In 2015, Americans learned from the US Department of Justice (DOJ) that public authorities had imposed a “predatory system of government” on poor black citizens in Ferguson, Missouri (Chait 2014). The extensiveness of police repression and harassment, deployed to extract revenues for the municipality, looked eerily similar to the practices of authoritarian regimes. The government of a small inner-ring suburb of St. Louis, we learned, had designed an aggressive system of “poverty traps” for the citizens. Ferguson residents, primarily poor and black, were targeted, arrested, and summonsed on civil-ordinance violations; they were assessed prohibitive fines and fees and subjected to jail if they failed to pay (US Department of Justice 2015). Many discovered it was almost impossible to escape the resulting cycle of perpetual debt, which often drew them into further entanglements with police and courts. It soon became clear that whereas Ferguson officials may have been masterful in their repression and pilfering—generating an average of three arrest warrants per household and fees sufficient to sustain a municipal government—they were hardly alone. Local governments around the country, which also approached their poor black and Latino residents as suspect populations, were actively pursuing similar projects of governance (Harris 2016).

As a popular uprising emerged, journalists quickly set to work, adding to the damning evidence in the DOJ report and constructing varied interpretations of the newly visible municipal repression and collusion between the municipality’s budgetary arm and its police forces. The same dramatic events, however, appeared to catch off guard many in our field of political science, in unfamiliar empirical territory and lacking a conceptual language to describe what unfolded. Indeed, the American politics subfield appeared to be ill-prepared for Ferguson—out of step in a manner reminiscent of its fumbled responses to the social injustices of Hurricane Katrina a decade earlier and waves of urban rioting and protest several decades before that (Frymer, Strolovitch, and Warren 2006).

As political dissent grew, it revealed a considerable disconnect between the repressive state practices under dispute in localities and the frameworks, concerns, and focus on national institutions that prevail in the subfield of American politics today. There simply was not much on the “intellectual rack” that could be used to make this aspect of US politics and governance more legible, explain its sources, and specify it through empirical analysis. Indeed, the vital journalism that emerged thrust into the spotlight governmental practices that had rarely been discussed or measured by the field’s mainstream scholars—practices that were deeply at odds with democratic ideals and prevailing models of US politics and citizenship.

Scholars from our subfield had important things to say about Ferguson, of course. In op-eds and prominent political science blogs (e.g., The Washington Post’s Monkey Cage), they explained how off-year elections and nonpartisan ballots work in US politics to diminish voter knowledge and turnout, much to the advantage of powerful organized interests. They reflected on the cavernous racial divide in public attitudes toward the criminal justice system and offered thoughtful commentaries on the protesters’ use of social media to solve collective action problems. As community protests grew, scholars offered sharp insights into whether the “Ferguson moment” might generate a movement and challenges of leadership and organization (see, e.g., Schaffner et al. 2014; Tucker 2014).

As important as these contributions were, their focus was a telling indicator of our subfield’s preoccupations (for contrasts, see e.g., Allen and Cohen 2015; Harris 2014). In recent decades, mainstream scholarship on US politics has largely retained its long-standing center of gravity, anchored in electoral-representative processes, citizen opinion and participation, politics within and among branches of national government, and policy struggles among organized interest groups. In most of this work, citizen involvement with government appears to resemble an unalloyed good; more is better than less. Those who are more engaged with electoral-representative institutions, for example, enjoy greater political voice, at the expense of those with weaker connections. Policy influence leans toward the “repeat players,” who have intimate ties with governance, and away from those who are ignored by officialdom. Those who are more fully incorporated into the welfare
We focus on the state’s welfare and criminal justice systems . . . because the institutions and agents of these systems play pivotal roles in the operations of state power, governance, citizenship, and politics in RCS communities.
Thus, as protests emerged in Ferguson in 2014 and spread to West Baltimore, Charleston, Staten Island, and Cleveland, questions about unequal voting rates fit the subfield’s research agenda far better than questions about the state–citizen encounters that residents in these communities had actually been experiencing in their dealings with police, schools, jails, bail offices, and the gamut of local institutions that encircle the poor. Biased representation on the city council fell right into our wheelhouse, but we had less to draw on when asked about how state power operates in communities like Ferguson and why people there found it so difficult to resist the control and exploitation of public authorities. If asked about relevant dynamics of public opinion or why there was not more responsiveness to the “median voter,” we could easily describe a conventional subfield view. However, when asked about police power and state repression in local communities of color, or asked about mass resistance to governmental predation, what could we in the American politics subfield offer as a well-considered, empirically warranted prevailing view? It is telling that when *The Monkey Cage* did turn to the latter issues (in an excellent essay by Henry Farrell), it bypassed the American politics subfield and drew instead on insights from sociologist Charles Tilly’s analysis of European history to explain why “Ferguson’s government was run like a racket” (Farrell 2015).

In communities like Ferguson, the state was actively deployed against its citizens and residents; it was a persistent threat and a force of domination and exploitation in their lives. To focus, then, on how these residents were insufficiently incorporated into governmental processes (e.g., through electoral and representative institutions) is to frame political analysis at the outset in a way that is deeply at odds with their political experience. To be blunt: the mainstream of our subfield has been intellectually uncurious about such political experiences because they do not fit neatly into the electoral-representative dynamics that have become the taken-for-granted object of our attention. Few have asked how governance is practiced in communities at the bottom of America’s ethnoracial and class orders or paused to consider that electoral-representative frameworks may result in a blinkered perspective that actually distorts critically important political dynamics in local communities. The powerful political questions raised by protesters and the DOJ report were difficult for our subfield to answer because, for the most part, they fell outside of our chosen field of view.

In this chapter, we encourage our colleagues to expand this field of view. Toward that end, we explore several underlying sources of the disconnect between our subfield’s mainstream and the political lives of RCS communities. We focus on the state’s welfare and criminal justice systems—not only because they stand at the center of our own work as political scientists, but also because the institutions and agents of these systems play pivotal roles in the operations of state power, governance, citizenship, and politics in RCS communities. The latter observation should not be mysterious. More than a century ago, W. E. B. Du Bois said of his Philadelphia neighborhood that “police were our government and philanthropy dropped in with periodic advice” (Du Bois 1968, 195). A half-century ago, the Kerner Commission singled out “police practices” and the conditions of “welfare programs” as two of the top grievances leading RCS communities to rise up in the streets (United States 1968). In 2015, attorney general Loretta Lynch observed that in communities like Ferguson, police often represent the “only face of government that [residents] see” (Lynch 2016).

We begin first with the subfield’s prevailing approaches to race and class, clarifying how they obscure key dynamics of subjugation that are fundamental to the political lives of RCS communities. Second, we discuss subfield assumptions about where politics happens, whose politics merits our attention, and which types of political activities matter for the quality of American democracy. Third, we take a closer look at the study of welfare and criminal justice systems in the subfield of US politics, clarifying how and why prevailing approaches have focused so little on their social control functions and governmental uses. Fourth, we return to race and class, urging our subfield to give greater attention to how these and other axes of differentiation and inequality emerge and change as political outcomes produced, in part, through governing practices such as those carried out by welfare and carceral institutions.

In what follows, we hope to convince students of US politics that the important research our subfield pursues on the first face of the American state should be complemented by more sustained, careful attention to its second face. In fact, we suggest that understanding of the former will remain distorted in important ways as long as it is not connected to a more thorough understanding of the latter. Marginalization in electoral-representative politics both reflects and enables the practices of subjugation and repression that we describe as the American state’s “second face.” Or, we might as easily say that the latter reflects and produces the former. Scholars distort understandings of both faces of the American state when we pay attention to only one—or imagine that the two are connected by a one-way causal relationship running from representation to governance. The two, in fact, are deeply entwined, with changes in one reverberating through the other. Thus, whereas effective political change may emerge from the greater incorporation of RCS communities into electoral-
representative processes, it also may emerge through direct efforts to disrupt, resist, and overturn the modes of governance that constitute the state's second face.

PERSPECTIVES ON RACE, CLASS, AND US POLITICS

To make sense of the mismatch between the Ferguson moment and our subfield's dominant lens, we begin with race and class: first, as they operate in RCS communities, and second, as political scientists typically address them in the study of US politics. Our goal is not to adjudicate longstanding debates about how best to conceptualize race and class (see, e.g., Back and Solomos 2009; Wright 2005) or to argue for a “best” model. Rather, we aim to unsettle the subfield’s prevailing approach by showing how it clashes with experiences of governance in RCS communities and approaches in fields that have given greater attention to them.

Many scholars working in critical theory, history, and sociology take it as axiomatic that we must ask how racial hierarchies enable and structure class relations, how class relations constitute and organize race in America, and how the two together intersect with other axes of differentiation and power (e.g., gender). From this perspective, scholars are drawn to ask how race and class relations are interwoven in the lives of RCS communities and how best to conceptualize the terms of their interplay (see, e.g., Gordon 2008; Gowen 2010; Hayward 2013; Kim 2000; Sharkey 2013; Sugrue 1996; Wilson 1997). These questions have been a guiding concern for sociology, for example, ever since the dawn of the twentieth century, when W. E. B. Du Bois and Max Weber identified the interplay of race and class system as foundational (see, e.g., Morris 2015). By contrast, in the American politics subfield, race and class typically are conceptualized as alternative explanations, hailed into empirical analysis in the form of separate independent variables.

It is perhaps for this reason that in our own studies of citizens’ welfare and criminal justice encounters—based on in-depth interviews conducted approximately 15 years apart—we are struck by how experiences in RCS communities disrupt the tidy analytic opposition of race and class variables (Lerman and Weaver 2014; Soss 2000). Many of our study participants declined to impose separate frames of class or race as a lens for interpreting what Evelyn Nakano Glenn (2011) called experiences of “substantive citizenship.” Class was central to the lived reality of race for poor black and Latino informants, just as racial subordination wove its way through their understanding of being lower class. Many avoided these categories altogether and hedged when asked about one versus the other. Instead, they spoke of an overarching sense of being minor and marginal—a sense that, as poor people of color, they were subjects targeted by state power more than citizens in a system of democratic governance. They often spoke not of predefined categories to which they belonged (e.g., black, Latino, Asian, poor, or wealthy) but rather of their experiences with the state and how these experiences were broadly shared across their communities. Consider the following (Soss 1999, 368):

They [state authorities] make decisions that influence or govern the smaller people in the world, people who don’t have no say-so or nothing.... I’m what you call the “little man.” I’ll always be the small man. I don’t have any power. I don’t have any say-so.... Power is...I don’t know what word I’m looking for. It’s a dominating type of thing. You can move people around like puppets just by making laws and having the police enforce those laws. If you do something that the people with power don’t like, they’ll have you arrested, and there’s nothing you can do about it.

