of the costs for on-cycle elections. The city of Concord, California, for example, estimated the cost of running a standalone election at $58,000—more than twice the $25,000 estimate for running an on-cycle election. Entrenched officeholders may resist this reform; however, the change is too simple and too powerful to be ignored. With a small cost-saving measure, much could be accomplished.

Moreover, on-cycle elections are part of the only institutional reform that could expand minority representation. Among the institutions cited as detrimental to minority or lower-class interests, at-large elections receive the most attention. In an at-large system, if the white population can coordinate and vote for the same set of candidates, then they can control every council seat in every locality where they comprise a majority of the active electorate. By contrast, in district elections, if racial and ethnic minorities are at least somewhat residentially segregated—a pattern that exists in almost every American city—then racial and ethnic minorities can influence the outcome of at least one council seat well before they become a majority of the city population. The effectiveness of at-large elections depends on the nature of the white vote and the extent of the racial divide, but it is certainly possible that the numerous citywide elections that occur each year around the country could serve as an effective barrier to minority representation today.

Although at-large elections are the most obvious and frequently cited barriers, scholars have identified other potential institutional barriers to minority representation, including small council size, nonpartisan elections, and council–manager government. Reducing council size or simply maintaining a small number of council seats is a practice that has been linked to minority underrepresentation. By limiting the number of seats on the council, a city can increase the threshold for the number of voters required to control a seat. This effectively limits minority voters from electing minority candidates or reduces the number of seats controlled by minorities. Others perceive a change from nonpartisan to partisan elections as an important reform for minority interests. Advocates argue that moving to partisan contests would help minorities by making electoral choices clearer and easier and by allowing political parties to mobilize more voters. Finally, some scholars contend that directly elected mayors—rather than a nonelected city-council manager—can expand minority representation by making elections more meaningful and attracting a wider array of voters.

What makes this set of institutions especially worthy of consideration is the fact that most cities around the country use them. Across the nation, 64% of all cities continue to use at-large elections, slightly more than 75% hold nonpartisan elections, and slightly more than 50% have a city–manager rather than a mayor–council form of government. If these formats represent barriers to minority success, they are having a widespread effect.

Nevertheless, the effect of institutions varies greatly across groups. For African Americans, institutions represent a potentially critical determinant of political representation. This analysis suggests that two reforms—the establishment of district elections and the move to on-cycle elections—could significantly expand black representation on city councils nationwide (Hajnal and Trounstine 2005). For both election timing and district type, the effect of institutional reform appears to be reasonably significant: on average, a 6-percentage-point increase in black representation when moving to on-cycle and districted elections. The exact effects of institutional changes in a city likely would depend on the racial composition of the population, the nature of the racial divide, and other local factors. For Latinos and Asians Americans, the situation is different.

Institutional change apparently offers much less hope for directly addressing inequalities in electoral outcomes. However, institutional changes are significantly correlated with increased turnout, which is highly influential in increasing Latino and Asian American representation (Hajnal and Trounstine 2005). In summary, there are important opportunities for enhancing minority descriptive representation in local government through institutional changes.

Substantive Representation

Understanding mechanisms to enhance the share of minority officeholders is an important first step in addressing underrepresentation. However, the ultimate goal is to enhance substantive representation. We are concerned about who votes and who is elected but, ultimately,
it is what government does that determines how well
democracy serves minority interests. Research suggests that
the main factor in determining whether minorities are well
represented in local policy decisions is whether they are a
part of the governing coalition. In cities in which minorities
are part of the dominant regime, outcomes can be closely
aligned with minority preferences. This study reveals that
more competitive electoral systems offer minorities the
best opportunities for incorporation into the governing
coalition (Trounstine 2008). Other scholars have shown that
institutional structures such as district elections, on-cycle
elections, and annexation laws can affect substantive
outcomes in addition to descriptive representation (Bridges
1997; Burns 1994; Leal, Martinez-Ebers, and Meier 2004;
Polinard et al. 1994). Their research confirms that local
structures can be manipulated to reduce black influence in
the local political arena (Engstrom and McDonald 1982;
Welch 1990).

Studies also indicate that descriptive representation
can enhance the substantive representation of minority
interests. The effects are generally minor in magnitude
but there is evidence that black leadership can have a
significant impact on minority public employment (Kerr
and Mladenka 1994; Mladenka 1989), police practices
(Marschall and Shah 2007; Saltzstein 1989), education
policies (Henig et al. 1999; Meier and England 1984),
and social-welfare spending (Karnig and Welch 1980).
However, these effects are generally not significant enough
to noticeably improve the economic well-being of the
African American community (Colburn and Adler 2001;
Perry 1991; Sonenshein 1993; Thompson 1996). Although
considerably less effort has been devoted to understanding
the substantive impact of Latino leadership at the local
level, early research found few signs of major shifts in policy
(Hero 1990; Hero and Beatty 1989; Muñoz 1994; Polinard
et al. 1994; Rosales 2000). If descriptive representation has
a major impact, it may be more symbolic in nature. Minority
representation has been linked to increased interracial
cooperation (Hajnal 2007; Stein, Ulbig, and Post 2005),
greater minority efficacy (Bobo and Gilliam 1990), and
expanded minority participation (Barreto 2007).

EMERGING QUESTIONS

We now understand that racial and ethnic minorities are
underrepresented along many different dimensions at the
local level, and we know that low turnout is a significant
contributor to this state of affairs. This chapter identifies
concrete changes that cities can make in terms of both
policy (e.g., minority hiring) and structure (e.g., on-cycle
elections), which can enhance minority representation.

However, many questions remain. As the United States
becomes a minority-majority nation, inequalities in the
smallest political units along racial lines will become even
more significant. We need to know more about when,
where, and why racial divisions are paramount or subsumed
by other cleavages. The demographics of nontraditional
gateway cities are transforming rapidly, with large
populations of Latinos and Asian Americans emerging in
The South and The Midwest. Can we expect race to have the
same pivotal role in these regions? Trounstine (2015) found
that white residential exclusivity drives political polarization
and decreased support for public goods. Given that racial
hierarchies and residential segregation persist, it seems
clear that race is likely to continue to drive preferences,
choices, and outcomes in city politics. However, there
also may be substantial differences in the racial politics
of the future. Whereas white residents continue to live in
racially homogeneous neighborhoods, black, Latino, and
Asian American residents live in increasingly diverse places
(Enos 2011; Logan and Stults 2011). Integrated minority
neighborhoods could provide the foundation for diverse
political coalitions as well. However, the extensive work
exploring the challenges of building minority coalitions
should caution against any assumption that minority
collisions will emerge naturally or easily (Benjamin 2010).

The suburbanization of America continues largely
unabated in the twenty-first century. Given that some
scholars (e.g., Oliver 2012) have argued that smaller
communities have fewer divisive issues and higher levels
of responsiveness to residents’ preferences, will the
divisions outlined in this chapter quietly disappear? Our
preliminary analysis cautions against this conclusion.
We found no relationship between city size and minority
underrepresentation. Compared to large cities, blacks,
Latinos, and Asian Americans in small communities are
just as unlikely to win election to office, work in municipal
jobs, and serve in the police force (as Ferguson, Missouri, so
alarmingly demonstrated).

Additionally, more work is needed to uncover the
factors that govern the incorporation of not only African
Americans but also Latinos and Asian Americans. Given
the range of factors including national origin, immigrant
status, and socioeconomic status that could divide
these diverse panethnic groups, more research aimed at
understanding divisions in these two political communities
is essential. More important are studies that lead to a
better understanding of intergroup relations. With whom
are Latino and Asian American residents in coalition and
why? Similarly, which groups oppose Latino and Asian
American initiatives at the local level? Several scholars
offer interesting theories concerning racial conflict and
coalition-building in a multiracial world (Carmichael and
At the local level, minorities could have a major impact in the outcomes of democracy, which makes it even more troubling that their voices are heard less at the local level. However, Asian Americans represent the majority of the population of Honolulu, a third of San Jose, and almost a fifth of both New York and Los Angeles. In the cities where they live, Asian Americans could have a pronounced impact. Likewise, the average Latino resident lives in a city that is 39% Hispanic and the average African American resident lives in a city that is 35% black. At the local level, minorities could have a major impact in the outcomes of democracy, which makes it even more troubling that their voices are heard less at the local level. This makes it even more important that we continue to learn about inequality in local politics and the ways in which that inequality can be reduced.

Why We Should Focus on Local Politics

Many of the patterns described in this chapter are not unique to local politics. Indeed, other chapters in this task force report discuss deep political inequalities along race and class lines at the national and even the international levels. However, the consequences of bias and division are likely to be more severe at the local level for one overarching reason: the uneven geographic distribution of the population. Segregation by race and other demographic characteristics means that groups that comprise a small fraction of the national population—and therefore have a limited impact on national contests—can comprise a substantial share of the population within smaller geographic boundaries and therefore become major players in the cities, districts, or states in which they are concentrated. Despite their recent growth, Asian Americans continue to represent only 6% of the national population. Whether they turn out to vote in larger or smaller numbers is unlikely to affect the outcomes of national contests.

Hamilton 1967; Jennings 1994; Jones-Correa 2001). However, systematic empirical tests of these group-relations theories are still rare. We know, for example, that blacks and Latinos sometimes work together in the urban arena (McClain and Karnig 1990), which sometimes results in sharp conflict (Vaca 2004), but more research is needed to rigorously explain that variation. In an increasingly complex, multiracial urban environment, answers to these questions will likely explain much about who will win and who will lose in urban democracy.

Finally, urban-race scholars should consider the impact of new fiscal strains on the representation and well-being of racial minorities in the urban arena. Does the current economic crisis and the tendency of state governments to usurp funds from their localities impinge on the ability of racial minorities to shift resources so that they more closely mirror minority preferences? Likewise, is greater global competition creating a greater incentive for cities to pursue a developmental agenda that limits minority gains? It is possible that these two trends may change; however, in the immediate future, it is important to consider how urban leaders are coping with accomplishing more with less.

NOTES

1. Data are from the 1986 International City/County Management Association survey of city clerks.
2. Across the state, mayoral elections drew an average of only 28% of the voting-age population to the polls. Data are from the 2001 Public Policy Institute of California survey. See also Holbrook and Weinschenk (2014) and Caren (2007).
3. A study of Michigan school districts in 2000 found that registered-voter turnout averaged only 7.8% across the 477 districts (Weimer 2001).
4. Data are from the 1990 American Citizen Participation Study (Verba et al 1995).
5. We also collected data from a series of 20 mayoral-election exit polls in major cities to determine whether actual turnout patterns matched reported turnout patterns. The exit-poll data confirm the basic skew that was evident in self-reported voter turnout.
6. The dataset is derived from available local exit polls and includes the vote choice of 56,000 respondents across 63 elections for different local offices in five cities (i.e., New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, and Detroit) between 1985 and 2005. It includes not only mayoral vote choice (23 elections) but also candidate choices in city council (26 contests), city comptroller (two elections), city attorney (two elections), city clerk (one election), and public-advocate (two elections), as well as preferences on six ballot propositions. Given concerns about generalizability, we endeavored to assess divisions across a much larger set of elections. Specifically, we collected the vote by race for mayor in all available primary and general elections in the nation’s 25 largest cities in the last 20 years. This process resulted in a dataset with the aggregate vote by race for 254 candidates in 96 elections, which represents a fairly wide range of cities and electoral contests (Hajnal 2010).
7. For each election, we proceeded as follows. We obtained the proportion of respondents from a given group (e.g., blacks) that supported the winning candidate. We then subtracted the proportion of respondents from a second group (e.g., white respondents) that supported the same winning candidate. We then pooled all of the elections and took the mean of the absolute value of the group difference (i.e., black support minus white support).
8. It is interesting that there is no election in which the educational divide is larger than the racial divide. In only one election—the 1997 mayoral runoff in Los Angeles between two white men (i.e., Richard Riordan and Tom Hayden)—was the income gap larger than the racial gap.
9. T-tests indicated that racial divides are significantly larger than all other demographic divides.
10. The nature of the religious gap varies considerably. Across the different
contexts, the largest religious gap fluctuates between almost all of the different combinations of pair-wise groups among the six different religious categories (i.e., Protestants, Catholics, other Christians, Jews, Muslims, and those with no religious affiliation). The average divide between Protestants and Jews, however, was marginally larger than the average gap between any other two religious groups. Theeffect of religion on the vote diminished greatly when we simultaneously considered other factors such as partisanship, ideology, and race.

11. T-tests indicated that the average racial divide was significantly larger than these political divides.

12. Partisan divides tended to dominate electoral outcomes in general elections in cities with partisan contests when both candidates were white.

13. Even in non-bipartisan contests, the racial divide dwarfed most other demographic divides and was roughly on par with both the liberal – conservative and the Democrat – Republican divides (i.e., 23.6- and 27.1-percentage-point gaps, respectively, in single-race contests). Racial divisions are not isolated to a few biracial contests but rather are a more pervasive aspect of the urban political arena.


16. The share of council seats held by African Americans was only slightly higher (i.e., about 5.5%) among cities with more than 20,000 people. Among cities with more than a 5% black population, the average ratio of council share to population size was 0.64. This indicates that although African Americans are descriptively well represented in a significant number of cities, they completely lack representation in many more.

17. Racial and ethnic minorities, of course, are not the only groups underrepresented in political offices. Women are greatly underrepresented at all levels (Center for American Women and Politics 2008). Surveys of officeholders also indicated that the majority are from privileged backgrounds, measured by either education or income (Carnes 2013).

18. The Knight Foundation surveys were conducted in 1999 and 2002. The cities are not a random sample of American cities but they are fairly representative of medium-to-large-sized cities on a range of demographic measures (Hajnal and Trounstine 2013a).

19. We also controlled for trust and efficacy because research has shown that racial and ethnic minorities tend to be less trusting and to feel less efficacious politically. By controlling for these beliefs, we could isolate the effect of demographic characteristics. Because first and foremost we are concerned about differences in perceived responsiveness across demographic groups within a city, our analysis incorporated fixed effects for each city (with the national sample as the excluded category) as well as fixed effects by year.

20. Interactions between race and income stress were not statistically significant, which indicates that minorities are less approving of local government than whites, regardless of their level of wealth.

21. We expect that as turnout in city elections expands, the vote will be less skewed by class or race, and less-advantaged interests will have more voice in determining outcomes. There is ample evidence that turnout, in fact, is less skewed as turnout increases at the state level; our own analysis of local exit polls demonstrated the same relationship (Hill and Leighley 1992; Hajnal 2010).

22. Most US cities have a council—city manager form of government; even in those with a mayor, the mayor seldom has veto power or unilateral control over the budget (Hajnal and Lewis 2003). Thus, council elections are almost always central to local policy making (Krebs and Pelissero 2003).

23. Redistributive policies are those that target and benefit less-advantaged residents. They include functions such as welfare, public housing, health care, and education. Developmental policy, by contrast, is focused on programs that seek to encourage economic growth and the ongoing economic vitality of a city. Developmental spending includes outlays for highways, streets, transportation, and airports. Finally, allocational policy is spending on a range of basic city services that can be considered “housekeeping” services, including services such as parks, police and fire protection, and sanitation. These three categories do not exhaust the entire range of possible spending functions but they do account for most of government spending. For each spending area, we measured the proportion of total government expenditures for programs in that area.

24. According to its advocates, a more recent reform (i.e., term limits) has had the opposite effect and has helped minorities by forcing out long-term white incumbent leadership and opening up positions for which minorities can compete.

25. Figures are from the 2001 ICMA survey.

26. There are, however, several interesting studies of group relations in a particular city or policy arena (Kim 2000; Saito 1998). Almost all of the studies that provide more systematic empirical evaluations of group dynamics in the political arena have used public opinion surveys rather than actual political behavior as their data points (Bobo et al. 2000; Kaufmann 2000). These surveys of individuals administered either in one city or nationwide generate hypotheses about the determinants of intergroup conflict and cooperation. However, it is clear that expressed attitudes and actual behavior can and often do differ.

27. These figures are derived from the 1990 American Citizen Participation Study (Verba et al 1995), a recent nationwide survey, and the 2000 US Census.

REFERENCES


During the last two decades, a historic shift has occurred in the voting patterns of the indigenous population of some South American countries. Indigenous people, who traditionally voted for a mix of different types of parties, have begun to vote in large numbers for new left-wing parties. This shift has been particularly pronounced in the Central Andean countries, specifically Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, which have the largest indigenous populations.

What explains this historic shift? Why have indigenous voters embraced leftist parties in recent years? And what are the consequences of this shift for policies in the region?

This chapter argues that leftist parties in the Central Andes have used a combination of ethnic and populist appeals to win the support of large numbers of indigenous people. Whereas centrist and rightist parties have largely avoided politicizing ethnicity, leftist parties have sought to appeal to indigenous voters as indigenous people. They have forged close ties to the indigenous movement, recruited indigenous candidates, invoked indigenous symbols, and advocated indigenous rights. These appeals have resonated with many indigenous people who have become increasingly ethnically conscious in recent years.

Leftist parties have also used classical populist appeals to attract indigenous as well as nonindigenous voters. I define classical populist appeals as a mix of personalist, antiestablishment, nationalist, and state interventionist appeals that are focused on the subaltern sectors of the population. Leftist parties have recruited charismatic candidates, denounced the traditional parties, vigorously opposed market-oriented reforms, criticized foreign intervention in their countries, and called for income redistribution. These types of appeals have resonated among indigenous people because they continue to be overwhelmingly poor and they have benefited little from the policies implemented by the traditional parties beginning in the 1980s. Although some centrist and right-wing parties have also employed populist appeals, they have not done so to nearly the same degree as leftist parties.