The little people are like us, people that live in houses like these, you know transitional housing, I’m talking about men and women alike. If you don’t have a job and you getting things from the government or such as welfare or whatever, you’re part of the little people. But if you actually going out there and getting a job or actually have a job and you know and pay, you know. If you not paying into the system, you’re looked over.1,2

In recent decades, a growing number of scholars have engaged the co-constitutive relationship between race and class via the concept of intersectionality (see, e.g., Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall 2013; Crenshaw 1991). Framed in this manner, race, class, gender, and other dimensions of social differentiation do not produce disadvantages in “additive” ways (e.g., disadvantages of race added to those of class) but rather through a conjunctural logic that constitutes distinctive positions in relations of power and oppression (e.g., the position of a lower-class Asian American woman). In recent decades, intersectionality scholarship has flourished in fields such as critical race theory and gender studies and become prominent in disciplines such as sociology, law, and history. It has attracted a growing number of political scientists yet has largely failed to penetrate the discipline’s mainstream. Indeed, although political scientists have produced a number of acclaimed works in this vein (e.g., Cohen 1999; Hancock 2004; Strolovitch 2007), it is noteworthy that in the 15 years from 2000 to 2014, the American Political Science Review published only three articles that contained the word “intersectionality.”3

1. A live-in caretaker for an elderly relative who rented a room to a tenant.
2. A woman who lived in a modest single-family home.
Explicit use of the intersectionality concept, of course, is not required for careful attention to the interweaving of race and class in the lives of poor Americans of color. Indeed, many historians who make no use of the concept trace the origins of American racial categories to the brutally coercive labor system of slavery (Wood 2003), and they emphasize how exploitative class relations have shaped and conditioned American ideologies of racial subordination over time (Fields 1982). Discourses and practices of racial subjugation, in turn, have played a pivotal role in constructing the American “working class” as a social and political category rooted in whiteness and “free labor” (Roediger 1999). Historically and today, RCS communities have confronted labor markets structured by race and experienced race differently depending on the structure of those labor markets. Indeed, as Cybelle Fox (2012) shows in Three Worlds of Relief, profound differences in welfare provision across regions of the United States in the early twentieth century can be traced directly to distinctive configurations of racialized labor relations. To explain how RCS communities experienced the welfare state in that era, we must understand how different labor systems intersected with the particular racial constructions of poor blacks, Mexicans, and Southern and Eastern European immigrants. *Neither race nor class operated in a manner independent of the other.* Blacks in the South and Mexicans in the Southwest were both subjected to domination, exploitation, prejudice, and discrimination, for example. However, migratory labor systems in the Southwest produced a racial order that differed markedly from racial subjugation in the Jim Crow South, where more racially rooted systems of labor extraction prevailed (Fox 2012).

For RCS communities today, positioned at the intersection of race and class systems, the two dimensions of power relations remain thoroughly entwined in experiences of civic ostracism, economic marginalization, and state-led governance. Race and class blend together in denigrating discourses that construe their neighborhoods as repositories for a disordered “underclass” filled with women deemed “welfare queens” and men deemed criminal “superpredators” (Beres and Griffith 2001; Hancock 2004; Reed 1999). Experiences of labor markets remain strongly conditioned by race (Pager 2007), even as rising class inequalities have intersected with immigration and other recent developments to reconfigure the meanings and implications of racial classifications (Hoschschild, Weaver, and Burch 2012). Interminority conflict in cities continues to be shaped by the twinned experiences of race and class subordination (Kim 1999).

Indeed, when students of politics focus on RCS communities, they often part ways with the disciplinary mainstream’s tendency to address race and class separately, stressing instead the importance of class politics within racially subordinated groups (or, sometimes, racial conflicts in the context of class subordination). This perspective has proven essential for illuminating the contributions that disruptive poor and working-class blacks have made to the struggle against white supremacy (Kelley 1994). It has played a key role in efforts to explain the suppression of issue agendas through “secondary marginalization” (Cohen 1999), the vexed terrain of “respectability politics” (Harris 2012), and the construction or destruction of cross-class racial solidarities around the interests and concerns of black elites (Reed 1999; Thompson 2006).

Yet, in most scholarship in the subfield of US politics, these interplays of race and class relations remain marginal concerns. Here, the starting point for analysis typically is far from the experiences of RCS communities, in ongoing debates about government institutions, party and interest-group systems, public opinion and citizen participation, and so on. Focused in this manner and framed by the field’s heavy reliance on multivariate analysis, political scientists typically treat race and class as distinct societal variables used to test alternative causal explanations for political outcomes. In the process, efforts to study race and class as intersecting social structures and productive social forces—efforts to specify the terms of their interplay and the ways they shape, condition, and produce changes in one another—are almost wholly displaced by narrower projects of classification and coding designed to meet the needs of variable-based analysis. Thus, race typically is deployed to specify categories of subjective identity or (assigned) group membership that differentiate political actors, policy targets, and objects of public attitudes. Class typically is equated with (and reduced to) categories of socioeconomic status, measurable on the basis of possessions (e.g., education and income) or on the basis of subjective class identifications.

In treating race and class as values possessed on discrete variables, most political scientists today operate at a distance from contemporary innovations in theories of race and class. Across the social sciences, many scholars have turned toward more constructivist and relational theories of race; for example, those that emphasize how socially recognized racial “groups” are constructed over time through material and symbolic practices that establish boundaries between “social kinds” and how these racial boundaries operate as powerful social structures organizing the terms of political, economic, and social relations (see, e.g., Bonilla-Silva 1997; Brubaker 2004; Desmond and Emirbayer 2009; Fox and Guglielmo 2012; Kim 1999; Loury 2003; Loveman 1999; Wimmer 2008). Many such theories emphasize the need to analyze race “as a political construct that was created and has been deployed in order to pursue
power and maintain control” (Frymer, Strolovitch, and Warren 2006, 41). From this perspective, racial classifications and ideologies must be understood as emerging through, servicing, and shifting to accommodate historical configurations of domination, exploitation, and control (e.g., slavery and Jim Crow) and thus appear, in the first instance, in concert with the evolving terms of capitalism and class. When class and race are conceptualized in these ways, questions of social control—and the productive and repressive mechanisms of what we call the state’s second face—are built into the race–class analysis in the first instance. Race and class are conceived in terms of power and political relations organized in part by the state rather than as mere classifications of possessed traits. By contrast, most empirical research in our subfield—and, within it, a large share of work in race, ethnicity, and politics (REP)—continues to rely heavily on theoretical frameworks that reduce race to a discrete reference point for identities and attitudes, shorn of historically specific power relations, including racial threat (Blalock 1967), racial contact (Allport 1954), and racial resentment (Kinder and Sanders 1996). As Lowndes, Novkov, and Warren (2008, 13) rightly argued in a recent critique of the subfield, “Much work on racial attitudes and political behavior proceeds as if in a historical, contextual, and institutional vacuum devoid of either a causal, constitutive, or discursive narrative about racialized politics or racialized development.”

A key result of these tendencies has been to occlude the fundamental role of gender in producing and structuring relations of race and class. In reducing race to a discrete reference point for identities and attitudes, shorn of historically specific power relations, the subfield of US politics has largely banished inquiries into “the ways gender is racialized and race is gendered” (Glenn 1999, 4). Uses of gender politics to ward off threats to the racial order—for example, through alarmed calls for white male solidarity to protect white women from mythical threats of violent sexual predation at the hands of black men—fall beyond the scope of political analysis (e.g., Kantrowitz 2000). The gender specificity of the male breadwinner in capitalist class relations is placed under erasure, severed from its historical dependence on women’s domestic labor and the gendered modes of social reproduction that have enabled it (Fineman 2005). Race and class are analyzed as if their operation, historically and today, could be neatly separated from gender and assumed to have equivalent consequences for men and women.

The divisions of race from class (and both from gender) that arise from theory and method in the study of US politics tend to be reinforced in political science by the structure of subfields and strong pressures toward issue specialization. Thus, in some areas of study, race is taken to be an obvious and essential element of analysis whereas class is virtually ignored; in other areas, the reverse pattern obtains. Consider, for example, the politics of poverty and inequality. Poverty and inequality, of course, are closely related outcomes, and many governmental actions that matter for one also affect the other. Accordingly, we might expect to find a high level of “cross-fertilization” and continuity across the two political-science literatures. Yet, in our subfield’s literature on US poverty politics, racial factors take center stage, largely unaccompanied by significant scrutiny of class relations (e.g., Gilens 1999; Neubeck and Cazenave 2001). Conversely, in the scholarship on economic inequality in the United States, class power and class biases stand at the forefront of analysis whereas racial politics are largely unmentioned (e.g., Bartels 2008).

The contrast is not simply a matter of different researchers having different concerns; it is constitutive of the intellectual discourse in each subspecialty of American political science. In each literature, a deviating group (i.e., the richest or the poorest) is singled out and contrasted with the “ordinary citizens” of the American polity. Thus, on one side, the racialized poor are analyzed in relation to the American “mainstream,” with hardly a mention of the super-rich, class power, or relations of production. On the
other side, we find analyses framed by the rich pulling away from the rest, as if a common trajectory had been shared by the American middle classes and RCS communities in the lowest reaches of the social order.