Support from indigenous people has helped the leftist parties win significant representation in the legislature and, in some cases, win the presidency of the Central Andean nations. In office, these leftist parties have implemented their policy platforms to varying degrees. Some leftist parties have aggressively worked to expand indigenous rights and address ethnic inequalities. Others have attempted to dismantle market-oriented policies and reduce foreign influence in their countries. Still other leftist parties, however, have largely eschewed ethnopolitist policies, preferring to maintain largely the same policies as their centrist and right-wing predecessors.

This chapter provides an analysis of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, the three South American countries with the largest indigenous populations. The first section discusses the traditional voting patterns of indigenous people in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. It shows how those patterns began to change in the late 1990s and early 2000s with the rise of new leftist parties. The second section examines the causes of this shift, focusing on the ethnic and populist appeals that these new leftist parties have made. It also discusses the key differences between the mix of ethnic and populist appeals made by different parties in different countries. The conclusion reviews what consequences the left governments have had for the indigenous population in these countries and provides some policy recommendations to address the gaping ethnic inequalities that remain.
similarly voted in large numbers for an indigenous leftist party, Pachakutik, between 1996 and 2002, but in recent years they have increasingly supported Rafael Correa’s leftist-populist movement, Country Alliance. In Peru, they have voted for Ollanta Humala’s leftist-populist movement since 2006, although it is unclear whether they will continue to support this movement given Humala’s rightward drift since taking office. Nonindigenous voters have also voted for the left in the Andean countries in recent years, but not to the same degree as indigenous voters.

**Bolivia**

In Bolivia, the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR), a centrist catch-all party, largely monopolized the indigenous vote after leading the 1952 revolution in that country (Romero Ballivián 2003; Ticona Alejo, Rojas Ortuste, and Albó 1995; Van Cott 2005). After the revolution, the MNR eliminated literacy restrictions on the franchise and expanded schooling and social programs in rural areas, bringing significant benefits to indigenous communities (Albó 2002, Rivera Cusicanqui 1986, Yashar 2005). The MNR also created peasant unions in rural areas, which it used to help control the indigenous population. As a result, the indigenous population voted overwhelmingly for the MNR. In the 1958 elections, for example, the MNR won 95% of the vote in provincial areas, which were overwhelmingly indigenous, as opposed to 51% of the vote in the departmental capitals, which had a larger proportion of whites and mestizos (Madrid 2012, 40). The complete dominance of the MNR in the countryside ended after the 1964 military coup in that country, but the MNR continued to fare well in indigenous areas even after the return to democracy in the late 1970s. Indeed, the MNR finished first in majority indigenous areas in the 1985 and 1993 elections, and second in the 1980, 1989, and 1997 elections (Madrid 2012, 46).

Leftist parties did make some inroads among indigenous voters in Bolivia after the return to democracy, but their performance was inconsistent. The Democratic and Popular Union (UDP), a left-wing coalition, finished first in majority indigenous provinces in the 1980 elections and its successor, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), won these provinces in 1989, although it finished a distant third in 1985. In the late 1970s and 1980s some leftist-indigenous-led parties, dubbed the Katarista parties, also sprang up in Bolivia. These parties, which were based in Aymara organizations in the Department of La Paz, did not fare very well, however. Although the Katarista parties collectively won as much as 12% of the vote in majority Aymara provinces in some elections, they never won more than 3% of the national vote (Madrid 2012, 43). Moreover, these parties all disappeared after participating in one or two elections.

The indigenous population in Bolivia did not shift to the left until a new indigenous party, the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS), emerged from the largely Quechua-speaking coca grower unions in rural Cochabamba (see figure 1). In early 1997, the coca grower unions, which had gained control of the largest indigenous federation in Bolivia, founded an indigenous-led party called the Assembly for the Sovereignty of the Peoples (ASP). This party initially fared little better than the Katarista parties, winning ample support in the indigenous coca-growing areas of the Department of Cochabamba but only 3.7% of the vote nationwide. After a leadership split, however, Evo Morales and other leaders left the ASP and created a new party called the Movement Toward Socialism, borrowing the name and registration of a defunct left-wing party. The MAS developed a much broader and inclusive platform and appeal than the ASP or the Katarista parties, and it fared much better. In the 2002 elections, it won 21% of the national vote, followed by 54% in 2005 when Morales was elected president for the first time. Morales has since been reelected twice, capturing 64% of the nationwide vote in

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**Figure 1: Vote for Leftist Parties in Bolivia, 1993–2009**

![Graph showing vote for leftist parties in Bolivia, 1993–2009.](image)
2009, and 61% in 2014. The MAS has fared particularly well in indigenous areas. In the 2005 elections, it won 73% of the vote in majority Aymara municipalities and 74% of the vote in majority Quechua municipalities. The MAS was even more dominant in the 2009 elections, capturing 95% of the vote in majority Aymara municipalities and 90% of the vote in majority Quechua municipalities (Madrid 2012, 57).

**Ecuador**

The indigenous population of Ecuador has also voted increasingly for left-wing parties in recent years (see figure 2). During the 1980s and early 1990s, no single type of party dominated in indigenous areas in Ecuador, and majority indigenous provinces tended to favor the same parties as the nation as a whole. In the 1978 presidential elections, the populist Concentration of Popular Forces (CFP) and the conservative Social Christian Party (PSC) split most of the vote in indigenous provinces. In 1984 and 1988, Democratic Left, a center-left party, finished first in indigenous areas, followed by the PSC in 1984 and the populist Ecuadorian Roldosist Party (PRE) in 1988. In the 1992 elections, however, two conservative parties, the PSC and the Republican Union Party (PUR), divided up most of the vote in indigenous provinces.

It was not until the rise of an indigenous-led leftist party, the Pachakutik Plurinational Unity Movement, in the mid-1990s, that Ecuador’s indigenous population began to swing decisively toward the left. Pachakutik, which was founded in 1996 by Ecuador’s indigenous federation, won 24% of the vote in majority indigenous counties in the 1996 legislative elections, and 37% in 1998 and 2002 (Madrid 2012, 90). It also won 34% of the presidential vote in majority indigenous counties in 1996, 19% in 1998, and 53% in 2002, although its presidential candidates in these elections were not members of Pachakutik (Madrid 2012, 87). Other leftist parties also fared well in indigenous areas in these elections. For example, the Democratic Left won 23% of the vote in majority indigenous counties in the 1998 presidential elections and 11% in the 2002 presidential elections.

Support for Pachakutik declined somewhat after 2002 in the wake of the party’s increasingly ethnocentric turn and its failed alliance with Lucio Gutiérrez and the Patriotic Society Party (PSP). The party continued to fare reasonably well in indigenous areas, but its support elsewhere dissipated. In the 2006 legislative elections, the party won 28% of the vote in majority indigenous counties but only 6% in counties where the indigenous population represented a minority. Similarly, in the 2006 presidential elections, Pachakutik won 15.9% of the vote in majority indigenous counties, but only 2.8% of the vote elsewhere (Madrid 2012, 105). In 2009, the party did not nominate a presidential candidate, but it did compete in the legislative elections, winning 19% of the vote in indigenous majority counties, but only 3% of the vote elsewhere.

The main beneficiary of Pachakutik’s decline was the party’s erstwhile ally, the Patriotic Society Party. The PSP had started out as a left-of-center populist movement that was critical of neoliberal policies, but it veered toward the right after Lucio Gutiérrez was elected president in 2002, implementing sweeping market-oriented policies that led to the rupture with Pachakutik. The PSP nevertheless managed to maintain its ties to many indigenous communities, thanks in part to its clientelist programs. These ties paid off electorally, enabling the PSP to win 42% of the vote in majority indigenous counties in the 2006 presidential elections and 54% in the 2009 presidential elections.

**Figure 2: Vote for Leftist Parties in Ecuador, 1992–2013**
The other beneficiary of Pachakutik’s troubles was a new left movement, the Country Alliance (AP), founded by Rafael Correa, a left-wing economist who had served as economics minister in the government of Alfredo Palacio. Correa has dominated the Ecuadorian political landscape in recent years, winning the presidency by large margins in 2006, 2009, and 2013. Correa has had rocky relations with the indigenous movement in Ecuador, but he nevertheless has managed to win a growing amount of support in indigenous areas. Indeed, Correa won 35% of the vote in majority indigenous counties in the 2009 presidential elections. The only election in which he has fared better in indigenous areas than in non-indigenous areas, however, was the second round of the 2006 presidential elections. In this election, Correa won 74% of the vote in majority indigenous counties, as opposed to 58% elsewhere, thanks in part to the endorsement he received from Pachakutik and the indigenous movement.

**Peru**

Indigenous voters in Peru have also veered left in recent years (see figure 3). Traditionally, the indigenous population in Peru, like that in Ecuador, did not vote consistently for any particular party or ideological tendency. Rather, they typically supported the same party as the rest of the Peruvian population. The left typically fared better in indigenous areas than in other parts of the country, but it did not typically win these districts. In the 1980 elections, a center-right party, Popular Action (AP), finished first in majority indigenous provinces as well as in the country as a whole. In the 1985 elections, a center-left party, the Peruvian Aprista Party (APRA), swept to victory nationwide and won a plurality of the vote in indigenous provinces, but APRA actually fared worse in indigenous areas than in non-indigenous areas. During the 1990s and early 2000s, indigenous voters, like the Peruvian electorate more generally, mostly voted for the center-right personalist movements led by Alberto Fujimori and Alejandro Toledo. Fujimori, the dean of a Peruvian agricultural school, won the 1990, 1995, and 2000 elections. Fujimori had initially campaigned on a vaguely centrist platform, but in office he shifted appreciably to the right, implementing sweeping market-oriented reforms. These policies generated strong economic growth, leading Fujimori to garner high levels of support among Peruvians of all ethnicities. He finished first in majority indigenous provinces in each of these elections, but he did not fare appreciably better in indigenous areas than in non-indigenous areas. In 2000, Fujimori resigned in the wake of a corruption scandal and, as a result, new elections were held in 2001. These elections were won by Alejandro Toledo who headed Peru Possible, another personalist, center-right political party. Toledo, who had finished second in the 2000 elections, captured 54% of the vote in majority indigenous provinces in 2001, as opposed to 37% of the vote in provinces where the indigenous population was in the minority.

Beginning in the 2006 elections, however, indigenous voters in Peru veered left. In 2006, Ollanta Humala ran for president as the leader of a left-wing populist movement called the Peruvian Nationalist Party (PNP). Humala swept the highlands of Peru, winning 58% of the vote in majority indigenous provinces and 35% of the vote elsewhere. He lost the runoff election to Alan García of APRA who had drifted to the right since his first term in office in the 1980s. Humala ran again in 2011, this time as the head of a left-wing alliance called Peru Wins (GANA). Once again, Humala triumphed in indigenous areas, capturing 59% of the vote in majority indigenous provinces, as opposed to 36% in provinces where the indigenous represented a minority.

Thus, the indigenous populations in all three Central Andean countries have shifted to the left in the last three
During the 1990s and early 2000s, indigenous voters, like the Peruvian electorate more generally, mostly voted for the center-right personalist movements led by Alberto Fujimori and Alejandro Toledo.

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decades. So far, the shift has been most pronounced in Bolivia, but it has also been clearly apparent in both Ecuador and Peru. What has caused this dramatic change in voting behavior?

THE LEFT’S ETHNOPOPULIST APPEALS

The shift to the left among indigenous voters has stemmed in part from the widespread use of ethnic and populist appeals by the leftist parties. The indigenous-led leftist parties, such as the MAS and Pachakutik, have used ethnic appeals the most, but the mestizo-led leftist parties, such as Country Alliance in Ecuador and the PNP in Peru, have also used them significantly. They have nominated numerous indigenous candidates for prominent positions, and they have forged close ties with indigenous organizations. They have advocated indigenous land and water rights, multicultural education, affirmative action, and numerous other policies that benefit the indigenous population. And they have made various symbolic appeals to the indigenous population, employing indigenous language and symbols in their campaigns. These ethnic appeals have helped attract numerous indigenous voters, many of whom have become increasingly ethnically conscious in recent years.

Leftist parties in the Andes have also used classical populist appeals to woo both indigenous and nonindigenous voters. They have denounced the traditional political and economic establishment, accusing it of corruption and incompetence. They have recruited charismatic political outsiders as their presidential candidates and built campaigns around them. They have deplored foreign intervention in their countries, and vowed to take back their countries’ natural resources from foreign hands. Finally and perhaps most importantly, they have criticized the market-oriented policies that Andean countries implemented in the 1990s, and they have pledged to use the state to redistribute wealth to the masses. These appeals have resonated strongly among the indigenous population because they benefited relatively little from the market-oriented policies that were implemented by the traditional parties under pressure from foreign governments and the international financial institutions. As a result, during the 1990s indigenous people grew increasingly disenchanted with economic and political elites and the foreign interests that were allied to them.

The MAS in Bolivia has gone the furthest to employ ethnic appeals, and it has been rewarded with overwhelming support from the country’s indigenous population. As noted above, the MAS was founded by indigenous-dominated organizations, and from the outset most of the party’s leaders were indigenous. The MAS, unlike previous indigenous parties in Bolivia, established ties to indigenous organizations throughout the country, including in Aymara, Quechua, and the lowlands indigenous communities. Over time, the MAS established ties with many urban mestizo-dominated organizations and recruited white and mestizo candidates for some key posts, but indigenous organizations remained the bulwark of the MAS and most of the party’s leadership continued to be indigenous, including the party’s head Evo Morales.

The MAS has made numerous symbolic and substantive appeals to the indigenous population. The party has styled itself as the legitimate representative of the country’s indigenous population, and the party’s leaders and candidates have used indigenous clothing, given speeches in indigenous languages, and invoked indigenous symbols, rituals, and sayings. The MAS has also advocated many of the traditional demands of the indigenous movement, including indigenous land and water rights, agrarian reform, antidiscrimination laws, and multicultural education as well as state recognition of indigenous forms of knowledge and justice.

Evo Morales and the MAS have also used all of the classically populist techniques to court indigenous and nonindigenous voters. Morales’s humble origins, down-to-earth popular style, and status as a political outsider have enabled him to connect with poorer, politically disenchanted voters. Morales has railed against the traditional political elites in Bolivia, denouncing them as criminals and frauds who serve only their own interests. He has vigorously opposed foreign intervention in Bolivia, expelling the US ambassador from Bolivia and rejecting a proposed free trade agreement with the United States. The MAS has also aggressively opposed the US government-sponsored coca eradication programs in Bolivia, going so far as to expel the Drug Enforcement Agency from the country. He has criticized the neoliberal policies of the traditional
parties and moved to nationalize or assert greater state control over key industries in the country. For example, during the first year of his administration, he announced a gas “nationalization” plan and demanded that foreign firms pay a higher share of their revenues to the Bolivian government. The Morales administration has also sought to redistribute income to the poor by establishing conditional cash-transfer programs, such as the Bono Juancito Pinto and the Bono Juana Azurduy, that make payments to mothers who keep their children in school and attend pre- or postnatal doctor visits.

Pachakutik in Ecuador also used ethnopopulist appeals extensively, which helped the party attract substantial indigenous support. Like the MAS, Pachakutik was founded by indigenous organizations, notably the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), in 1996, and the party has maintained those ties since that time. The party’s name, its banner, and its logo are all indigenous symbols, and Pachakutik is often referred to as the political arm of the indigenous movement. Moreover, most of Pachakutik’s leaders and many of the party’s candidates for key elected positions have been indigenous, although Pachakutik, in alliance with other parties, nominated mestizo presidential candidates in 1996, 1998, and 2002. Pachakutik has also embraced many of the traditional demands of the indigenous movements. The party has advocated indigenous autonomy, land reform, water rights, multicultural education, and the representation of indigenous organizations in government agencies.

Pachakutik used classical populist appeals as well. In 1996, 1998, and 2002, the party nominated as its presidential candidates well-known celebrities from outside the party and built their campaigns around them. These candidates were not traditional politicians. Freddy Ehlers, the party’s presidential candidate in 1996 and 1998, was a television journalist, and Lucio Gutiérrez, the party’s candidate in 2002, was a military colonel who had first risen to fame when he participated in the indigenous-led overthrow of then-president Jamil Mahuad. Both Ehlers and Gutiérrez criticized the traditional parties extensively and presented themselves as independent and honest alternatives. Ehlers and Gutiérrez also criticized the market-oriented policies that had been implemented by previous governments and they called for redistributing the country’s wealth. Gutiérrez, for example, declared that he was going to form “a government of the people against neoliberalism” (Quintero López 2005, 99). After the 2002 elections, however, Gutiérrez began to shift to the right, signing an agreement with the International Monetary Fund, maintaining the country’s market-oriented policies, and establishing close relations with the United States. Nevertheless, the populist appeals Ehlers and Gutiérrez made in their campaigns helped them win the support of large numbers of indigenous and nonindigenous voters.