Thus, in his landmark intervention in the study of poverty politics, *Why Americans Hate Welfare*, Martin Gilens (1999) wrote little about class relations, wealth accumulation, and the power of class-based interests. His analysis focused instead on racial biases in media stories on poverty and the ways that white Americans’ stereotypes of black Americans shape their attitudes toward welfare programs. By contrast, when Gilens (2012) engaged subfield debates on inequality and democracy in America in his equally acclaimed *Affluence and Influence*, class politics define the terms of analysis whereas race largely disappears from view. Equally important, the study of race in welfare politics proceeds as if the real barrier is attitudes that stymie shared preferences for redistribution across racial groups, whereas the study of inequality politics focuses on the organized power of the wealthiest Americans with hardly a mention of race. Indeed, in the indexes of three of the most influential recent political science books on the politics of inequality, references to race, racism, and racial politics are found on only a few pages (i.e., Bartels 2008, one page; Gilens 2012, six pages; Hacker and Pierson 2010, zero pages).

A similar contrast is seen in the literatures on descriptive representation in government, on one side, and governmental responsiveness to mass publics on the other. In the first literature, we find steady streams of research on racially representative bureaucracies (e.g., Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard 1999; Rocha and Hawes 2009) and the racial compositions of legislatures (e.g., Gay 2002; Pantoja and Segura 2003). By contrast, studies of class biases among elected representatives are quite rare (see Carnes 2013), as are studies that combine race and class in an intersectional analysis of representation in governance (Watkins-Hayes 2011). In the second literature, questions of class bias predominate in studies of governmental responsiveness, regardless of whether these studies correlate policy actions with public preferences (e.g., Bartels 2008; Gilens 2012) or trace them to power imbalances in the “organized combat” of interest groups (Hacker and Pierson 2010; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012). Responsiveness studies that foreground racial bias remain unusual in the subfield (e.g., Frymer 1999), and studies that foreground the interplay of race and class in political representation remain rarer still (e.g., Thompson 2006).

In many cases, separate analyses of race or class in the study of US politics can be traced to the underlying structure of disciplinary sections and subfields. In the discipline of sociology, for example, the prominent field of social stratification has encouraged theoretical and empirical dialogue across studies of race, class, gender, and other hierarchical social structures. In political science, by contrast, scholarship of this type has been organized into separate communities of inquiry. REP has largely developed as a distinct area, set off from the largest research areas of US politics and organized as its own American Political Science Association (APSA) Organized Section (founded in 1995). REP research started from the position of being a marginal player in the larger subfield (and polity), which regularly diminished the importance of black political actors, discourses, and indigenous institutions. Because of this, it understandably proceeded from the argument that black politics should be viewed primarily through the lens of race and research strategies that emphasized its distinctive ideological traditions and indigenous political sites and information sources. Adolph Reed (2004) explained the contextual imperatives at work; black politics emerged from a potent ideology of racial uplift and interest collectivity, grounded in the idea that race was “an undifferentiated, corporate entity”:

> ...consolidation of a white supremacist order...altered the context of black public debate.... The result was a default mode of politics in which individual “leaders” could determine and pursue agendas purportedly on the race’s behalf without constraint by either prior processes of popular deliberation or subsequent accountability. Securing patronage appointments for elite blacks appeared as generic gains for the race partly because of the premise that elevating the best men advanced the group as a whole, as well as because the power of scientific racism in broader American political rhetoric raised the significance of any black achievement, by any individual, as a challenge to the ideological foundations of white supremacy. **The potential for felicitous pursuit of a politics that took class interest as synecdochic for race interest was overwhelming.** (Reed 2004, 111; italics added)

Although discussions of class and gender did surface in REP research, many studies assumed an invariant experience of race across the class spectrum, preferring models that presumed interests, goals, and ideas that cohered along racial lines. As a result, even if unintentional, other forms of difference were treated as secondary or even superficial—a distraction to the primary status of racial difference. As Reed (2004) explained, the tendency to naturalize race-based interests and treat as unimportant (or disruptive) internal differences within the group (or interests and ideas that transcended race) was overwhelming (c.f. Hochschild 1995). The study of black politics entailed “a forgetting,” whereas the practice of black politics entailed a “silencing” of some groups that posed a threat to the pursuit of a positive public image (Cohen 1999). Despite the force of Reed’s critique and the
the profession today continues to speak to questions of class inequality in a way that pushes serious analysis of race and ethnicity to the margins.

class bias as a primary subject of analysis when studying political influence and responsiveness in American politics. Yet, as the report of the APSA’s Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy amply demonstrated, the profession today continues to speak to questions of class inequality in a way that pushes serious analysis of race and ethnicity to the margins (see Jacobs and Skocpol 2007).

For example, in an article that is excellent in other respects, Howard Rosenthal dispatched racial politics as a competing explanation for trends in economic inequality that are better explained by class politics (Rosenthal 2004). The explanatory role for race must be minor, he concluded, because racial prejudices and hostilities did not rise in tandem with inequality trends: “It is hard to see racism as hardening in the last quarter of the twentieth century when inequality increased. Racism and racial tension seem to have been at least as rife when inequality fell” (ibid., 868). Here, we see a further peculiarity, characteristic of the field: scholars tend to conceptualize race in terms of irrational attitudes (mainly of whites) or episodic social tensions that are eventually overcome rather than as a fundamental, durable, and evolving social structure that organizes the polity (Frymer, Strolovitch, and Warren 2006). Thus, for Rosenthal and others, if racist attitudes did not trend upward, racial politics could not have contributed to expanding inequality. No consideration is given to changes in the structure of racial relations that emerged as within-race inequalities rose sharply. No mention is made of the ways that key features of American political life—from the party system to voting habits to support for policies—became reorganized around racial cleavages after the 1960s, during the very decades that produced an ascendant conservative coalition, sharp political polarization, and spiraling economic inequalities. From these perspectives, race became more powerful as a political force during this time, not less—even though biological racism was on the wane and some indicators of explicit racial prejudice improved.

In other cases, leading scholars wrote race out of the political picture in a more fundamental way by simply restricting their analysis to whites. Consider, for example, the following passage from Unequal Democracy, in which Larry Bartels (2008) defended this analytic move (and the distortions it produces) as both conventional and expedient:
Throughout this chapter I follow the lead of Stonecash, Brooks, and many other writers in this domain by limiting my analysis to whites. Doing so obviously produces a distorted picture of the contemporary party system, and those distortions are especially significant for an analysis of class-related cleavages, given the strong and persistent correlation between race and economic status in American society. Nevertheless, the distinctiveness of white political behavior over the past half-century and the overwhelming focus on whites in the existing scholarly literature and popular literature make this limitation expedient for my purposes here. (2008, 68)

Against this backdrop, we can see more clearly how political science scholarship on the welfare state (and, more recently, the carceral state) reflects common practice in the study of US politics as a whole. In historical efforts to explain the comparative weakness of the US welfare state, for example, factors related to race and class typically are counterposed on a roster of explanations that includes other (allegedly separate) factors (e.g., institutional design, historical path dependency, and political culture) (e.g., Hacker 2002; Huber and Stephens 2001; Skocpol 1992; Steinmo and Watts 1995; Wilensky 1975). Political analyses of welfare programs for the poor tend to emphasize racial factors (e.g., Gilens 1999; Neubeck and Cazenave 2001; Pefley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman 1997), whereas those that focus on social-insurance programs for “ordinary Americans” tend to emphasize class politics (e.g., Hacker 2006; Mettler 2011). In these analyses, race and class seem to belong to separate domains of analysis or to define opposing explanations for a given political outcome. Severed from their roots in historical relations of subjugation and exploitation, race and class become abstract variables suitable for correlation—but highly unsuitable for (1) illuminating the second face of the state as a complex of institutions and agents pursuing agendas of social control, and (2) understanding and combating the oppressive conditions of governance that plague RCS communities in America today.

THE PLACES OF POLITICS: WELFARE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AND THE SITES OF CITIZENSHIP

A second barrier to addressing the second face of the state in RCS communities arises from the way scholars in our subfield have conceived and studied “political” experiences in the citizenry. Drawing heavily on theories of representative democracy, students of US politics typically reserve the label “political” for citizen activities that “aim at influencing the government, either by affecting the choice of government personnel or by affecting the choices made by government personnel” (Verba and Nie 1972, 2). In practice, this perspective has limited the inquiry to a narrow subset of Americans’ interactions with government: mostly actions that address electoral or legislative institutions and, within this set, mostly those directed at the national level. Consequently, much of what the field says about citizens’ political lives focuses on the ways that individuals think and behave as constituents operating in electoral and legislative arenas.

Thus, political scientists produce numerous studies that analyze how citizens, as electoral constituents, vary in their political preferences and levels of engagement. The field is especially attentive to citizens when they act as legislative constituents: organizing as interest groups, contacting their elected representatives, and using lobbying and other tactics to sway legislative actions. As political scientists, we should study these types of roles and activities. Our over-reliance on this citizen-as-constituent model, however, has distorted our understanding of the lived experience of political citizenship for many Americans today. When representatives in government are treated as the defining reference point for politics, day-to-day experiences of politics—personal experiences of power, authority, membership, injustice, rights, rules, standing, political agency, and so on—apparently become less important than citizens’ preferences about political candidates who they have never met and the policy choices of distant legislative bodies and the registering of their opinions in infrequent elections. The quality of American democracy appears to hinge on how closely public officials resemble the citizenry (i.e., descriptive representation), how well officials’ policy choices align with citizens’ preferences (i.e., substantive representation), and how often the people involve themselves in the electoral process. The political lives of different groups in the polity are compared by asking who got a seat at the policy-making table, a role in selecting governing officials, a voice in the formal debate, and a chance to determine legislative outcomes.

These are all critical questions, and the American politics subfield has made great strides in studying barriers to electoral and legislative influence in all of its forms (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). We now can state with confidence that many people simply do not have the time or resources needed to vote for, campaign for, and lobby lawmakers; that only a biased subset of Americans runs for office and manages to get elected; that civic associations and organized interest groups today primarily represent the most advantaged; and that elected officials tend to ignore the policy preferences of all but the wealthiest citizens (see, e.g., Bartels 2008; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Butler 2014; Carnes 2013;
Gilens 2012; Strolovitch 2007; Skocpol 2003). This portrait of political life encourages scholars to identify the major threats to democracy in predictable ways: unequal political voice and biases in participation and responsiveness, a frayed social fabric producing disconnected and disengaged citizen-constituents, polarized political elites acting at a distance from voters, the “irrationality” of citizens who appear to vote against their own material interests, and so on.