Pachakutik continued to make some populist appeals in subsequent elections, but with considerably less success. Many of its white and mestizo leaders left the party because of its increasingly ethnocentric direction, and after 2002, the populist space came to be occupied by Rafael Correa and, to a lesser extent, Lucio Gutiérrez. In spite of Gutiérrez’s shift to the right after he became president, he continued to implement some populist policies and engage in populist rhetoric. He denounced the political elites, boosted social spending in poorer areas, and created a poverty subvention program, all of which helped him continue to win many votes in indigenous areas. Correa went even further than Gutiérrez in populist appeals. He railed against the political establishment and promised to bring an end to the “long night of neoliberalism.” Moreover, in office, Correa made good on many of his promises. He rejected a free trade agreement with the United States, declined to renew the US lease on a naval base in Manta, Ecuador, imposed major taxes on foreign oil companies, and boosted social spending considerably. Such populist rhetoric and policies helped Correa win support among many indigenous and nonindigenous voters.

Rafael Correa also undertook some efforts to attract indigenous voters with ethnic appeals. In the 2006 elections, Correa aggressively sought the support of Pachakutik and the indigenous movement for his campaign, arguing that they should support him because “we have much affinity. I have even advised the indigenous movement. I am an indigenista in the good sense of the term” (Zeas 2006, 225). A significant sector of Pachakutik wanted to support Correa, but in the end, the party opted to run its own candidate, the indigenous leader, Luis Macas, for president in 2006. Correa, nevertheless, continued to court indigenous voters, emphasizing his experience working in indigenous communities and speaking Quichua on the campaign trail. In addition, Correa recruited some former leaders of Pachakutik to his new party and embraced some of the traditional demands of the indigenous movement. Nevertheless, Correa nominated significantly fewer indigenous candidates than the MAS or Pachakutik, and he made significantly fewer ethnic appeals. Correa did not do too well in indigenous areas in the first round of the 2006 presidential elections, but he fared much better in the second round thanks in part to the support he received from Pachakutik and the indigenous movement in the runoff election.

After taking office, Correa’s relations with Pachakutik and the indigenous movement rapidly deteriorated, however. Tension first surfaced in the constituent assembly, which had been tasked with revising the Ecuadorian
constituent in 2008. Pachakutik and the indigenous movement sought to amend the constitution to declare Ecuador a plurinational nation, to grant Quechua status as an official language on a par with Spanish, and to give the indigenous population veto power over mining operations in their territories (Becker 2011). Correa and the indigenous movement ultimately compromised on these issues and the indigenous movement supported the approval of the new constitution, but relations continued to deteriorate in the years that followed. Pachakutik and the indigenous movement bitterly opposed the 2009 mining law, with CONAIE calling his actions “neoliberal and racist” (Becker 2011, 58). Correa, on his part, has denounced some indigenous leaders with equally intemperate language and he has sought to marginalize CONAIE and forge alliances with smaller indigenous federations. Although Correa has continued to try to court indigenous voters, his poor relations with CONAIE and Pachakutik and his party’s lack of indigenous candidates has made that difficult (Becker 2013, Léon Trujillo 2010). Partly as a result, Correa fared worse in indigenous areas than in nonindigenous areas in the 2009 and 2013 presidential elections, even though his overall share of the indigenous vote has been relatively high.

Ollanta Humala in Peru has also used ethnic appeals to gain the support of indigenous voters, but much less than the MAS or Pachakutik. Indeed, Humala’s ethnic appeals have more closely resembled Correa’s than those of the indigenous-led parties. Humala does not self-identify as indigenous per se, but his name and appearance convey his indigenous origins. Moreover, Humala has frequently employed indigenous symbols, such as the indigenous flag, in his campaign, and he has often worn indigenous clothing at campaign events and interspersed his speeches with Quechua sayings. Humala has also recruited various indigenous candidates. Indeed, according to Paredes (2008, 11), 13% of his party’s congressional candidates in 2006 had indigenous surnames, as opposed to 6% of the candidates of APRA, his party’s main rival that year. Humala has not forged many alliances with indigenous organizations, which are notoriously weak in Peru, but many of these organizations ended up supporting his campaigns in any event. Humala has also adopted a number of ethnic demands, although they have not been a central component of his platform. For example, he pledged to recognize Peru as a multicultural country, to expand multicultural education, to increase the use of indigenous languages in government affairs, and to permit the use of indigenous forms of justice. He has also denounced racial and ethnic discrimination and vowed to promote indigenous values and customs. Humala, however, has been careful to distance himself from the radical ethnonationalist views of his father and some of his siblings.

Ollanta Humala has also used populist appeals to attract voters, including indigenous voters. Humala, like Morales, is a political outsider. Humala served as a military officer prior to entering politics, and he first came to the public eye when he carried out an uprising against Fujimori during the waning days of his regime. In 2006, Humala created his own party, the Peruvian Nationalist Party (PNP), to run for president. The PNP’s campaigns have focused to a large extent on Humala himself, but the party has also promoted a diffuse anti-establishment, leftist-populist ideology. Humala has proudly referred to himself as an “anti-system candidate,” and he has vigorously denounced the traditional political elites (Humala 2006). Humala has aggressively opposed neoliberal policies as well. His 2006 governing plan declared that “the systematic application of neoliberalism... in our country has meant a social fracture without precedents in Peruvian life.” He proposed to redistribute wealth to the poor by boosting social spending and creating various agricultural, employment, and education programs. Humala has also voiced strongly nationalist views. He blamed foreign countries for many of Peru’s problems, and he vowed to recuperate Peru’s natural resources, to reexamine Peru’s foreign debts and investments, and to renegotiate the free trade agreement that Peru had signed with the United States. This rhetoric helped Humala sweep the largely indigenous Peruvian highlands, which had been largely left out of the economic growth that market-oriented reforms had brought to coastal areas of Peru.

Humala toned down his rhetoric somewhat after he lost the 2006 runoff election for president, however. He distanced himself from Hugo Chávez who had intervened in the 2006 elections, promising that he was not going to follow Chávez’s model. Humala also acknowledged that market-oriented policies had helped Peru in some ways and he promised to respect property rights, foreign investment, and the free trade agreement with the United States. Nevertheless, Humala did not abandon his populist appeals entirely in 2011. He continued to denounce the neoliberal policies of his predecessors and he vowed to redistribute the country’s wealth and to recuperate the country’s natural resources, which, he argued, had been given away to foreigners. He also continued to rail about the corruption of the traditional parties and political elites (Núñez 2011). These continued populist appeals helped him win the support of indigenous voters again in 2011.

Thus, in all three Andean countries, left parties have made significant ethnopopulist appeals in recent years. The left-wing parties’ ethnopopulist appeals have helped them win the support of numerous indigenous voters, and most of the left-wing parties have fared significantly better in indigenous areas than in nonindigenous areas. The one important exception is Rafael Correa who has typically...
The economies of all three countries have grown rapidly, inflation has largely remained under control, and poverty has declined sharply. However, inequality, which dropped sharply in Bolivia and Ecuador between 2008 and 2011 has begun to increase again, and poverty rates continue to be much higher in indigenous than in nonindigenous areas.

CONCLUSION

Indigenous voters have undergirded the success that some leftist parties have enjoyed during recent years in the Central Andes. Nevertheless, the influence that indigenous leaders and organizations have wielded over leftist governments has varied considerably from country to country and so have the policies that these governments have pursued. Although some leftist governments have implemented both ethnic and populist policies, others have focused more on populist policies or have largely eschewed both types of policies.

Evo Morales and the MAS in Bolivia have gone furthest in implementing pro-indigenous policies. Upon taking office, the Morales administration oversaw the drafting of a new Bolivian constitution. The new constitution recognized the country as plurinational, granted official recognition to various indigenous languages, and made the indigenous flag, the *wiphala*, one of the country’s national symbols. The new constitution also granted the indigenous population the right to territorial autonomy and self-governance, including the right to benefit from the exploitation of natural resources in their lands, to employ traditional forms of justice, and to elect their own leaders through traditional practices. In addition, the Morales administration has sought to expand the teaching of indigenous languages and history, it has mandated indigenous representation and indigenous language use in some state institutions, and it has passed legislation that tightens the laws against ethnic and racial discrimination.

The Correa administration in Ecuador, by contrast, has adopted a much more limited ethnic agenda. As noted earlier, the government has had a poor relationship with the main indigenous organizations in Ecuador and it has largely marginalized them from the policymaking process. The Correa administration also has taken over and restructured the privately managed pension system and has implemented an agrarian reform measure that has redistributed a significant amount of land to indigenous and peasant communities. The Morales administration has been careful to keep inflation under control, however, by maintaining rather conservative fiscal policies, and it has sought to expand its trade links to countries throughout the world.

The Correa administration in Ecuador, by contrast, has adopted a much more limited ethnic agenda. As noted earlier, the government has had a poor relationship with the main indigenous organizations in Ecuador and it has largely marginalized them from the policymaking process. It has rejected efforts by the indigenous movement to control mining in indigenous territories and it has repressed indigenous protests. The Correa administration, however,
has aggressively pursued populist policies. It has boosted social spending, renegotiated oil and mining contracts with foreign companies, and adopted more interventionist policies on foreign trade. The Correa administration has also taken a hard line with its foreign creditors.