The assumption that frames this account, rarely noted by political scientists, is that politics (and, thus, political agency) occurs in citizens’ lives when they take action as constituents. Political citizenship most often is enacted at the voting booth but may happen through contacts with elected officials; it happens indirectly when citizens support interest groups that speak for them or work on behalf of political parties and campaigns. Other activities in citizens’ lives also may hold political significance but mainly insofar as they act as influences on these more primary political roles. Thus, political scientists may take an interest in citizens’ experiences in schools or bowling leagues, or inquire about their families and social networks, but they do so primarily to figure out how citizens gain the types of knowledge and other resources needed to engage in more truly “political” endeavors. The implication (usually left unsaid) is that the lives we lead outside of these spaces and activities are not our political lives and, therefore, not relevant to the quality of our citizenship or democracy.

Even when political scientists push back against the preeminent focus on electoral politics in the American politics subfield, they tend to leave this preoccupation with representative government undisturbed. Thus, Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson (2010), like Robert Dahl (1973) and E. E. Schattschneider (1935) before them, emphasized the need to move beyond the analysis of “politics as electoral spectacle” and focused more intently on the “organized combat” of pressure groups intent on shaping legislative decisions regarding policy. Hacker and Pierson (2010) rightly criticized American politics research for its emphasis on election inputs and outputs—as if the real prizes in political life are electoral victory and a seat in government. Instead, they called for political scientists to attend more closely to organized struggles over “what the government actually does for and to its citizens” (2010, 108). The most important political actors, they suggested, seek to control public policy because, in the end, it is the ability to use policy for preferred ends that is the real “prize” in political life.

We would go further still. By focusing political analysis on “coalitions of intense policy demanders” who repeatedly duel it out in the halls of power, Hacker and Pierson (2010) actually reinforced the field’s tendency to see the “real stuff” of politics as something that happens in locales far removed from RCS communities. There is much to applaud in their call to decentrize elections in the study of US politics and to pay close attention to the most powerful interests in American political life. In heeding this call to shift emphasis toward the powerful and organized, however, political scientists risk replicating—or even deepening—a major drawback of the field’s conventional focus on “politics as electoral spectacle.” The narrow focus on citizens as constituents is tightened further still, as scholars come to equate the truly important essence of politics with interactions between policy-making elites and powerful “repeat players” who vie for policy control. The political actors who are able to win disproportionate benefits from government, in this view, also seem to deserve disproportionate attention from political scientists. Thus, Hacker and Pierson’s (2010) call to focus on “what the government does for and to its citizens” turns out to be an agenda that, once again, focuses political analysis on actors distant from RCS communities—and on governing activities far removed from those that drew Ferguson protesters into the streets.

Within the REP subfield, several scholars have provided valuable correctives to this focus on electoral and legislative incorporation. Their studies yielded rich portrayals of political life and political agency as they transpire in barbershops and churches (Harris 2001; Harris-Lacewell 2004); in political struggles for change in black city neighborhoods (Hunter 2013); in the “infrapolitics” of working-class blacks of the Jim Crow South (Kelley 1994); in the informal networks that underpin Latina “survival politics” (Hardy-Fanta 1993); in the insurgent, extrastitutional politics of protest (Gillion 2013); and in arenas of popular culture such as rap music (Bonnette 2015; Iton 2008). Even in the REP subfield, however, the leading journals and most prominent debates continue to be framed by representation in electoral and legislative processes. Access and influence vis-à-vis these institutions continue to provide the major measurement for assessing variations in power, citizenship, and governance across racial and ethnic groups. Here, as in the rest of the discipline, significant empirical research demonstrates how deeply people in RCS communities are marginalized in electoral and legislative processes (Griffin and Newman 2008; Guinier 1994; Tate 2003).

These observations about US politics are critically important, of course. However, taken alone (as they have been in political science for decades), they yield a political understanding of RCS communities strongly biased toward themes of absence, passivity, and exclusion. In study after empirical study, political scientists shine a light on what RCS communities lack—their underrepresentation in office,
Mainstream scholarship offers little about why, when, and how various actions by state authorities construct race–class positions or how organized governmental practices of social control are guided and rationalized through the coordinates of race and class.

they have direct, personal experiences with state officials who have the authority to alter their lives in profoundly damaging or beneficial ways. They are stopped and frisked walking down the street or perhaps publicly subjected to violence at the hands of state authorities. They claim and receive public resources that allow them to feed their children or perhaps have this lifeline severed when they are deemed to have violated government rules. In RCS communities, these types of events are central to the lived experience of citizenship. They raise fundamental questions of governmental responsiveness and state power, and they are frequently at the heart of grievances that generate political demands and protests. Yet, most scholars in our subfield continue to treat these realities as if they had little relevance for citizenship and democracy in America.

To understand why politics of this type remains obscure in political science, it is important to see how the field has gravitated over time toward an overwhelming focus on national political institutions, modes of political competition, and patterns of citizen opinion and behavior. Students of US politics today frequently note the institutional importance of federalism and, with some regularity, take methodological advantage of the repeated observations provided by state-level variations in political and policy outcomes. In the main, however, serious studies of state and local politics—for example, studies of the type that anchored debates about community power a half-century ago—have largely fallen out of favor. This shift in analytic focus has produced, among other things, a variety of biases in the mix of substantive political relations and issues that draw attention from political scientists.

Governance of poverty and criminality—and, more broadly, practices of social control related to race, class, and gender—consists primarily of state and local functions in the American polity. As Theodore Lowi (1998) rightly reminded the subfield:

There is a wise old saying in America, that “all politics is local”; there is a still wiser corollary, that all social control is local. All of the fundamental policies that regulate the conduct of American citizens...
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and corporate persons have been and still are made by the state legislatures. State [and local] government in the U.S. is a regulatory state, and as a regulatory state it specializes in setting rules of conduct and backing those rules by sanctions. (Lowi 1998; Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011)

Thus, like its narrow focus on electoral and representative institutions, our subfield’s strong emphasis on the national level of US politics pushes to the margins a variety of active and repressive modes of governance that are distinctively critical to the political lives of RCS communities. What appears to be a neutral methodological choice to focus analysis at the national level turns out to be a substantive political decision that privileges the first face of the state over critical inquiries into the second.

Political inequality in the United States, then, lies not only in what the advantaged have and the RCS communities lack but also in distinctive state and local modes of governance that are pervasive in RCS communities yet largely unknown outside of their boundaries. It is a mistake to imagine that all citizens engage the same government, with some capable of being more effective than others. The American state, famously fragmented and decentralized, also is variegated: it presents different citizens with different modes of governance and positions them unequally in relation to its varied institutions. Our distinction between the “first” and “second” faces of the state is far too crude to do justice to this multiplicity. However, although this distinction is not sufficient on its own, we suggest that it provides an essential building block for efforts to construct more theoretically rich and empirically defensible accounts of American politics that are capable of making the political lives of RCS communities recognizable.

If we look to the streets of Ferguson and Baltimore, we find citizens who are outraged for reasons that are not, in any simple sense, about whether policy makers are responsive to the median voter. To be sure, many in RCS communities feel ignored by policy makers; indeed, they are poorly represented in government; and these political dynamics demand both political analysis and political action. Their immediate grievances and their dramatic embrace of political agency, however, have not focused on electoral and legislative outcomes. They have been rooted in people’s direct experiences of state authority and the ways in which they are governed as subjects of the polity. Political scientists’ favored remedies for such grievances—and, more generally, for the ills of American democracy—focus on deepening the electoral incorporation and legislative representation of marginalized groups. Yet, the relationship between the two realms of politics is far from straightforward.

After all, most Americans today feel poorly represented by government, and empirical research lends credence to this view (e.g., Gilens 2012). Yet, outside of RCS communities, weak political representation clearly does not produce comparable practices of repressive and predatory governance. Conversely, when representatives supported by RCS communities gain office and seek to represent them in “substantive” ways, it is far from clear that their efforts translate into dramatic changes in governance on the ground. Baltimore is a clear example of this dynamic, an exemplar of what Philip Thompson (2006) called “deep pluralism” under mayors and city elites that rode into office by mobilizing the minority poor and building their civic capacity. It was also a city where empowerment and representation did not lead to better treatment by local governing authorities such as the police. Indeed, decades of scholarly research underscore the gaps between legislative outcomes and street-level bureaucratic practices and the potential for significant changes in the former to be followed by continuity in the latter (Brodkin 2012; Edelman 1964; Handler 1986, 1995; Lipsky 1980).

These observations do not cast doubt on the political importance of electoral influence and legislative representation (which we take as a given). Rather, they call into question the widespread tendency in our subfield to treat electoral and legislative incorporation as the obvious and singular remedy for all grievances and negative experiences of government. Admonitions to vote and lobby and gain representation on the city council seem trite against the backdrop of experiences in Ferguson and Baltimore: routine violence and abuses of police authority, predatory uses of fines and fees to fund municipal budgets, and so on (US Department of Justice 2015). Whatever its value for democracy may be, a tighter correlation between public preferences and policy making has a loose relationship to efforts to set right these distortions of democratic citizenship. Indeed, under conditions that are easy to envision, greater responsiveness to majoritarian preferences in US politics might be quite consistent with a regime that practices violent subjugation in RCS communities. Thus, as political scientists continue to lament the thin ties connecting RCS communities to “the political process,” urging greater incorporation, members of RCS communities take to the streets to protest the thick injustices of state authority in their lives. If history is any guide, their insurgent actions may play an important role in wringing policy concessions from elected officials who otherwise would have ignored them (Fording 1997, 2000; Piven 2006; Piven and Cloward 1977).

Our point is simply that important forms of politics transpire outside of the formal institutions of representative government and cannot be reduced to mere outcomes of
representative government. Dissenting voices, of course, repeatedly call the profession to account. Since Michael Lipsky’s (1980) landmark work, students of street-level bureaucracy have consistently called for greater attention to “the frontlines” of governance as critical sites of political citizenship. Yet, as the US welfare state grew during the twentieth century, and as America’s massive carceral state emerged at century’s end, political scientists rarely acknowledged their growing importance as domains of political life in their own right—a subject to which we now turn.

GOVERNING RACE, CLASS, AND CITIZENSHIP

Welfare and carceral practices are central to the state’s second face, as it is experienced in RCS communities; yet, political scientists typically treat them as if, somehow, they fall outside of the significant forces of political life. Such modes of governance often are treated as if they affect only a marginal subset of the population (and those who have behaved in certain ways) and operate merely as technical endeavors, carrying out necessary but apolitical administrative functions. Public-assistance programs for the poor are tools for meeting social needs, in this view, easily contrasted with “political” government institutions that organize competition and bargaining among political interests and register citizen preferences. Police and prisons secure public safety, carrying out necessary state functions through administrative procedures and the actions of trained bureaucrats, not political actors. These state activities are, in short, politically uninteresting. Indeed, among those of us who study them, many share the experience of being told at one time or another that our topic is “not really political science.”

We do not need to read far into the discipline to see evidence of this orientation. Within the first few weeks of a typical political science doctoral program, students of American politics can easily discern this facet of the subfield’s boundaries and absorb its scope and bias. In The Future of Political Science, a compilation of 100 essays billed as the “most exciting ideas now percolating among political scientists” (King, Schlozman, and Nie 2009), about one fourth of the contributions focus specifically on electoral and legislative dimensions of the polity, with many addressing the implications of growing economic inequality for American politics. Yet, only one contribution (i.e., by Traci Burch) addresses the political importance of criminal justice institutions, and not a single essay focuses on the political significance of welfare institutions.

When Perspectives on Politics, one of the APSA’s two flagship journals, devoted an entire special issue to “the American politics of policing and incarceration” in September 2015, it staged a pointed intervention, illuminating the subfield’s long-standing blind spot (see the editor’s introduction, Isaac 2015). Indeed, decades had passed since scholars like James Q. Wilson (1975) and Stuart Scheingold (1992) penned their important volumes on the politics of crime and punishment. Calling out the field for its inattention to a remarkable transformation of the American state, Marie Gottschalk (2008) bluntly described this neglect in the title of her Annual Review of Political Science essay: “Hiding in Plain Sight: American Politics and the Carceral State.”

Relative to the carceral state, research on the welfare state has a larger footprint in political science, particularly in the study of American political development. Yet, it typically is characterized by an important asymmetry, focusing mostly on the benefits allocated by welfare policies but discussing little about the state’s second face as it operates in RCS communities. People engaged by government welfare programs are generally described and conceived as beneficiaries of state action, with key political questions pivoting on their real or perceived “deservingness” for this desirable role (see, e.g., Gilens 1999). Political scientists typically present the US welfare state as less generous than its counterparts in other Western democracies, giving little attention to the comparatively large role that US welfare programs—with their rich histories of “man-in-the-house” rules, midnight raids, and agendas to promote “Americanization,” work, sexual restraint, and marriage—have played in the social control of RCS communities (on the first, see e.g., Huber and Stephens 2001; Skocpol 1995; on the second, see Gordon 1994; Katz 1996; Piven and Cloward 1993; Smith 2007).

Influenced particularly by the writings of Marshall (1964), scholars have actively debated political explanations for the US welfare state’s historical emergence and evolution—including the roles that race, class, and gender played in shaping its categorical architecture, limited scope, and unusually heavy reliance on “submerged” modes of provision (see, e.g., Hacker 2002; Katznelson 2005; Lieberman 1998; Mettler 1998; Noble 1997; Skocpol 1992). Students of political behavior routinely analyze welfare policies as objects of public attitudes and beliefs (see, e.g., Cook and Barrett 1992; Feldman and Steenbergen 2001; Feldman and Zaller 1992; Gilens 1999; Goren 2001; Jacoby 2000; Shapiro and Young 1989). The scope and structure of the welfare state, in these literatures, are important political outcomes to be explained and objects of political contestation. Rarely are the political character and practices of these institutions contemplated. Welfare is seldom analyzed as an instrument of governance, a structural basis
for political subjugation, a site where citizens exercise important forms of political agency, or an arena for direct political experiences with modes of social control that have lasting consequences for political consciousness and action.

The root of this bias can be traced, in part, to a distributive paradigm for contemplating the US welfare state, in which politics determines “who gets what, when, and how” (Lasswell 1936). Why, we typically ask, have some social groups been excluded from social protections or given inferior benefits, whereas others have received greater benefits and protections from risk? This focus on the allocation of desirable civic and social goods—Marshallian rights and resources—emphasizes the channeling of poor Americans (more often, women and people of color) into inferior public assistance programs that offer inferior benefits under more variable, conditional, discretionary arrangements. These questions are vitally important, to be sure (Liberman 1998; Mettler 1998; Noble 1997). Furthermore, by engaging them, scholars in our subfield have generated keen insights into the political forces that made white Americans the primary beneficiaries of social insurance, housing assistance, and veterans’ benefits throughout the twentieth century (Katznelson 2005; Lieberman 1998). In focusing so consistently on the exclusion of RCS communities from social provision, however, the subfield has tethered its understanding of marginalization to a tale of deficits and neglect. As Stephen Pimpare (2007, 314) rightly noted: “Even in analyses specifically focused on the history of race and welfare...it is exclusion that is the focus: African Americans are characters in someone else’s story, bit players in a sub-plot, not protagonists.”

—Stephen Pimpare

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citizenship”—central to the quality and character of citizenship experienced by poor women, and particularly poor women who are racially subordinated (Nelson 1984). The reconstruction of political relations within the welfare state, scholars such as Kathleen Jones (1990) contended, should be seen as nothing less than central to the pursuit of gender justice in the polity as a whole.

Serious attention to the carceral state emerged much later in the American politics subfield, and it remains more limited. Its incorporation surely would have encountered fewer hurdles if welfare scholarship had attended to the social-control functions of social programs—and its visible connection to policing and penal practices—all along. Conversely, because the subfield has traditionally neglected the state’s policing and penal activities, recent theoretical and empirical interventions have been able to start with a cleaner slate, less beholden to intellectual grooves cut in the middle of the twentieth century.

Here, scholars have not had to contest a well-established distributive paradigm, and they have been under less pressure to make their studies speak to existing debates about political competition and state neglect. Thus, recent work powerfully emphasizes the political consequences of the carceral state, with its sprawling apparatuses of policing and imprisonment. Scholars such as Marie Gottschalk (2012, 364) argued that correctional growth has begun to “fundamentally alter how key social and political institutions operate and pervert what it means to be a citizen in the United States.” Contemplating how the American state now “governs through crime,” Jonathan Simon (2007) concluded that criminalization and criminal justice logics have fundamentally “transformed American democracy.” To explain the centrality of punishment in the lives of RCS communities, scholars including Lisa Miller (2008), Nicola Lacey (2008), and Vanessa Barker...
Cohen’s encounters with criminal justice and welfare systems. Cathy question that seeks to provide insights into citizens’ Latino(a) Americans do not include even a single recurring Election Survey) and the best surveys of black and National Election Study and the Cooperative Congressional primary surveys of American citizens (i.e., the American 2004; Western 2006). Yet, despite their documented (and, Lerman and Weaver 2014; Miller 2008; Murakawa 2014; Owens 2008; Soss 2000; Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011; Weaver and Lerman 2010).

Within our subfield, studies of the state’s second face can be invigorated by recognizing several key insights. Most important, encounters with welfare and criminal justice systems are political experiences, both prevalent and profoundly consequential in RCS communities. Indeed, criminal justice and social welfare apparatuses (e.g., police, courts, parole agencies, and prisons; welfare agencies, schools, hospitals, public housing, and disability services) are among the most prominent and influential state-led institutions in RCS communities (Fernández-Kelly 2015). That they do not fit neatly into an electoral-representative model of politics is not sufficient reason to ignore them. In separate studies of political citizenship, our interviewees placed great emphasis not on City Hall, Congress, or political parties but rather on their direct and frequent experiences with welfare offices, police, jails, courts, reentry agencies, and prisons as they tried to explain how government works, what political life is like for them, how they understand their own citizenship and political identities (Lerman and Weaver 2014; Soss 2000). “That’s the only government I know,” one interviewee said, after remarking on his interactions with criminal justice authorities (Lerman and Weaver 2014). In RCS communities, criminal custody has become a normal mode of interaction with government and an expected experience of the state (Lerman and Weaver 2014; Roberts 2004; Western 2006). Yet, despite their documented (and, for residents, obvious) political significance, our subfield’s primary surveys of American citizens (i.e., the American National Election Study and the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey) and the best surveys of black and Latino(a) Americans do not include even a single recurring question that seeks to provide insights into citizens’ encounters with criminal justice and welfare systems. Cathy Cohen’s Black Youth and Culture Survey remains the sole political science survey to focus substantially on criminal justice experiences (see Cohen 2010).

Criminal justice and welfare institutions also must be addressed as primary sites of political agency and demand making in RCS communities. As welfare and criminal justice agencies operate as sites of state power vis-à-vis citizens, actively pursuing agendas of surveillance and social control, they equally serve as targets for the political claims of community members who routinely direct demands at them on an individual basis (Gordon 1988; Soss 2000) and, in more turbulent times, engage them as contentious collectives (Piven and Cloward 1977, 1993). Indeed, a closer examination of recent protests revealed a dual logic from which our subfield can learn: contestations of state failures to provide security from violence and deprivation, as Miller (2016) emphasized, and contestations of repressive and disciplinary state projects that work more affirmatively to sustain subjugation, as Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor (2016) stressed. In more quotidian and ongoing ways, people in RCS communities routinely call on police and welfare officials, seeking to make these state apparatuses responsive to their specific problems, needs, and interests. “Experiences in these [interactions] bring practical meaning to abstract political concepts such as rights and obligations, power and authority, voice and civic standing” (Soss; Fording; and Schram 2011, 284). Such encounters play a critical role in the political subordination and control of RCS communities (Clear 2007; Roberts 2004), but they also are sites where people with few conventional political resources make effective claims on government, resist state power, and “mobilize the state” against threats to their autonomy (Butler 1995; Cohen 2004; Soss 2000, 26–59).