Finally, the Humala administration in Peru has avoided both ethnic and populist policies. Indigenous leaders and organizations have not played a prominent role in the Humala administration, and it has mostly declined to embrace indigenous rights. It has largely maintained the same market-oriented policies as its predecessors, declining to nationalize foreign enterprises or antagonize foreign investors and creditors. The Humala administration has retained Peru’s commitment to free trade policies and expanded its trade links with its neighbors.

All three administrations have enjoyed similar economic policy successes in spite of these policy differences. The economies of all three countries have grown rapidly, inflation has largely remained under control, and poverty has declined sharply. However, inequality, which dropped sharply in Bolivia and Ecuador between 2008 and 2011 has begun to increase again, and poverty rates continue to be much higher in indigenous than in nonindigenous areas.

To address this gap, the governments of all three nations will need to invest heavily in social programs. These programs do not need to be narrowly targeted at indigenous people. Conditional cash transfer programs, minimum wages, and educational investments, for example, have all been shown to reduce poverty and inequality in indigenous areas even when they have not been narrowly targeted at indigenous citizens. Nevertheless, it is crucial that Latin American governments pursue inclusive policies that seek to bring development to the entire country, rather than just focusing on a few core areas.

NOTES

1. I code party ideology using the database on Latin American party ideology from Baker and Greene (2011). This data is available at: http://spot.colorado.edu/~bakerab/data.html.

2. Electoral volatility tended to be higher in indigenous areas than in non-indigenous areas, however, and indigenous voters tended to split their votes among more parties (Madrid 2005a, b).

3. Indigenous voters have also supported non-leftist parties in some cases, most notably Lucio Gutiérrez’s Patriotic Solidarity Party, but the vast majority of their votes have gone to leftist parties in recent years.

4. These figures exclude the departments of Chuquisaca, Santa Cruz, and Potosí for which data were not available.

5. I identify majority indigenous departments and provinces in Bolivia using data from the 2001 census in Bolivia on the number of indigenous language speakers. I also use language data from the 2001 census to identify majority Aymara and Quechua areas. The language data is highly correlated with self-identification data across sub-national units.

6. I use self-identification data from the 2001 census in Ecuador to identify majority indigenous counties and provinces.

7. I use language data from the 1993 census in Peru to identify indigenous majority provinces in the country.

REFERENCES


That there has been a massive increase in income inequality in the United States over the past generation is no longer news. Still, the transformation has been extraordinary in several respects. It is not just that the shift in relative economic resources has been very large; it is that the gains have been extremely concentrated at the very top of the income distribution. Occupy Wall Street’s “We are the 99%” slogan was perhaps insufficiently inclusive—the largest gains have gone not just to the top 1%, but to the top .1% and top .01%. The latter group has seen its share of national income grow by roughly 600% in the past 40 years (Saez 2015). Equally striking is the distinctiveness of the American experience. Although there has been some growth of inequality in most affluent democracies, the United States is an outlier, both with respect to changes in broad measures of inequality and with respect to the hyper-concentration of gains at the very top of the income distribution (Piketty 2014).

Racially grounded conflict has always shaped the American experience, not least with respect to the distribution of economic opportunities and rewards. But where does race fit into the profound drift toward economic oligarchy we are experiencing? On the effects of rising inequality the case is clear: disadvantaged minorities have on the whole been big losers from the upward redistribution of national income. Most obviously, anything that makes existing wealth a bigger source of future economic well-being is going to be relatively disadvantageous to those who have little of it, as is true for historically disadvantaged minorities in the United States (Piketty 2014). There is also evidence of a “Great Gatsby curve” that suggests declining opportunities for upward mobility as a society’s income distribution becomes more unequal (Krueger 2012). Because minorities are disproportionately located toward the bottom of the income distribution, they would likely be net losers from any decline in mobility associated with rising income inequality.

Finally, even the limited wealth that American minorities possessed turned out to be acutely vulnerable to the financial crisis (itself arguably a manifestation of winner-take-all inequality). During the Great Recession, the median white family lost 16% of its wealth, while the median black family lost just over half and the median Latino family lost two-thirds (Taylor, Kochar, and Fry 2011). This astonishing disparity reflects a history of disadvantage that left much of the limited wealth minorities had accumulated in the most precarious parts of the housing market. Just as “last hired, first fired” seniority systems worked against those seeking to break through systems of social exclusion, today’s housing bubbles disproportionately damaged the last ones able to buy.

Rising inequality has a disparate impact on racial minorities, but what about racial conflict and inequities as a potential causal factor in generating the shift in income distribution? A fair amount of comparative evidence suggests that high levels of racial and ethnic heterogeneity are likely to retard redistributive efforts in general, and that these forces have probably played a role in limiting the scope of the welfare state in the United States in particular (Alesina and Glaeser 2004). Nonetheless, most treatments of the recent rise in inequality have downplayed the contribution of race.

One possible reason for dismissing the causal significance of race is offered by Howard Rosenthal (2004, 868): “...it is hard to see racism as hardening in the last quarter of the twentieth century when inequality increased. Racism and racial tension seem to have been at least as rife when inequality fell.” Yet even if we accept Rosenthal’s assertion that racism and racial tension have not increased we are left with two possible conclusions. The first is

Acknowledgements: This chapter draws heavily on joint work with Jacob Hacker, and I am grateful for extended discussions of these issues with him, as well as the helpful feedback of other taskforce participants.
Rosenthal’s: race doesn’t have much to do with the rise in inequality. The second possibility is that race matters, but that it does so through its interaction with changes in other factors within the social environment. As Soss, Fording, and Schram (2011, 55) have noted, with respect to the deep scars of race in the United States, too many analysts are drawn to “linear stories of progress that celebrate the enlightened present. By suggesting that race matters less today, such stories obscure the possibility that race now matters in new ways, and in ways that reflect the legacies of earlier eras.”

It is this second possibility that I explore in this chapter. There is a good case to be made for the claim that racism and racial tension are in fact important sources of rising inequality, including rising top-end inequality. Of course, after one considers the possibility of interaction effects there might be many possible arguments one could construct about the role of race. I focus on only one: its connection to the American party system, and, in turn, the transformed party system’s impact on inequality. The chapter takes up these two stages of the argument in reverse order. Drawing on previous work with Jacob Hacker, I briefly describe the impact of the current American party system (specifically the radicalization of the Republican Party, or GOP) on inequality, and then turn to the argument that race is likely a major factor in explaining why the GOP has radicalized around economic issues, and has been able to do so in a politically sustainable way.

AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND RISING INEQUALITY

It is, of course, widely recognized that the two parties have polarized over the past generation. There is more controversy about how to characterize the movement of the parties that produces this polarization. Many analysts either ignore the question, or suggest implicitly or explicitly that it reflects a relatively equal move of both parties away from the median voter (Fiorina 2005). Yet there is strong and mounting evidence that polarization is better characterized as asymmetric—that is, a result largely of the Republican Party’s sharp turn to the right (Hacker and Pierson 2015; Mann and Ornstein 2012; Theriault 2013).

The Evidence of Asymmetric Polarization

The most obvious evidence of asymmetry lies in the DW-Nominate scores of congressional roll call votes that provided the core empirical observations of polarization. As the creators of these scores recently put it, “...the data are clear that this is a Republican-led phenomenon where very conservative Republicans have replaced moderate Republicans and Southern Democrats. ... Moreover, the rise of the ‘Tea Party’ will likely only move Congressional Republicans further away from the political center” (Hare, McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2012). Extensions of DW-Nominate to presidential and to vice-presidential candidates show the same pattern (Hacker and Pierson 2015). So do—more weakly—data on state legislatures (Schorr 2013). Similar techniques recently used to place Supreme Court justices on a left-right scale showed that while Democratic appointees on the Court were moderate by modern standards, four of the then-current GOP appointees were among the six most conservative justices to serve on the Court in the last 75 years, while the fifth (Kennedy) was in the top 10 (Liptak 2010).

Other signs of asymmetry are more difficult to quantify, but increasingly difficult to ignore. Most important is the striking and intensifying pattern over the past 20 years of what Tushnet (2004) has called “constitutional hardball.” In the past two decades—since asymmetric polarization entered a new and more intense phase with the rise to power of Newt Gingrich—the GOP has repeatedly violated established norms (without breaking legal restrictions) to gain partisan advantage. The instances of GOP-instigated hardball include extending the filibuster to block virtually all majority party initiatives, repeated government shutdowns, the impeachment of President Clinton, disabling established agencies by refusing to make any appointments to top posts, and “hostage-taking” related to debt ceiling increases. At the state level, Republicans have resorted to mid-decade reapportionments and engaged in systematic disenfranchisement of Democratic voting blocks.