Against a backdrop of spiraling incarceration and renewed protests of police violence, criminal justice has begun to surface—albeit haltingly—within American politics research. For RCS communities, however, the rise of mass incarceration since the 1970s is a relatively recent chapter in a long-standing experience of governance by police and penal authorities. Not only in the Jim Crow South but also throughout the country, police—alongside public and private social-welfare agencies—have long been central to the lived realities of citizenship in RCS communities (Muhammad 2010). Indeed, deep insights into the state’s second face weave their way through the writings of many leading black intellectuals of the twentieth century. In The Philadelphia Negro (1899), W. E. B. Du Bois described his neighborhood in the Seventh Ward by recalling, “Police were our government, and philanthropy dropped in with periodic advice.” In 1966, writing four decades before “stop-question-and-frisk” came under attack and at the very moment mainstream intellectuals roundly celebrated the end of the prison, James Baldwin wrote of how his Harlem community was “forbidden the very air,” as blacks were kept indoors through police
In making these arguments, leading black intellectuals also highlighted a second theme that largely escaped analysis in the American politics subfield: the entwinement of the state’s carceral and welfare apparatuses. Exclusions from welfare benefits have always been part of a broader political experience in RCS communities that encompasses the welfare state’s second face: the midnight raids and moral uplifting of welfare caseworkers, paternalist social services demanding various forms of behavioral compliance, extensive policing of private as well as public spaces, discretionary uses and abuses of legal authority, and so on. Analytic distinctions between welfare and carceral apparatuses are necessary if scholars are to understand their differences and specify their relationship. (For example, we should not lose sight of the fact that welfare caseworkers—however much they may pursue surveillance and punishment—are not police officers who walk the streets with discretionary authority over the use of deadly force.) The problem lies in our discipline’s limited efforts to understand how these two systems interact and, together, serve as mechanisms of social control. Both parts of this formulation are important. For example, when scholars note how a felony record limits access to welfare benefits, they address the first blind spot (i.e., the interaction of the systems) but remain within a framework that ignores these systems’ collaboration in co-producing social control. The prevailing logic of welfare exclusion is retained, framing a storyline that pits the punishing hand of the carceral state against the beneficent distributions of the welfare state.

As historians and sociologists often stress, the broader story is not so straightforward. The densely woven fabric of social control in RCS communities encompasses a host of “collaborative practices and shared information systems between welfare offices and various branches of the criminal justice system” (Gustafson 2011, 2). Today, core functions of social provision—such as housing, employment, physical and mental health, and education—are carried out on a large scale by agencies of the carceral state (Stuart 2014; Wacquant 2009). (In fact, prisons are now the largest public providers of mental-health services in the United States.) In agencies such as Child Protective Services, the pursuit of child-welfare goals blends seamlessly into the policing and prosecution of criminal negligence and abuse (Roberts 2012). In traditional means-tested welfare programs, officials employ criminal logics of “penalty for stops after the Terry ruling and Nixon’s “no-knock” policy. The civic consequences of these experiences were highlighted by one early black sociologist, writing after Du Bois but before Baldwin, who noted: “Too often the policeman’s club is the only instrument of the law with which the Negro comes into contact. This engenders in him a distrust and resentful attitude toward all public authorities and law officers” (quoted in Muhammad 2010, 251).

Intellectuals coming out of more radical traditions of black political thought were also keenly attuned to police authority in shaping the politics, resentments, and relationships to authority in the “dark ghettos.” Malcolm X, for example, described the view from RCS communities: “Our people in this particular society live in a police state. A black man in America lives in a police state. He doesn’t live in any democracy. He lives in a police state. That’s what it is, that’s what Harlem is” (X and Breitman 1965). It is no accident, from this perspective, that the prison emerged as a pivotal location for the black freedom struggle and antiracist movements in the century’s middle decades (Berger 2014).

In making these arguments, leading black intellectuals also highlighted a second theme that largely escaped analysis in the American politics subfield: the entwinement of the state’s carceral and welfare apparatuses. Because scholars in our subfield rarely engage the interdisciplinary literature on welfare’s social-control functions (cf. Abramovitz 1988; Gordon 1988, 1994; Piven and Cloward 1971/1993; Ward 2005), the salutary efforts referred to as “welfare provision” seem to be quite distinct from state efforts to police criminal behavior and punish violations of law. Indeed, of the 34 chapters in the excellent Oxford Handbook of U.S. Social Policy (Bélond, Howard, and Morgan 2015), not one is devoted to the criminal justice system and only three pages on imprisonment are noted in the index for the 688-page book. This is despite the fact that a large interdisciplinary group of scholars outside of the subfield elaborated at length about how welfare and carceral practices interpenetrate and work in tandem within the advanced capitalist state (Lacey 2008).

In RCS communities, police, courts, and welfare agencies historically have worked alongside one another as interconnected authorities and instruments of governance. The civic consequences of these experiences were highlighted by one early black sociologist, writing after Du Bois but before Baldwin, who noted: “Too often the policeman’s club is the only instrument of the law with which the Negro comes into contact. This engenders in him a distrust and resentful attitude toward all public authorities and law officers” (quoted in Muhammad 2010, 251).

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violation” to discipline clients and aggressively investigate and prosecute them for potentially felonious cases of welfare fraud (Gustafson 2011). Prisoners, meanwhile, are classified as “voluntarily unemployed,” thereby owing thousands of dollars in child-support debt on release—a fact that quickly sweeps them into various mechanisms of welfare supervision (Katzenstein and Waller 2015). Indeed, some argue that broader debts related to incarceration now constitute a deeply predatory component of the welfare state in its own right, through which the state can seize the resources of the poor families attached to incarcerated men and women (Katzenstein and Waller 2015). Symbolic migrations between the two arenas are just as observable: repeat users of public assistance are now commonly called welfare “recidivists”; some welfare recipients are made to work in prison garb (Kohler-Hausmann 2008), and some politicians have proposed that they be housed in prison dorms.

When we ignore such material and symbolic interconnections, we misspecify the structure and functioning of the American state and—equally important—occlude how low-income minority citizens experience surveillance, monitoring, coercion, work extraction, and confinement across the range of institutions that encircle their communities. The official missions of these agencies may differ—to protect children from mistreatment, to ensure public safety and crime control, to educate youth, to provide housing, to provide income support and job training, and so on—yet, in practice, they also collaborate in a shared, multifaceted project of oversight and transformation oriented toward changing behaviors of populations considered deviant. Scholars, mostly outside political science, recently began to highlight these connections across different sites of state action, describing how the “punitive arm of the state” has “percolated itself into traditionally nurturing institutions like the family and the community center” as well as social-service spaces throughout government (Rios 2006, 49; see also Beckett and Herbert 2009; Fernandez-Kelly 2011; Gustafson 2011; Roberts 2012; Simon 2007; Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011; Stuart 2014; Wacquant 2009).

These interconnections, in fact, have deep historical roots. The welfare and carceral capacities of the American state developed alongside one another and have always been entwined. Throughout the twentieth century, for example, labor regulation strategies designed to ensure work compliance in RCS communities operated through a division of labor between welfare and criminal justice authorities. In the Jim Crow South, welfare officials facilitated the exploitation of black agricultural workers by offering a bare subsistence level of support only when the fields lay idle. When hands were needed for planting or picking, local officials moved the poor off relief by applying vague eligibility rules, inspecting homes for moral violations, or simply shutting the welfare office (Piven and Cloward 1971/1993). Welfare officials promoted work among poor black women through “employable mothers” rules, implemented mostly “in areas where seasonal employment was almost exclusively performed by nonwhite families” (Bell 1965, 46). Working through different means, police secured compliance with the sharecropping system by using vagrancy laws to arrest blacks deemed to be “in idleness.” They frequently channeled them into the exploitative labor arrangements of the penal system, in which chain gangs and convict-leasing programs were widespread (Mancini 1996).

These social control functions were hardly restricted to the South or to the sphere of work. Because welfare programs operated as tools of labor regulation in RCS communities (Piven and Cloward 1993), they also were deployed to impose dominant groups’ preferred models of domesticity, monitor sexual and reproductive practices, place parenting under surveillance, and regulate gender and race relations (Gordon 1994; Mink 1995). In many of these activities, welfare agencies functioned in RCS communities as entities separate from police and immigration bureaus (in formal terms) but also as full collaborators in the policing of citizen behavior. In a recent discussion of poverty governance in urban “main stem” districts, for example, sociologist Forrest Stuart (2014) emphasized how social reformers from the 1880s to the 1930s developed “two-pronged tactics” of social control, deploying assistance and rehabilitation on one side and penal incapacitation on the other. Noting “the nineteenth-century police role developed via a symbiotic relationship with private welfare organizations” (Marquis 1992), Stuart (2014, 4–6) highlighted several key dimensions of integrated practice, as follows:

Police were either formally charged with or quickly assumed the burden of not only controlling crime, but also overseeing a plethora of social welfare services (Monkkonen 1981, 1982). This included taking censuses, regulating health standards, providing ambulances, and giving overnight lodging in police stations; functions that provided broad and amorphous powers to deeply intervene into the daily lives of the urban poor... [Social welfare] organizations used their political influence at the state and city levels to draft ordinances prohibiting vagrancy, loitering, begging, and drunkenness...[and then] demanded that police departments behave much like surrogate organization employees. Most notably, the COS [Charity Organization Society] enlisted the police to investigate the homes of anyone receiving relief, draw up central registers of the poor, and report back to COS officials as to whether or not a recipient should continue receiving aid.... They enlisted the police to discover child abuse and neglect, as...
well as assist in locating and returning lost children.... This coupling was unmistakable for its targets. Managers and customers of the Main Stem’s vaudeville theaters quickly learned to keep “a weather eye open for the social worker, with policeman in tow, out to preserve the integrity of the American home (McLean 1965, 86–7).”

Calling for an expanded historical conception of the welfare state itself, which would include penal institutions, Steven Pimpare (2007, 315–16) offered the following insightful critique:

Slavery, its successors (sharecropping, tenancy, convict labor), and the prison have been as important throughout American history in the lives of (poor) African Americans as have, say, Social Security, homeless shelters, or Medicaid. By excluding them because they are malign in intent, we make all but inevitable a distorted view of the history of the American welfare state.

Now, as in the past, welfare and criminal justice function as distinct systems with separate missions that, nevertheless, are deeply entwined as components of the state’s second face. The contemporary system of mass incarceration in America grew directly out of the collapse of mental health institutions in the mid-twentieth century (Harcourt 2007), and many scholars suggest that the comparatively weak US welfare state has played a foundational role in this country’s development of an outsized carceral state (Gottschalk 2014; Lacey 2008). In the United States today, stigmatizing political discourses frequently assimilate race- and class-identified “welfare queens,” “gangbangers,” “thugs,” and “superpredators” in threatening narratives of underclass pathology (Beres and Griffith 2001; Hancock 2004; Reed 1999). Public attitudes toward means-tested welfare and criminal justice policies exhibit remarkably similar dynamics (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman 1997). Budgets for welfare and carceral systems tend to be strongly correlated (Guetzkow and Western 2007) and governing logics and practices routinely migrate from one system to the other (Gustafson 2011; Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011).

The deep interplay of welfare and carceral systems, and their shift in tandem over recent decades, equally reflects a division of labor that is sharply gendered. Soss, Fording, and Schram (2011, 48) summarized a growing literature that has emerged mostly beyond political science when they wrote the following:

[In recent decades], the penal and welfare systems have converged as symbiotic elements of a “double regulation of the poor” (Wacquant 2009). This convergence can be understood as gendered in four senses. First, its institutions have been built, politically, around gender-specific cultural images of poor racial minorities: the lawless, violent male of the underclass ghetto and the lazy and licentious welfare queen. Second, the system operates through gender-segregated institutions, with women making up roughly 90 percent of adult welfare recipients and men making up roughly 90 percent of prisoners (Haney 2004). Third, the direction of change on both sides has been toward a “masculinizing of the state” as a paternalist, behavior-enforcing custodian (Wacquant 2009, 15). The “nanny state” of welfare protections and prison rehabilitation programs has been supplanted by a “daddy state” emphasizing direction, supervision, and discipline (Starobin 1998).

Fourth, historically masculine images of the worker-citizen have been elevated and universalized as a behavioral norm (Collins and Mayer 2010; Korteweg 2003). For former welfare recipients and prisoners, the sine qua non of civic reinstatement is the same: formal employment and wage-based support of one’s children.

That political scientists so rarely study these two systems together is particularly telling given that, in RCS communities today, their interactions, their gendered foci, and their shared logics are so readily observed. The relationship between school suspensions and later experiences of incarceration, for instance, is but one example of a common pattern in which sites of social-policy implementation—child protective services, foster care, Trespass Affidavit programs, and so on—introduce young people to the penal system and channel them toward its machinery. When residents experience crises related to drug addiction, domestic violence, or a host of other social problems, they turn to social welfare workers and police—who often communicate and collaborate, regardless of which one served as the point of first contact. Involvements with both systems are common for families in RCS communities and, regardless of whether “mandatory reporting” rules apply, residents tend to assume that information yielded in one system will be available to authorities in the other.

In a recent book exploring criminal justice effects on RCS communities (Lerman and Weaver 2014), Weaver was struck by how often and easily people shifted between the two systems as they discussed the role of government in their lives. A man named Marcus, for example, explained a welfare caseworker’s disregard for him by pointing to stigmas related to both domains: “Cause it’s, I believe it’s my caseworker, cause of the fact that I have a felony, she wanna overlook me but wanna scold me from time to time: ‘You’re not looking for a job and this, that and the third.’” Later, when recalling a criminal court judge, he brought the two together again: “In 2001, I got some tickets which weren’t mine, they were my brother’s but I didn’t wanna tell on him so I took the blame for it and like I’m paying for them now and trying to pay them off.... The amount of the fines is no biggie but it’s the principal, and the judge going to say, cause I told her I was on GA [general assistance], ‘GET
A JOB! [That’s what the judge said?] Yeah. That’s another person, don’t have the data in front of them, just figured that I’m on GA all my life.” Lerman and Weaver (2014) began their study mainly interested in the racial and civic consequences of the criminal justice system; yet, for Marcus and many others, the welfare state was never far from their experiences of discipline and control. When asked which was more stigmatizing, having a conviction or being on GA, Marcus responded: “A little of all of it.”

TRANSFORMING RACE, CLASS, AND CITIZENSHIP

Having come this far in arguing for greater attention to welfare and carceral institutions as active forces of governance in RCS communities, we are now in a position to return to where we began: our subfield’s leading approaches to race and class. Previously, we noted how the subfield typically deploys race and class as independent variables, alternative explanations, axes of social classification, bases of subjective identification, and objects of political attitudes. In all these guises, students of US politics ask how race and class operate as causal factors that influence various outcomes. Rarely does our subfield address the question of how to understand the production of race and class as historically specific political outcomes (Hayward 2013; Omi and Winant 2014). In this final section, we briefly extend our discussion to how welfare and carceral practices in RCS communities make and remake these fundamental axes of social differentiation and inequality in America.

Beyond their uses as methods for managing poverty and crime—indeed, beyond their functions as tools of surveillance, repression, and social control—welfare and criminal justice institutions also must be understood as productive forces. As police, courts, prisons, and social-welfare interventions are deployed to govern RCS communities, they reconstruct categories of race and class, transform their meanings, and redefine their operations as social structures.

The material and symbolic boundaries of race, class, and nationality citizenship are not natural givens or exogenous forces in political life. They are shaped and reshaped over time as political actors use institutions to divide populations in various ways, define the terms of their relations, and subject them to different modes of governance (Brubaker 2004; Loveman 2014; Somers 2008). Thus, RCS neighborhoods in places such as Ferguson and Baltimore do not exist simply as sites where political action may take place. They are politically constructed spaces built over time, in part by raced and classed governmental policies, such as the housing, education, and public-assistance programs of the welfare state and the surveillance and punishment practices of the carceral state (Hayward 2013; Massey and Denton 1993). These policies segregate and stigmatize, constructing understandings of groups and “their places” that come to seem normal, natural, and even legitimate. Thus, many RCS neighborhoods become understood as “bad places” that “ordinary Americans” should avoid going to or living in—shrouded in images of danger and degradation that cannot be explained by their objective conditions alone (Sampson 2012). The governing practices that saturate these places (e.g., police frisk, arrest, and search) display for the public the suspiciousness of their targets in ways that fuel, reinforce, and sometimes transform long-standing racial and class ideologies.

Through its activities of penal control and poverty management—under the guise of responding to crime and poverty—the state constructs RCS communities in various ways. Carceral and welfare practices shape the boundaries of racial categories and membership (Wacquant 2009); reproduce the material conditions of RCS communities and create durable “classification[s] of social status” (PAGER 2013, 267; Western 2006); restrict and channel the flow of people across space (Beckett and Herbert 2010; Capers 2009); confer standing, legitimate exclusions from societal institutions, and authorize private discrimination (PAGER 2013); assert blackness, communicate race- and class-inflected knowledge about groups, and regulate the meaning and salience of race and class differences; single out RCS groups as needing oversight, contrasting them against citizens who “play by the rules” and need protection from RCS communities; resuscitate racial ideologies and shore up their invidious presumptions when they are challenged by new norms (Muhammad 2010); engage RCS communities in constructive projects of identity-making, social valuation, internal labeling of “decent” and “law-breaking” (i.e., deserving and undeserving) (Anderson 1999; Lerman and Weaver 2014); socialize RCS communities into and out of political life (Lerman and Weaver 2014); and insinuate themselves into prevailing patterns of collective consciousness.4 In short, criminal justice and welfare governance “invest [race] with meaning” (Capers 2009, 53) and function together as class-specific, spatially targeted race-making institutions (Hayward 2013; James 1994; Lipsitz 1998; Omi and Winant 2014).5

Whereas our subfield has focused mainly on questions including how racial stereotypes influence support for welfare and criminal justice policies, scholars in other fields have given more attention to how these systems function as powerful forces in the first-order projects of manufacturing racial differences and configuring their intersections with class relations (Capers 2009; Carbado
As police, courts, prisons, and social-welfare interventions are deployed to govern RCS communities, they reconstruct categories of race and class, transform their meanings, and redefine their operations as social structures.

2005; Muhammad 2010; Rios 2011; Roberts 2004; Wacquant 2005). Criminal justice punishments and punitive welfare sanctions produce, as Glenn Loury (2012) termed it, a “violence of ideas”: gradually, the act of punishing itself comes to “seem natural, inevitable, necessary, and just” as an institutional practice, and the raced-classed targeting of punishment (as well as surveillance, programs of behavior modification, and so on) comes to be viewed as normal and right. Active governmental efforts to impress work, marriage, and sexual responsibility on welfare recipients convey to the broader public that specific groups—widely understood in race–class terms—would not work, marry, or behave in a sexually responsible manner unless compelled or taught to do so (Soss and Schram 2007). These ideas gain momentum and, whether or not consciously intended, become lodged in media constructions of poverty and criminality, exploited in electoral campaign strategies, embedded in policy rationales, reflected in employer hiring decisions, and—most broadly—internalized as taken-for-granted assumptions and implicit biases both in the citizenry and among their political representatives (Entman and Rojecki 2001; Gilliam and Iyengar 2000; Mendelberg 2001; Peffley and Hurwitz 2010).

Criminal justice and welfare interventions construct what we might term the public reputation of RCS groups: communicating powerful stories and images about who is suspicious, who can be trusted with freedoms, and who deserves the benefits that governments provide for citizens in full standing. Through these encounters, citizens are swept into a process of the “state assigning worth” (Capers 2011, 24). As Justice and Meares (2014) described, this process “offers Americans race- and class-based lessons on who is a citizen deserving of fairness and justice and who constitutes a group of dangerous others deserving of severe punishment, monitoring, and virtual branding.” Such state-led processes are supported by many instruments—on the criminal justice side, for example, by gang databases that envelop whole communities (e.g., in Denver, more than half of young minority boys are in the database), criminal records to label potential job seekers, racial incongruity and pretextual stops, the criminalization of certain substances and not others, and police practices that focus on certain neighborhoods (Beckett, Nyrop, Pfingst 2006).