This list is neither short nor are the items trivial. It is this set of practices that led Mann and Ornstein (2012), two of the most respected and moderate voices in the profession, to recently conclude: “The GOP has become an insurgent outlier in American politics. It is ideologically extreme; scornful of compromise; unmoved by conventional understanding of facts, evidence and science; and dismissive of the legitimacy of its political opposition.”

Crucially for my argument, asymmetry is visible in policy stances as well. There is clear evidence that the Republican Party has moved sharply to the right on domestic policy issues most relevant to addressing inequality (Hacker and Pierson 2010; Hacker and Pierson 2016). Since 1990 it has essentially renounced tax increases under all circumstances. It has rejected progressivity as an important goal of the tax code, instead making tax cuts for the wealthiest Americans its highest priority. It has turned against financial regulation. It has rejected health-care
reforms (like the Affordable Care Act) as socialist, even when they closely follow models that Republicans advocated not many years ago. While treading delicately because of the difficult politics involved, Republicans have taken increasingly critical stances on long-established social programs like Medicare, Social Security, and Medicaid. Unlike the Democrats’ leftward movement on a few issues like gay marriage, there is little sign that the GOP’s rightward shift on economic issues matches observed changes in public opinion.

Finally, and tellingly, there has been a marked rightward shift in the party’s rhetoric concerning the role of government. Drawing a contrast between “makers and takers” has assumed a central place in the Republican rhetorical repertoire. GOP leaders have increasingly emphasized dependence on government as an existential threat to American society. In the words of recently elected Iowa senator Joni Ernst, “What we have fostered is really a generation of people that rely on the government to provide absolutely everything for them. ... [W]e’re at a point where the government will just give away anything” (Kilgore 2014).

The most famous expression of the maker/taker dichotomy was, of course, Mitt Romney’s “47%” analysis offered to fund-raisers during the 2012 presidential campaign. But Romney’s maker/taker frame was not just a momentary private indiscretion—it is increasingly common in GOP rhetoric. The same sort of language has been central to major speeches of Paul Ryan, the man often seen as the leading idea guy in the modern Republican Party. Tellingly, Ryan was added to the 2012 ticket to provide balance to the insufficiently conservative Romney. Ryan’s credibility with the Republican base was built around the “Ryan budgets” passed by the House GOP caucus. Even with more-than-typical levels of ambiguity, these budgets called for staggering cuts in future spending in Medicaid, Medicare, and other domestic programs. Ryan repeatedly warned of a “tipping point” in which the American way of life is “transformed into a soft despotism” keeping “everyone in a happy state of childhood.” He accused the government of designing a “hammock, which lulls able-bodied people into lives of complacency and dependency” (Noah 2012). In an address to the American Enterprise Institute he referred to the “insidious moral turning point” when “we become a nation of net takers versus makers.”

Denigration of half the electorate was just part of the new GOP framing of our political economy. The other side of the coin was the rapturous celebration of a tiny segment of Americans as the wellspring of prosperity. Here too, there was a new addition to our political lexicon: “job creators.” The extent to which these heroic figures came to dominate Republican frames was revealed in the tweet GOP leader Eric Cantor chose to send out on Labor Day 2012: “Today, we celebrate those who have taken a risk, worked hard, built a business and earned their success.”

It is important to recognize just how substantial a move to the right this rhetorical posture represents. Of course, Ronald Reagan’s conservatism was tough on government. Still, his rhetoric was vastly more inclusive than that of the 2012 GOP presidential campaign. In depicting government-supported parasites, Reagan would typically focus on a tiny subset of the population: the “welfare cheats” who were exploiting the rest of us. “Makers and takers” dramatically widened the circle of “dependency” to include roughly half the population. Equally significant, the depiction of “job creators” radically narrowed the circle of the truly productive to embrace a tiny fraction of citizens. With respect to economic issues, only those at the fringes of the conservative movement in the 1980s and early 1990s would have embraced the combined rhetorical moves now common in the GOP.

The new framework was, in essence, an espousal of Ayn Rand’s political economy. Her trilogy of “producers,” “looters” (i.e., government), and “moochers” is here compressed to “makers” and “takers,” but the vision of government remains that of a malignant force extracting from the former on behalf of the latter. Rand’s world-view is not marginal to modern Republican politics. One leading light in the party is named after her. A second, Ryan, openly celebrated her centrality to his political vision—at least until it became unpopular to do so. He handed out copies of Atlas Shrugged to staffs as Christmas presents, and stated in 2005 that if he “had to credit one thinker, one person” for why he got involved in public service “it would be Ayn Rand” (Mayer 2012). Embracing Rand’s unapologetic elitism is an astonishing move for a political party that must compete in mass elections, a move for which there is no parallel in any other rich democracy outside of fringe parties.
Asymmetric Polarization and Income Inequality

Hacker and I have argued that the GOP’s profound shift to the right on economic issues has been a significant contributor to rising income inequality in the United States (Hacker and Pierson 2010). While it would be a mistake to absolve Democrats entirely of responsibility for inequalitarian policy initiatives in the United States, there have been stark differences between the parties on core policy issues. Repeatedly, the modern GOP has shown that it places an extraordinarily high priority on advancing and then protecting tax reductions for a remarkably narrow slice of American voters.

In some important areas, most notably high-end tax cuts, Republicans have successfully pushed for major legislation that has produced substantial increases in income inequality (Bartels 2008). Equally important, however, has been the role of GOP obstruction in promoting “policy drift” (Hacker 2004) that is highly favorable to the well-to-do. Governments have long played a central role in influencing the distribution of “private” incomes through their policy choices. Throughout the twentieth century, elected officials periodically updated policies to respond to the evolution of markets. In the past few decades, such updating has virtually ceased—at least in areas where it might counteract the explosion of earnings at the top.

In areas as diverse as industrial relations, the minimum wage, financial regulation, and corporate governance (regarding executive pay), the GOP has consistently and effectively obstructed any governmental efforts to respond to the evolution of markets (Bonica, McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2013; Hacker and Pierson 2010).

Over the past few decades, a homogeneously conservative GOP combined high levels of party unity with an expanded willingness to utilize the filibuster. The result has been unprecedented levels of minority obstruction. In turn, this obstruction has made it extremely difficult to adopt policies that might address mounting income inequality. It is no coincidence that the Affordable Care Act—the most significant downwardly redistributive policy of the past four decades—was passed during a brief window when GOP numbers in Congress were at their lowest level since the 1970s. It received zero Republican votes.

Race and Realignment

In addition to these forces, race has arguably been central to the long-term and continuing transformation of the Republican Party. Its impact has worked through at least two important mechanisms. The first linkage between race and the GOP’s rightward march relates to partisan realignment, and specifically to the “Southernization” of the modern Republican Party. The sequence here is well-known but still deserves emphasis. A crucial trigger of partisan polarization was the rise of the civil rights movement, which led to a clearer ideological demarcation between the two parties. This in turn provoked a gradual movement of conservatives (at both the elite and mass level) into the Republican Party. Fateful, it aligned what is by far the most conservative region of the country with the GOP (Carmines and Stimson 1989).

Despite some pushback (Shafer and Johnston 2009) there is ample evidence that racial attitudes among white southern conservatives were key to this political transformation. Partisan positioning around the civil rights movement was highly salient in the South. After showing some hesitation, Republican elites decisively signaled their more conservative stance on the cluster of issues associated with racial liberalism. As Larry Bartels has documented, long-term electoral realignment had a strikingly Southern flavor: “While it is true that white voters without college degrees have become more Republican in their presidential voting behavior over the past half-century, that trend is almost entirely confined to the South” (Bartels 2006).

Of course, it is possible that this had nothing to do with race—possible, but not likely. Evidence suggests that the shift away from the Democrats was especially dramatic...
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The anchoring of the country’s most conservative region to the country’s more conservative party has helped push the entire party rightward, facilitating its contribution to rising income inequality. The long-term shift in the Senate is striking. In 1960 all of the 22 senators from the former confederacy were Democrats. Today, 19 of 22 are Republicans. The Southern contingent within the House Republican caucus has grown in size in every election save one since 1976. Given the strength of incumbency, the transformation has played out very gradually. After the 1994 “Republican Revolution” election that catapulted Newt Gingrich to the Speakership, Southerners held 69 of the 230 House Republican seats. After the 2012 election, Southerners held 98 of 233.

In short, the racial roots of the modern GOP are very clear.

Arguably, the “weight” of the South in GOP politics was even greater than these raw numbers. Southerners have provided the majority of the party’s congressional leadership (including Gingrich, McConnell, Armey, DeLay, Cantor, and Lott) over the past two decades. And unsurprisingly, Southern members in both House and Senate have been disproportionately represented in the party’s most conservative and militant wing. They are far more likely to be members of the Tea Party caucus, and were significantly more likely to take the more radical position in recent fights that led to a government shutdown and a risky game of chicken over raising the debt ceiling.

of the Republican Party’s posture on economic policy. As I argued in the first part of this chapter, the GOP has moved far to the right on a host of economic issues as well as in its rhetorical framing around those issues. Increasingly, the GOP’s rhetoric and, in many cases, its policy stances, seem built on a libertarian or “Randian” framing of politics in which government transfers represent illegitimate takings. The increasing prominence in Republican discourse of the maker/taker juxtaposition and the deployment of the term “job creators” as a way of referring to employers are consistent with its growing opposition to practices that entail some degree of redistribution—including practices that are long-established.2

For political scientists who expect parties to consider the demands of the median voter, the development of such a stark stance on political economy issues presents a puzzle (Hacker and Pierson 2015). The GOP’s rhetorical and policy shifts contradict an elegant formalization of democratic politics, which suggests that increasing inequality should increase demand for redistribution that benefits the median voter (Melzer and Richard 1981). It is one thing for a major political party to rhetorically target a small population stigmatized as “welfare cheats.” It is quite another thing to disparage roughly half the population (“the 47%”), and to marginalize most of the rest of the electorate through rhetoric that lionizes a tiny sliver of entrepreneurs.

The GOP’s sharp shift on distributional issues, which would seem to raise electoral challenges, thus represents a considerable puzzle. The question is how much, if at all, the presence of racial antipathies in the GOP contributes to GOP voters’ support for, or acquiescence to, a fiercely anti-redistributive agenda—or, more accurately, an agenda that actually promotes redistribution toward a narrow group at the top. Theoretically, this provides one plausible account for why the Melzer/Richard model would not hold (Lee and Roemer 2006).

Again, I do not want to suggest that racial tensions are the only reason that Republican rhetoric and policy stances have come to so fiercely support policies favoring
top income groups. Other forces, such as the growing political organization of business and the wealthy, the rise of conservative media, the emergence of evangelical Christians as a potent political force, and the increasingly favorable alignment of the GOP coalition with geographic biases in American electoral politics, have clearly played important roles.

Moreover, the capacity to send racial messages without using openly racial language makes pinpointing the role of racial antipathy in electoral and partisan politics considerably more difficult. “Dog-whistle politics” is now an established art in conservative circles; its role in the development of the modern GOP is well-documented (Haney Lopez 2014; McAdam and Kloos 2014; Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011; Weaver 2007). Conservative Republicans vigorously denounce any suggestion that race is a factor in their intensifying rejection of large stretches of federal domestic policy.

Nonetheless, evidence suggests that race is in fact a significant ingredient in the cocktail of Republican hostility to the federal government and particularly to redistributive policies. The GOP’s political stronghold is now located in the Deep South, which is simultaneously poorer, more racially heterogeneous, and more intensely conservative than other areas of GOP strength. Valentino and Sears (2006) find substantial evidence that in the South there is a strong, even growing linkage over time between racial conservatism and attachment to the GOP. This result is consistent with striking new research on the legacies of slavery in modern political behavior. In a detailed and careful study, Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen (2015) find that “whites who currently live in Southern counties that had high shares of slaves in 1860 are more likely to identify as a Republican, oppose affirmative action, and express racial resentment and colder feelings toward blacks.”

The Revealing Case of the Affordable Care Act

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) presents a remarkably useful case study for examining the broader dynamics of GOP antipathy to redistribution. NFIB v. Sebelius (an unanticipated Supreme Court ruling in 2012) generated something of a natural experiment. States suddenly needed to decide whether to expand Medicaid enrollment. The expansion would have been supported by heavy subsidies from the federal government. Because the program would have largely benefitted low-income residents, the ensuing political dynamics were highly suggestive.

As written, the ACA was extremely redistributive toward heavily Republican “red” states. These states pay considerably lower federal taxes per capita. They pay an even lower share of the main tax sources for ACA expansion, which targeted affluent Americans. Even more important, low-income households are far more prevalent in red states (and especially Southern states), and existing Medicaid rules there were far more restrictive. Therefore, these states stood to receive huge inflows of money from the ACA’s Medicaid expansion as well as its income-tested subsidies for private insurance. The Supreme Court’s controversial decision on the ACA—ironically relying on five Republican appointees for its majority—gave states the option of rejecting Medicaid expansion. This development unexpectedly jeopardized much of that massive redistribution from Democratic “blue” states to red states.

It is difficult to exaggerate what a bad deal this new option is for the states. The individual states were being asked to make a very modest contribution to Medicaid expansion—in return, they would get a huge flow of resources. Moreover, much of the expected inflow would go not just to low-income households that would now hold insurance, but also—through that insurance—to health-care providers, including hospitals, which will be financially squeezed in the absence of these anticipated resources.

Despite these extremely powerful financial incentives, as of 2014, 24 states had rejected Medicaid expansion. The list of rejectionists included almost all the states that stood to gain the most financially. Acceptance would not only provide insurance coverage for more than 7 million people. It would also bring in an estimated $423 billion in federal funding over a decade, providing almost $170 billion in reimbursements to hospitals as well as increased state employment. Even though states would have to modestly increase Medicaid expenditures (one dollar for every 13.4 contributed by the federal government) the net effect on state budgets would have been positive (Dorn, McGrath, and Holahan 2014).

This opposition has been concentrated in the old states of the confederacy, only one of which (Arkansas) has accepted Medicaid expansion. Of course, there is a long history of Southern ambivalence about national redistributive programs. Substantial research has suggested the significance of racial antipathies in driving that resistance (Lieberman 2001). Yet even against that historical backdrop, the political opposition within red states to the ACA is stunning. While racism and the desire to sustain the Jim Crow racial order played a considerable role in the history of Southern resistance to the welfare state, a reasonable politico-economic logic was at work. Social policies like Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Social Security, or a higher minimum wage threatened to increase the reservation wage of the poor—that is, the lowest wage at which they would be willing to accept a
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Public opinion research supports the possibility that racial frames are fueling political resistance to the ACA (Tesler 2012). Racial antipathy seems to play a significant role in evaluation of the program, reinforced by the identification of health-care reform with President Obama. As Tesler argues, there is now strong evidence that if policies can be identified with particular groups, voters may transfer their evaluation of the groups to the policies. This can be true even if the actual association of the group with the policy is tenuous at best. The racial divide on health-care reform is not only far greater today than it was with Clinton’s proposals in the 1990s; whites are more hostile to the same described proposal when it is attributed to Obama rather than Clinton.

CONCLUSION: RACE AND TOP-END INEQUALITY

Critics (e.g., the Soss and Weaver contribution to this taskforce) are correct. Investigations of rising inequality have too often downplayed the significance of racial divisions. In this brief analysis, I have sketched out two of the pathways through which racially grounded conflict very likely contributed to the startling shift of income to a relatively small cluster of very affluent Americans. Both pathways work through the GOP, whose sharp rightward movement on economic issues has been a key contributor to rising top-end inequality.

Evidence concerning the first pathway—race as a key driver of political realignment, consolidating the nation’s most conservative elements in a single party—is strong. Evidence on the second pathway—racial antipathies as a key feature expanding the electoral base (and hence the political practicality) for extremely antiredistributionist policy stances in the GOP—is more circumstantial.

Indeed, the nature of dog-whistle politics may mean that such evidence is necessarily circumstantial—that the alternative hypothesis is essentially un falsifiable. It will almost always be possible to posit “ideological” rather than racially grounded rationales for opposition to particular policies—even if those ideological positions are riddled with inconsistencies.
Nonetheless, the circumstantial evidence available is considerable. Much of it is grounded in behavioral research that has used innovative techniques to highlight the presence of racial antipathies in conservative white electorates, especially in the South. In this chapter I have sought first to draw a plausible connection between these sentiments and support within the GOP (including among those on relatively low incomes) for a “Randian” stance toward redistribution that is largely absent from partisan politics outside the United States. Second, I have deployed policy-grounded evidence derived from the case of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion rules, post NFIB v. Sebelius. Comparative evidence bolsters the case for racial antipathy playing a role. I am unaware of any prior example of a poor region rejecting such huge transfers when they are packaged in a way that would not significantly raise reservation wages.

NOTES
1. Including my work with Jacob Hacker (Hacker and Pierson 2010).
2. Of course such stances need not be philosophically consistent. Indeed, despite the popularity of such rhetoric in “red” states, those states actually contribute far less in federal taxes than they take out in benefits, while the reverse is true of “blue” states (Lacy 2009).
3. In this respect resistance to Medicaid expansion parallels recent GOP-led efforts to raise hurdles to voting. A recent study found evidence that these restrictions “are highly partisan, strategic, and racialized affairs.” All other things being equal, new restrictions became considerably more likely where there was a large minority population, where minority turnout had increased, and where Republicans control legislatures. These findings, the authors conclude, “are consistent with a scenario in which the targeted demobilization of minority voters and African Americans is a central driver of legislative developments” (Bentele and O’Brien 2013).

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