As the constructed public understandings of RCS communities, these governing practices also shape patterns of thought and behavior within them. They demand that RCS communities regularly perform or, as Capers termed it, “negotiate the script” to avoid aggravating the police contact. Such performance is “a full-time endeavor” that asks its subjects to engage in citizenship-limiting practices, such as consenting to unlawful searches and limiting their travel through white neighborhoods (Capers 2011; see also Capers 2009). This work on the part of RCS communities becomes “analogous to a trial” where, in effect, they must “take the stand” to describe their law-abidingness before ever going to court. In performing against the script—for example, by not asserting rights of due process or by not letting the search proceed—the suspect is actually “assuming the position of a second-class citizen, or three-fifths of a citizen, or a denizen, or an at-will citizen allowed autonomy only at the discretion of the law officer” (Capers 2011, 28). Furthermore, as governments engage in processes of “symbolic branding”—that is, labeling individuals by the processes of arrest, conviction, and imprisonment—they mark individuals as occupants of a social status that defines and limits access to other social, political, and economic goods (Pager 2007; Wacquant 2009). This work on the part of RCS communities becomes a foundation for race-making and racial subjugation in private domains—for example, employers making use of the state’s criminal labels to distinguish the hirable from the nonhireable.

This race-making evokes and draws power from the past as it molds the polity in the present, working through the legacies of earlier (and, in some cases, now-discredited) instruments that designated and segregated RCS communities as a suspect group. The criminalization of blackness, as Muhammad’s impressive account reminds us, stretches far beyond Dilulio’s (1995) thrill-seeking invocation in the 1990s crime wars of “superpredator” juveniles roaming the streets. Rather, it goes as far back as the postslavery era when practices of racial subjugation, violence, isolation, and neglect developed in tandem with ideas about black criminality—heuristics that became
central to the nation’s racial imagination and expansive notions of what constituted blackness (Muhammad 2010). As David Garland (2005, 817) wrote, “The penal excess of the lynching spectacle said things that a modernized legal process could not.... It reestablished the correlative status of the troublesome black man, which was as nothing, with no rights, no protectors, no personal dignity, and no human worth.”

Today, instruments of punishment continue to mark the black body as criminal and project this view both outward to “law-abiding” society and inward to RCS communities—constructing a status that some political theorists describe as a type of social and civic death and banishment from the public square (Cacho 2012; Dilts 2014). In fact, this racialized death is explicit in the Constitution, which prohibits slavery except in one condition: “as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.”

The prison system and practices of the carceral state not only shape broader discourses around race- and class-based notions of what constituted blackness (Muhammad 2010). As David Garland (2005, 817) wrote, “The penal excess of the lynching spectacle said things that a modernized legal process could not.... It reestablished the correlative status of the troublesome black man, which was as nothing, with no rights, no protectors, no personal dignity, and no human worth.”

Criminal stigma becomes a wellspring of racial stigma as race and racialized residence come to “signify” criminality (Eberhardt et al. 2004; Kang 2005), enveloping whole groups and labeling them as “potential criminals” regardless of their transgressions or adherence to rules. So extensive is this idea—or ideology—that blacks are “saddled with a provisional status” until their law-abidingness can be proved, whereas white membership “denotes civility, law-abidingness, and trustworthiness” (Anderson 2012, 80). Just as it was during the time of which Muhammad wrote, societal narratives and ideas about crime—whether in the media, social interactions, or employer decisions—are often ideas about RCS communities. This two-way arrow—that blackness is suspicious and criminality is raced—classed—begins to blur the boundaries. Thus, scholars identified the deeply embraced ideas of dangerous populations in “shooter” games of individuals deciding quickly who is wielding a weapon and who to take out (Kang 2005); they have found that once a young person has been arrested, survey interviewers perceive his race differently than at a prior time (Saperstein and Penner 2010); and that our memory tends to fail or it takes us much longer to process when confronted with information that goes against the black-cum-predator stereotype.

Race-making is witnessed not only in processes of symbolic branding and stigmatizing ideas about “others” but also in the habits, narratives and norms, and modes of resistance found in the RCS communities. Criminal justice configures the internal politics, processes of identity formation, and community dynamics of the RCS groups. Indeed, whereas most REP scholarship has rightly focused on distinct levels of trust, processes of opinion formation, and the pivotal role of racial identity and group consciousness in shaping policy preferences and voting behaviors among RCS communities, it is indeed curious that the heft and coercive treatment that criminal justice regularly exerts on RCS communities until recently has not been considered as a critical force in the black “counterpublic” (Cohen 2010 is an exception). In a pattern that is now familiar to readers, scholars in sociology and law have been keenly attuned to these dynamics. Victor Rios, an urban ethnographer, described the ways that RCS youth in the juvenile system in Oakland developed identity through the criminalization they experienced in schools, detention centers, police encounters, and even the neighborhood community center. By being imagined and treated as thugs and deviants, youth “developed identities that they often wished they could renounce”—embracing being “hard” as a failed type of resistance to authority figures (Rios 2006, 44). More abstractly, Justice and Meares (2014) described how these encounters offer a “hidden curriculum” to RCS communities that counters the mainstream conception of criminal justice as egalitarian, procedurally fair, and just.

The emotional force of minority youths’ first experiences of the police baptizes them, in a way, giving a significant and lasting memory of the state exerting power over them and of their position as suspects. These experiences, far from being neutral, eventually shape an individual’s interpretations of events, how one moves through the world, and what one comes to believe (Capers 2011; Hagan, Shedd, and Payne 2005; Peffley and Hurwitz 2010). The legal scholar Devon Carbado (2005), drawing on his own experience, called it a “racial naturalization.” Experiences with police and being arrested or jailed not only were important (and, often, early) in communicating “ideas about who should be where, how they should look and act, and what constitutes ‘suspicious behavior’” (Lerman and Weaver 2014, 157). They also contributed to an involuntary and broad race—class socialization, building on and consolidating ideas about racial equality, the position of their group, the salience of their identity, and their connection to the group (Lerman and Weaver 2014). Lerman and Weaver (2014) found that these interactions strengthened racial learning; specifically, they diminished faith in the American Dream, reduced individuals’ senses of their equal worth, exacerbated perceptions of discrimination against themselves and their group, and cultivated “serious misgivings about the extent of equality.”

Because criminal justice interventions and welfare encounters cultivate habits of consciousness and behavior through direct personal experiences, they work as well to construct the stories and social structures that enclose RCS communities (Hayward 2013). Policing, for example, plays a
critical role in the segregation of social and physical space through “racial-incongruity” stops, a practice that treats people who are racially “out of place” as suspicious (Capers 2009). These interventions become “the seedbed for historical consciousness—a kind of socially and politically charged remembering through which people transform experiences of pain into collective narratives” (Ralph 2013, 112). Personal experiences with police and welfare officials are retold and become elements of collective memory. They become building blocks for communal narratives of suffering and resistance that instruct new generations about what it means to be a member of an RCS community (Davis 1988).

**CONCLUSION**

Our subfield has long revolved around images of the American polity as a representative democracy, in which citizen–state interactions tend to be voluntary and normatively desirable. “Contacts” with state officials and other forms of “participation” contribute positively to responsive governance; therefore, it is cause for concern that disadvantaged social groups have so much less of these civic and political goods. Inequality, in this view, results from the best off having stronger ties to political representatives and converting their greater access and influence into policies that advance their interests and preferences.

This broad electoral-representative framework guides our subfield to valuable political insights and animates some of its best theoretical and empirical work. Yet, it is deeply incomplete. Taken alone, it operates to systematically distort our understanding of the American polity as a whole and, like Ralph Ellison’s (1952) “invisible man,” render the political lives of RCS communities unrecognizable. This framing of US politics is rooted in a partial and highly salutary view of the American state, a view that places its active contributions to repression, subjugation, and social control under erasure. Working within such a framework, we argue, scholars inevitably will be hobbled in our efforts to understand the political lives of RCS communities. Greater attention to what we call the state’s “second face” is essential for our subfield to develop more analytically and politically powerful accounts of political inequality and marginalization in RCS communities—and equally essential if we are to comprehend the wellsprings of political agency, resistance, and solidarity that emerge in response. We cannot measure political marginalization and inequality solely in terms of deficiencies such as inferior levels of participation, organization, and government responsiveness or inferior access to generous citizen-enhancing social provision. For too long in our subfield, “politically disadvantaged groups” have been conceptualized in terms of an inability to enlist government effectively to one’s aid. In 2014, Ferguson made the limits of such a view readily apparent and efforts to address it politically urgent.

Ferguson posed important and troubling questions to our subfield, as Katrina, Watts, and similar flashpoints of racialized inequality had previously done many times. We focus here on the question of whether American politics can be adequately understood by a scholarly field that bounds its inquiries according to a representative-democratic frame and a Marshallian, rights-centered conception of state action. Building on the insights of many scholars before us, we argue that our subfield should expand its analysis of American politics to include greater attention to the state’s second face and must work to build a less distorted account of American politics that reflects—as more than an anomaly or unfortunate exception—the political lives of RCS communities. The second face of state-led governance actively produces citizenship, social inequalities, and the structured patterns of the political order through its practices of social control. In an era of mass incarceration, paternalist welfare, and “broken-windows” policing, when “the power of the US government to regulate, study, order, discipline, and punish its citizens...has never been greater” (Novak 2008, 760), it is unacceptable for the mainstream of our subfield to continue excluding these dimensions of politics and government. By expanding our field of vision in the ways we describe, scholars can generate significant new insights into the American state and US politics in the twenty-first century.

**NOTES**

1. From Lerman and Weaver’s interview transcripts for their 2014 book; this quote did not appear in the book.

2. In addition to the concept of the “little” person, we can also see here a theme that we will return to later in the chapter: the integration of welfare and criminal justice institutions. In an interview focused on experiences with the welfare system, the first individual describes his “small” status by talking about police and arrests (Soss...
REFERENCES


AU1: Refs have only Stuart 2014
AU2: Found this quote on page 78. Okay to include?
AU3: Found this quote on page 48. Okay to include?